Mai Muhammad
b. al-Hajj Hamdun, who likely reigned in 1729-1744, was one of the last
successful Sayfawa monarchs of the 18th century. During the Late
Sayfawa Period, the dynasty that ruled Borno gradually withered with the loss
of Bilma. Even more, Wadai’s expansion into eastern Kanem, the autonomy of the
Bedde, and Bagirmi’s attacks against the Kotoko states and southern Borno
during the reign of mbang Muhammad
al-Amin also occurred in this late 18th century decline. Naturally,
tensions between Borno and Mandara continued as well, with disastrous
consequences for Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. Nonetheless,
until the fall of Gazargamo in 1808, the Sayfawa remained powerful and likely
possessed a spiritual stature or authority unequalled in the Central Sudan. Yet
before that decline of the second half of the 18th century, some of
the last maiwa endeavored to reassert
Borno’s political and economic dominance. Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents
such a ruler, and although his reign is poorly documented, glimpses of his
attempts to restore Borno’s hegemony can be found. After a brief overview of
the extant sources, this article shall review Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun’s
policy with regard to Hausaland, the question of relations with Mandara and
Bagirmi, and an overview of domestic affairs within Borno. Undoubtedly,
Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents one of the last assertive Sayfawa rulers,
whose reign complicates narratives of 18th-century Bornoan decline and
political disengagement.
Discussing the
Sources
In terms of source material, the
lack of a surviving chronicle severely limits one’s efforts to reevaluate the
reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Nonetheless, an assortment of oral sources
and written sources provide enough clues for a tentative overview. First, the Diwan. Essentially a list of the various
rulers of the Sayfawa maiwa with
brief details on their reign, the Diwan aids
in establishing an approximate timeline for the Sayfawa rulers. In addition, the Kano Chronicle briefly alludes to an
attack on the Kano kingdom by Borno during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj
Hamdun. Besides identifying the Sarkin Bornu as Ali, the chronicle’s erroneous
description of the campaign is contradicted by Bornoan oral sources which establish
that it was not Ali who attacked Kano in the 1730s.
A third written source, a rihla copied in the mid-19th
century, presents a number of problems. The manuscript was found in the library
of Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Miskin, and supposedly written by his grandfather, Muhammad
b. Ali b. Dunama b. Ali b. Umar b. Idris. It is supposedly a
description of the hajj of Ali b.
Umar. But the year given for this undertaking, 1727-8, and the description of
the reign of about 15 years that followed, are more applicable for Muhammad b.
al-Hajj Hamdun. Is it possible that this source is about the hajj of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun but changed to be about Ali b. Umar due
to the latter’s renown?
Besides the aforementioned written
sources, a number of oral sources exist. One of the most important, a Kanuri
praise song translated by J.R. Patterson in Kanuri
Songs, is particularly conspicuous. Given the genre and its conventions,
one cannot expect a song that is necessarily historically accurate. Yet it
speaks to a type of court praise singing and ethos that very much emphasized
military valor and power. In addition, studies of the history of the Central
Sudan based on oral sources supplement the meager textual ones. For instance,
H.R. Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs contains
a short chapter on Muhammad Hajimi and the Masbarma that alludes to the Kano
campaign. Likewise, a girgam translated in Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan refers to Muhammad as the “lord of
Lergam the Black Prince with the white mouth-veil.” This supports the
identification of the builder of the elite brick building at Lergam with
Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, a tradition cited by Seidensticker.
Unsurprisingly, a number of 19th
century, colonial-era reports and works by 20th century scholars
drawing on oral sources for the history of Hausaland, Bagirmi and Kanem refer
to relations with Borno in the first half of the 18th century. Furthermore,
M.G. Smith, Hogben and Kirk-Greene provide useful clues on Kano and Hausaland
during this period while Lavers, Nachtigal, and H. Lanier’s syntheses of
Bagirmi history assist in reconstructing Bagirmi’s relationship with Borno. Great
caution must be used with such material, particularly as later scholars
sometimes regurgitated information from colonial-era scholars who hardly cited
their sources. For instance, Lavers has uncritically repeated H.R. Palmer for
the theory of a Mandara campaign of Ali b. Umar during the 1650s. When one
checks Palmer, however, there is no sourcing to determine where he found this
information!
Overall, the sources for the reign of
Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun are hardly adequate, but sufficient for a tentative
overview. Doing so allows one insights into the nature of Sayfawa statecraft
and relations in a dynamic 18th century world. The Sayfawa maiwa were hardly the indolent
sovereigns only engaged in Islamic study or ritual seclusion in this time.
Borno,
Kano, and Hausaland, c. 1729-1744
Perhaps the best documented action of
the mai was his attack on Kano, which may have taken place in 1734 (it
coincided with a solar eclipse). Kano had previously been the subject of a
campaign during the reign of Idris b. Ali in the 16th century. At
the time, Kano’s actions of fortifying settlements near Borno’s frontier were
seen as a threat. For perhaps equivalent reasons, Borno’s Muhammad b. al-Hajj
Hamdun also attacked the powerful Hausa kingdom. In this campaign, probably in
the 1730s, the Kano Chronicle reports
that “May Ali” came to make war on Kano during the reign of Sarkin Kano Kumbari
(1731-1743). The Bornoan forces allegedly camped at Faggi for 3 nights without
fighting due to the intervention of Shehu Tahiru and Shehu Bunduu. Apparently, one of the
mallams, Shehu Attahiru, who persuaded the mai
to leave was an ancestor of the emir of Kano. Unfortunately, this
chronicle does not elucidate why the conflict arose in the first place, but it
emphasizes the role of highly respected Islamic leaders in bringing peace.
Despite the chronicle suggesting a rather
brief Bornoan siege, other sources suggest a far longer campaign. For example, tradition
reported in Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs suggests
that the mai was in the Kano state
for 7 months.
Indeed, the mai attacked but did not
prevail “until the appointed time came.” If the campaign lasted at least 7
months and the mai eventually
prevailed, then Borno may have been able to successfully restore its position
of dominance over Kano, albeit likely only with some form of tribute or vassal
status for Kano’s sarki. In terms of
why the conflict arose in the first place, Lavers has proposed that Kano was
attacked to prevent it from importing guns and upsetting the regional balance
of power.
While plausible, there is no evidence for this in our surviving sources. Other
scholars emphasize internal dynamics within Kano. Thus, the Gaya, whose
influence in Kano affairs was great during the reign of Sarkin Kano Sharifa and
Kumbari, played a role. Moreover, new towns and walls around several in the
eastern domain of Kano, such as Takai, Tsokuwa, and Rano implied the closing of
the frontier with ribats. The newer towns constructed in this era often
followed a uniform plan, suggestive of state or official planning. They were
often built in the open plain while others, at major crossroads for trade,
became administrative centers for taxation and cheap labor for Sharifa and
Kumbari.
Thus, it is possible that Borno’s intervention in Kano was due to the latter’s
operations along its eastern frontier and the creation of fortified
settlements. This theory is more persuasive than that of the firearms in Kano,
although the two are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, Borno’s response was
likely motivated by increased attempts at centralization by Kano’s rulers as
well as ensuring Kano’s access to firearms did not upset the regional balance
of power.
But what was accomplished by Borno’s
intervention in Kano in c. 1734? According to some sources, the conflict with
Kano likely reverberated across Hausaland with Bornoan intervention beyond.
Although the Kano Chronicle does not
report the outcome, other sources highly affirm the notion of Borno’s ruler
reestablishing Kano as a vassal state (even if only symbolic). The Gazetteer of Kano Province reports that the mai had issued an ultimatum
to Kano: he would burn the city unless tribute was paid. Others suggest that Borno
overran other parts of Hausaland at this time, too. Although corroborating
evidence is lacking, Hogben and Kirk-Greene wrote of the many Kanuri links in
Zaria. For instance, the office of Limamin Kona was reserved to a family of
Borno origin. Other Bornoan emissaries or officials in Zaria could potentially
be linked to this episode, such as the Madalla. Another source, the Abuja Chronicle, dates the Beriberi
(Kanuri) of Borno attacking Hausaland to 1734, with Zaria paying tribute to
Borno. Other evidence for this
is lacking, but it is certainly possible that Borno’s actions in Kano in c.
1734 also impacted Zaria and other Hausa states, particularly in the
reassertion of a claim by Borno to regional hegemony. To what extent Borno may
have also used Gobir to influence events in Hausaland is unclear, but Gobir
during the reign of Babari (c. 1741-69?) attacked Bornoan territory at Shirra. Ultimately, a resurgence
of Bornoan claims to regional supremacy and tribute may have been won from Kano
and Zaria during the c. 1734 campaign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.
Mandara, Bagirmi and the East
In addition to the Kano campaign, which appears
to have been a success, Borno’s relations with Bagirmi during this time appear
favorable for the former. Bagirmi was forced to submit to the authority of
Borno during the reign of mbang Lahoual (or Alahouine). In the words of H.
Lanier, “En 1741, attaqué par le sultan de Bornou, il fut vaincu et dut se
soumettre à la souveraineté de ce pays.” Although Bagirmi was able
to throw off the yoke of Borno during the reign of Hadji (dated c. 1741-1784 by
Lanier) and end Borno’s claims to sovereignty of the kingdom, Muhammad b.
al-Hajj Hamdun was apparently successful in Bagirmi. Likewise, the rihla mentions
Bagirmi as one area where the Sayfawa mai traveled on the pilgrimage. If
the problematic source is incorrectly attributing the hajj along the
Sudan Road to Ali b. Umar but actually describing a pilgrimage of Muhammad b.
al-Hajj Hamdun, then Bagirmi was allegedly one of the areas where the Sayfawa
ruler settled 5000 captives in 1727/8. This act of establishing
settlements in Bagirmi could be partly motivated by a desire to facilitate
travel for pilgrims using the Sudan Road in the 18th century. Furthermore,
it also served to emphasize the power of the Sayfawa ruler whose act of establishing
towns or villages in other kingdoms was an assertion of Borno’s influence and
power in the Central Sudan.
Naturally, the highly problematic account of
the 1727/8 pilgrimage must be interpreted very carefully. But it is consistent
with the actions of the Sayfawa in the first half of the 18th century
who may have successfully imposed tributary relations on Bagirmi. In fact, it
may also have been during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun that the “Kurata”
or Tunjur Arabs in Kanem sent their leader to Borno for confirmation of his
position. This may explain why the praise song to this mai names the
Kurata among the captives of the mai. The actions of the
Sayfawa mai in Bagirmi are perhaps to be expected with similar developments
in Kanem which may have included greater control of the Tunjur in Kanem who
usually resisted the alifa at Mao. In short, Borno may have succeeded
in establishing firmer control of Kanem (which was to become a major
battleground in the 19th century) as well as imposed tribute on
Bagirmi whilst protecting its influence over various polities south of Lake
Chad.
Besides Bagirmi and the eastern shores of
Lake Chad, Mandara was also another arena of conflict for Borno. The previously
mentioned Rihla even claims “Ali b. Umar” (although the dates used in
the document align with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun) died in Krowrowa, which
appears to be Kerawa, once a capital of Mandara. This problematic source
asserts, “He raided Krowrowa and died there in Krowrowa where his grave is
visited.”
This is contradicted by the Diwan, which indicates that Muhammad b.
al-Hajj Hamdun died in Gazargamo. In spite of these
contradictions and inaccuracies, the text does seem to be accurate in referring
to conflict with Mandara during the first half of the 18th century,
before Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama’s disastrous campaign in the 1780s. According to
Barkindo, the Islamization of Mandara in the early 1700s was supported by
Borno. In fact, Dunama b. Ali (c. 1696-1715) was said to have sent Islamic
scholars to Mandara. Tradition in Mora of Mandara’s conversion to Islam during
the reign of Bukar Aji (who reigned c. 1715-1737) even suggests he grew up in Borno
and was sent to Mandara after Borno had the previous ruler killed. Interestingly,
Bukar Aji is also said to have taken the title of mai and remodelled his
court on that of Borno. Tradition also asserts that Bukar Aji and his successor
sent regular gifts of tribute to Borno. Even Hamdun b. Dunama reciprocated,
sending a personal Quran to Bukar Aji.
Yet despite Borno’s role in the ascent of
Mandara’s first Muslim king, occasional conflict occurred. To Lavers, serious
trouble with Mandara occurred during the reigns of al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama and
Muhammad b. Hamdun, who both fought Mandara. It would seem that Mandara’s
allegiance to Borno depended on the proximity of Borno’s army. So even the
spiritual authority or stature of the Sayfawa and the renown some maiwa achieved
as pious figures was not sufficient to ensure the loyalty of Mandara. In this
case, Mandara’s now Muslim kings were likely eager to benefit from expansion
and raiding, when possible, the vulnerable tributary polities of Borno. Though
it does not seem likely that Hamdun b. Dunama or Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun
died in a war with Mandara, the existence of conflict between the two states
points to a problem which only grew during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. But
for now, Borno was able to meet the challenge, at least based on available
evidence. Moreover, the period of Aji Bukar and Madi Makiya’s reigns, c. 1715-1751,
also coincided with the immigration of Bornoan settlers in Mandara. Their
presence also necessitated the assertion of Sayfawa rule or authority that may
have caused conflict with Mandara’s kings who saw these settlers as their
subjects.
But, Mandara’s kings accepted Borno’s right to tax many towns in the northern
part of its domains until c. 1751 and Borno continued to raid parts of Mandara
despite receiving gifts and tribute from Aji Bukar and Madi Makiyya, the latter
possibly the son of a Kanuri woman. This level of Bornoan
influence in the affairs of Mandara may have also been motivated by the
interests of the Bornoan elite to expand and protect their influence in the
south while the north was challenged by population movements due to prolonged
drought and climate change.
Internal Dynamics in Borno
In terms of internal affairs and domestic
concerns, the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was challenged by ecological
shifts, migration, and famine. Indeed, a famine that persisted for 2 years occurred
during his reign. The last several years of
his reign coincided with a drought that lasted from 1738-1753. Due to this
period of long-lasting drought, various groups such as the Jetko, Tubu, Tuareg,
Koyam, and Fulani migrated to more fertile lands, thereby increasing the
chances for conflict over scarce resources in difficult times. Despite these challenges,
Borno was still in control of Bilma. The Bedde, however, were beginning to act
autonomously in the 18th century and disrupt caravan routes.
In the face of these challenges, the Bornoan
state was still able to continue past Sayfawa practices such as the sponsoring
of elite brick structures. At the site of Lergam, for instance, Muhammad b.
al-Hajj Hamdun is remembered for sponsoring the construction of a brick
building for what was likely a palace enclosure. According to Wilhelm Seidensticker,
“The name of the founder of the palace was given as Mohammed Ajimi, who can be
considered identical with Muhammad b. al-Haji Hamdun (ca. 1731-1747).” Located 31 kilometers
west of Geidam and on the northern banks of the Komadugu Yobe, today the site
lacks any visible evidence of bricks except for a few from what was presumably
the wall of the palace enclosure. Magnavita also described the site of Lergam,
reporting that Lergam was also known as Kirishadam, referring to the largest
refuse mound. Although the area was only an estimated 250 by 250 meters, Lergam
appears to have been built by the mai as a temporary residence. Like Gambaru built in the
16th century, Lergam indicates that a Sayfawa ruler was still able
to support elite architecture using brick well into the 1700s.
Likewise, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also
supported the creation of new towns or settlements, including Kurnawa or
Dalaturi. Kurnawa, according to J.R. Patterson’s Borsari District Assessment
Report, was founded by a Mandara slave named Haji Amadu. This Mandara
captive of the Borno mai, Momadu Haji, was given his freedom upon his
return from Mecca. Subsequently, he left Birni Gazargamo and founded Kurnawa
with his followers. His descendants later ruled the town. This act demonstrates the
role of the Sayfawa and their captives or dependents in the administration and the
creation of new settlements. The praise song to this mai also emphasizes
his power to redistribute and relocate people:
You son of Aji, can collect or disperse
people at your will
And turn again, and make a town (with
those you have dispersed)
You are the scourge of Jillam, Dalla Darge
and Dakkinam Dalla Damaram
Some towns are founded during the cold
season of the year
But some of yours have been founded as the
result of your victories, Aji Gana the Intriguer
Many
of these places are difficult to identify, but the implication is rather clear:
the mai possessed great authority through the control of people,
including the relocation of dependents or subjects to create new towns. Additionally,
he was able to found towns through his military victories. Since the
conventions of the praise song may lead to exaggeration, one must use this type
of material very cautiously. Even though the general image of the authority of
the maiwa in this period is supported by conflict with Mandara (possibly
related to Bornoan settlers in parts of Mandara), the possible settlement of
slaves in parts of Bagirmi and Wadai, and the creation of Kurnawa as a
prosperous town.
Finally, the domestic religious
policies and political choices made by Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun were also
significant. He was the first mai to invite Shaykh Tahir b. Ibrahim to
Gazargamo. This shaykh later played a prominent role in Borno during the reign
of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). His father, Hamdun, was also
remembered as a scholar in Borno tradition who had studied at al-Azhar in
Cairo. Hamdun was also said to
have written 12 copies of the Quran and placed himself in ritual seclusion. His son, whose pilgrimage
to Mecca is still up for debate, may have been similarly pious but was also
more likely to have engaged in military campaigns. Yet he also included respected
Muslim leaders such as a Masbarma in his retinue during the c. 1734 campaign
against Kano. He also listened to Kano mallams to end that conflict,
again suggestive of how essential Islam was to state ideology and
administrative practices of the Sayfawa court. He likely benefitted from the
caliphal status of the Sayfawa whose pious sanctity was acknowledged widely, while
also simultaneously endeavoring to recover or restore Borno’s economic and
political hegemony.
Conclusion
Despite the paucity of written sources
that directly speak to the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, enough material
exists to reconsider this reign. Whilst the Late Sayfawa Period unquestionably
included decline, it is very misleading or inaccurate to portray the last
century of effective Sayfawa rule as merely one of indolent or secluded maiwa
who passively responded to the changing political, economic, intellectual and
ecological landscapes. Through the Kano campaign in the 1730s, interventions in
Mandara and Bagirmi, the possible support for the Sudan Road for pilgrims, Borno
remained a significant contender in the region. Similarly, the sponsoring of
new towns and brick architecture as an expression of elite authority reveal the
strength of Borno’s ruling dynasty. In other words, all was not immediately
lost for the Sayfawa maiwa until the second half of the 18th
century. Undeniably, the prolonged drought and population movements from 1738-1753
and the burgeoning power of the Kel Ewey in Kawar, as well as favorable shifts
in power relations that benefitted Mandara, Bagirmi, and Wadai eventually did weaken
Borno’s claims to regional hegemony. Yet assertive and dynamic leaders did
exist in the 18th century. The reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun,
poorly documented as it is, illustrates this dynamic leadership of the Late
Sayfawa Period.
