Bornoan River Ceremony

A photograph of the Komadugu near Gazargamo (Borno Sahara and Sudan).

Whilst perusing Frauke Jäger's "Maiduguri–Twentieth Century Capital with Ancient Roots" in From Bulamari to Yerwa to Metropolitan Maiduguri, we found some intriguing references to ancient customs maintained in Borno's current capital. One of these practices is of deep antiquity in Borno, beginning under the Sayfawa dynasty. According to Jäger this water ritual took place when the river reached the dry riverbed during the rainy season. Afterwards, the Shehu threw a silver ring inside the river. The courtiers believe this is a blessing for a good harvest for the year. The crowd in attendance also took water from the river home. Under the Sayfawa maiwa, this custom was once celebrated with the slaughtering of an ox, prayers for a good harvest and commerce and even an oracle at the Komadugu Yobe (Jäger 28). Apparently, vassal kingdoms of Borno engaged in the same rite, too (29). In terms of her analysis of this ceremony, Jäger drew from field notes, Lukas, Seidensticker and Palmer. In the case of Palmer, she merely refers, indirectly no doubt, to Muhammad Bello's Infaq al-maysur. Unfortunately, Palmer did not cite his source for the quotation, merely referring to it as a "Bornu Fellata manuscript" (Palmer 105). But based on the brief extract used by Palmer, the text was likely that of Bello or someone whose work was perhaps based on his.

Moving on Lukas, whose study of the grammar and vocabulary of the Kanuri language was published in 1937, one finds another reference to the same ceremony. In this case it is for the river (Ngadda?) flowing near Yerwa (Maiduguri) in a translated passage (based on oral tradition?). Lukas reported that, in former times, the Shehu came to the river with attendants when the nearby river filled up during the rainy season. Riding on a horse, the Shehu threw a silver ring into the river and people brought other items to throw into it as offerings or sacrifices (Lukas 177). However, some people practiced more superstitious customs when this ceremony took place. Women hoping to have children prayed at the river and rolled naked in the river. In addition, at the source of the river, "fetish" practices were done by others (178). Clearly, the river was linked to fertility (of land and people) and some of the customs done in Borno were not Islamic. Yet the ceremony led by the Shehu was seen as distinct, and presumably did not include "fetish" practices.

A translation of Muhammad Bello's work referring to improper customs in Borno (translated by Salahudeen Yusuf).

Besides Jäger and Lukas, Muhammad Bello's 19th century description of the ceremony is the most interesting. Used in a context of justifying the jihad's attacks on Borno under the Sayfawa, Bello needed to portray the ceremony as idolatrous or pagan. Thus, the customs of Borno, despite Islam being widespread, made the people unbelievers. The Sayfawa rulers, despite their status as Islamic kings, failed to condemn idolatrous or "pagan" practices and therefore were legitimate targets. While Bello also included the custom of sacrificing animals and sprinkling blood at the gates of cities as among their acts of disbelief, his reference to the practice of offering sacrifices to snakes brings to mind Machina (Bello 72). Since some of what he described may have been more specific to vassals of Borno rather than the Sayfawa rulers themselves, his brief sentence on the river ceremony is probably the easiest to relate to the ruling dynasty. Sadly, his description is too short, but comparing how they do to the river what the Copts did to the Nile in the "days of ignorance" is telling. Clearly, superstitious practices were taking place at rivers and the Sayfawa were guilty of participating them as customs inherited from their forefathers. If the river ceremony was an ancient one of the Sayfawa, it may even have roots in Kanem when the king was seen as the source of sustenance (possibly through a similar ritual involving rivers or streams associated with the wet season and fertility). 

The annual river rite was probably performed at Gambaru, too. According to Ritchie, whose report on Borno was published in 1820 based on informants who had been there, a virgin was sacrificed to the river flowing near Gambaru. Relying on an informant named Hadji Hamet, allegedly a Borno native, the story suggests that a virgin was sacrificed every year when the river inundated near Gambaru. That Hamet's account was at least somewhat believable is the mention of castles erected at Gambaru. Although attributed to Christians, this is probably an allusion to the fired-brick ruins at the site. Moreover, Burckhardt, in his Travels in Nubia, was informed by a Borno native that the mai ordered a virgin thrown into the river (Burckhardt 444). It is somewhat muddled whether or not the ceremony took place both near Gazargamo and at Gambaru, but it is clearly tied to the rainy season ceremony of prayer and rituals at the river. The throwing of a virgin (slave?) into it also seems to be another clear allusion to the river's association with fertility. 

Unfortunately, the throwing of a virgin into the river brings to mind human sacrifice. Moreover, that Borno natives were the sources of this information does incline one to believe there is some truth to it. But were these women actually drowned in the river? Or was it more akin to the women who, praying for children, waded in the river? Certainly, the slaughter of an animal and prayers for a good harvest are remembered in Borno tradition, but it is difficult to imagine the Sayfawa rulers sanctioning human sacrifice. The ceremony was likely of deep antiquity but associated with the Islamic prayers and practices of the ruling elite. That, of course, still made them infidels to Muhammad Bello. For even one act of disbelief can outweigh one's other actions. But the throwing of a virgin into the flooded river sounds like the later tradition of women praying for children entering it or others using foam from the river to wash themselves.

Intriguingly, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi agreed that the visits of the Sayfawa kings to special places to give alms or conduct ceremonies was condemnable. He also wrote, "But its performer should not be imputed with unbelief, since no one claims that it has any impact (on them) nor do they intend to shirk (polytheism) (with such acts), rather their claim, because of ignorance is that giving alms at these places is better than in other places" (Bello 300). While not directly commenting on the annual river ceremony, al-Kanemi's letter suggests it was associated with the other places where the mai gave alms and performed sacrifices. It was not acceptable from an Islamic point of view, but not due to disbelief. Instead, it was through ignorance and innovation in the faith. If al-Kanemi saw human sacrifice as part of these rites, which is not mentioned by either Bello or himself, it was possibly due to the ideological conflict between Bello and himself. Or, as we believe to be more likely, human sacrifice was not part of the rites. Despite his condemnation of it, the annual river custom was later practiced by the al-Kanemi dynasty anyway. Popular traditions and rituals can become Islamic. The antiquity of this custom may also stretch back in time to pre-Islamic Kanem. It was certainly a custom associated with the rulers that could incorporate Islamic prayer and rituals while still honoring ancestral tradition. 

Muhammad Bello, al-Kanemi and Borno

Although Muhammad Bello did not reproduce in full all the letters he received from al-Kanemi of Borno, his Infāq al-Maysūr contains a plethora of important details on the conflicts between the jihadists of Uthman dan Fodio and Borno. Translated by Salahudeen Yusuf as A History of Islam, Scholarship and Revivalism in Western Sudan, Being an Annotated Translation with Introduction of  Infaqul-Maisur fi Tarikh Bilad al-Tukur of Sultan Muhammad Bello bin Fodio, the first chapter contains an overview of the lands of the western and central Sudan. Borno, receives mention as an area in which Islam was widely spread and deeply practiced before the jihad, even by commoners. Recitation of the Quran, Islamic scholarship and religious devotion were well-rooted in the area. 

However, for two reasons, Muhammad Bello called into question the Islamic legitimacy of the Sayfawa rulers of Borno. First, certain customs and traditions persisted despite the conversion to Islam centuries ago. Women went unveiled, sacrifices were made in the river (Komadugu?), and sacrifices or ceremonies were held at trees or certain rock sites. Al-Kanemi saw the old rituals involving sacrifices at presumably venerated in pre-Islamic times as customs similar to what was done by people in central Islamic lands, like Syria and Egypt. Bello, on the other hand, was very rigid on this, even condemning the nomadic Fulani for a custom or tradition involving fire, dances, and objects tied around the head of children by agreeing with Shaykh Abdullahi al-Thuqa. Nonetheless, this was seen as justification for the jihad, since it was perceived as shirk by Bello. Furthermore, by lending support to the Hausa rulers who fought against the jihad, Bello argued that the Sayfawa mai had become an unbeliever. If a Muslim ruler supports unbelievers against other Muslims, such a ruler becomes an unbeliever himself. Furthermore, as head of the state, the behavior of the mai called into question the Islamic legitimacy of Borno. Thus, the jihadists were in the moral right. Unsurprisingly, al-Kanemi countered this by drawing on the same sources and evidence as Bello: the Quran, Islamic law, hadith, logic.

Later in their correspondence, which appears to have been infrequent due to messengers failing to deliver letters, al-Kanemi seems to have shifted somewhat his argument. While acknowledging some customs in Borno that were improper, he accuses the allies of the jihad of initiating conflict with Borno on incorrect, false grounds. The Fulani and others who attacked Borno seemed to be more interested in gathering booty and captives, which triggered part of the debate between Bello and al-Kanemi on whether enslavement of said captives was legal in Islam. The two never reconciled, based on the letters reproduced by Bello, but one can see how the conflict between Sokoto and Borno was centered on defining a Muslim. Part of this even drew from the longer history of Islam in West Africa, especially Askia Muhammad of Songhay and his questions posed to al-Maghili. Askia Muhammad's seizure of power was seen as a jihad of sorts by Bello, and a model for a proper Islamic ruler to emulate. Intriguingly, Bello did not cite or reference other works of al-Maghili written to or for Hausa rulers of Kano and Katsina, perhaps since that would have called into question the legitimacy of the jihad against Hausa rulers (sarakauna). Nonetheless, the model of Askia Muhammad and expectations of a Muslim ruler as a pious, just figure who corrects the behavior of his subjects and follows Islamic precepts. One wonders to what extent al-Kanemi would have drawn on the history and legacy of the Sayfawa monarchs to counter Bello's claims. Perhaps al-Kanemi would not have used the past of the Sayfawa due to his own political ambitions?

Mentioning Haiti in Kano

Although we have often wondered what people in African during the 19th century knew of Haiti, there is a brief mention of the Haitian Revolution in Kano. Hugh Clapperton, who traveled to Borno and the Sokoto Caliphate in the 1800s, recounted this particular episode in his Journal of a Second Expedition Into the Interior of Africa: From the Bight of Benin to Soccatoo, published in 1829. According to Clapperton, an Arab merchant residing in Kano was killed by his female slaves. According to his informants, the custom was to sell such slaves toward the coast. Clapperton, when asked what should be done, endorsed hanging the slaves once it was clear they had killed their master from Ghadamis. Naturally, this led to Clapperton's curiosity about the slave population in Kano. Surprisingly, it was thirty slaves for every free man. Given these demographics, Clapperton used the example of St. Domingo (Haiti) as a warning to the people of Kano, since slaves may rise up and seize control when they overwhelmingly outnumber their masters. Besides the example of Haiti, which we presume was either unknown or poorly understood in West Africa, Clapperton cited recent history of the Hausa slaves in Oyo who rebelled. 

The Sokoto Caliphate

Murray Last's The Sokoto Caliphate is perhaps outdated, but still highly useful for an overview on the history of Sokoto. Beginning with the regional background and the origins of Uthman Dan Fodio early Community of followers, Last covers the jihad, the early expansion and consolidation of the Caliphate, its administration, and the vizierate. Basing his work mainly on local Arabic sources penned in the 19th and 20th centuries, Last's work is supplemented by the journals, letters, and colonial-era documentation when available. Thus, the portrait of the Caliphate is undoubtedly one of its elite. Those eager to find a deeper social history or economic history of the Sokoto Caliphate will be disappointed. Indeed, the study itself is mainly focused on Sokoto and its hinterland, meaning those eager for a complete history of Sokoto that includes the developments in all its emirates during the period from, say, 1804-1903, will not find it here. Nonetheless, Last's history is still significant in its rich use of the aforementioned sources to demonstrate how Uthman Dan Fodio's successors created an Islamic state which managed to survive for a century, transforming the larger Central Sudanic region in the process. 

In fact, through its early days battling with Gobir and establishing a new state after their hijra, to the establishment of a more established administrative structure during the reign of Muhammad Bello as caliph, one must note the accomplishments of the jihad. First, the Hausa kingdoms were transformed in a process that drew from Fulani, Hausa, Tuareg and other ethnic groups supporting it (or, indifferently allowing it). Second, the Shaikh and his successors were able to transcend a strictly Fulani base for power by moving beyond a solely Fulani/Fulani clan alliances and marriages. Third, Bello was able to promote the settlement of "cattle Fulani" in the sparsely settled area of Sokoto's hinterland, thereby encouraging them to become sedentary, more productive and more amenable to thorough Islamization. Fourth, the jihad established a state system in which the moral authority of the caliph was strong enough to never be successfully rebelled against by the major emirates. Fifth, the Sokoto rulers cultivated a unity through their adherence to Islam and the guidance of Islamic Law and religion as recommended in the writings of Uthman dan Fodio and his brother and son. Unlike their "pagan" and other enemies, the forces of the Sokoto caliphate were usually more unified, even when the major emirates to the east only sent "presents" as tribute or did not fully participate in the annual campaigns.

Of course, Sokoto's growth and economic importance also transformed the Central Sudan. Borno, which lost some of its territory to the forces of the jihad, mainly coexisted peacefully with Sokoto after al-Kanemi's heroic saving of the kingdom. Relations with Baghirmi were to be peaceful in order to secure an eastern route to the Nile, when the Mahdi was supposedly to appear (Islamic millennialism in the Sokoto Caliphate is a topic worthy of additional study). The Tuareg and Agades were of course already linked to Hausaland via the salt trade and other forms of commerce, but the Sokoto Caliphate's expansion likely helped to secure it as the economic center of the vast region. Studying its economic history and the role of slavery, textile production, the salt and kola nut trades, and trans-Saharan commerce will be our next areas of research. 

The Lāmīb̳e of Fombina : a political history of Adamawa, 1809-1901

The Lāmīb̳e of Fombina : a political history of Adamawa, 1809-1901 by Sa'ad Abubakar analyzes the rise and fall of a jihadist state founded by the Fulbe, or Fulani, in the vast region of Fombina. Unlike other emirates within the Sokoto Caliphate, Fombina lacked a prior history of political centralization. Instead, the large province was shared by a plethora of ethnic groups living in small chiefdoms. The Fulani int he area, who already had a presence by the 18th century, were also divided into smaller clan and lineage groups. While Borno and Mandara had some degree of influence in the area through trade, raiding and conquest, and the Jukun state appears to have exerted some degree of influence there previously, Fombina's non-Fulbe lived in "theocratic" chiefdoms and small-scale polities. Long-distance trade was limited and the Fulani in the pre-jihad period lived under the dictates of the non-Muslim, non-Fulani sedentary populations. That said, the Fulani themselves were only weakly Islamized prior to the 19th century, preferring to live by pulaku and customary laws and tradition rather than Islamic ones. 

Nonetheless, events in the 19th century led to a rapid transformation of this area, turning it into one of the largest yet most decentralized emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. The jihad in Fombina, propelled by Modibbo Adama, was strengthened by incoming Fulani migrants who were fleeing Borno after al-Kanemi's victories against Gwoni Mukhtar and other jihadists. In addition, some of the Fulani clan leaders led an expansion into the southern areas to claim new pasture and lands, subjugating pagan sedentary groups. By the 1840s, with a capital established at Yola, the Adamawa emirate was a large, decentralized state with various sub-emirates that largely acted independently of Yola. According to Abubakar, this decentralized nature of Adamawa was due to the incomplete conquest of the Habe populations in the region (many rebelled and sometimes cut off loyal provinces) and the resistance of Fulani Ardo'en and sub-emirs to obey the emir in Yola. While tribute and participation in the military campaigns of the emir were expected and could be gained from loyal provinces, southern sub-emirates often ignored or rebelled against this. In addition, not all Fulani clans were included in the Adamawa leadership, and Islam itself was not widely practiced or observed by the Fulani. Thus, some ignored or disobeyed the emir at Yola. This problem only worsened as some of the sub-emirates experienced dynastic crises or internal wars over succession, a problem the ruler at Yola could not always alleviate. 

Ultimately, by the end of the century, the partition of this vast, loosely joined state was inevitable. British, French and German interests in the Benue and Chad Basin made its longevity numbered. The state, to its credit, was able to consolidate some of its gains and implement a real administrative machinery (with titles borrowed from Hausa and Kanuri, as well as other parts of the Sokoto Caliphate), and the use of slaves for food crop production and the promotion of trade (particularly ivory) did promote some degree of economic development and improvement in conditions for Fulani and allied leaders. Furthermore, the invitation extended to Muslim scholars and pilgrims attracted a larger class of pious Islamic leaders, who in turn promoted a deeper spread and adherence to Islam. Earlier in its existence, it also scored victories against Mandara and was able to protect its northern border with Borno. The state was even able to survive the Mahdist movement and the Sudanese warlord, Rabeh, ultimately falling to the European powers. 

The central theme here appears to be one in which the incomplete centralization of the Adamawa Emirate hindered its ability to establish a stable political system. Of course, This uneven centralization of the state appears to have been a result of the region's lack of such a system before the 19th century, as well as the particular nature of Fulbe society and political traditions. Thus, instead of a jihadist state that had the political traditions of Hausa states with centuries of political traditions, Modibbo Adama and his successors had to create one wholesale, borrowing from the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno, and Hausaland. Indeed, Adama is said to have studied and lived in Borno and adopted some of its titled positions in his administration, testifying to the importance of these older political systems in Adamawa attempt at reforms. Abubakar likewise endeavors to include pagan, non-Fulbe peoples as part of this story, albeit their perspective is more dependent on oral tradition and often lost in the entangled histories of the various sub-emirates. 

Rawdat’l-Afkaar

Although its brevity diminishes its use, Dan Tafa's Rawdat’l-Afkaar is a fascinating local source on the history of Hausaland and the Central Sudan. Presumably drawing on oral traditions and other written sources, Shaykh Dan Tafa's brief account outlines the history of the "Sudan" and in particular, the Hausa states. Gobir's history in particular is quite important given that Shaykh Uthman dan Fodio lived in Gobir before the jihad that led to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. What is particularly interesting for our purposes, however, are the references to Borno and earlier epochs in the history of the Hausa states of the area. 

First, Borno. According to Shaykh Dan Tafa, Borno once dominated all or most of Hausaland. And, according to him, it was Gobir which first refused to pay tribute to Borno. However, Borno was never able to, according to Dan Tafa, conquer Air or Ahir. However, he does corroborate the role of Borno in coming to the aid of Ahir against the Kanta of Kebbi in the 1500s. Indeed, a brief account of mai Ali's battles with the Kanta of Kebbi can be found in Dan Tafa's chronicle. One also finds the familiar tradition of a man appointed to rule Hausaland by the ruler of Borno in the distant past, although one wonders if the translator's choice of the term "political captive" is accurate. Using that terminology might lead one to suspect slaves were appointed to administer subject provinces due to the greater expectation of loyalty, yet the actual conditions and type of provincial rulers or leaders could have been different when speaking of early Borno expansion into Hausaland. Indeed, even the question of tribute and what it actually entailed brings to mind one Nigerian's scholar's important point about reconsidering the relations between Hausaland and Borno as one of empire or Bornoan or Kanuri imperialism. Indeed, when Dan Tafa explains how an increasingly powerful Gobir demanded tribute from other Hausa states, it is also stated that Gobir sent fine gifts of horses as well. So, the gifts or tribute given to Gobir were reciprocated and it is not clear to what extent Gobir exerted any real control of tributary states. One can assume that a similar relationship existed when the Hausa states sent tribute to Borno through Daura. In fact, Heinrich Barth's description of Katsina's relationship with Borno seems to confirm this.

Unsurprisingly, however, the bulk of the short work is most useful for the history of Gobir and Hausaland. While its chronology is not always clear or perhaps is unreliable, it does offer some tentative and clear chronologies for certain events in the history of the region. First of all, Amina of Zaria or Zakzak is said to have raided as far southwest as the Atlantic Ocean. While this is perhaps exaggeration, one wonders if, when using the dates suggested by the Kano Chronicle, one can perhaps detect Zaria raiding and trading as far south as Yorubaland in the 1400s. Where the chronology seems more than a little unreliable, or perhaps earlier Gobir rulers were forgotten, is Dan Tafa's allusion to an alliance of Agabba of Ahir, Muhammad ibn Chiroma of Gobir and the ruler of Zamfara against Kebbi. If accurate, this would suggest a date in the late 1600s or during the reign of Muhammad Agabba of Air (who also established the sultanate of Adar through his line). However, Dan Tafa's chronicle claims Muhammad ibn Chiroma was the son of the first ruler of Gobir after their expulsion from Air, an event which must have occurred centuries earlier than the late 1600s and early 1700s. Thus, Chiroma was either the first "Gobir" king or the earlier rulers before they firmly established themselves as the kings of Gobir were forgotten or not recalled by Dan Tafa's sources. 

Despite the omission of Gobir's political history before the late 17th century and early 18th, Dan Tafa's account gives the reader an idea of Gobir's political power in Hausaland and in relation to its neighbors. Indeed, they were so bold as to attack the outskirts of Borno and Bawa, who ruled in the late 1700s, refused to send or pay tribute to Borno. One also finds interesting allusions to the power of Kebbi in the 1500s, particularly when its ruler established a capital at Surami that received water brought by the Tuareg who were forced to do so. Although Kebbi's power lasted for only about a century, one benefits from learning a few more details about this powerful Hausa state. Sadly, Kwararafa is only mentioned briefly and one is left in the dark about this southern power.

Sword of Truth: The Life and Times of the Shehu Usuman dan Fodio

Mervyn Hiskett's Sword of Truth is a short biography of Uthman dan Fodio, the reformer and leader whose movement revolutionized Hausaland and much of today's northern Nigeria in the 19th century. Although the full history of the Sokoto Caliphate is not the main topic of Hiskett's monograph, a biography of its foundational figure is important for establishing the theological, intellectual, cultural, and political contexts of its origins. Beginning with an overview of Uthman dan Fodio's origins in a scholarly Fulani Muslim community and the larger world it was a part of, the reader is taken on a journey into the late 18th century landscape of Hausaland. Although one wonders if more recent scholarship has added more nuance to the question of "mixed Islam" and the relationship of Islamic scholars with the Habe ruling courts of the Hausa states, Hiskett's biography suggests a number of causes for the outbreak of the jihad. For instance, tensions between Fulani nomads and Hausa chiefs, the global currents of Islamic intellectual thought (though, according to Hiskett, the Shehu was not a fundamentalist or a devotee of Shaik Jibril b.Umar's iconoclasm), Hausa political corruption and abuse, arbitrary enslavement, and the Shehu's belief in his own divinely sanctioned position as a renewer of the faith. Indeed, to prepare the way for the Mahdi, the Shehu felt compelled to lead what eventually became a militant movement against the rulers of Gobir and other states for their adherence to "paganism" (or tolerance of it) and restrictions on orthodox Islam. 

While the biography of Uthman dan Fodio is revealing of intellectual and religious thought in the Central Sudan during his era, Hiskett's sources are mainly from the Shehu or his family and supporters. This inherent bias does place limitations on his general narrative of the Shehu's career. The perspective of the Gobirawa dynasty, for instance, has to be gleamed from the pro-jihad sources Hiskett relies on. With the exception of the correspondence with al-Kanemi of Borno, one finds little, at least in terms of Central Sudan's Muslim intellectuals, of the regional scholars opposed to the jihad. Perhaps recent scholarship, with access to more Arabic (or Hausa) manuscripts from the pre-jihad era, can shed fuller light on the array of opinion and intellectual climate within the region and the relationship of the scholars to issues of reform, ulama-state relations, and, eventually, Uthman dan Fodio. 

Nonetheless, there is much insight in Hiskett's biography and use of local Hausa sources (in Arabic and Hausa), particularly as they shed light on the transformation of the Sokoto Caliphate and the ideal state based on Sharia the Shehu and his followers sought to establish. For instance, Hiskett argues that the Shehu accepted ijma and was a devout Sufi, therefore disqualifying him from classification as a fundamentalist or Wahhabi-influenced. The gradual readoption or return to Hausa political titles in the Sokoto Caliphate, for example, or accusations of corruption and greed against political officials in it also harkened back to pre-jihad political problems of the Hausa states. While the Shehu sought to, through his brother Abdullah b. Muhammad and son, Muhammad Bello, to lay the foundations for a state closer to their Islamic ideal, the Sokoto Caliphate fell short of its initial goals. However, it further entrenched the importance and spread of Islam in the area through uniting most of the Hausa areas into a state based, in theory, on Islamic law and the prominent role of scholars. Through the encouragement of local writing in Hausa and Fulfulde on Islamic themes, the Shehu and his followers undoubtedly played a pivotal role in strengthening northern Nigeria's Islamic identity and orientation. 

Borno and Brazil

Although we here at the blog have been interested in the history of Kanem-Borno and exploring the existence of links between Haiti and that ancient African civilization, it would be foolish to omit the Borno diaspora elsewhere in the Americas. In the case of Brazil, we can thank Francis Comte de Castelnau for his recording of interviews with various West Africans in mid-19th century Bahia. While many were Hausa and other West Africans, a number of his informants on the interior of  Africa were from Borno. Their names were Karo, Damoutourou, Aba-Hama, Suleman, Ali, Mammarou, and Ibrahim. A sketch of one, presumably Mammarou of Mounao (in Borno), appears in the image above, as Figure 1. While the Borno informants had arrived in Brazil at different times and in at least one case was in Brazil for over 30 years, their testimonies provides some context on Borno's turbulent 19th century. The wars with the Fulani, slave raids, tensions with Bagirmi, and their own brutal path to Bahia show the ways in which Borno was integrated into the larger world. 

In the case of Damoutourou, who had been in Brazil over 30 years, and could speak Hausa, Kanuri, "Begharmi" and "Wadei," it's possible he did not know of the fall of the Sayfawa dynasty. Karo, from Angoumati, another "Bernou" in Bahia, provides information of a fantastic sort on the so-called Niam-Niam cannibals. Mammarou, of Mounao, on the other hand, was a soldier who had traveled around Borno and its environs. Last, but certainly not least, Ibrahim of Borno claimed to have traveled to the east on the Mecca Route. He also claimed to have seen people who were cannibals in the lands south of Darfur....which probably goes to show how some Bornoans exaggerated and promoted tales of cannibals or humans with tails to gullible outsiders. Son of a Borno father and Hausa mother, Ibrahim's life is an additional example of the various ways in which the peoples of Borno were tied to their neighbors and beyond, from West Africa to the Red Sea. 

The other Africans interviewed by de Castelnau were not from Borno, but provide a number of details about it. Aboubakar of Bagirmi, for example, saw his homeland as a tributary of Borno. Born in Massenya, the capital, he knew of the eastern routes through Waday, Darfur, and "Zambulma." As one of the central lands on east-west "Sudanic" route that went from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea, people from Baghirmi were well-situated to know of and encounter various African peoples, especially people from Borno who passed through en route to Sudan, Egypt, and Mecca. Oddly, Aboubakar did not recognize words like Kordofan, Abyssinia, or Nubia, perhaps reflecting unfamiliarity with terms not used in Baghirmi for eastern lands.

So, Brazil is definitely on the list of places with connections to Borno. While we have a lot of work to do before one can attempt an analysis of the experiences of "Borno" Africans in Bahia or other parts of the Latin American nation, they were clearly not alone among Muslims living in the region. Perhaps more were in Bahia and the Northeast than any in Rio de Janeiro, and they presumably participated in the cultural and religious community of African Muslims. We suspect that they may have joined hands with Hausa and Muslim Yoruba in the 1835 uprising, and perhaps in acts of marronage. If events in Saint Domingue were analogous, there may have been group activities tied to marronage and slave resistance that united the "Borno" Africans with their Hausa, Fulani, and Bagirmi "foes" and friends in Brazil.