While perusing Ronald Cohen's "The Dynamics of Feudalism in Bornu" we felt compelled to record some of our thoughts. Cohen, building on his ethnographic work among the Kanuri, endeavors to apply the feudal framework to the political system of Borno. Since the "fief" was allocated from the Sayfawa mai (or Kanembu Shehus) to nobles with the right to tax said land, but the central authority never lost the ability to revoke such allotments, Cohen sees Borno as diverging from feudalism as developed in medieval Europe. Moreover, Cohen sees in the Borno case another major difference due to the inconsistency of primogentire for royal succession. Unlike Europe, where primogeniture became the rule, several rulers of Kanem-Borno were succeeded by non-filial relatives. The large size of the Magumi royal clan and the growth of various lineage segments throughout the course of its long history created conditions in which there were always a number of potential contenders for the throne.
Adding into the mix of this often volatile political equation is the role of a major council that invested new kings. Cohen did not delve deeper into this, but a council who confirmed the new king plus competing lineages for the royal throne created conditions in which Borno's political system was often unstable, particularly after famines, unsuccessful wars, or other moments of crisis. In order to combat this instability in royal succession, Borno rulers began to increasingly rely on slave officials and outsiders of the Sayfawa lineages in order to ensure loyalty. In order to maintain the loyalty of subordinates, the rulers of Borno ensured they possessed the means to revoke fiefs given to them and maintained their subordinate position. Furthermore, the ubiquitous role of the patron-client relations and relative absence of currency led to a general social pattern in which subordinates provided labor, fealty and services to a superior in exchange for protection, occupation, economic advancement, political office, and security. Overall, the "unique" Borno feudal state was centralized in some ways but appears to have been inherently unstable in the long-run, yet Cohen may have missed aspects of stability and centralizing tendencies apparent in apparently "weak" rulers of the Sayfawa dynasty.