5/1/24

The Sudanese Travels of Theodor Krump


Spaulding's translation of Krump's journal, or at least the sections relevant to Sudan, translated as The Sudanese Travels of Theodoro Krump, is a short but important source on the Funj Sultanate at the beginning of the 18th century. Traveling as part of a mission to Ethiopia, some of the Jesuits and Franciscans who joined a caravan from Egypt to the south became trapped in Sinnar due to illness or, like Krump, served as a physician to the sultan of Sinnar. Although less detailed than one would like on the intricacies of the sultanate and its capital city, Krump's narrative provides the reader with a sense of the kingdom's economic purpose. Indeed, despite the frequent threat of Arab bandits and rebels against the sultanate attacking caravans traveling from Egypt, Krump considered Sinnar to be a wealthy city and one of the major trading emporiums of Africa. Goods and people arrived from Egypt, across the Red Sea, India, Ethiopia, Fezzan, and Borno, and Krump's time in the capital led him to meet Greeks, Portuguese, Turks, Abyssinians, Copts, and others in the cosmopolitan capital. This is impressive, considering what Krump saw as the insecure trade routes and the, to put it lightly, challenging or disloyal behavior of some of the vassal rulers to the Funj. 

Krump's narrative also provides the reader with a sense of the political and social conditions in the Sinnar Sultanate. For instance, Christianity, though no longer practiced, could be seen with the ruins of a monastery and churches. At one site, locals informed Krump that the population practiced Christianity as recently as 100 years ago, which is perhaps inaccurate if Christianity disappeared earlier in the 1500s. In addition, the fact that much of the population wore little clothing and already elites and vassal rulers relied on slave soldiers suggests the Sinnar Sultanate was a society in which, perhaps, adherence to Islam among the general population was not strict and it was easier for rulers to trust slaves. However, Krump did witness at least two villages of fuqara, villages or towns in which a Muslim scholar or holyman received immunity from the state. This has been proven by the land grants or charters issued by the Funj, yet one wishes Krump told us more about how these functioned. Of course, as a Catholic missionary who saw Islam as a false religion, he naturally was not interested in reporting on every detail of the Islamic society he was visiting. Nonetheless, his description of a jellab killing his sister for living an immodest life and what appears to have been a Sufi practice of chanting and prayer, particularly population with members of the caravan from Borno and the Fezzan, suggests Sufist practices were already widespread. Those from Borno and the Fezzan, however, were described as using a round bow covered with a skin under strong tension, which was then used to produce various tones of loud sounds. These are accompanied with singing and jumping in what was likely a Sufi or mystical Islamic practice? A look at the Sufist practices in Borno, the Fezzan, and Sinnar might lead one to see an early instance of Sufist practices connecting the the regions, particularly as we know that in the 17th century a native of the Funj Sultanate traveled to Borno's Sufist community at Kalumbardo.

Unfortunately, Krump is less useful for the particularities of Sinnar's relations with other Sudanic kingdoms. Ethiopia, whose conquest of Fazughli was only achieved about 15 years previously, plus frequent trade and communication between Sinnar and Gondar, made it the most frequently mentioned African kingdom in communication with Sinnar. However, the allusion to people from Borno and the Fezzan in Krump's caravan suggests that connections to lands to the west were also relevant. While the particular Fezzani and Bornoan travelers met by Krump may have come to the Sudan from Egypt, other sources suggest a route from the west, one that must have traversed Waday and Darfur, was already in use. Sadly, Krump's account tells us little about those western connections, which must have been of gradually increasing importance due to the establishment of Muslim sultanates in Darfur and Waday.

4/20/24

Rawdat’l-Afkaar

Although its brevity diminishes its use, Dan Tafa's Rawdat’l-Afkaar is a fascinating local source on the history of Hausaland and the Central Sudan. Presumably drawing on oral traditions and other written sources, Shaykh Dan Tafa's brief account outlines the history of the "Sudan" and in particular, the Hausa states. Gobir's history in particular is quite important given that Shaykh Uthman dan Fodio lived in Gobir before the jihad that led to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. What is particularly interesting for our purposes, however, are the references to Borno and earlier epochs in the history of the Hausa states of the area. 

First, Borno. According to Shaykh Dan Tafa, Borno once dominated all or most of Hausaland. And, according to him, it was Gobir which first refused to pay tribute to Borno. However, Borno was never able to, according to Dan Tafa, conquer Air or Ahir. However, he does corroborate the role of Borno in coming to the aid of Ahir against the Kanta of Kebbi in the 1500s. Indeed, a brief account of mai Ali's battles with the Kanta of Kebbi can be found in Dan Tafa's chronicle. One also finds the familiar tradition of a man appointed to rule Hausaland by the ruler of Borno in the distant past, although one wonders if the translator's choice of the term "political captive" is accurate. Using that terminology might lead one to suspect slaves were appointed to administer subject provinces due to the greater expectation of loyalty, yet the actual conditions and type of provincial rulers or leaders could have been different when speaking of early Borno expansion into Hausaland. Indeed, even the question of tribute and what it actually entailed brings to mind one Nigerian's scholar's important point about reconsidering the relations between Hausaland and Borno as one of empire or Bornoan or Kanuri imperialism. Indeed, when Dan Tafa explains how an increasingly powerful Gobir demanded tribute from other Hausa states, it is also stated that Gobir sent fine gifts of horses as well. So, the gifts or tribute given to Gobir were reciprocated and it is not clear to what extent Gobir exerted any real control of tributary states. One can assume that a similar relationship existed when the Hausa states sent tribute to Borno through Daura. In fact, Heinrich Barth's description of Katsina's relationship with Borno seems to confirm this.

Unsurprisingly, however, the bulk of the short work is most useful for the history of Gobir and Hausaland. While its chronology is not always clear or perhaps is unreliable, it does offer some tentative and clear chronologies for certain events in the history of the region. First of all, Amina of Zaria or Zakzak is said to have raided as far southwest as the Atlantic Ocean. While this is perhaps exaggeration, one wonders if, when using the dates suggested by the Kano Chronicle, one can perhaps detect Zaria raiding and trading as far south as Yorubaland in the 1400s. Where the chronology seems more than a little unreliable, or perhaps earlier Gobir rulers were forgotten, is Dan Tafa's allusion to an alliance of Agabba of Ahir, Muhammad ibn Chiroma of Gobir and the ruler of Zamfara against Kebbi. If accurate, this would suggest a date in the late 1600s or during the reign of Muhammad Agabba of Air (who also established the sultanate of Adar through his line). However, Dan Tafa's chronicle claims Muhammad ibn Chiroma was the son of the first ruler of Gobir after their expulsion from Air, an event which must have occurred centuries earlier than the late 1600s and early 1700s. Thus, Chiroma was either the first "Gobir" king or the earlier rulers before they firmly established themselves as the kings of Gobir were forgotten or not recalled by Dan Tafa's sources. 

Despite the omission of Gobir's political history before the late 17th century and early 18th, Dan Tafa's account gives the reader an idea of Gobir's political power in Hausaland and in relation to its neighbors. Indeed, they were so bold as to attack the outskirts of Borno and Bawa, who ruled in the late 1700s, refused to send or pay tribute to Borno. One also finds interesting allusions to the power of Kebbi in the 1500s, particularly when its ruler established a capital at Surami that received water brought by the Tuareg who were forced to do so. Although Kebbi's power lasted for only about a century, one benefits from learning a few more details about this powerful Hausa state. Sadly, Kwararafa is only mentioned briefly and one is left in the dark about this southern power.

4/5/24

Timbuktu and the Arma

Michel Abitbol's Tombouctou et les arma is an important work on the history of the Pashalik of the Arma. Most people often ignore the 2 centuries or so of political and social history of Timbuktu and the Niger Bend after the fall of Songhay. Abitbol's work shows just how important that later, post-Songhay period was in terms of the Pashalik's political, social, economic, and regional importance. Indeed, the Pashalik persisted for so long partly because Timbuktu continued to be a major center for commerce and bridge between the Maghrib and the Sudan, long after the decline of al-Mansur's dynasty and the end of the Askias of Gao. However, even the Askias survived in a fashion, since a branch of them became close allies with the Arma regime. And while the authority of the Pashalik was later limited to Timbuktu, Djenne, Gao and other areas of the Niger Bend, and often became reduced to a ceremonial power of investiture for Tuareg chiefs who could sometimes attack or pillage the area with impunity, the Pashas continued to be the recognized authority of Timbuktu and a major power until the rise of Macina. Intriguingly, Abitbol believed the Arma, who became acclimatized and, later on, developing dominant families who dominated the position of pasha, despite the usually short tenures, were not a class per se. Instead, they were a leadership elite of essentially military origin and function. However, their alliance with the sharifs, ulama, merchants, Askias, and ownership of large numbers of slaves (who sometimes worked the land they owned) and dependents or haratins suggest something on the nature of a class society. The rather large corpus of sources used by Abitbol also suggests Timbuktu's importance in trans-Saharan trade retained its significance, too, surpassing in overall value the exports of other areas of the Sudan to North Africa. Clearly, there was a basis for great wealth accumulation and, in one case, a Pasha who even endeavored to emulate the great emperors of Mali and Songhay, possibly with the intention of recreating their grandeur for the Pashalik.

3/20/24

Cissoko, Timbuktu, and the Songhay Empire

Sékéné Mody Cissoko's Tombouctou et l'empire Songhay is a fascinating yet problematic work. Originally published in the 1970s, and by an author who accepted the theories of Cheikh Anta Diop and believed in the need of connecting postcolonial African nation-states to their precolonial past, the Songhay Empire is presented as the apogee of Western Sudanese civilization. We are led to believe or accept a number of premises, including that the Songhay state was a modernizing one and that the pyramidal character of buildings and mosque construction in the region may be a reflection of connections with Ancient Egypt. Cissoko also asserts that the level of learning at Timbuktu was comparable to a university, despite his acknowledgement that the city lacked the madrasas characteristic of Egypt or the Maghreb and the decentralized nature of instruction which emphasized Islamic religious education or law. In addition, Timbuktu, as the intellectual and economic capital of the vast Sudanese empire, characterized the Islamic influence that was largely marginal or absent in the South and east of the Empire. Indeed, Cissoko's work reflects this dichotomous view of Songhay civilization as one torn between the "high" Islamic culture and literacy of the towns and western provinces versus the found of traditional beliefs and religions in areas like Dendi. In fact, Sonni Ali's infamous relations with the ulama of Timbuktu is presented as an example of anticlericalism while the Sonni were and are associated with magic or sorcery in the "traditional" Songhay culture. 

Despite it's flaws, perhaps Cissoko's synthesis is worthwhile as a testament to the methodology and value postcolonial African historians practiced with regard to the Western Sudan. Cissoko clearly sought to balance the usual written sources with oral traditions and ethnographic work based on his own work and that of scholars like Jean Rouch and Boubou Hama. While it was not especially successful in Cissoko's case, and perhaps he overstates the "clash" between "animist" traditional religion and Islam, Cissoko's study raises a number of relevant historical questions and contemporary dilemmas. For instance, is it true that the Songhay Empire, at its zenith under the Askias, created a modern state in which the rulership was independent and dissociated from the individual with a greater degree of political centralization? The evidence utilized by our author, mainly restricted to the Tarikhs, al-Maghili's responses to Askia Muhammad and Leo Africanus, do not suffice to adequately answer this question. Furthermore, if the masses of the population of Songhay were slaves, why was it not a slave society? Surely the lack of sufficient documentation makes the demographic analysis of Cissoko questionable, particularly in his high estimates for Timbuktu's population. 

Furthermore, one could ask if it is a fair portrayal of the bourgeoisie marchande in Cissoko's analysis? Was it true that they did not invest their profits locally into things like land, new enterprises, or industries that could have revolutionized the economy? If 16th century Songhay truly enjoyed such a prolonged period of commercial success and growth, is it fair to make Cissoko's generalization given our paucity of sources? One can see how Cissoko thought addressing that question would be rather relevant to 20th century postcolonial Malian or African readers of his work. As their postcolonial states sought economic growth or development with different models, perhaps Cissoko's critique of the alleged wastefulness of the Askias and Songhay elites had more to do with the modern political and economic elites in Mali. That said, Cissoko's study does offer a (dated) comprehensive overview of the Songhay Empire that raises a number of interesting questions. We shall endeavor to explore some of those questions with Michał Tymowski.

3/18/24

Deciphering Meroitic


Enjoying this lecture by Claude Rilly on the Meroitic language. While we don't agree with all of his theories and conclusions, we certainly hope scholars are on track to finally understand this ancient African language.

3/9/24

On the Sultans of Waday

Marie-Jose Tubiana's "Un document inédit sur les sultans du Wadday" is a useful article for anyone interested in the history of Waday. Consisting of 2 similar documents attributed to a Usman ibn Fodde or Uthman ibn Fodda, the translated source is a chronological list of the sultans of Waday. In addition to collating 2 versions of this source, one of which came from the sultan of Waday, Tubiana uses other sources to corroborate and comment on the list. Like the Diwan of Kanem-Borno, it's basically a list of the sultans with a few sentences describing what the said ruler accomplished or experienced during his reign. In addition, there is some confusion in the source as it incorrectly places Sabun into an earlier chronological moment in the history of Waday. 

Despite some of the obvious problems of the source, it's chronology seems to be generally accurate. Like, perhaps, the Diwan of Kanem-Borno, there may be some mystical value to certain numbers attached to reign lengths (66, for instance, was special in this source) and the earlier kings appear to have existed in a more "mythical" context. Sadly, what actually transpired between Abd el-Karim and the Tundjur kings who ruled previously is not entirely clear. One is still unsure about Abd el-Karim's connection to Bidderi in Bagirmi, too. All one can say is that Abd el-Karim probably reigned sometime in the first half of the 17th century and he was a propagator of the Islamic faith. Subsequent rulers are also mentioned but it is mainly only beginning with Sabun in the early 19th century are the events of Waday's political history better known. The wealth of sources for the 19th century allows for more corroboration and detail on the kings of Wadai, while the events of the years prior to Sabun can only be glimpsed with occasional references to the Tunjur, Darfur or the larger Central Sudan. Indeed, even the origins of Abd el-Karim are unclear as some source ssuggest roots in the modern-day Sudan while other traditions, such as those reported by Barth and Nachtigal, suggest some kind of connection to the Islamic settlement of Bidderi and a Muslim movement against the pagan Tunjur. 

Interestingly, some later research suggests some degree of Islamic observance among the Tunjur. In fact, the Tunjur rulers were remembered by Arab names, including the final one, a Dawud, who was overthrown or replaced by Abd el-Karim. In addition, O'Fahey cited evidence of a Tunjur king from the region of Darfur and Wadai who was reported in Muslim sources. To what degree Abd el-Karim was the first Muslim ruler in what became Waday is difficult to say, but the realities of Tunjur, Kanem, and Bornoan influences in the region suggest Islam may have had some influence in Waday before the 17th century. Later Borno influences and conflict with Borno, Darfur, Bagirmi, Rabeh, the Mahdists in Sudan, and, finally, the French, continued to shape Waday's sultans while a number of contenders, dignitaries, and rival claimants for the throne frequently clashed. Furthermore, some Waday rulers clashed with their own dignitaries who resisted kings who became too powerful. This frequent instability and conflict over power helps explain why Waday could occasionally rise to a hegemonic status in the Central Sudan but very quickly, within a reign or two, suffer severe declines, population exoduses, plagues, and even do nothing while Rabeh ravaged tributary states like Dar Kuti, Dar Runga and Bagirmi.