The Question of a Jewish Presence in Medieval Mali

Songhay at the time of Sonni Ali Ber, in Adam Konare Ba, Sonni Ali Ber.

Although the tradition of a Jewish population near Tindirma (in Mali) has long been known, this past has not been confirmed through archaeology or finds like gravestones. That said, it is remarkable that the tradition has been reported in the Tarikh al-Fattash, the marginalia in Timbuktu manuscripts, and oral tradition collected in the region during the 20^th century. Since some versions of the tradition insert fantastic or unrealistic details, such as the giant stature of the ancient Beni Israel or their 7 leaders commanding thousands of cavalry forces, we previously assumed this was purely legendary. When reconsidering the evidence, however, our opinion has changed to a tempered skepticism.

            First, let us explain our initial stance rejecting the historical validity of the Jewish population in Tindirma. The 1447 letter of Antonio Malfante, a man who traveled to Tuwat and wrote of the area’s Jewish population, also mentioned their prominence in trade. But the same author wrote of the “Philistines” of the Sahara, apparently Tuareg, who did not let Jews pass through their territory. According to Malfante, “They are sworn enemies of the Jews, who do not dare pass hither.”[1] Assuming Malfante correctly understood the nature of the Jewish community’s relationship with Saharan nomads, the Jewish population in Tamentit or other northern Saharan trading centers did not usually cross the Sahara. If they did, the “Philistines” presumably harassed them.

            Of course, it is very dangerous to rely too heavily (and uncritically) on a single source. It is certainly possible some Jews crossed the Sahara from Tuwat in the 1400s. Their presence in Songhay during the reign of Askia Muhammad is likewise implied by the government’s actions to ban them and despoil traders of their goods for doing business with Jews.[2] Leo Africanus also echoed this, describing the ruler of Songhay (or the “king” of Timbuktu) as “an inveterate enemy of the Jews.”[3] It is difficult to imagine the need for anti-Jewish laws or proclamations if there were absolutely no Jewish people in the domains of Songhay. While al-Maghili’s role in this is quite probable, one must wonder to what attitudes regarding Jews existed in the Western Sudan.

            An additional type of evidence attesting to the Jewish colony of Tindirma can be found in the margins of various manuscripts from Timbuktu. According to Susana Molins Lliteras, notes dated to 1504/5 describe the ancient Jewish presence near Tindirma. These notes report that the Jews were buried with their heads facing west. Furthermore, the presence of Hebrew inscriptions was noted. This type of evidence must be carefully evaluated, but it illustrates how the idea of a Jewish presence in Tindirma was around by the early 16^th century. Indeed, despite the Hebrew writing, the notes mention a donation in the area as well as an allusion to knives and swords.[4] Perhaps this is referring to some type of military regime or system in place to defend the area’s prosperous farmers?

            Besides the marginalia in Timbuktu manuscripts, the Tarikh al-Fattash echoes the notion of a Jewish past in Tindirma. Although its composite nature and 19^th century interpolation forces one to consider that the references to the Jewish presence are based on oral traditions, it brings new details into the narrative. For instance, the report on the Tindirma region in the chronicle alludes to the use of wells by the Jews as a water source for their farms. It is also here where the legend of 7 Jewish princes arose, who allegedly each commanded a group of 12,000 horsemen. They were also said to have partitioned the 333 wells built for agricultural purposes among themselves. The names given to these princes appear to be Arabic, such as Fadl ben Mizar.

In terms of the community’s disappearance, the chronicle only mentions that a single Jew was there when a Sorko man and his wife, Marma came to the region. When the kurmina-fari Amar arrived to establish Tindirma as his capital, this lone survivor was dead. This account seems particularly legendary, but the Jewish man named his town Bako.[5] Yet, if the date of 1497 for Umar Komadiakha’s appointment as kurmina-fari is accurate, this suggests that whatever Jewish communities lived in the region had disappeared or dispersed by the late 15^th century.[6]

            As one moves into the colonial era, a reconnaissance of Tindirma was conducted by Bonnel de Mézières. This Frenchman traveled to Tindirma in the company of a respected Timbuktu scholar. He claimed to have seen evidence of the extensive wells built in the region as well as the Jewish cemetery. He also found evidence of a tumulus at Coigur.[7] Since he personally witnessed what was described as the cemetery of the Beni Israel and traveled with an informant presenting oral traditions, there does seem to have been, in the distant past, a prosperous community here perceived as non-Muslims. At least, that’s what was commonly believed by this period.

            Later, in the postcolonial era, Mahmoud Abdou Zouber collected oral traditions published as Traditions historiques songhoy (Tindirma, Morikoyra, Arham). A number of local informants recounted the tradition of an ancient Jewish presence in the region, though sometimes contradicting each other. In some cases, it is also possible that the local traditions were influenced by the Tarikh al-Fattash or drew from similar sources. Yet one key difference is the reference to possible conflict with the Songhay under the Si dynasty. According to one informant, one “Israelite” was in the region when Umar (Amar Aboubakari) built the mosque in Tindirma. Said to have perished at a place called Founefoune 3 years after the arrival of the kurmina-fari, which has been dated to 1497, the single survivor of the community would have died in c. 1500. This informant also reported that the Jews were not defeated in battle or exterminated. Instead, he reported, “Ces Israélites n'ont pas été exterminés par la guerre ; ils sont morts tout simplement.”[8]

On the other hand, other informants hinted at a military conflict that ended the Jewish presence in the region. According to tradition, Sonni Ali had a grand court at Tindirma, suggesting the region was once important to 15^th century Songhay rulers before Askia Muhammad. Moreover, the town, Baka, between Tindirma and Lessoudji was said to have been the place where Jews established a community and subjected the local inhabitants. In the words of the informant, “Les Israélites s’y ont fixés, et ont exercé leur domination sur les autochtones.”[9] This town, Baka, sounds suspiciously close to the name of the Jewish town in the Tarikh al-Fattash. Where things differ is the tradition of the barakoy, Mansikoura, said to have battled the Jews. Indeed, an informant said “C’est le Barakoy qui a vaincu les Israélites et les a contraints à descendre jusqu'à Tindirma.”[10] Elsewhere, the area the Jews once resided in is referred to as the Barissileyla, a place near the river where Jewish tombs, human remains, and wells were found. As for the barakoy, his title appears to include the word mansa, a title used by the barakoy in the Songhay Empire.

Sketch of the Fati region by Bonnel de Mézières.

While the traditions imply that the barakoy had used military force to displace the Jewish population, it is not clear to what extent said venture may have contributed to the dissolution of the community. Tradition suggests this occurred in the 15^th century, too, likely during the reign of Sonni Ali (c. 1464-1492). After all, Sonni Ali is said to have conquered Bara, the region where Tindirma seemingly was a part of.[11] If the traditions are not entirely legendary, there is a chance that the Jewish community of the area was relocated by a barakoy at this time. Later on, by the late 15^th century, the community had died out or dispersed. But the references to the construction of wells and agricultural produce suggest that, for some time at least, the local elites from this allegedly Jewish population lived off the taxation and agricultural production of the region. To what extent they were linked to supplying provisions to Timbuktu or other towns is unclear, but one could imagine a scenario in which Jewish traders might have expanded their interests in the region by investing in agriculture. Their construction of well-built wells for sources of water may have also appealed to Sonni Ali, who once expressed an interest in canals and has been said to have sponsored the creation of wells in the Gourma region.[12] In fact, a tradition reported by Boubou Hama asserts that Jews supported Sonni Ali against the Islamic clerical class and Tuareg.[13] Consequently, it is not inconceivable that Jewish traders with links to Tuwat and a settlement near the Niger supported Sonni Ali during his conquests of Jenne, Timbuktu and other parts of the Middle Niger.

Traditions of the barakoy chasing Jews may contradict this possible alliance between Sonni Ali and the Jews. But it is possible that the Jewish presence near Tindirma, however small or large it may have been, expressed support for Sonni Ali. Their dispersal through the hydraulic program of the Songhay leader could have led to the dissolution of the community. Then, under Askia Muhammad, persecution or banning of Jews may have further weakened whatever was left of the Jewish presence in the region. Ultimately, whatever was left of the community near Tindirma ended by the late 1490s as Askia Muhammad became the ruler of Songhay. Despite that, oral tradition recorded a non-Muslim presence in the area that was very likely tied to Jewish traders who may have come from Tuwat. Since oral traditions, chronicles and, to a certain extent, archaeological traces of ancient wells survive, the notion of a Jewish community in the 15^th century Western Sudan is quite plausible. To what extent they encouraged proselytization or how they managed the area under their authority is unclear, but it was likely in decline by the late 15^th century during the reign of Sonni Ali.

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[1] Antonio Malfante, “Letter from Tuwat”, in The Voyages of Cadamosto and Other Documents on Western Africa in the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century.

[2] John Hunwick, Jews of a Saharan Oasis, 64

[3] John Hunwick, Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sa‘dī's Ta’rīkh al-sūdān down to 1613 and other Contemporary Documents, 281.

[4] Susana Molins Lliteras, “The Making of a Historian in Timbuktu: The Signed Marginalia Attributed to Mahmud Ka’ti in the Fondo Ka’ti Collection”, in Scribal Practice and the Global Cultures of Colophons, 1400–1800, 147-148.

[5] Octave Houdas (trans.), Tarikh el-Fettach" ou Chronique du chercheur pour servir à l'histoire des villes, des armées, et des principaux personnages du Tekrour: documents arabes relatifs à l'histoire du Soudan, 119-123.

[6] John Hunwick, Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire, 104, 343.

[7] Bonnel de Mézières, “Reconnaissance à Tendirma et dans la région de Fati, Bulletin de la Section de Géographie, t. XXIX, 130-131.

[8] Mahmoud Abdou Zouber, Traditions historiques songhoy (Tindirma, Morikoyra, Arham), 14-18.

[9] Ibid., 74.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Hunwick, Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire, 92.

[12] Adam Konare Ba, Sonni Ali Ber, 102.

[13] Ibid., 102-103.

Askia Muhammad, Borno, and Dallol Maouri

Although evidence for it is likely not strong, traditions included in Landeroin's "Notice historique" in the Documents scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, 1906-1909 include a tale of Askia Muhammad of Songhay passing through Borno on the return from the hajj. Well, according to the Tarikh al-Sudan, Askia Muhammad went to Mecca in 1496, returning to Gao in 1498. Oral tradition in Dendi, however, has Askia Muhammad going on the pilgrimage at age 15. But the youthful Askia Muhammad of Dendi tradition was apparently able to kill his uncle, the Si (Tchi in Landeroin's spelling) and undertake the pilgrimage as an atonement of sorts. In the words of Landeroin, "Au cours de son voyage de retour, Maammarou aurait traversé le Bornou, dont le sultan Dounama lui aurait rendu hommage, puis passant par Shifaoua (région de Sokoto) où un chef peul lui aurait fait présent de mille bœufs, il serait enfin rentré dans son pays par Bounza, Finguila, Tounouga, Sanafina, Koulou, Kirtachi et Saÿ." 

The legend seems to associate the return of Askia Muhammad, or Maammarou with the placement of different peoples on the way to Gao. Of course, there is also no evidence for Askia Muhammad being a teenager when he undertook the pilgrimage. But is there any chance of contact between Borno and the Askia? The mai he allegedly met, Dounama, would have been Ali b. Dunama (r. 1465-1497), if the recorded dates for the Askia's pilgrimage are correct in the chronicles. Since there is evidence of Ali b. Dunama also going on the hajj and meeting al-Suyuti, it would be intriguing if the two monarchs did meet at some point. But one must wonder if the Askia would have returned via Borno, particularly if Muslims from the Western Sudan were using trans-Saharan routes to reach North Africa and Egypt. 

But, Landeroin found lingering traditions of the Sayfawa visiting the area of the Maouris, too. Their chiefs supposedly had body scars similar to those of the Manga and Mobbers of Borno. Moreover, they claim descent from a Sayfawa prince named Ari. Said to be the son of a Sayfawa mai named Kaloumbou, who ruled contemporanously with Askia Muhammad I of Gao, one is tempted to think of either Ali b. Dunama or Ali b. Idris (r. 1538-1539). But when Landeroin calculated the number of generations based on the genealogies collected from the Maouri, he believed that their origin dated back to the 17th century. If so, is it possible that the name Kaloumbou might actually be connected to Kaloumbardo, a Sufi center in Borno whose members dispersed after its destruction in 1677?

Either way, it is very difficult to take at face-value the attempt to link Askia Muhammad with Borno. But there does seem to have been some movement into the Maouri region of people with roots in Borno. Later on, those claims were perhaps refined and a fictitious link to the Sayfawa became part of the narrative. Whether or not the famous Kalumbardo had any connection to the Arewa of Dallol Maouri is still speculative at this stage. 

Muhammad Kanta of Kebbi and Borno: Buffer State Imperial Politics in 16th Century West Africa

Sword of the Kanta of Kebbi (Kirk-Greene & Hogben)

Although the history of Kebbi’s meteoric rise to major power in 16^th century West Africa is well-known, its conflicts with Borno remain little studied. Despite oral tradition and textual sources referring to at least one major campaign launched by Borno against the rising power of Kebbi, the exact details of this episode remain contradictory. On the one hand, Muhammad Bello and Shaykh Dan Tafa, writing in the 19^th century and presumably drawing on oral tradition, wrote of a large-scale conflict between the Kanta of Kebbi and Borno’s Mai Ali (r. 1538-1539). On the other hand, other sources either do not specify the Sayfawa mai who launched the invasion and failed siege of Surame, or they attribute it to Muhammad (r. 1519-1538) or Dunama b. Muhammad (r. 1539-1557), other Sayfawa monarchs. We shall endeavor to explore this campaign through a fusion of primary and secondary sources, hoping to use the more accurate chronology of Lange for piecing together this illustrious campaign in the annals of 16^th century Borno and Kebbi. This brief article shall argue that the epic war with Kebbi recalled by tradition may have been launched by Abd Allah (r. 1557-1564), but the conflict was tied to larger questions or regional hegemony, commerce and geopolitics in 16th century West Africa. 

Review of the Textual Sources

Beginning with the written sources will provide an overview of the conflicts between Kebbi and Borno. The earliest written source to directly allude to military conflict between Borno and Kebbi is the brief account of West Africa written by Anania. Not merely reproducing the description of Leo Africanus, Anania drew from more updated sources. For instance, informants who had traveled to Kano or those who had been to Tripoli and heard of Borno were possible sources of information on Kebbi’s conflict with Borno. According to Anania, the ruler of Kebbi was also so powerful that he was called an “emperor”. Indeed, “Puis vient Aquà et Cabi, don’t les noirs appellant le prince empereur à cause de sa puissance.”[1] Since the editions of Anania’s work were published in the 1570s and 1580s, this suggests that Kebbi’s military hegemony in much of Hausaland was still effective well into the second half of the 16^th century. Later, in his brief account of Borno, Anania wrote that, “Ce prince est si puissant que plusiers fois il a mis sur pied de guerre cent mille hommes contre le roi de Cabi.[2] While he unfortunately did not name the mai in this war, this large-scale campaign is a good candidate for the war that preceded the death of the Kanta of Kebbi. Indeed, even when one considers the figure of 100,000 as an exaggeration or overstatement, there was clearly a sense of a major conflict between Borno and Kebbi in this era. Since Mai Ali only reigned for about a year in the 1530s, it is difficult to imagine him having been capable of launching more than one expedition against Kebbi with vast numbers of troops. In terms of the most detailed 16^th century Borno source, the chronicles of Ahmad b. Furtu, no reference to Kebbi is made. This strongly supports the notion that Borno’s conflicts with Kebbi occurred during a reign previous to that of Idris b. Ali (r. 1564-1596). Interestingly, Idris b. Ali did campaign against Kano, however.

The subsequent written sources from the 17^th century shed little additional light on the matter. Ahmad Baba, writing in the early 17^th century, referred to Kebbi’s people as among the Muslims. In fact, they had been Muslims for over 60 years.[3] This information is in general accordance with the rise of a Muslim power at Kebbi earlier in the 16^th century. Later in the same century, the Tarikh al-Sudan of al-Sa’di, provides a much more extensive background for the ascent of Kebbi political and military might. According to this chronicle, Askiya Muhammad I campaigned against Agades in 1516, defeating the sultan, al-Adala. However, Kuta, who bore the title of Kanta, rebelled against the Askiya afterwards over displeasure over the division of booty. Kuta allegedly asked the Dendi-fari for his share of the booty from the Agades campaign and was refused, leading to his revolt with the support of his own troops. Naturally, Songhay endeavored to end Kuta Kanta’s revolt in 1517-1518, but the Askiya failed. According to al-Sa’di, the Kanta already had a base or city at Leka, too.[4] Even subsequent Songhay rulers failed to defeat Kebbi. Askiya Muhammad Bonkana, for instance, was defeated by Kebbi at Wantaramasa. Even Dawud failed to gain the upper-hand in his conflict with the Kanta in 1551/2-1552/3. Overall, Songhay hegemony over Kebbi was brief, beginning sometime during the reign of Sunni Ali and effectively ending by 1517.[5] In terms of Kebbi’s conflict with Borno, however, al-Sa’di provides us a date for the death of Muhammad Kanta, Sultan of Leka, 24 May 1561.[6] This date of 1561 for Muhammad Kanta’s death has been the basis for a c.1561 date for the unsuccessful Borno campaign remembered in tradition. Moreover, it identifies the Kanta who perished in 1561 as a different person from Kuta Kanta, who rebelled against Songhay in 1517. If one works backwards from 1561 with the assumption of the regnal length of 38 years for this Kanta, Muhammad Kanta must have occupied the throne of Kebbi from 1523-1561. If, alternatively, Muhammad Kanta and Kuta Kanta were the same individual, the Tarikh al-Sudan demonstrates that the Kanta who defeated Borno was the very same individual who bested the Songhay earlier in the century.

Besides these West African sources, Girard, the enslaved Frenchman living in Tripoli, also wrote briefly of Kebbi and Borno. According to him, it was during the reign of Mahi-Mahomet (Mai Muhammad) that the famous war against Kebbi was waged. Clearly borrowing from Anania, Girard sought to identify a specific Sayfawa mai in the war. His years, however, are not reliable unless one considers this Muhammad, who was said to have also made an alliance with Dragut in Tripoli in 1555, as Dunama b. Muhammad.[7] The overall picture from these 17th century sources suggest that the illustrious war between Borno and Kebbi occurred before the reign of Idris b. Ali (1564-1596) and that the Kanta of Kebbi who died in 1561 might have been the second king to bear that title. They also attest to Kebbi's regional paramount status in Hausaland for part of the 16th century.

Moving into the 19^th century, one finds very similar accounts of Kebbi’s war with Borno in the works of Muhammad Bello and Dan Tafa. For Bello, the people of Kebbi had a Katsina mother and Songhay father. This notion appears to be based on Kebbi’s oral traditions, since “cousinship” with the people of Katsina was believed in the 20^th century, too. Furthermore, on the first Kanta, he wrote, “And it is said that he conquered Katsina, Kano, Gobir, Zaria and the contry of Ahir and some parts of Songhai land. He also waged war on Borno.”[8] This Kanta, named Muhammad in Bello’s account, died at Jiriwa from an arrow wound received at Dugul near Katsina.[9] Again, Bello's history emphasizes Kebbi's status as a major power in Hausaland during this period. 

A plan of Surame (Kirk-Greene & Hogben), the capital of Kebbi besieged by Borno in c. 1561.

Dan Tafa's account is unsurprisingly quite similar to that of Muhammad Bello. In his chronicle, the Kanta had rebelled against his Fulani overlords and conquered Zamfara, Zaberma, Ahir and engaged in conflict with Borno more than once. This Kanta also built Gungu, Leka, and Surame. He was even said to have made his Tuareg subjects responsible for transporting water from a lake called Tanshama to Surame and forced them to transport horses of the Kanta’s military garrison. Given these exactions, the ruler of Ahir, or Agades, sought the aid of Mai Ali of Borno against the Kanta. The Kanta was defeated outside Surame but Borno’s forces were unable to take the Kebbi capital. Whilst returning to Borno, Ali’s forces were attacked at Nguru and defeated 7 times by the pursuing Kebbi forces.[10] Of course, no sources closer to the period in question reference the Fulani as overlords or masters of Kebbi. It is perhaps a garbled allusion to Kebbi oral traditions of the Kanta spending time amongst the Fulani before his rise to power. Nonetheless, Dan Tafa's account reiterates the notion of the Kanta's exploitation of the Tuareg (among other groups) and the interests of Kebbi in the north. With Agades a major nexus point for Hausaland's trans-Saharan trade, the Kanta's interests in the north undeniably attracted the interest of Borno and its sphere of influence in the north.

Besides Bello and Dan Tafa, Heinrich Barth also wrote of Kebbi’s wars with Borno. For Barth, the famous battle with Kebbi was led by Mai Muhammad of Borno, and Kebbi was ruled by Tomo at the time. This is contradicted by other sources, however.[11] Barth was likely drawing from Girard in naming the mai as Muhammad, but his identification of Tomo as the Kebbi king is certainly erroneous. This suggests that by the 1850s, when Barth was visiting the region, he was unable to access historical traditions from the descendants of the Kanta at Argungu. Nonetheless, his account follows the trend of identifying Kebbi as a major power in the region historically.

Reviewing Oral Tradition

After reviewing the major written sources on this particular bellicose episode in the annals of Borno’s history, let’s shift to oral traditions and 20^th century accounts. E.J. Arnett, author of the Sokoto Gazetteer, drew on the same aforementioned sources plus oral traditions to write about Kanta’s war with Borno. In his account, Mai Ali of Borno came to attack Kebbi via the Sosebaki region and besieged the city of Surame. He generally followed Bello and Dan Tafa, but added that Muhammad Kanta, the first of the sultans, reigned for 38 years.[12] H.R. Palmer, another colonial-era scholar, believed that Borno’s famous conflict with Kebbi must have took place during the reign of Muhammad b. Idris, not Ali b. Idris. In addition, traditions of Borno origin north and west of Kebbi held by various tribes referencing Mai Ali of Borno suggested to Palmer that Borno’s interventions in this part of the Central Sudan were of a long-lasting nature. As for Surame, the walls of the Kebbi capital were briefly described as being of 10 miles in circumference and demonstrated the use of stones. Lastly, Palmer dated the famous war to c. 1527/8, a date which undoubtedly too early.[13] H.A.S. Johnston also alluded to the Sayfawa-Kanta war. According to tradition, the Kanta punished the Tuareg by forcing them to aid in the construction of Surame. They were additionally forced to bring water for their camels from their own region. When Borno attacked Surame, tradition also remembered the defenders using corpses that were placed at defensive positions on its walls to trick the Bornoan army into believing that they had more troops. This has led to the famous phrase “dariya ba loto,” or laughter without end, in remembrance of this moment.[14] Thus, a ruse as well as military skill were the sources of the Kanta's victory against Borno. The cause of the war was clearly linkd to Kebbi's northward expansion and influence in Asben, too. 

But the best attempt at using tradition and written sources was attempted by Kirk-Greene and Hogben. They reported the “tribal cousinship” of the Kebbawa and Katsina, for instance. Further, the story of Muhammad Kanta’s skill at boxing and links to the Fulani appear in traditions. They even share a praise song for Muhammad Kanta which contains numerous kirari. For example, descriptions of Muhammad Kanta saying “I am the club with which to beat an elephant” strongly emphasize his military strength. Tradition even remembers a wife of Muhammad Kanta, Makulo, or Ayeshe. The daughter of the ruler of Agades, Makulo’s jealousy of Kanta’s first wife is associated with the creation of the town of Gungu in one legend. As for the famous war with Borno, the siege of Surame’s failure is attributed to the placement of corpses with slit mouths along the defensive positions of the town walls. This rich oral tradition of the Kanta naturally emphasizes his military attributes but adds an additional layer with the Tuareg wife. She was allegedly jealous of the Kanta’s first wife being favored over her in spite of her dark skin and commoner origin.[15] Consequently, the Kanta's strength, tradition of leadership and influence in Asben are suggestive of a possible area of contention or concern for Borno in Hausaland at this period.

Synthesizing the Sources

Upon revisiting Palmer, Arnett, Kirk-Greene and Hogben and other 20^th century colonial sources, questions linger on the details of the Borno war. Kirk-Greene and Hogben believed the Kanta who fought the famous war with Borno was the founder of the Kebbi sultanate (at least as a major power). If, however, one follows the chronicle of al-Sa’di, written in the 17^th century, the first Kanta who rebelled against Songhay authority was named Kuta. This may have been the father of Muhammad Kanta, although it is possible that Kuta was another name of the same figure. Nonetheless, postcolonial scholars have sought to address the contradictions and problems of this period with inclusion of other sources. Djibo Hamani, for instance, used historical traditions from Agades to support the 1561 date for the Borno-Kebbi war. After all, the sultan of Agades was remembered for returning from an expedition in Adar around this period, although Hamani mistakenly believed the mai was likely Dunama b. Muhammad. This is problematic since the most accurate chronology of the Sayfawa would make Abd Allah the probable ruler at the time of the c. 1561 war. However, Hamani’s theory that the sultan of Agades may have accompanied the mai in the Kebbi campaign is plausible, particularly since he had requested aid of Borno against Kebbi.[16] Indeed, Borno later backed a competing royal faction in Agades against the faction supported by Kebbi in the early 1600s.[17] Moreover, the chronicles of Agades indicate that the sultan of Agades who would have reigned in c. 1561, Muhammad el-Adel, seized power in 1556 and reigned 39 years.[18] This sultan, who held power for a relatively long time and was said to have returned from Adar (an area once under the influence of Kebbi), is a good contender for the Agades ruler who may have asked for Borno’s help against Kebbi. Moreover, the route followed by the Bornoan troops, which crossed the Sosebaki states and stayed in areas north of Katsina and Kano, may have passed through Adar before reaching Kebbi. This route would have also favored a path through which troops from Asben may have met with Borno’s army en route to Kebbi.

In light of all the available evidence, the major war with Borno remembered in tradition probably is the one that took place in c. 1561. However, due to the sources referring to intermittent conflict between Kebbi and Borno in the 16^th century, it is likely that war or raids occurred the reigns of earlier Sayfawa monarchs. Thus, a war may have took place during the brief reign of Ali b. Idris. Another conflict may have emerged during the reign of Dunama b. Muhammad, although he had a war with the Bulala sultans of Kanem that may have been far more pressing.[19] Likewise, Abd Allah b. Dunama, whose reign included a lengthy famine remembered in the Diwan, may have had more pressing concerns from the Bulala, Sao groups and others in Borno noted to have engaged in rebellion or banditry at the beginning of Idris b. Ali’s reign. The sources suggest that a major conflagration developed during the reign of Abd Allah b. Dunama, but this may have actually overlapped with the regency of Aisa Kili bint Dunama. Is this why the Borno sources are largely silent on the c. 1561 war with Kebbi? Could the gender of the Bornoan ruler at the time have possibly complicated how the war was remembered by later generations, even if Aisa Kili was known for her military prowess?

Conclusion

In summation, the tale of Borno’s conflicts with Kebbi in the 16^th century is an important element of Borno’s geopolitical relations within West Africa. This article has argued that the Kebbi–Borno war should be understood as the product of buffer-state politics and Sayfawa geopolitics rather than a single act of aggression by Muhammad Kanta. With Kebbi as a major power in the area between Songhay and Borno, direct conflict between these two imperial powers was largely avoided. However, Kebbi’s expansion likely impinged upon Borno’s influence in Hausaland and Asben. This, in turn, led to conflicts as the Sayfawa likely sought to regain lost influence in Asben, the major commercial artery to the north for Hausaland. Similarly, Borno’s political leadership during the 16^th century, before Idris b. Ali (r. 1564-1596) included the reestablishment of relations with Tripoli, famine, and conflicts with the Bulala. Kebbi’s ascent may have paradoxically aided Borno by limiting Songhay eastward expansion and creating a more regionally united Hausaland. Nonetheless, interest from the part of Borno in preserving its influence in Asben and parts of Hausland made conflict inevitable. This is why numerous wars (and likely raiding expeditions) were probably launched throughout the reign of Muhammad Kanta. It is very likely that Muhammad Bello and Dan Tafa remembered Ali b. Idris as the ruler at the time of the significant 1561 campaign due to there actually having been some sort of war or conflict in c. 1538-1539. Likewise, Mai Dunama b. Muhammad’s interests in an alliance with Draghut may very well have included increased trade to ensure a larger share of trans-Saharan commerce with Tripoli remained with Borno. Idris b. Ali, whose reign included a successful termination of the conflict with the Bulala sultans of Kanem as well as consolidation of Sayfawa rule in Borno, was probably able to ensure Borno’s quick recovery from the devastating loss to Kebbi. In truth, dynastic squabbling upon the death of Muhammad Kanta may have been another factor as Kebbi’s power and influence in Hausaland withered away within a century or so after Muhammad Kanta.

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[1] Anania, “L’interieur de l’Afrique occidentale d’après  Giovanni Lorenzo Anania,” 343.

[2] Ibid., 347.

[3] Ahmad Baba, Mi'raj al-su'ud: Ahmad Baba's Replies on Slavery, 45.

[4] Al-Sa’di, Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire: Al-Sadi's Tarikh al-Sudan down to 1613 and other contemporary documents, 113-114.

[5] Ibid., 92, 127, 147.

[6] Ibid., 150.

[7] Rémi Dewière, L'esclave, le savant et le sultan: représentations du monde et diplomatie au sultanat du Borno (XVIe-XVIIe siècles), 612.

[8] Muhammad Bello, A history of Islam, scholarship and revivalism in Western Sudan : being an annotated translation with introduction of Infaqul-Maisur fi Tarikh Bilad al-Tukur of Sultan Muhammad Bello bin Fodio,  81.

[9] Ibid., 82.

[10] Shaykh Dan Tafa, Rawdat al-Afkaar, 9-10.

[11] Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa Vol. 3 (1896), 671-672.

[12] E.J. Arnett, in Nigerian Northern Provinces, 3-6, Sokoto Gazetteer, 113.

[13] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 229.

[14] H.A.S. Johnston, A Selection of Hausa Stories, 117-118.

[15] Kirk-Greene & Hogben, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of their Historical Traditions, 239-246.

[16] Djibo Hamani, Au carrefour du Soudan et de la Berbérie: le sultanat touareg de l'Ayar, 211.

[17] Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A Study of the Origin, Growth, and Collapse of a Dynasty (891-1846), 253-254.

[18] Yves Urvoy, “Chroniques d'Agadès,” 152.

[19] Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem-)Bornū: Chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 80.

The Early History of Gao and the Songhay: Trade, Power, and Islam along the Niger (AI)

What follows below is an attempt to use AI to write a short essay on a topic based on our notes. The notes in question were written based on several academic publications we read a few years ago. Sadly, the free version of ChatGPT was unable to reproduce proper citations before we used up the free access to the best version. Nonetheless, we thought it would be worthwhile to show what it is capable of doing with information we fed to it. After some time, we will ask it to revise this again using whatever additional sources it can access. A link to our notes that are the basis of this can be found here. 

The early history of the Songhay and the rise of Gao (known to medieval Arabic writers as Kawkaw) illustrate the development of one of West Africa’s earliest powerful political centers. Located along the Niger River at the point where Saharan caravan routes met fertile riverine settlements, Gao emerged as a dominant regional hub before and during the early second millennium CE. Arabic geographers, although writing from afar and often relying on merchant testimony, consistently presented Gao as a sovereign kingdom that exercised influence over multiple subject peoples. Archaeological evidence, particularly from Gao-Saney, reinforces this image by revealing craft specialization, foreign imports, and signs of urban stratification. Yet the limited availability of contemporary written sources means historians must critically combine archaeology, oral tradition, and later West African chronicles to reconstruct this period. Through this synthesis, a picture emerges of a culturally dynamic society grounded in indigenous traditions but strengthened by the adoption of Islam and long-distance trade.

Well before the rise of Gao as a trans-Saharan commercial center, the Niger Bend supported communities that relied on the river’s abundant resources. The Sorko, known as expert fishers and boatbuilders, and the Gow, skilled hunters of hippopotamus and other dangerous river animals, formed some of the earliest identifiable groups associated with Songhay. Their craft specialization facilitated trade along the river and created patterns of settlement that anchored early political formation. Matrilineal descent was a defining feature of these river societies. Authority passed not solely from father to son but through the mother’s lineage, which ensured that elite women played essential roles in validating leadership transitions. Religious life centered on spirits connected to water, the riverbed, and animal life. Kingship was sacred, and rulers derived legitimacy from their roles as intermediaries with supernatural forces. Such cultural foundations did not disappear with the arrival of Islam; instead, these Sudanic social structures shaped the ways Islam was received and practiced.

Songhay historical memory, preserved in later chronicles, places the earliest ruling seat at Kukiya, downriver from Gao. The Zuwa (or Za) dynasty, said to descend from a foreign ancestor or hero figure, represents the first political lineage acknowledged by tradition. Oral narratives speak of battles between these early kings and powerful river spirits, sometimes depicted as fish demons, symbolizing struggles over control of ritual authority and sacred space within the community. Archaeological discoveries in the Bentyia–Kukiya region, including early Muslim burials, suggest that the site was not isolated nor purely mythical. Instead, Kukiya appears to have been a substantial multiethnic settlement that was already interacting with Islamic traders by at least the 11th to 12th centuries. Over time, as trade networks intensified and Gao’s geographic advantages became more important, political power shifted northward, indicating a gradual process of state consolidation rather than abrupt replacement.

By the 8th–9th centuries CE, Gao emerged clearly in Arabic writings as a capital city and political force. The geographer al-Yaqubi noted that the king of Kawkaw ruled a number of subject peoples, including desert-dwelling Sanhaja nomads. This claim aligns with archaeological findings showing that Gao was integrated into long-distance economic systems. Gao’s prosperity stemmed strongly from trans-Saharan trade. Caravans from Tadmekka, Kawar, and the Fezzan arrived with salt — a critical commodity that held both economic and political value. In return, Songhay merchants and rulers exported copper, ivory, animal products, and enslaved captives. These exchanges linked Gao to the wider Islamic world stretching from North Africa to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Excavations at Gao-Saney have revealed copper-working furnaces, imported pottery and glass beads, and architectural features suggesting elite compounds. Such evidence confirms that Gao was not merely a waystation but a thriving production and consumption center. The kingdom’s ability to control trade routes and levy taxes or tribute helped consolidate political authority and population growth.

Islam did not arrive in Gao through conquest but through commerce and diplomacy. By the 10th–11th centuries, rulers known by the title Qanda (or Kanda) had converted to Islam, according to al-Bakri. Their subjects, however, largely maintained traditional beliefs and cult practices. Gao thus existed at this time as a dual-religious polity, with two towns: one Islamic and one that upheld indigenous spirituality. This structure demonstrates a transitional phase when kings embraced Islam’s advantages for diplomacy and legitimacy while still depending on traditional bases of ritual power among their people. Notably, Islamization appears to have been elite-driven. Conversion supported alliances with North African Muslims and facilitated smooth trade relations. But kings continued to rely on matrilineal structures to ensure dynastic stability, which reflects the persistence of indigenous frameworks for rule.

A political transformation became visible in the late 11th and early 12th centuries. The names of rulers that appear in Arabic texts vanish, and new rulers known as the Zaghe/Za emerge prominently in the archaeological record. Royal tombstones found at Gao-Saney are inscribed with Arabic prayers and titles such as malik (king) and malika (queen). Some of these funerary stelae were carved from marble imported from Almeria in Islamic Spain, revealing direct commercial and cultural connections with the wider Muslim world. This new leadership reinforced Islam at the highest levels of authority while retaining Songhay’s matrilineal basis of succession. The prominent burial of queens indicates that elite women were not diminished by Islam but remained central to the legitimacy of rulers. These developments mark Gao’s first clearly documented period of Islamic monarchy, accompanied by a flourishing of intellectual and cultural engagement beyond the Sahara.

Gao’s influence extended beyond commerce. Medieval accounts record that its rulers engaged in conflicts with the Ghana Empire to the west and Kanem to the east. These wars were not merely territorial but economic, driven by competition for control of trade corridors, especially those linking goldfields, salt mines, and northern markets. Warfare and diplomacy were tools to secure and manage tribute from both riverine and desert communities. Gao’s growing military power suggests a centralized administrative apparatus capable of organizing cavalry and riverine forces. That capacity would later form the basis of Songhay’s imperial strength under Sunni Ali.

Islam in Gao did not override existing beliefs. Instead, the two systems merged into a culturally hybrid form of statecraft. Rulers valued Islamic law, Arabic literacy, and international alliances, while also maintaining sacred ceremonial roles rooted in Sudanic cosmology. Spirit possession, public ritual, and matrilineal inheritance endured. This dual legitimacy — Islamic and indigenous — made Gao’s political structure both flexible and resilient. Rather than abolishing entrenched social customs, Islam was used to reinforce monarchy and expand bureaucratic functions, especially in commerce, taxation, and diplomatic communication.

Reconstructing early Songhay history requires attention to the nature of the available sources. Arabic geographers provide some of the earliest written references to Gao, but their works contain gaps and uncertainties because they relied heavily on second-hand information. Archaeology offers concrete material evidence of urban development and Islamic influence but remains limited to sites that have been excavated, especially around Gao-Saney. Oral traditions preserve indigenous perspectives and cultural meanings but contain mythic elements and were shaped by later political contexts. The Tarikh al-Sudan and Tarikh al-Fattash, written centuries later, reflect Songhay’s imperial ideology rather than early history. Despite these limitations, the convergence of evidence strongly indicates that Gao was a powerful and Islamizing state by the 11th century, rooted in earlier indigenous cultural institutions. Continual comparison of sources allows historians to create a clearer, though still evolving, understanding of this crucial period.

By the beginning of the 12th century, Gao had emerged as a thriving urban center with solid economic, military, and religious foundations. Its rulers commanded long-distance trade networks, projected force against rival states, and served as guardians of both Islamic and indigenous authority. These achievements ensured that Gao remained influential even when incorporated into the Mali Empire in the 13th and 14th centuries. When the Sunni dynasty restored independence in the 15th century and expanded to create the Songhay Empire, they built upon centuries of state formation and a tradition of political innovation rooted in the early history of Gao. The foundations of one of West Africa’s greatest empires began not with sudden transformation, but through gradual evolution driven by commerce, culture, and hybrid spirituality.

Contribution to the History of Songhay

Jean Rouch's Contribution à l'histoire des Songhay is rather outdated yet still useful for insights on Songhay history and culture. A reputable ethnographer who studied Songhay religion and magic extensively, Rouch's understanding of their history unsurprisingly emphasizes Islam as an alien element that laid the foundations for the collapse of the Askia. Despite this problematic frame for Songhay history, Rouch's work is one of the best earlier attempts to make sense of Songhay history from its shadowy early origins at Kukiya to the late colonial period. 

Unfortunately, Rouch repeated some of the mistakes of Delafosse and early colonial scholars. For instance, the Za dynasty were said to have been Christianized Lemta Berbers who left Tripolitania around 670. In addition, the early state of Ghana (Wagadu) is attributed to Judaeo-Syrian colonists. These mistakes inhibit a deeper understanding of early Songhay, one which clearly indicates an important role for the Sorko, Gow, and farming populations living near and along the Niger as the foundation of the first Songhay polity. This later inhibits Rouch's analysis of the Za, Si, and Askia dynasties since Islam, promoted by Askia Muhammad, is blamed for the fall of Songhay. Sonni Ali, on the other hand, was the champion of a "black" state that brought Songhay to its zenith, something commemorated in Songhay oral traditions, religion, and Rouch's problematic view of Islam's relations with Songhay religion. 

Of course, later scholars have benefitted from new approaches to the Timbuktu chronicles, epigraphic evidence from Bentia & Gao, as well as archaeological excavations at Gao and other sites in Mali to throw into question a number of theories held as gospel in Rouch's day. The picture that emerges now is one far more dynamic and one that calls into question some of the older generation's stereotypes of Kukiya as the fount of "black" Songhay paganism and even the historicity of Ali Kulun. Nonetheless, Rouch's insights are occasionally insightful here, particularly his proposed translations for Za dynasty rulers recorded in the Timbuktu chronicles. His familiarity with Songhay oral tradition and religion also adds a new dimension to the ways in which Sonni Ali and other rulers are remembered for building their empires through military conquests aided by magic or occult knowledge. 

Development and Regression on the Middle Niger

Le développement et la régression chez les peuples de la boucle du Niger à l'époque précolonial by Michael Tymowski is an ambitious work. An attempt to make sense of around 1000 years of economic progress and regression along a key part of the Western Sudan (centered on the Middle Niger), Tymowski relies heavily on the Timbuktu chronicles, external Arabic sources, and oral traditions. He persuasively makes the case for economic development with the growth of urban centers, limited private land tenure, and accelerated long-distance trade, which later declined in the 1600s and 1700s. This shows that the history of "development" in sub-Saharan African areas has always been dynamic, and not simply one of timeless "backwardness" or irrelevance. 

However, Tymowski's study is quite outdated and relies on French translations of sources in Arabic. It also relies heavily on Jean Rouch and other somewhat outdated scholarship on Songhay ethnography and oral traditions, even repeating the unproven claim that the Dia/Za dynasty of early Songhay rulers were actually Lemta Berbers. In addition, he heavily relied on the problematic Tarikh al-Fattash chronicle for assertions about servile/caste populations. This dependence on French translations of Arabic sources and outmoded scholarship on Songhay ethnography and oral traditions suggest possible limitations of Tymowski's study. While one must acknowledge that the aforementioned Timbuktu chronicles are probably reliable for the 1400s and 1500s (at least more so than for earlier centuries), Tymowski's attempt to derive meaningful conclusions or theories about the economic development of the Mali Empire and Songhay Empire may be misleading or problematic. Nonetheless, there are a number of intriguing ideas about the relationship between the towns (Gao, Djenne, Timbuktu) and the countryside, as well as the role of the state in promoting land tenure arrangements along the lines of property property or through state domains (those of the askias) that controlled and promoted the redistribution of goods. 

Racial Tropes in the Moroccan Conquest of Songhay

Although mainly based on one source produced as part of a royal proclamation after the defeat of the Songhay, Mauro Nobili and Saïd Bousbina demonstrate the reduction of Songhay into the trope of the enslaveable black. This attitude, by the way, reminds us of al-Fishtali's similarly condescending references to the envoy of Borno who was received in Morocco during the the reign of Idris b. Ali. Race, and the blackness of the Songhay trumped their Islamic and ethnic identities.