Investigating
the history of Bagirmi before the 19th century is an arduous task. Due
to the lack of detailed sources on the history of this part of the Chad Basin
before the 1800s, Bagirmi receives less attention than its more famous
neighboring polities, Kanem and Borno. Moreover, the 19th and 20th
centuries provide far richer source materials, consisting of travel reports, al-Tunisi’s
account of Sabun’s invasion of Bagirmi, and a plethora of colonial-era publications
and reports. This material, naturally, makes it far easier to research Bagirmi
in the 1800s whilst its earlier period remains somewhat shadowy. In an attempt
to explore early Bagirmi history, this brief article will analyze the reign of mbang
Burkomanda I of Bagirmi, whose reign has been tentatively dated c. 1635-1665
by Gustav Nachtigal. In spite of the paucity of written sources from this time,
one can triangulate various traditions from Bagirmi, Wadai and its neighbors to
create a fuller narrative of Burkomanda’s reign. Moreover, Burkomanda I’s reign
was part of a much larger trend of dynamic political leadership across much of
the Chad Basin and the Central Sudan in the 1600s. Indeed, Burkomanda’s reign
overlapped with a period of political change and unrest to the east of Lake
Chad, one which Bagirmi endeavored to profit from through far-flung raids and
political interventions. Symbolically and materially, this was represented by
the erection of brick walls around the palace in Massenya, cementing the ascent
of the mbang in the wider region.
A
Commentary on the Sources
Whilst a few important works have been written
by Anglophone and Francophone scholars on Bagirmi’s royal genealogy, much
remains to be done. Even so, studies of the kingdom’s cosmological symbolism, political
structure or its model of predatory accumulation have been produced. Still,
little has been done to advance the study of pre-1800 Bagirmi. John Lavers, in
a brief essay published in Annals of Borno tentatively sketched this lengthy
period of Bagirmi history (c. 1500-1800), but largely repeated Nachtigal. Besides
Lavers, of course, many colonial-era writers wrote studies on Bagirmi kingship,
history, the Barma language, or the specific Melfi district. But few have been
able to advance beyond this due to the contradictions in the oral traditions,
which all the sources ultimately rely upon. In other words, unless new textual
sources come to light, historians will not progress from Nachtigal’s schematic
view of Bagirmi history. Indeed, some scholars,
such as Viviana Pâques, have even gone as far as to challenge simple
assumptions of linear historical narratives in the oral materials. In a move
that recalls the ways in which Zuidema interpreted the Spanish cronistas on
the history of the Incas, Pâques seems to believe that much of what is reported
in the traditions reported to Nachtigal, Barth, and others is ultimately tied
to a mythological and cosmological order of thinking.
However, close examination of the
various 19th century and colonial-era reports and texts can be
triangulated for a deeper understanding of Burkomanda I’s reign. For instance, the
various lists of Bagirmi kings produced by Nachtigal, Escayrac de Lauture, Barth,
Lanier, and Palmer can be subjected to greater scrutiny. This can unveil commonalities
and patterns.
Using Henri Carbou’s writings on the Bulala and Wadai, as well as al-Tunisi, highlight
some of Wadai’s traditions as relevant for reconstructing Bagirmi history. Abadie,
Palmer, Tubiana, Barkindo, and Hagenbucher on the history of Bagirmi’s
neighbors and rival polities can shed further light. For example, a number of
Bagirmi-oriented sources allude to ephemeral reigns of Wadai kings usually
omitted from the Wadai kings lists. By using the general dates for Wadai, the
Bulala sultans in Fitri, Mandara, as well as Kanem and Borno, one can better
contextualize the events associated with Burkomanda’s reign. In addition, utilizing
these sources permits a likely more accurate reading of Bagirmi’s attempts to
assert itself in a politically dynamic Chad Basin and Central Sudan during the
1600s.
Mbang Burkomanda I’s Rise to Power
Although little is
known of Burkomanda’s early life, he is intriguingly remembered by the name of
his mother, Aisa Bele. Furthermore, he was reportedly the son of Omar, who
reigned from c. 1608-1625 in Nachtigal’s chronology. Surprisingly, Burkomanda
was tchiroma during the reign of his uncle, Dalai (r. 1625-1635). One can surmise from this
that Burkomanda’s mother may have hailed from a powerful faction or family in
Bagirmi, if Burkomanda’s maternal kin helped him succeed his uncle.
Burkomanda also benefited from the political
reforms and accomplishments of Abdallah (r. 1568-1608). This powerful mbang promoted
Islamic reforms in Bagirmi’s state structure and created several powerful posts
held by individuals of slave origin. Indeed, Nachtigal seemingly believed that
the powerful military officer, the fatsha, was held by a slave since the
time of Abdallah. This may have been done to weaken the influence of brothers,
uncles and other relations in Bagirmi’s royal disputes and military leadership.
Abdallah was also believed by Nachtigal to have completely reversed the
tributary relationship with the Bulala sultans, too. By 1608, this seminal
Bagirmi ruler was allegedly responsible for imposing a small tribute on Middogo
and receiving annual presents from the Bulala, Logon, and Kousseri.
In short, Bagirmi had already
demonstrated signs of greater political centralization and expansion during the
reign of Abdallah. Indeed, this may have triggered a campaign from Borno’s
Idris b. Ali (r. 1564-1596) which led to his death. Undoubtedly, Burkomanda benefitted
from the reforms of his grandfather and may have sought to surpass his
predecessor, Dalai, who was less successful in his military raid against the
Musgo (Musgun).
Burkomanda later succeeded in expanding the scale of military actions,
intervened in Fitri, and even struck Borno territory in Kawar.
Raiding Far and Wide for Three Years
Believed to have
begun a long series of campaigns soon after his reign began, Burkomanda led his
troops far and wide. Targeting Burlum, Bayo, and Bolongo districts, Burkomanda threatened
the Kenga. Crossing to Middogo and Fitri, Burkomanda went even further afield.
His troops crossed Batha and the Bahr el-Ghazal to Kanem, then moved to the
Karka region. Then, Bagirmi raiders struck Borku and Kawar, before passing to
the south and plundering the Shuwa in the Kotoko principalities. This was
followed by another attack, this time against Mandara. Fellata to the south of Mandara
were also targeted before Burkomanda camped his troops in Musgo territory. Due
to the wishes of his soldiers to return, Burkomanda eventually agreed. Given that tradition
remembers this taking place over the course of three years, one must ask why
the ruler of Bagirmi was eager to launch several punitive raids and actions
against Bagirmi’s neighbors. Given the volatile conditions in Kanem around this
time and the formation of Wadai, perhaps in c. 1635 (to use Nachtigal’s
chronology), one can best interpret Burkomanda’s actions as an attempt to
profit from and exert Bagirmi’s status as a regional power.
Beginning with Kanem, a political vacuum
made raids and possible expansion attractive. The Bulala sultans were defeated
by the Tunjur and were no longer relevant here. Borno, whose ruler, Umar b.
Idris, likely appointed Dala Afuno to oversee Kanem around this time, relied on
the alifas to ensure the tribute from Kanem. However, Dala Afuno was
remembered in Kanem for having to wage war on various groups to receive any
tribute. Indeed, Dala Afuno had to fight the Tubu, Daganas, El-Lassalas, Shuwas
and Koukas to the west of Lake Fitri to pay tribute.
Besides trouble receiving tribute, conflict
with the recently arrived Tunjur, migrating after Wadai’s foundation in c. 1635,
soon arose. Tunjur tradition, according to Gros, remembers conflict between the
Tunjur and Bulala occurring at Mao during the time of Dawud’s grandson, Smain. While
the Tunjur eventually seized Mao, Tunjur tradition specifically named their
leader, Ramadan, as dying in conflict with the Dala Afuno. In other words, Kanem
during the 1630s was politically volatile and unstable as the first alifa sent
by the Sayfawa was engaged in conflict with various groups refusing to pay
tribute. Sensing this insecurity and instability, Burkomanda may have viewed
Kanem as relatively easy to raid. This would explain why he was able to reach beyond
to Borku and Kawar.
As for the raids on Borku and Kawar, one sees
another aspect of Bagirmi’s long-term regional aspirations. Due to its
geographic position, the kingdom lacked direct access to towns in the southern
Sahara used for profitable trans-Saharan trade. Bagirmi needed access to these to
become less dependent on Borno for North African, European, and other goods. Thus,
it is likely Burkomanda envisioned long-term acquisitions to the far north. Lavers was correct to
note this possible motive for Burkomanda’s actions, perhaps aiming to maintain
Kanem’s openness for commerce or to assert Bagirmi control over routes to the
north. The ultimate failure of
this strategy may be explained by the distance involved and the eventual
restoration of Sayfawa authority in Kanem through the consolidation of the alifas.
Nonetheless, memories of this Bagirmi raid in Bilma were vivid enough when
Maurice Abadie reported it. In Kawar tradition, however, the Bagirmi attack
which resulted in a massacre of the town’s population was the result of a
Bulala attack.
This may have been a result of Burkomanda’s close relationship with the Bulala
sultans in Fitri, particularly as his sister, Zara, was married to the Bulala ruler.
Afterwards, Burkomanda’s forces moved
south and west. Attacks against the Shuwa certainly included many cattle and
horses among the booty. The assault directed against Mandara, which may have
been ruled by Abale at the time, was probably inspired by Mandara expansion
into the Musgo (Musgun) territories. Burkomanda’s goal was undoubtedly intended
to minimize the expansion of rival polities into Bagirmi’s own raiding zones
and tributary regions. Mandara, at the time not yet Islamic, was possibly also
attacked by Borno during the reign of Ali b. Umar (c. 1639-1677). This suggests
that Mandara’s rulers were expansionist at this time or threatening its peer
polities. In fact, according to Barkindo, Bagirmi’s attack “appears to have had
the purpose of checking Wandala expansion into what was assumed by Bagirmi, to
be her own area of influence.”
Lastly, Burkomanda’s whirlwind campaigns included
the Fitri region for an important reason. Heading toward that direction was
important for the alliance between the Bulala sultans and Bagirmi at this time.
Sealed through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to the Bulala sultan, this seemingly
developed after the Bulala already established the dynasty in the Fitri region,
after defeating the Kuka. Bulala oral traditions attribute this to a half-Tubu
Bulala prince, Djil Esa Tubo, or Djili Esa Toubo. According to traditions not
cited by Carbou, this Djil Esa Tubo actually lived in Bagirmi with his mother
for some time. If so, it is no wonder that Djil Esa Toubou was likely the
Bulala ruler who married Burkomanda’s sister. He was already raised there and probably
connected to Bagirmi elites. Carbou, presumably
drawing on oral traditions as well as the earlier work of Nachtigal, provides
strong evidence for a Bulala-Bagirmi alliance around the time of Burkomanda, confirmed
through the marriage of Burkomanda’s sister to Djil Esa Tubo. This, in turn,
explains why Burkomanda may have included the Fitri area in his lengthy military
excursions during his reign.
By contextualizing this seemingly random
series of attacks within the wider political changes affecting Kanem as well as
the foundation of Wadai to the east, one can perceive how Bagirmi’s actions
were likely done in response to a politically volatile moment. Burkomanda sought
to strengthen his position within the Central Sudan through raids, political expansion,
and achieving long-term economic goals through access to Kawar and Borku.
Attacking Mandara due to the latter’s expansion into Musgun lands was designed
to ensure Bagirmi’s own sphere of influence there and source of captives.
Bagirmi interests in Fitri were tied to their relationship with the Bulala and,
perhaps, a desire to keep an eye on developments further east in Wadai.
The Later Years of Burkomanda I
Unfortunately, the remainder of Burkomanda
I’s reign becomes much harder to contextualize. Besides campaigns against the
Sarua and Ndamm about 3 years later, little else is known, except for a war
with Wadai. Nonetheless, one can detect Burkomanda’s continued interests in
expansion and promoting his own position across the region with brick walls for
the palace. A later war with Waday suggests Bagirmi was, at this time, still a
stronger power.
Nachtigal, one of the better sources, wrote of
subsequent campaigns led by the mbarma and fatsha. Directed
against the Sarua and Ndamm, they were not especially successful. Burkomanda’s later
execution of his fatsha and mbarma due to a small offense is not explained
by Nachtigal but may be connected to this. Perhaps their failure to achieve success
like Burkomanda’s earlier campaigns aroused his anger. Or the two were involved
in a plot. Given the vast military authority these figures held, it is
difficult to imagine Burkomanda ordering their execution on a simple offense. Lack
of success in military ventures or a political conflict may have been part of
it.
Developments in architecture or the
material expression of royal authority also occurred at this time. Burkomanda
appears to have been the first to construct a brick wall for the palace in
Massenya. According to Nachtigal, at least. The use of brick for
royal or elite structures has a longer history in Kanem and Borno, areas which influenced
the development of the Bagirmi state. To see them used here in Burkomanda’s
reign must be interpreted as an expression of the state’s political ascent in
the Central Sudan. After all, besides Bagirmi, the use of fired-brick had been practiced
by the Bulala and Sayfawa, rival dynasties which had once dominated Burkomanda’s
polity. By employing them in his own palace, Burkomanda demonstrated Bagirmi’s ascending
status as a Sudanic power.
Finally, Bagirmi’s war with Waday during Burkomanda’s
reign raises more tantalizing questions. Sparked by Waday’s attacks on the Bulala
state in Fitri, which led to the capture of Burkomanda’s sister, they clearly
indicate the importance of the Fitri area for Wadai and Bagirmi. Nachtigal wrote
that Burkomanda freed his sister after a battle at Rabbana on the west bank of
the Fitri.
Carbou, on the other hand, saw a possible Kuka role in fostering a Waday attack
in Fitri, perhaps to force the Bulala sultans out of the region.
With Lanier, likely drawing from Escayrac
de Lauture, one learns more about Wadai’s leader during this war. Apparently, Wadai’s
troops were led by a king named Mohamed ez Zaouni, who supposedly attacked
twice. In the second attack, at Middogo, Wadai forces captured Burkomanda’s
sister. But Burkumanda was able to “refouler les Ouadaiens.” In Escayrac de Lauture’s
version of events, Burkomanda’s victory against Wadai took place at a place
called Sadao. His version emphasized that after the capture of Wadai’s Mohammed-Zaouni,
“qui avait occupé le trône pendant six mois,” Wadai replaced him with a
king named Issa. But, tellingly, any war with Bagirmi was finished by an
unspecified epidemic. In other words, Bagirmi
not only captured the Wadai king, but the conflict continued until an outbreak
of disease or pestilence forced an end.
Unfortunately, none of the Wadai king
lists mention this Mohammed-Zaouni or Issa, but Lauture’s list of Wadai rulers
places them after Abd el-Kerim and a king named Edris (Idris). As it appears quite
likely that the standard lists of Wadai kings tend to omit names of rulers who
only lasted briefly on the throne, Mohammed-Zaouni and Issa may have been very
brief rulers sometime in the 1650s or 1660s. Indeed, Lauture’s list places Issa
right before Saleh-Dered, clearly omitting many Wadai kings of the 1700s. Another
writer, Carbou, likewise noted at least one king often not included in the Wadai
kingslist: El Djezam, who succeeded Kharif. If, as Lauture indicates,
Mohamed-Zaouni and Edris ruled for less than a year while Issa reigned for
under 2 years, it is possible they briefly occupied the throne after c. 1655,
when Abd el-Kerim likely died (according to Nachtigal’s chronology).
Undoubtedly, much of Burkomanda’s relatively
long reign of 30 years has not survived in traditions. Nevertheless, the later
annals of his reign included the use of brick walls, the victory against Wadai,
and Burkomanda’s actions regarding the Surua and Ndamm. Of course, the
executions of his fatsha and mbarma raise a number of tantalizing
questions, too. The victory against Wadai raises important manners related to
the known chronology and list of kings of this state in the 17th
century. Despite the unexplained factors in the rest of his reign, the use of
brick attests to a regional aspiration to status and power in the Central
Sudan. Likewise, the ruler’s continued interest in Bagirmi’s expansion and
influence in neighboring peoples demonstrates an ongoing interest in “predatory
accumulation.”
Conclusions on Bagirmi in the Pivotal
17th Century
Despite the limited written sources for
this period in Bagirmi history, deep investigations into the earlier centuries
of Bagirmi’s political history are feasible. Endeavors to make sense of the
contradictions must keep in mind the importance of looking to traditions from
neighboring societies and rival polities, too. Whilst some contradictions and
gaps will remain unresolved, one can approach a holistic view of pivotal
Bagirmi mbang reigns prior to the 19th century.
This tentative analysis of Burkomanda I’s
reign was an attempt to do so. By contextualizing what is reported about
Bagirmi’s neighbors and rival states in the middle decades of the 17th
century, one can make sense of (or at least approach a reasonable
interpretation) how Bagirmi, for some time during the dynamic 17th
century, asserted itself as a major state in the Central Sudan. This was
accomplished or attempted through military raids and wars, the adoption of
brick buildings, interventions in Fitri and Kanem, and Bagirmi success against
Wadai. Future scholarship on this period of Bagirmi history must examine more
closely the question of religion, particularly in the aftermath of Umar b.
Idris of Borno’s termination of the first Kalumbardo. Subsequent research must
thoroughly revisit the list of kings for Waday, the Bulala in Fitri, the alifas
of Kanem and the Tunjur to better understand how the Bulala sultans losing
Kanem led to Bagirmi’s attempt to fill a political void.
