Shuwa Arabs Documentary

After watching this same channel's series on the Kanuri, we decided to check out their other videos. They are short and of course are not anywhere close to a complete history. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see people from the region interviewed and discussing their traditions and history. The Shuwa Arabs appear to have been present in Kanem by the 14th century, where a reference to them seems evident in a letter from the Sayfawa mai to the Mamluk sultan, Barquq, written in 1391/2. According to that letter, Judham Arabs even killed a mai, so nomadic Arabs had become involved in the unstable conditions in Kanem related to civil war and the Sayfawa versus Bulala. This documentary focuses on aspects of Shuwa Arab culture and traditions, like marriages or the former importance of camels. 

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850 is another one of Zeltner's shorter books, this one consisting of some introductory chapters and essays on 4 major figures who shaped the Chad Basin in the first half of the 19th century. Beginning with 2 chapters on the regional context and Arab migrations before delving into Abd al-Jalil, Yusuf Caramanli, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi and Sabun of Wadai, Zeltner treads familiar ground. Those who have read his work on Tripoli and Kanem will perhaps not find much new material here. Nonetheless, he corrects some of his past assertions or mistakes and offers some more detailed analysis and commentary on Arab genealogies and the rise of Wadai as the major power in the eastern Chad Basin. Zeltner is probaby correct to identify the ancestors of the Bani Hassan as among the Arabs in Kanem who allied themselves with Idris b. Ali against the Bulala in the 16th century. The suggestive analysis of Kotoko and Mandara state and religious ideologies and the ancestor-snake cult of Wadai are thought-provoking, too. 

Although one may take issue with a great man approach to the history of the area around Lake Chad, Zeltner's detailed study of the 4 aforementioned leaders actually does a great job highlighting how closely connected their respective states and peoples were. For al-Kanemi, the shehu who founded today's dynasty of Borno, his maternal family's Fezzani origins and his upbringing in today's Libya (plus his several years spent in the East) illustrates how the elites of Borno were not isolated from broader trends and currents in the Islamic world. Moreover, due to what Zeltner sees as the military weakness of Borno, al-Kanemi had to rely on diplomacy to avert a Tripolitanian invasion and use their support against Bagirmi. While he perhaps ultimately failed to fully restore Kanem to Bornoan suzerainty, and the Fezzani invasions were disasters that even included his sister among their victims, al-Kanemi succeeded in impressing the British Borno mission, ending the Bagirmi threat, defended the western frontier, and secured an alliance with the Awlad Sulayman. 

One cannot help but admire al-Kanemi, despite his flaws and perhaps his questionable reasons for agreeing to send his child as a hostage to Libya. His charisma, ability to attract Kanembu and Arab followers (as well as other adventurers and outsiders), military and spiritual leadership and interest in technological and economic advantages of relations with the British certainly made him an exceptional ruler in a turbulent era. It just seems fantastic that he was so afraid of a Tripolitanian invasion despite surely knowing something of the financial straits of the Pasha. Either way, British refusal to loan the necessary funds and direct relations with Britain made the invasion impossible. That must be part of the reason for al-Kanemi's cordial reception of Denham, Clapperton and Oudney. He further secured Borno from northern attacks through sealing an alliance with Abd al-Jalil and the Awlad Sulayman, who became the effective rulers of the Fezzan after al-Mukni's fall from grace. 

The other figures examined by Zeltner include some of the most influential and notorious figures in the history of Chad and Libya. Yusuf Caramanli, the murderous man who slaughtered his own brother in front of their mother, saw to the end of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty in the Fezzan. His corsair activity and heavy involvement in the slave trade were interrupted by European pressure and the Greek war of independence, forcing him to overtax the population. Unlike, say, Muhammad Ali in Egypt, he was never able to successfully conquer or launch a permanent occupation of Sudanic Africa. His bey of the Fezzan, who harbored his own hopes of an empire in the southern lands, was recalled. As mentioned previously, Yusuf additionally failed to secure the necessary British loans to fund a full invasion of Borno. Nevertheless, the fact that his troops were able to invade Bagirmi and loot Massenya was an impressive feat, showing Tripolitanian imperial ambition perhaps akin to that of Egypt in the Sudan. It also attests to the powerful role of firearms in a region which had once been a pioneer in the use of muskets in 16th century Borno.  

Wadai under Sabun and Abd al-Jalil of the Awlad Sulayman represent more admirable figures. The latter, after his tribe's defeats and oppression from Yusuf Caramanli and Tripolitanian authorities, almost became the force of unification for Libya's Arabs. By mastering the Fezzan and establishing cordial relations with Borno, he only needed to secure a Mediterranean port. The divisions within the Arab population and conflict with the Pasha who succeeded Yusuf made this impossible before his death. Tragically, a famine and treason among the Arab allies brought about the death of Abd al-Jalil. The Awlad Sulayman later migrated to Kanem, where they became the major arbiter between Borno and Wadai. British and French involvement in Tripolitanian affairs, plus British interest in securing a sea port open to Fezzani caravans (and a dream of ending the slave trade) further demonstrate how significant European involvement in Central Sudanic, Central Saharan affairs were before the colonial conquest. 

Wadai under Sabun, who restored centralized monarchical power and opened a trade route through Benghazi, represented another visionary leader whose successors arguably failed to live up to the opportunities he created. Although we recall other sources mentioning Wadai's invasion of Bagirmi under Sabun as an action mandated by the Sayfawa mai in Borno, Zeltner focuses on the invasion and subsequent tributary status of Bagirmi as a momentous event and display of the regional ambitions of Sabun. Wadai benefited from Barma and other migrants and slaves who brought with them their weaving and dyeing skills. Moreover, intervention in the affairs of Kanem by investing their own alifa at Mao represented a direct threat to Borno. Despite Sabun's opening of a direct trans-Saharan route to the Mediterranean (instead of going through the Fezzan or the arduous route through Darfur, a state previously at war with Wadai) and his success in reducing Bagirmi to a vassal, his successors closed the kingdom due to fears of a Tripolitanian invasion. It would take decades before Wadai's rulers took full advantage of the commercial opportunities Sabun created. Fortunately for Wadai, their rulers did succeed and in so doing created a state which approximated the borders of modern Chad. 

Unquestionably, the first half of the 19th century brought major changes to the Central Sudan and Libya. Demographic changes with the further migration of Arab nomads south of Lake Chad accompanied political and economic transformations. The slave trade, still of the utmost importance for trans-Saharan commerce, continued unabated. But the growing influence of the British and the French in Tripoli and direct contact with Borno promised significant alterations in the balance of power. Borno emerged from the jihad to the west as reduced power, no longer a hegemonic force. Wadai to the east became a major force to reckon with. Libya, through the fall of the Caramanlis and Awlad Sulayman, was more effectively administered by Ottoman-appointed officials. While British dreams of ending the slave trade and ensuring commerce with the African interior via the Sahara did not materialize, the looming threat of Europe dangled like a sword of Damocles over this region of Africa. 

Histoire des Arabes sur les rives du lac Tchad

Jean-Claude Zeltner's Histoire des Arabes sur les rives du lac Tchad is one of those important works that sorely needs an updated sequel. The history of Arabs in the Chad Basin is a significant topic pertinent to the ethnographic, demographic, religious, and cultural history of our region. However, the paucity of sources for earlier periods and some of Zeltner's outmoded concepts of "Hamites" hinders this study. One would hope a modern sequel to Zeltner's research would unveil more intimate details of the relations between the state and Arab nomads in the larger region. Instead of seeing Arabs as outside the state and, until the rise of al-Kanemi and Rabeh, marginal, perhaps a new perspective could shed light on more active involvement of some groups in Kanem, Wadai, Borno, the Kotoko principalities, and Bagirmi. Something of this can be gleamed from historians of the Darfur Sultanate or Bagirmi, for example. The Arab population in Bagirmi, for instance, appear to have been one of the 3 principal ethnic groups of the kingdom. Arab relations and intermarriage with the Fulani also seems important.

Unfortunately given our few sources on the earliest penetration of Arab migrations into the Lake Chad area, Zeltner has to really begin with the late Kanem phase of the Sayfawa dynasty. We know from our Arabic sources that the earliest Arab migrations (in this case referring to nomadic or semi-nomadic populations, not Arab traders or individual immigrants coming via Egypt and North Africa) were present in the Kanem region by the late 14th century. Zeltner links them to Arab migrations to Egypt and Sudan since the early days of the Islamic conquests in the 7th century. As indicated in his magisterial history of Kanem, some of these Chadian Arabs claim descent from tribes whose history appears in the records of pre-Islamic Arabia or the early days of Islamic expansion. If Robin Law is correct, these Arabs in 14th century Kanem may have aligned themselves with the Bulala against the Sayfawa, perhaps providing horses and siding with the Bulala in raids and pillaging. It is not too much of a stretch of the imagination to envision the marauding Arab tribes of the 14th century as decentralized and perhaps motivated by easy booty, but lacking deeper loyalties to the Bulala sultans.

Later, during Idris b. Ali's reconquest (or re-assertion of Bulala loyalty to the Borno sultans), Arab populations in Kanem were among those resettled to Borno. According to Zeltner, the Sayfawa dynasty did not rely on Shuwa Arabs in the way al-Kanemi or Rabeh did. Vassals of the Sayfawa, however, did accord some kind of land rights or impose tribute on Arab tribes, like their Borno overlords. Overall, in Zeltner's eyes, the Shuwa remained outside the state and subject to their own shaykhs. Although in Borno an official was appointed by the mai to oversee nomadic groups, they were largely left alone as long as they paid tribute. Perhaps to truly understand Arab populations during the Sayfawa period woudl also require historical context on the Tedas, Dazas, Koyam, Fulani, and Tuareg subject to the Sayfawa of Borno. 

With further migration of Arab tribes into Borno and other regions south of Lake Chad, they came to play a major role in supporting al-Kanemi defeat forces aligned with the jihad to the west. Some of them became key officials of the al-Kanemi dynasty, although the majority remained largely unassimilated. Another group, the Awlad Sulayman, came to play a major role in 19th century Kanem. In spite of their failure to serve the larger interests of a Bornoan reconquest of the lost territory, as effective rulers of Kanem they made the region a buffer between Wadai and Borno. Despite subsequently becoming even more integrated into Rabeh's state, Shuwa Arabs seem to have been most effectively integrated under al-Kanemi and his successors than the Sayfawa. Rabeh, on the other hand, represented something new and different in the region. Despite other scholars seeing continuity from the al-Kanemi dynasty to Rabeh's brief empire, Zeltner emphasizes how it represented a dramatic break with established tradition. Moreover, chiefs of the Arab tribes were now appointed by Rabeh's state directly. 

The rest of Zeltner's book provides a quick overview of the Arab population under French colonial rule. He essentially sees them as a population refusing the modern or new. Their refusal to embrace the modern or find effective ways to challenge it with their own internal resources ensured their marginalization under colonial rule and into the postcolonial period. Following this interpretation, Zeltner briefly summarizes the peculiarities of their vernacular Arabic, family structure, religious life, and the individual. We will have to find Chadian Arab authors or perhaps Chadian or Nigerian scholars who tackle the complex history of Arabs in this region, perhaps scholars who can shed more light on the particularities of Arab-state relations in the Central Sudan. Zeltner's work is indispensable, particularly his work on Kanem. Nonetheless, a more modern approach with comparative data on other transhumant pastoralists could shed new light on the subject. Furthermore, we find Zeltner to be too influenced by Urvoy and Lange on the allegedly "Berber" origins of the Sayfawa dynasty and his view of land tenure in Borno may require some modifications.