On the Sultans of Waday

Marie-Jose Tubiana's "Un document inédit sur les sultans du Wadday" is a useful article for anyone interested in the history of Waday. Consisting of 2 similar documents attributed to a Usman ibn Fodde or Uthman ibn Fodda, the translated source is a chronological list of the sultans of Waday. In addition to collating 2 versions of this source, one of which came from the sultan of Waday, Tubiana uses other sources to corroborate and comment on the list. Like the Diwan of Kanem-Borno, it's basically a list of the sultans with a few sentences describing what the said ruler accomplished or experienced during his reign. In addition, there is some confusion in the source as it incorrectly places Sabun into an earlier chronological moment in the history of Waday. 

Despite some of the obvious problems of the source, it's chronology seems to be generally accurate. Like, perhaps, the Diwan of Kanem-Borno, there may be some mystical value to certain numbers attached to reign lengths (66, for instance, was special in this source) and the earlier kings appear to have existed in a more "mythical" context. Sadly, what actually transpired between Abd el-Karim and the Tundjur kings who ruled previously is not entirely clear. One is still unsure about Abd el-Karim's connection to Bidderi in Bagirmi, too. All one can say is that Abd el-Karim probably reigned sometime in the first half of the 17th century and he was a propagator of the Islamic faith. Subsequent rulers are also mentioned but it is mainly only beginning with Sabun in the early 19th century are the events of Waday's political history better known. The wealth of sources for the 19th century allows for more corroboration and detail on the kings of Wadai, while the events of the years prior to Sabun can only be glimpsed with occasional references to the Tunjur, Darfur or the larger Central Sudan. Indeed, even the origins of Abd el-Karim are unclear as some source ssuggest roots in the modern-day Sudan while other traditions, such as those reported by Barth and Nachtigal, suggest some kind of connection to the Islamic settlement of Bidderi and a Muslim movement against the pagan Tunjur. 

Interestingly, some later research suggests some degree of Islamic observance among the Tunjur. In fact, the Tunjur rulers were remembered by Arab names, including the final one, a Dawud, who was overthrown or replaced by Abd el-Karim. In addition, O'Fahey cited evidence of a Tunjur king from the region of Darfur and Wadai who was reported in Muslim sources. To what degree Abd el-Karim was the first Muslim ruler in what became Waday is difficult to say, but the realities of Tunjur, Kanem, and Bornoan influences in the region suggest Islam may have had some influence in Waday before the 17th century. Later Borno influences and conflict with Borno, Darfur, Bagirmi, Rabeh, the Mahdists in Sudan, and, finally, the French, continued to shape Waday's sultans while a number of contenders, dignitaries, and rival claimants for the throne frequently clashed. Furthermore, some Waday rulers clashed with their own dignitaries who resisted kings who became too powerful. This frequent instability and conflict over power helps explain why Waday could occasionally rise to a hegemonic status in the Central Sudan but very quickly, within a reign or two, suffer severe declines, population exoduses, plagues, and even do nothing while Rabeh ravaged tributary states like Dar Kuti, Dar Runga and Bagirmi.

Voyage to Wadai

Traveler al-Tunisi's Voyage au Ouadây is the sequel of sorts to his earlier narrative on his travels through the Darfur Sultanate. Even more extended and featuring additional tangents and chapters on his traversing of the Sahara, al-Tunisi's account provides detailed informaton about a pivotal era in the history of the Sudanic region (and Tripoli). Traveling to Wadai during the reign of Sabun, who opened another route for trans-Saharan trade to Benghazi, al-Tunisi personally witnessed (or heard via his father and others) the exploits of Wadai's victory against Baghirmi. In addition, al-Tunisi witnessed the last days of the Awlad Muhammad sultanate in the Fezzan, some of the career of Yusuf Qaramanli in Tripoli, and stories of the decline of Borno via jihad of Zaky (Uthman dan Fodio). Thus, al-Tunisi's travels and anecdotes captured a significant moment in the history of the Sudanic region as major figures like Sabun, Yusuf Qaramanli, al-Kanemi, and Uthman dan Fodio reshaped the economic, social, and political landscape of much of Africa. Indeed, through his experience in Egypt and witnessing the reforms of Muhammad Ali, one can even include Egypt and the Sudan as part of this era of momentous change which significantly impacted the Sudanic areas.

A native of Borno who studied at al-Azhar in Cairo.

Undoubtedly, the major importance of this work is the overview of the kingdom of Wadai. Probably founded sometime in the early 1600s, al-Tunisi reported some of the traditions of its origins. Claiming Abbasid origins and other traditions, Wadai's first ruler united the region and established a tradition in which successors could only be born to mothers from 5 privileged tribes. Moreover, the sultans of Kordofan, Darfur, and Waday purportedly shared a common origin, which could be a reflection of the previous political history before the 17th century. While, sadly, the people of Wadai and Darfur, to al-Tunisi's knowledge, did not write or keep chronicles of their history, he was able to write a brief summary of the history of Wadai's sultans before Sabun. Indeed, it was clearly one in which conflicts with the Keira sultans of Darfur were frequent. Darfur's rulers intervened in the affairs of Waday while those of Wadai attempted to do the same in the other country. In fact, before al-Tunisi's arrival in Wadai, conflicts with Dar Tamah, the mountainous region subject to Darfur that stood between the kingdoms, were supposedly fueled by the Fur sultan's interest in weakening Darfur. However, neither kingdom could truly subjugate the other. Perhaps the vast distances and relatively equal military forces (despite Waday's troops being braver) lowered the chances of success. However, after Sabun's death under mysterious circumstances (was he killed by cow thieves or did he die from illness), one of his brothers later seized the throne with the aid of Darfur, pledging to pay tribute. That brother, however, was able to relatively easily take power due to internal divisions and a recent plague that struck the kingdom. Needless to say, he was able to easily enough throw off the yoke of tribute to Darfur. 

The major area of focus for al-Tunisi, of course, was the piety and brilliance of Sabun. Intriguingly, he personally was not well-treated by Sabun. Blaming it on a Moroccan sharif who abused his position and influence in Wadai's court, al-Tunisi was not the recipient of the totality of Sabun's largesse. Instead, it was the privileged position of al-Tunisi's father, who served as an advisor to the sultan, which seems to have accounted for the high praise of our author. His father, who received land grants, gifts, and helped in some of Sabun's campaigns (including the violent one which denuded Tamah of crops), must have told his son of some of the brilliance and piety of Sabun. According to our author, Sabun vanquished injustice, centralized administration (by shortening terms of service for administrators and using others to spy on them), welcomed ulama and Islamic holymen, and engaged in just campaigns against the incestuous, violent mbang Ahmad of Bagirmi. Furthermore, Sabun revealed himself as a reformer and visionary, planning to create coinage (a plan he was persuaded not to pursue by his court), open new trade routes to the Magreb to decrease his dependence on the Fazzan, and employ firearms with slaves especially trained in their use. While some of Sabun's reforms and visions did not materialize, he was able to, despite the significant loss of lives, open a new trans-Saharan trade route, expand Wadai's influence in Bagirmi and make Wadai one of the strongest kingdoms of the Bilad al-Sudan. The story of his rise was also an admirable one, relying on cunning and careful planning to outmaneuver his brothers. Sadly, after his death, Wadai witnessed a series of ineffective or corrupt rulers who disputed the throne until a brother of Sabun returned decades later. 

One of the most interesting chapters of al-Tunisi's voyage tells the tale of the conquest of Bagirmi, a major kingdom once tributary to Borno. Unlike other sources, claiming Sabun of Wadai only invaded Bagirmi upon the request of a (weakened?) Borno, al-Tunisi places all the blame on mbang Ahmad. Ahmad was so perverse he married his half-sister, ignoring the wishes of the ulama and Islamic law. Then he went so far as to lust after his daughter! Meanwhile, his fetcha was busy raiding Wadai territory despite several peaceful letters from Sabun. To provide even further justification, ulama in Bagirmi allegedly wrote to Wadai asking for intervention from the tyranny, corruption, and perversity of the mbang. Unsurprisingly, after the raids on Wadai territory continued unabated, and the alleged corruption of Bagirmi's ruler descended into further degeneracy, Sabun launched a campaign. Sabun's troops continued their advance onto Massenya while the mbang pretended his troops could handle the invasion and there was no immediate threat. By the end of the campaign, Bagirmi's mbang was killed in battle, Massenya was sacked (the treasury of the mbang supposedly had the equivalent of more than 200,000 francs) and pillaged (including the enslavement and rape of several inhabitants) and Sabun placed another member of the royal family on the throne. Unfortunately, a son of the previous mbang and his fetcha continued to resist Wadai, fleeing to Kotoko and then plotting against the king placed on the throne by Wadai. After more campaigns, Sabun agreed to allow this prince to become the new mbang of Bagirmi, with an agreement to pay a lowered annual tribute to Wadai. The effects of this campaign were such that the price of slaves decreased and a number of Bagirmi subjects ended up in Wadai. 

Photo from Lebuef's Ouara, Ville Perdue.

For significantly increasing the size of the kingdom, welcoming Islamic scholars, and opening new trade routes, and combating corruption and tyrannical officials in his kingdom, Sabun was compared to Muhammad Ali of Egypt. While the comparison was probably just in some regards, Sabun's reign was perhaps too brief to consolidate all of his achievements for subsequent rulers. Nonetheless, al-Tunis's description of the customs and cultures of Wadai and the the rest of the Sudan (Black Africa) are occasionally fascinating and problematic. As in his book on Darfur, one can occasionally detect ethnocentric biases. Indeed, the depiction of the sexual and marital practices of Wadaians may reflect a belief in the lasciviousness of black Africans. The pagan populations to the south of the Muslim Sudanic states, naturally, are beyond the pale in terms of civilization and culture. Pagans who do not possess any law, they were also decentralized and did not unite when it would have been feasible to do so against the Muslim raiders to their north. But al-Tunisi was not so biased as to not recognize great talent in the artisanry of some weapons and tools produced by the southerners, the Fertity, Kirdaouy, and others. In addition, his account of the operation of Darfur slaving expeditions, very distinct from those of Wadai in that they were operated by private individuals with a firman from the sultan, illustrates how easily tributary pagan populations to the south could be victims of raids as well as benefit from the slaving expeditions. Some of these Darfur expeditions penetrated deep into the heart of Africa, with one 18th century group allegedly reaching a vast river with people who looked like Indians (this is not explained in the text). This deeper penetration of the African interior from the North is interesting in light of the deeper penetrating of slave trading from the Indian Ocean to the east as well as the ongoing slave trade to the Atlantic World.

Besides his general commentary on the military, administrative, religious, and marital customs of Darfur and Wadai, al-Tunisi also applied a theory of Ibn Khaldun to explain the decline of Borno under the Sayfawa. According to him, the forces of Zaky (dan Fodio) were initially so successful against the Bornoans due to the latter's customs of luxury and comfort. Becoming too comfortable and attached to their luxuries, the Bornoans were no longer able to field the type of brave resistance necessary against their opponents. Consequently, they required the aid of the al-Kanemi, mistakenly represented as the alifa of Kanem, to defeat the Fulani and liberate Birni Gazargamo. Unfortunately, al-Tunisi never personally traveled to Borno. But his father and other informants did, one source even reporting that the soldiers of Borno were such cowards that they mistook a flock of ostriches from afar for the vast army of their foes. The frightened Borno soldiers then were ready to turn around and flee. While the reality of Borno in this phase was more complex and al-Tunisi did not have enough information, it is possible his testimony reflects a shift in the Sayfawa dynasty's basis of power. Instead of pure military force, which likely retained importance, the Sayfawa mais may have relied more on their perceived spiritual and religious authority. One wishes al-Tunisi had been able to gather more information on Borno in the early 19th century instead of reporting a few anecdotes and commenting on the treatment of his father who was robbed there due to the ongoing conflict with Bagirmi. 

Overall, al-Tunisi's two-part travelogue is a fascinating account of much of the Sudanic belt of Africa in the early 19th century. His numerous tangents are occasionally delightful treats to information about various topics. For instance, the pretensions of Tubu Rechad "sultans" who take advantage of their desert setting to repeatedly demand gifts from travelers. Or, for instance, finally returning to Tunis only to have his father steal his money while taking a bath! Then the ordeal with his uncle when he endeavored to collect the goods and inheritance of his father, who passed away during his final trip to Waday. Our traveler experienced a number of setbacks and wonders, including people stealing his water while crossing the Sahara and being saved by a devout, faithful slave. He even experienced the perils of internal discord and war in the Regency of Tripoli when the Awlad Sulayman rebelled against Yusuf Qaramanli. The poor traveler even had to bear the risk of traveling with goods of Yusuf Qaramanli overland. One only wishes al-Tunisi and Perron had collaborated on an account of his experiences after his travels to Black Africa, such as the wars over Greek independence and events in Egypt after his final return to Cairo. 

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850 is another one of Zeltner's shorter books, this one consisting of some introductory chapters and essays on 4 major figures who shaped the Chad Basin in the first half of the 19th century. Beginning with 2 chapters on the regional context and Arab migrations before delving into Abd al-Jalil, Yusuf Caramanli, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi and Sabun of Wadai, Zeltner treads familiar ground. Those who have read his work on Tripoli and Kanem will perhaps not find much new material here. Nonetheless, he corrects some of his past assertions or mistakes and offers some more detailed analysis and commentary on Arab genealogies and the rise of Wadai as the major power in the eastern Chad Basin. Zeltner is probaby correct to identify the ancestors of the Bani Hassan as among the Arabs in Kanem who allied themselves with Idris b. Ali against the Bulala in the 16th century. The suggestive analysis of Kotoko and Mandara state and religious ideologies and the ancestor-snake cult of Wadai are thought-provoking, too. 

Although one may take issue with a great man approach to the history of the area around Lake Chad, Zeltner's detailed study of the 4 aforementioned leaders actually does a great job highlighting how closely connected their respective states and peoples were. For al-Kanemi, the shehu who founded today's dynasty of Borno, his maternal family's Fezzani origins and his upbringing in today's Libya (plus his several years spent in the East) illustrates how the elites of Borno were not isolated from broader trends and currents in the Islamic world. Moreover, due to what Zeltner sees as the military weakness of Borno, al-Kanemi had to rely on diplomacy to avert a Tripolitanian invasion and use their support against Bagirmi. While he perhaps ultimately failed to fully restore Kanem to Bornoan suzerainty, and the Fezzani invasions were disasters that even included his sister among their victims, al-Kanemi succeeded in impressing the British Borno mission, ending the Bagirmi threat, defended the western frontier, and secured an alliance with the Awlad Sulayman. 

One cannot help but admire al-Kanemi, despite his flaws and perhaps his questionable reasons for agreeing to send his child as a hostage to Libya. His charisma, ability to attract Kanembu and Arab followers (as well as other adventurers and outsiders), military and spiritual leadership and interest in technological and economic advantages of relations with the British certainly made him an exceptional ruler in a turbulent era. It just seems fantastic that he was so afraid of a Tripolitanian invasion despite surely knowing something of the financial straits of the Pasha. Either way, British refusal to loan the necessary funds and direct relations with Britain made the invasion impossible. That must be part of the reason for al-Kanemi's cordial reception of Denham, Clapperton and Oudney. He further secured Borno from northern attacks through sealing an alliance with Abd al-Jalil and the Awlad Sulayman, who became the effective rulers of the Fezzan after al-Mukni's fall from grace. 

The other figures examined by Zeltner include some of the most influential and notorious figures in the history of Chad and Libya. Yusuf Caramanli, the murderous man who slaughtered his own brother in front of their mother, saw to the end of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty in the Fezzan. His corsair activity and heavy involvement in the slave trade were interrupted by European pressure and the Greek war of independence, forcing him to overtax the population. Unlike, say, Muhammad Ali in Egypt, he was never able to successfully conquer or launch a permanent occupation of Sudanic Africa. His bey of the Fezzan, who harbored his own hopes of an empire in the southern lands, was recalled. As mentioned previously, Yusuf additionally failed to secure the necessary British loans to fund a full invasion of Borno. Nevertheless, the fact that his troops were able to invade Bagirmi and loot Massenya was an impressive feat, showing Tripolitanian imperial ambition perhaps akin to that of Egypt in the Sudan. It also attests to the powerful role of firearms in a region which had once been a pioneer in the use of muskets in 16th century Borno.  

Wadai under Sabun and Abd al-Jalil of the Awlad Sulayman represent more admirable figures. The latter, after his tribe's defeats and oppression from Yusuf Caramanli and Tripolitanian authorities, almost became the force of unification for Libya's Arabs. By mastering the Fezzan and establishing cordial relations with Borno, he only needed to secure a Mediterranean port. The divisions within the Arab population and conflict with the Pasha who succeeded Yusuf made this impossible before his death. Tragically, a famine and treason among the Arab allies brought about the death of Abd al-Jalil. The Awlad Sulayman later migrated to Kanem, where they became the major arbiter between Borno and Wadai. British and French involvement in Tripolitanian affairs, plus British interest in securing a sea port open to Fezzani caravans (and a dream of ending the slave trade) further demonstrate how significant European involvement in Central Sudanic, Central Saharan affairs were before the colonial conquest. 

Wadai under Sabun, who restored centralized monarchical power and opened a trade route through Benghazi, represented another visionary leader whose successors arguably failed to live up to the opportunities he created. Although we recall other sources mentioning Wadai's invasion of Bagirmi under Sabun as an action mandated by the Sayfawa mai in Borno, Zeltner focuses on the invasion and subsequent tributary status of Bagirmi as a momentous event and display of the regional ambitions of Sabun. Wadai benefited from Barma and other migrants and slaves who brought with them their weaving and dyeing skills. Moreover, intervention in the affairs of Kanem by investing their own alifa at Mao represented a direct threat to Borno. Despite Sabun's opening of a direct trans-Saharan route to the Mediterranean (instead of going through the Fezzan or the arduous route through Darfur, a state previously at war with Wadai) and his success in reducing Bagirmi to a vassal, his successors closed the kingdom due to fears of a Tripolitanian invasion. It would take decades before Wadai's rulers took full advantage of the commercial opportunities Sabun created. Fortunately for Wadai, their rulers did succeed and in so doing created a state which approximated the borders of modern Chad. 

Unquestionably, the first half of the 19th century brought major changes to the Central Sudan and Libya. Demographic changes with the further migration of Arab nomads south of Lake Chad accompanied political and economic transformations. The slave trade, still of the utmost importance for trans-Saharan commerce, continued unabated. But the growing influence of the British and the French in Tripoli and direct contact with Borno promised significant alterations in the balance of power. Borno emerged from the jihad to the west as reduced power, no longer a hegemonic force. Wadai to the east became a major force to reckon with. Libya, through the fall of the Caramanlis and Awlad Sulayman, was more effectively administered by Ottoman-appointed officials. While British dreams of ending the slave trade and ensuring commerce with the African interior via the Sahara did not materialize, the looming threat of Europe dangled like a sword of Damocles over this region of Africa. 

Wadai from a Chadian Perspective

It is always disappointing when a local scholar of an understudied precolonial African state produces mediocrity. Although Ouaddai, fondation d'un empire by Mahamat Seid Abazène Seid has the benefit of drawing on local, oral sources as well as the written literature on Wadai, it does not suffice for an overview or deep analysis of a major state in precolonial Chad Unfortunately, his frankly too brief book focuses mainly on the founder of Wadai (Abdel Kerim) and jumps all over the place chronologically to make a few generalizations about the nature of the state, its ethnic dimensions, and the administrative positions. There are some occasionally bizarre irrelevant references to Africa as the berceau of monotheism and an interpretation of Chad as both Arab and Africa. The latter position seems fair enough, and no one can deny the centuries-long presence of Arabic-speaking populations in Chad or their inclusion in the states like Wadai, Bagirmi, and Kanem-Borno. 

He seems to mostly support the idea of Abdel Kerim being of Abbasid Arab origin, but also Maba or at least spoke the language. We are also supposed to believe he married the daughter of the last Tunjur king in the region. The mix of traditions also suggest that he may have studied in Borno and Bagirmi as well as spending time in the Hijaz. His state adopted his name, and Wadai became a regional hegemon (albeit most of this seems to be in the 19th century, not the 17th or 18th centuries?). Wadai's problems with royal succession and internal dissension eventually paved the road to French colonial conquest. Nonetheless, Seid's study points to rational administration through the surveillance and rotation of officials and the non-despotic nature of the state. He rightly points out the limitations of al-Tunisi and Nachtigal, especially as the former was biased and his description of the kingdom should rightfully be seen as mainly reflecting the specific era of Saboun's reign. We also suspect Wadai to have been more in the sphere of influence of Borno until the late 18th century or early 19th. After all, Wadai's first invasion of Bagirmi supposedly occurred at the request of the mai. One also suspects the constant struggles for control of Kanem during much of the 1800s attests to Borno's continued interests in Kanem and the eastern shores of Lake Chad. 

Unfortunately, we are forced to rely on al-Tunisi, Barth, Nachtigal, and other outsiders since our surviving corpus of written sources is rather limited. The oral sources have much potential, but Seid's study is too brief and problematic to provide a proper analysis of this major Chadian kingdom (or empire). Moreover, Seid's attempt to interpret the Tarikh al-Fattash and Tarikh al-Sudan to support a Songhai connection or influence on Wadai is difficult to take seriously. Frankly, we do not know to what extent Muslims from the Songhai state were using the "Sudan Road" to reach Mecca. Moreover, the resurgent Borno kingdom as a huge state blocking Songhai from expanding east of Hausaland would suggest weak or limited Songhai influences or impact on Wadai. We find it far more likely that Wadai (and the Darfur Sultanate) owe more to Kanem-Borno and the previous Tunjur state than to any Songhai or Western Sudan societies. One also wonders if any attempt to read the prophecy of a future caliph of Takrur from Tarikh al-Fattash as predicting Wadai's rise is completely misguided. 

Histoire des Arabes sur les rives du lac Tchad

Jean-Claude Zeltner's Histoire des Arabes sur les rives du lac Tchad is one of those important works that sorely needs an updated sequel. The history of Arabs in the Chad Basin is a significant topic pertinent to the ethnographic, demographic, religious, and cultural history of our region. However, the paucity of sources for earlier periods and some of Zeltner's outmoded concepts of "Hamites" hinders this study. One would hope a modern sequel to Zeltner's research would unveil more intimate details of the relations between the state and Arab nomads in the larger region. Instead of seeing Arabs as outside the state and, until the rise of al-Kanemi and Rabeh, marginal, perhaps a new perspective could shed light on more active involvement of some groups in Kanem, Wadai, Borno, the Kotoko principalities, and Bagirmi. Something of this can be gleamed from historians of the Darfur Sultanate or Bagirmi, for example. The Arab population in Bagirmi, for instance, appear to have been one of the 3 principal ethnic groups of the kingdom. Arab relations and intermarriage with the Fulani also seems important.

Unfortunately given our few sources on the earliest penetration of Arab migrations into the Lake Chad area, Zeltner has to really begin with the late Kanem phase of the Sayfawa dynasty. We know from our Arabic sources that the earliest Arab migrations (in this case referring to nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, not Arab traders or individual immigrants coming via Egypt and North Africa) were present in the Kanem region by the late 14th century. Zeltner links them to Arab migrations to Egypt and Sudan since the early days of the Islamic conquests in the 7th century. As indicated in his magisterial history of Kanem, some of these Chadian Arabs claim descent from tribes whose history appears in the records of pre-Islamic Arabia or the early days of Islamic expansion. If Robin Law is correct, these Arabs in 14th century Kanem may have aligned themselves with the Bulala against the Sayfawa, perhaps providing horses and siding with the Bulala in raids and pillaging. It is not too much of a stretch of the imagination to envision the marauding Arab tribes of the 14th century as decentralized and perhaps motivated by easy booty, but lacking deeper loyalties to the Bulala sultans.

Later, during Idris b. Ali's reconquest (or re-assertion of Bulala loyalty to the Borno sultans), Arab populations in Kanem were among those resettled to Borno. According to Zeltner, the Sayfawa dynasty did not rely on Shuwa Arabs in the way al-Kanemi or Rabeh did. Vassals of the Sayfawa, however, did accord some kind of land rights or impose tribute on Arab tribes, like their Borno overlords. Overall, in Zeltner's eyes, the Shuwa remained outside the state and subject to their own shaykhs. Although in Borno an official was appointed by the mai to oversee nomadic groups, they were largely left alone as long as they paid tribute. Perhaps to truly understand Arab populations during the Sayfawa period woudl also require historical context on the Tedas, Dazas, Koyam, Fulani, and Tuareg subject to the Sayfawa of Borno. 

With further migration of Arab tribes into Borno and other regions south of Lake Chad, they came to play a major role in supporting al-Kanemi defeat forces aligned with the jihad to the west. Some of them became key officials of the al-Kanemi dynasty, although the majority remained largely unassimilated. Another group, the Awlad Sulayman, came to play a major role in 19th century Kanem. In spite of their failure to serve the larger interests of a Bornoan reconquest of the lost territory, as effective rulers of Kanem they made the region a buffer between Wadai and Borno. Despite subsequently becoming even more integrated into Rabeh's state, Shuwa Arabs seem to have been most effectively integrated under al-Kanemi and his successors than the Sayfawa. Rabeh, on the other hand, represented something new and different in the region. Despite other scholars seeing continuity from the al-Kanemi dynasty to Rabeh's brief empire, Zeltner emphasizes how it represented a dramatic break with established tradition. Moreover, chiefs of the Arab tribes were now appointed by Rabeh's state directly. 

The rest of Zeltner's book provides a quick overview of the Arab population under French colonial rule. He essentially sees them as a population refusing the modern or new. Their refusal to embrace the modern or find effective ways to challenge it with their own internal resources ensured their marginalization under colonial rule and into the postcolonial period. Following this interpretation, Zeltner briefly summarizes the peculiarities of their vernacular Arabic, family structure, religious life, and the individual. We will have to find Chadian Arab authors or perhaps Chadian or Nigerian scholars who tackle the complex history of Arabs in this region, perhaps scholars who can shed more light on the particularities of Arab-state relations in the Central Sudan. Zeltner's work is indispensable, particularly his work on Kanem. Nonetheless, a more modern approach with comparative data on other transhumant pastoralists could shed new light on the subject. Furthermore, we find Zeltner to be too influenced by Urvoy and Lange on the allegedly "Berber" origins of the Sayfawa dynasty and his view of land tenure in Borno may require some modifications.

Dar al-Kuti and the Outer Periphery

Cordell's history of the Dar al-Kuti Sultanate endeavors to explain the brief state's rise and fall in the context of greater integration of North Central Africa into the wider global, capitalist system of exchange. Beginning from c.1750 and ending with the French assassination of al-Sanussi, Cordell's study situates Dar al-Kuti's rise with an increase in the scale of trans-Saharan trade impacting the area where the Lake Chad, Nile, and Zaire basins intersect, specifically the Ubangi-Shari region. Although pre-1750 contacts certainly existed in some form, and evidence for a Barma or Bagirmi influence can be found in the early Muslim presence in what later became Dar al-Kuti, the Islamic presence and scale of slave raiding grew exponentially over the course of the 19th century. By the early 20th century, the slave trade was so central to the Sultanate that al-Sanussi had no other alternative in order to acquire the firearms, ammunitions and luxury imports to support his state and dependents. 

The expansion of slave raiding and trading for northern partners and the trans-Saharan routes led to unprecedented migrations, relocations, and, gradually, a larger Muslim presence as traders, settlers, and converts participated in this new, centralized state. According to Cordell, the origins of Dar al-Kuti began with a Runga (or someone of Bagirmi and Runga origins) appointed to oversee the region on behalf of the rulers of Dar Runga, itself a tributary to Wadai. Darfur's Sultanate had previously been a major player but lost control of southern trade routes leading to Central Africa while Wadai reaped the benefits. Over time, the region of Dar al-Kuti became more significant in the mid and late 19th century under Kobur and al-Sanussi, who promoted trade. The latter especially supported trans-Saharan trade through slave raiding. Once aligned with Sudanese warlord Rabeh, and massacring a French team in order to acquire firearms, al-Sanussi established an army replenished by slave recruits and imported guns. Cordell sees this as an example of secondary empire as al-Sanusi, like his former mentor, Rabih, used advanced military techniques and newer guns to build better equipped armies that preyed on various societies in North Central Africa for slaves, ivory, and new soldiers. 

However, given the origins of Dar al-Kuti in Dar Runga and Wadai, one can also see the state as inheriting a tradition that ultimately begins with Kanem, Bagirmi, and Borno in the Chad basin. In one sense, the state of Dar al-Kuti resembled those earlier, northern ones in its establishment of a centralized state which relied heavily on the slave trade and war. By preying on Banda, Kresh, Sara, and other groups who lacked centralized states, al-Sanussi was able to procure additional labor for local agriculture as well as exchange with Jellaba or other northern traders for cloth, guns, tea, sugar, beads, and other manufactured goods. In one sense, al-Sanussi accomplished on a smaller scale some of the same things Idris b. Ali of Borno did in the late 16th century. Like his more famous Borno counterpart, he incorporated firearms into his military and engaged in many population relocations or displacements while centralizing authority. Unlike Borno, Dar al-Kuti lacked a cavalry force and did not possess a large livestock, leather, salt or textile industry. Ecological and other factors contributed to this, as did Central Africa being more of a frontier in which Islam was largely restricted to the ruling group. Nevertheless, Dar al-Kuti was certainly also part of a pattern of Central Sudanic states that began long before in the north, one which gradually spread further south as more societies invested in trans-Saharan (and Sudanic) trade. Like its better known northern counterparts, Dar al-Kuti had its core, tributary and predatory zones but time and looming French conquest prevented the process from evolving into a larger state or empire.

So, Dar al-Kuti, despite its brief existence, represented a fascinating fusion of two separate developments that impacted the Central Sudan and Central Africa. One, the "secondary empire" effect, developed as soldiers with experience in the Egyptian conquest of Sudan brought military techniques and updated firearms to new regions. Their military superiority gave them an edge over various local populations, triggering migrations, displacement, and recruitment that reverberated across the vast region between Lake Chad and the Nile. Even centralized states did not always survive the challenge represented by Zubayr and Rabih. Indeed, Borno itself fell to Rabih in the 1890s. The second process was the gradual extension of the Central Sudanic state model further south into Central Africa as the frontier pushed south by the 18th and 19th centuries. The genius of al-Sanussi consisted of his decision to model his army and state on certain aspects of Rabih's destructive empire and build his own slave trading state. Even on the outer periphery of the trans-Saharan trade, itself a periphery of the Mediterranean and European-dominated commerce of his time, al-Sanussi created a large, centralized kingdom. Unfortunately for him, French colonialism and suppression of the slave trade meant his state was not long to last in the 20th century. 

The Sun Kings and the Central Sudan

Reyna's Wars without End: The Political Economy of a Precolonial African State is one of the few serious studies on the kingdom of Bagirmi accessible online. While mostly based on the 19th century and applying structural Marxist theoretical models to understanding the the Bagirmi state, Reyna proposes some interesting and plausible ideas on this kingdom as an example of predatory accumulation. In some respects, the analysis of Bagirmi's institutions and the role of war can be seen in Kanem-Borno, Wadai and Darfur. All these states seem to be influenced by similar ecological and demographic profiles with some common or shared influences from Kanem's formation sometime in the late first millennium of our era. In other words, the importance of labor in agrarian societies with low productivity shaped by a challenging environment (unpredictable rainfall levels in Bagirmi, for example, or the desiccation of Kanem after 1200), and a household state structure meant that these kingdoms or empires required a system of tribute, taxation and booty through raids to support an elite class of office holders and royal court. 

Family life presents one obvious case of parallels and similarities between Bagirmi and Borno. The domestic mode of production in Bagirmi bears a resemblance to that of Borno in that agriculture was carried out by patrilineal or patrifocal extended kin who, in theory, followed the directives of a male head of the unit. Juniors in this extended family unit were expected to show deference to their superiors until they married and became "successful" by having many children and starting their own unit. This brings to mind Cohen's conclusions on Kanuri family structure and the emphasis on respect or discipline-respect between patrons and clients. A successful Kanuri male would have had many wives, children, and dependents. Having dependents was a source of wealth since they produced the labor that could support his farm or other endeavors. A Kanuri, at least during the time of Cohen's fieldwork, might attach himself as a client to a wealthy or important Kanuri who could one day look out for his interests and assist him. Like the Barma officials of the royal court, government officials in Borno seem to have developed similar patron-client ties with their staff or court staff. Kanuri domestic life seems to have been similar, too, with the domestic mode of production of the village being mirrored by that of the state. 

For the officials of Bagirmi and Borno, more similarities can be found. In order to militarily arm and reward their followers or clients (perhaps clients is more accurate in the Kanuri case than that of the Barma), booty, especially slaves, were necessary to purchase imported horses, weapons, chainmail, or luxuries via trans-Saharan trade. This produced a cycle of contradictions in which the state relied on taxation of surplus crops cultivated by free farmers (with some slave villages in each of the aforementioned kingdoms) at low productivity. The constant raids and levying of tribute in order to supplement this for the ruling group (the mbangs of Bagirmi, mais of Kanem-Borno, kolaks of Wadai) in turn created difficulties for states or acephalous societies in the tributary or predatory zones by harming their domestic mode of production that was often similarly of low productivity. 

Moreover, some of the societies in tributary or predatory zones of the main kingdoms developed into military powers of their own, creating additional tributary or predatory zones that could challenge the "imperial" states and extend the system of predatory accumulation deeper into areas inhabited by "pagans" or kirdi. Reyna does not speculate on this, but one wonders if the origins of Bagirmi and Wadai can be traced to an earlier past as victims of raids from Kanem-Borno before becoming tributary states who gradually asserted themselves into regional powers of the Chad Basin. The Central Sudanic state seems to have preferred to have tributary and predatory zones separating itself from other centralized kingdoms, but the systemic instability of predatory accumulation would have eventually led to the the emergence of other cores that threatened, say, Kanem and later on, Borno. 

The central role played by Kanem-Borno as a major model for Bagirmi and other states in the Chad Basin suggests Bagirmi's history is also one of the contradictory diffusion of a Kanuri model or civilization across much of the Chad Basin (and beyond). According to Reyna, 24 percent of the titles in Bagirmi's court were of Kanuri origin. Similar Kanuri influences can be found as far away as Darfur, Fezzan, and Hausaland. The Sayfawa state appears to have exerted its influence across a vast range of the Central Sudan in a manner that created tributary states which gradually incorporated or adapted aspects of Sayfawa administration. In turn, their states continued or developed a similar state that relied on war and predatory accumulation which, after several centuries, eroded Sayfawa dominance of the Chad Basin. However, because the Kanem state was the origin of the model, even states which had long evaded Sayfawa suzerainty may have found it advantageous to associate with the past regional hegemon whose rulers enjoyed the most ancient association with Islam. This might account for local perception of Borno as the dominant power in the Central Sudan even after its decline in the 18th century. Even tiny Mandara could defeat Borno in 1781, yet others described it as the greatest or most powerful kingdom in the Sudan.

However, knowing that part of Borno's economy was built on the trade in salt, textiles, and its privileged position in trans-Saharan trade links to the Fezzan and Tripoli, one cannot help but wonder if the Sayfawa state did deviate from the predatory accumulation model seen in Bagirmi. According to Dewiere, for instance, Borno did not necessarily procure most of its slave exports from raids carried out by Bornoans. Instead, Borno became a depot for the slave exports of Bagirmi in the 18th century (and probably far earlier). Borno's functioning as a depot and its once dominant position in the movement of salt and textiles must have favored market growth and a prosperous merchant class. While they appear to have not invested in production, we would not be surprised if slave villages were more prominent in Borno than in Bagirmi. Furthermore, Borno faced Hausaland to the west, and was therefore tapped into a vast commercial network that moved kola nuts, salt, leather products, horses, and textiles and even gold. Before the Sokoto Caliphate's rise, Borno appears to have been the economic center of this vast network which must have encouraged some investments in production, market growth, and capital accumulation. Indeed, we know from Heinrich Barth that Kanuri or Bornoan migrants played a pivotal role in Bagirmi's 19th century textile industry. Perhaps Borno was able to deviate from predatory accumulation just before the shocks of the jihad of the early 19th century forever reoriented the Central Sudan. 

State and Society in Three Central Sudanic Kingdoms

Anders J. Bjørkelo's important comparative study of Kanem-Borno, Wadai, and Bagirmi is a worthwhile read on state development, trade, warfare, and administration of 3 of the major kingdoms of the Central Sudan. Although mostly based on 19th century sources and early colonial reports and collections, especially Barth and Nachtigal (and al-Tunisi for Wadai and a little on Bagirmi), Bjørkelo proposes some interesting insights into the nature of the state in these connected kingdoms. Like other scholars, especially O'Fahey, whose influence can be seen in Bjørkelo's analysis of the rituals of seclusion in the three aforementioned kingdoms, he traces their development as "divine kingships" with core, tributary and raiding/plundering zones that were influenced by the technological and ecological constraints of Central Sudan. Due to the diversity of the populations and the presence of agriculturalists and pastoral groups who were unified through coronation rituals, tribute, redistribution, trade, security provided by the state, and a similar level of development in agricultural and technological capacity (and, perhaps, low population densities in the case of Bagirmi if not all three states), one can develop a model of the "Central Sudanic" state in which Kanem-Borno was perhaps the most complex in its administrative apparatus. One could likely extend some of the conclusions to Darfur, the previous Tunjur state, and perhaps other states along the Sudanic belt.

The question of cultural and political diffusion from Kanem-Borno to Bagirmi and Wadai is not analyzed here (except for one 16th century Bagirmi king), but the antiquity of Kanem and its premier place as the dominant state in the larger region for most of the last 1000 years suggests Kanem or its subsequent Borno phase was a major influence on the development of administrative titles, practices, and Islamic conversion in Bagirmi and Wadai. Kanem was also, if Bjørkelo is correct, able to dominate the region so long by preventing the emergence of strong satellite states that would have encroached upon Sayfawa control of trade routes or access to the tribute (necessary to supplement the revenues from local taxes for the lavish lifestyle of notables and the royal court) and wealth via slave raids and plunder on peripheral peoples with less political centralization. Of course, the development of Wadai in the 17th century and the definite establishment of Bagirmi in the 16th (perhaps due to the Bulala rulers in Kanem losing control of Bagirmi) eventually modified the political landscape. 

In the 19th century, Borno lost Kanem and Baghirmi (which paid a nominal tribute to Borno) to Wadai and it was already losing part of its western and northern spheres of influence due to the loss of Bilma's salt caravan to the Tuareg and the followers of Uthman dan Fodio. Nonetheless, it was in Borno that the state appeared to have relied more heavily on royal slave officials, who were more reliable than officials of the royal family or notable lineages. Thus, according to Bjørkelo, Borno enjoyed more political stability than Wadai and it was in a better place than Bagirmi, which lacked a nokena or council. One might consider Kanem-Borno the inner core of the Central Sudan while Wadai and Bagirmi were also central but further removed from the center until the 19th century. Islam and the creative interplay of local traditions of kingship ("divine") and the new faith must have added to the reputation, perception of piety and power of the Sayfawa mais who, in several cases, performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and added that layer of religious or spiritual power to the already sacral elements of kingship. In short, the mai could be the 'king of kings' and recognized as such by several other dynasties of the Sudan because of Kanem-Borno's core position in the Central Sudan and the propagation of its own style of rulership and cosmopolitan Islamic connections that introduced Mediterranean and Near Eastern goods into the region. 

Unfortunately, one wishes Bjørkelo had found more of a balance between external sources and local, indigenous ones. Ahmad b. Furtu and Palmer's translations of mahrams, plus some of the European sources based on interviews with local populations add some depth. However, this is a study that relies heavily on Barth, Nachtigal, Muhammad al-Tunisi and the colonial-era reports or observations. A more extensive use of local sources and oral history may have strengthened the author's arguments or forced a qualification of some of the tentative conclusions reached in the study. For instance, we would have attempted to more extensively cite correspondence of local rulers to North Africa or Constantinople or endeavored to cite Ali Eisami narrative and extensive glossary of Kanuri terms, many of which have a political or economic nature. Similarly, local Arabic and ajami manuscripts, perhaps less available to the author in the 1970s, could be used more easily today to understand the role of the ulama in each of the respective kingdoms. Bobboyi was able to do this quite well in the case of ulama-state relations in Borno through textual sources and oral history. Dewière used even more sources (beyond Seetzen, Lyon, Barth, Nachtigal, Denham) to find more local Borno voices or perspectives to contextualize Borno in Saharan, Sudanic, and Islamic zones. Of course, if the sources are still limited for Bagirmi and Wadai, one would have to rely on Lauture, al-Tunisi, Barth, Nachtigal, and the colonial studies. 

Darfur Sultanate

Although Darfur is not Kanem-Borno, it is a part of a broader array of societies and polities that developed in the Sudanic Belt. Moreover, the Keira sultans of Darfur seem to owe something to the ancient civilization of Kanem-Borno. Indeed, if O'Fahey's excellent The Darfur Sultanate: A History, is any reliable indicator, Darfur seems to have been an easternmost extension of the "Central Sudan" region. The ancient use of Maghrebi-styled Arabic script in some of the early extant documents plus the presence of Kanuri words (goni, mayram) and people (oral traditions of a branch of the Sayfawa dynasty in the region, plus Borno faqihs and traders active in Darfur) do suggest some degree of influence from Borno. 

While O'Fahey seems to reject the theory of a Sayfawa colony in Darfur in the 1400s or 1500s as an unproven theory of Arkell, Darfur appears to have been, like Bagirmi and Wadai, at least partly influenced by Kanem-Borno and likely received some of its earliest Islamic influences from the west. Early medieval references to what is likely today's Darfur, particularly the Tajuwiyyin (probably the Daju, who may have established the first known kingdom or polity) and the subsequent Tunjur state, Uri, and the Darfur Sultanate as it existed under the Keira from the 17th century to 1916 definitely enjoyed cultural and economic ties to Kanem-Borno. Later, particularly after the conquest of Kordofan (making the kingdom as large as Nigeria for decades), Darfur's relations with the Nilotic Sudan and Egypt were unsurprisingly strengthened, and placing Darfur as a bridge of sorts between the Eastern and Central Sudan. In fact, one of the sultans, Muhammad al-Husayn, was of Ethiopian origin through his mother and merchants from Egypt and the Nilotic Sudan appear to have played a major role in the development of Kobbei as a city and economic link between the Nile Valley and Darfur. Fulani Islamic scholars, Borno faqihs, Bagirmi slaves and mercenaries, and even a Mauritian Shinqiti could become influential in the court or towns and settlements like Manawashi. 

As for the history of the Keira and their kingdom, O'Fahey mainly draws on al-Tunisi, Nachtigal, a number of charters and court records, letters, oral traditions, and external European and Middle Eastern documents that shed light on the history of the region or its relations with the outside world. Some pleasant surprises include Arabic local sources from the Tunjur state that preceded the sultanate, which was already partly Islamic, as well as a rich body of land charters that O'Fahey exploits to reconstruct land tenure (mostly usufructuary and entirely dependent on the will of the sultan), rural social structure, and the role of centralizing mechanisms in state administration. The richest source, besides oral traditions, appear to be the writings of al-Tunisi and Nachtigal for their detailed portraits of the sultanate in the 19th century. By this time, the sultanate was no longer making new conquests, but did appear to have gradually pushed south through slave raiding (although always requiring passage through lands controlled by Baqqara nomads) and incorporated a plethora of ethnic groups: Fur, Masalit, Meidob, Birged, Zaghawa, Fartit, and others. 

According to O'Fahey, Islam became one of the tools of the centralizing process as the Darfur sultanate transformed from warbands of the 17th century to one in need of more effective centralization in the 18th century after new conquests essentially ceased. The recipients of land grants and new administrative posts, often including Islamic holymen from the east or west, brought skilled and loyal bureaucrats, generals, and merchants into serving the state apparatus while simultaneously weakening the traditional titleholders. Naturally, this process was uneven and pre-Islamic religious and political influences continued to shape the kingdom. Islam did gradually become more influential on the Keira royal court, and several kings sponsored the construction of mosques, established land grants to religious scholars (like the mahrams and mallamtis of Borno), and engaged in the larger Muslim world to establish Darfur as a legitimate member of the Dar al-Islam. 

Yet, like the sultans of Agadez, the Darfur sultans faced severe limits to how much authority they could effectively yield. The low population density of Darfur probably placed limits on how much taxation and exploitation fief holders could get away with on the peasantry. Nomadic populations to the north and south controlled the access points of Darfur's major trans-Saharan trade commodities (slaves, ivory, gum arabic). In order to reach the slave raiding areas to the south and southwest, the kingdom's bands had to pass through lands controlled by nomads only loosely under the control of the sultans. Then, trans-Saharan caravans going to Egypt from Kobbei had to pass through desert or Sahelian landscapes under the control of the Zaghawa or other nomadic populations. It seems, perhaps like the Sayfawa dynasty, the Keira sultans engaged in some marital alliances with subject populations to facilitate trade and political incorporation of non-Fur peoples, but the demographic and ecological barriers imposed limits on how much authority the Keira could yield. If one adds the factor of conflicts over succession to the throne and the failure to adapt in time to new military technology, it is no surprise that the Keira were defeated by al-Zubayr so easily. Needless to say, Rabih, who served under al-Zubayr, would later go on to conquer Borno with the military tactics and armaments al-Zubayr used so effectively against the cavalry of Darfur.

Perhaps for our purposes, the best way to think about Darfur is in terms of its "Sudanic" dimensions as a crossroads of the Sudanic belt. In many respects, it brings to mind Borno and the Funj with regards to the land grants, mounted warrior elite soldiers, reliance on the slave trade (though O'Fahey thinks most slaves taken in raids by the Darfur state were used locally), tension between Islam and pre-Islamic practice, and centralizing administrative tendencies restricted by various factors. Unlike the sultans in Agadez, the Keira sultans were not elected by nomads determined to prevent the sultan from becoming too powerful, but obstacles to their centralization could be found in other ways. Like the Sayfawa dynasty in Borno, the Keira had to find a way to balance the sometimes conflictual subsistence economies of their subject populations while also supporting markets, long-distance trade, security, and, to the extent possible, cementing their relations with the larger (Islamic) world, even France. Darfur appears to have done this through supporting African pilgrims en route to the Holy Land, as well as engaging in diplomatic relations with the Ottomans, Egypt, and other states. One sultan, Muhammad Tayrab, even went so far as to order an expensive Arabic dictionary produced by an Indian scholar. Other sultans received honorific titles from Constantinople. These Sudanic states resemble, to a certain extent, "feudal" societies of Europe and Asia with a "Sudanic" state structure of private and communal land tenure, partly literate bureaucracies, monarchs with elective councils, and a constant struggle for harmonizing countervailing forces.