Les Sultans Dadjo du Sila

Although mostly focused on Sila during the French colonial period, Henri Berre's Sultans Dadjo du Sila (Tchad) is still of use for those interested in the precolonial period. Relying on documents written by court-affiliated persons with a degree of Islamic education, the genealogies and reigns summarized by Berre were supposedly updated by subsequent rulers. To a certain extent, the genealogies are part of the fabricated Arab origin claimed by the Daju sultan, perhaps as part of the standard way to connect the ruling family's lineage back to the Arabian peninsula and important people related to the Prophet. But if one focuses on the key period from c. 1486-1916, the list may be usable. Undoubtedly, it probably omits some rulers, but a few of the kings who reigned since the establishment of the state in Sila were remembered for their relations with Wadai, Darfur, or Dar Runga. For instance, an attack from Wadai during the reign of (Yusuf) Kharifein against Sila may lend some credence to the chronology used by Berre.

Where things become messier is Nachtigal's research in this area during the 19th century. Nachtigal's list appears to have been rather different from what was supplied to the French colonial officers or administrators. For example, there is no one clearly named Gitar in Berre's list. Yet someone of that name was, in one king list, the first Daju ruler in Darfur. As if things were not already confusing, another informant indicated that the earliest Daju king was named Kosber. The apparent absence of these names in the list shared by Berre may be the result of a difference in using Daju or Arabic names for the same people. Alternatively, the list shared in the 20th century colonial era may have wished to omit "pagan" ancestors. After all, Nachtigal's list given to him by a Sila prince indicated 6 of the Daju kings based at Jebel Marra were pagans. Perhaps the rulers in the 19th century were less concerned with claiming ancestry through Yemen and the uncle of Muhammad?

Fortunately, Nachtigal and Berre's lists do provide some context for the enigmatic references to the Daju in medieval Arabic sources. While Berre's list presents the rulers as being of Arab descent and migrating to the north of Darfur, sometime from 892-1212 in the reckoning of Berre, he also places them at "Djebel Morrah" from 1212-1417. This period of the Daju sultans at Jebel Marra fits the medieval Arabic references mentioning the "Taju" or "Tajuwa" in this general area from the 1100s-1400s. If Uri was a Daju royal town or settlement, perhaps that represents the time in the north of Darfur reported by Berre? Keeping in mind that the amount of time Berre assigns to the time spent in the north of Darfur is not exact, one may surmise that the early Daju kings were based at Uri and perhaps the settlement of Samna by the late 12th century. 

For reasons not entirely clear, although perhaps related to a desire to find a more secure base, away from possible interference from Kanem or the medieval Nubian states, the Daju kings moved to Jebel Marra in central Darfur. Evidence for an interest in this region from medieval Kanem is detected in the writing of Ibn Sa'id. According to him, the "Zaghawa" and "Tajuwa" were subjects of Kanem. To Ibn Sa'id, a 'town' or region called Tajuwa represented the capital of the "Zaghawa" where Islam had started to spread. Later on, however, Ibn Sa'id's work seems to acknowledge that another group of "Tajuwa" (Daju?) were pagans residing in mountainous and desert terrains. This "Tajuwa" group was said to be refractory to the sultan of Kanem. Although Ibn Sa'id's description of the region is contradictory and must be used cautiously, there seems to be some overlap with the Daju based in Jebel Marra in the 1200s. Conflating them with the Zaghawa could have been due to the Zaghawa being better known in external Arabic sources, or possibly an alliance between some Zaghawa groups and the Daju against Kanem's expansion. 

Once established in Jebel Marra, presumably by the late 1200s, the other Arabic references are enigmatic on this polity or state. To Ibn Khaldun, the Tajuwa were simply a sort of "Zaghawa." For al-Maqrizi, however, more information is reported on them. They were apparently known for working in stone, which correlates with archaeological ruins of stone constructions in Darfur. Supposedly, their land or territory began at a place called Tukama, perhaps a locality near their base in Jebel Marra. Assuming al-Maqrizi's information was contemporaneous with his times, the Daju polity had also engaged in a number of wars against a people called Wathku. One is tempted to read this as perhaps a rival polity or an area frequently raided by the Daju rulers, perhaps located in Darfur or a neighboring region. If the list provided by one Sila prince is accurate, six pagan Daju kings ruled from Jebel Marra. These kings could easily have reigned from Jebel Marra for much of the period when the Daju kings were based there by the late 1200s. According to Tunjur oral traditions in Kanem, these Daju kings subsisted on the plundering of their neighbors. Yet knowledge of it from as far away as the Mamluk Sultanate suggests it was involved in wider trade networks.

Ultimately, the earlier history of the Daju in Darfur is not remembered in great detail in the Sila of Berre's time. Indeed, one could even question the existence of a continuous dynastic line across time and space from their period in Darfur to the sultans of Dar Sila. But some of Berre's data and regnal years could easily fit the general timeline of the Daju sultans in Darfur. Perhaps Uri became the commercial city or center whilst Jebel Marra became a political capital by the end of the 13th century. By the 16th century, however, Darfur had fallen under the suzerainty of a Tunjur, Ahmed el-Maqur. Apparently, for much of this period, the Daju kings were based in a region south of Geneina, Djebel Kadjano. This was likely the period when the "Dagio" were counted among the subjects of Uri, identified by Anania in the late 1500s. An earlier, smaller Daju presence in Sila to the west is hinted at by Berre, and claimed by Tunjur tradition in Kanem. 

In summation, the data provided by Berre is intriguing and provocative. It raises questions about a tighter chronology through the genealogies provided by the royal court in the colonial era. On the other hand, the names seem difficult to reconcile with what Nachtigal reported. Unfortunately, Nachtigal did not provide complete lists from the data he collected. But from what he reported, it would appear to enumerate different Daju dynasts than the one produced in the 20th century. Further, one Daju prince's list recognized pagan rulers from their Jebel Marra period. When juxtaposed with the medieval Arabic sources, the traditions nonetheless corroborate a possible Daju presence at Uri as well as their base in Jebel Marra. Relations with Kanem in the 13th century, particularly during and after the reign of Dunama Dibalemi, were potentially a source of friction in which the Daju rulers moved further away, building a new political center in Jebel Marra. 

Kanem's 13th Century Eastward Expansion

A map of Kanem at its apogee based on a problematic map by Waziri.

One topic in the annals of medieval Kanem that remains poorly understood is the eastward expansion of the 13th century. The eastward expansion likely began during the reign of Dunama Dibalemi (1210-1248, according to the chronology of Lange). Kanem's influence spread as far east as the land of the Tajuwa and Zaghawa. However, the nature of this control or influence is not clear. Nor can one easily determine its longevity or the reasons for why the Sayfawa maiwa believed extending this far was a worthwhile endeavor. Fortunately, some clues to the nature of this eastward expansion have been possibly revealed through chemical analysis of beads at the site of Njimi in Kanem. Data from stone ruins in Darfur dated to the era of Daju rule as well as evidence from Christian Nubian provide additional clues.

First, let us begin with the early written sources. The most detailed account from the 13th century, by Ibn Sa'id, draws from the earlier writings of Ibn Fatima. Ibn Fatima traveled to Kanem during the reign of Dunama Dibalemi. Writing later in the 13th century, Ibn Sa'id included the "Zaghawa" and "Tajuwa" as subjects of Kanem's Muslim ruler. Ibn Sa'id's brief description of this vast region is unfortunately limited, one can make some sense of it. The Zaghawa, who lived east of Manan (in Kanem) were said to be mostly subjects of Kanem. Tajuwa, said to be the capital of the Zaghawa, adopted Islam and accepted Kanem's suzerainty. Yet, later on, Ibn Sa'id wrote that the Tajuwiyyin were pagans who were refractory to the sultan of Kanem and kept to the deserts and mountainous terrain (Hopkins & Levtzion 189). This confusing account suggests that the land between Kanem and Nubia included Zaghawa and Tajuwiyyin peoples. The latter had a capital where Islam was accepted and the ruler recognized the authority of Kanem's sultan. It is very likely that Ibn Sa'id was also using the 12th century work of al-Idrisi here, particularly in his account of a town called Tajuwa. For al-Idrisi, however, the Tajuwin were pagans who kept camels and were raided by their neighbors (124). One of their towns was Samna, which was raided by the ruler of Bilaq (in Nubia). The news of this attack reached travelers to Kawar, who later related it to al-Idrisi (114). If Ibn Sa'id's muddled narrative is reliable, the town of Tajuwa (the capital of the Daju polity?) included Muslims and recognized Kanem's rule, yet other groups living in the region of Darfur (or its surroundings) were largely autonomous of Kanem or sought to maintain their autonomy.

Besides Ibn Sa'id, other sources merely reemphasize the Tajuwa as a type of "Zaghawa" (Ibn Khaldun) or, in the case of al-Maqrizi, add a few details. The latter wrote of a place called Tukama at the beginning of Taju land. Word of the Taju's penchant for working in stone and their wars against the enigmatic Wathku also reached al-Maqrizi in Egypt (354). Putting together all the aforementioned external Arabic sources, one can surmise that medieval Islamic geographers from the north saw the Taju as a branch of the Zaghawa. In addition, they lived between Kanem and Nubia and included Muslims among their pagan population. In the 13th century, some recognized the authority of Kanem while those living near deserts or the mountainous, rugged terrain, were able to at least resist Kanem's oversight. When one considers the vast distance between Darfur and Kanem and the rough terrain, outright military conquest was unlikely. Thus, it is perhaps more logical to see Kanem's interests in this region as one of securing an eastern trade route. Besides this trade route, occasional raiding outside of a small tributary zone may have been a common feature. Consequently, the "town of Tajuwa" with its Muslims may have been linked to the trade route while the rest of the area was very loosely controlled by Tajuwa.

In the absence of internal written sources from the 13th century, one must look to oral traditions and archaeology for further detail. Gustav Nachtigal, who traveled to Darfur and Wadai in the 19th century, collected oral traditions everywhere he visited. In the Sula kingdom ruled by a Daju dynasty, Nachtigal saw a list given by a prince which enumerated 21 rulers (Nachtigal 81). Another list of kings that Nachtigal saw included 13 Daju kings, 13 Tunjur kings and 22 Keira (Fur) sultans. Yet another list gave 5 Daju kings and 25 Tunjur and Keira rulers. The first Daju king was called Gitar (272). This early Daju kingdom in the Darfur region was based in Jebel Marra (273). On the other hand, Nachtigal was also told that the first Daju ruler was named Kosber, who lived in Debba. And in the first list of 21 Daju sultans Nachtigal received from a Sula prince, 6 were said to have been pagans based at Jebel Marra. These Daju kings were said to have controlled Darfur until the Tunjur, Ahmed el-Maqur, seized power (274). Based on Nachtigal and subsequent authors, O'Fahey's study of the Darfur Sultanate endeavored to use all known traditions on the Daju and Tunjur kings of Darfur to reconstruct a more coherent chronology. O'Fahey was able to locate written sources that allude to a Tunjur dynasty in Darfur by the 16th century (O'Fahey 31). Furthermore, the Daju title for a chief, shartay, survived in Darfur among the Keira sultans (37). This roughly suggests that the Daju kings in Darfur rose to power sometime before the 1500s, probably in the 1100s or 1200s.

In terms of archaeological evidence from Darfur, Andrew James McGregor has produced the detailed work to date. According to McGregor, the Daju rose to power in the 12th or 13th century (McGregor 34). The Daju were the Taju pagans of al-Idrisi, with only 2 towns. Moreover, al-Tunisi apparently believed the Daju were one of the 5 aboriginal Wadai groups 40). Yet as a polity, the Daju kingdom was remembered in Tunjur tradition for primarily subsisting on raiding its neighbors (47). Intriguingly, McGregor found a manuscript source that assigned the arrival of the Daju to Sila to 1692 (39). This date, however, must be too late since Tunjur oral traditions in Kanem contradict it. According to Gros, who studied Tunjur oral tradition in Kanem, the father of the Tunjur ruler, Daoud el Mireim, Omar, had subdued the Daju of Sila (Gros 274). If so, and Daoud el Mireim was the last Tunjur ruler of Wadai, then the Tunjur dynasty there would have conquered the Daju of Sila (Sula) by the early 1600s if not late 16th century. In other words, a Daju presence in Sila (Sula) likely predates the 17th century. Anania's late 16th century description of a polity in Darfur called Uri, presumably the Tunjur dynasty's capital or commercial town, included Dagio (Daju) among its subjects (Anania 343). 

So, based on oral traditions and written sources, we know there was a Daju polity in the Darfur region by the 13th century. It was said to have been based on Jebel Marra and likely raided neighboring groups in Darfur and perhaps further afield. Although the early rulers were said to be pagans, Ibn Sa'id believed that Tajuwa, the capital or principal town, was a Muslim city. Since the kingdom of Makuria allegedly raided one of the Daju towns in the 12th century, it is possible the polity had also disrupted a trade route or attacked parts of Kordofan closer to the Christian kingdom. Overall, sadly, it is difficult to reconcile the sources on this enigmatic polity. Yet it's rather loose administrative structure and reliance on raiding may be clues for a weak polity. If this was the case, why was Kanem interested in conquering this region?

Recent archaeological evidence and chemical analysis of artifacts found at the probable site of Njimi may provide the answer. The article "LA-ICP-MS analysis of glass beads from Tié (12th–14th centuries), Kanem, Chad: Evidence of trans-Sudanic exchanges" noted that the chemical composition of beads at Njimi were more similar to medieval beads found in eastern African sites than those of West Africa. While not the best smoking gun, this pecularity for medieval Kanem suggests that most of its beads were ultimately derived from the same sources of Eurasian beads that arrived in places along the Swahili Coast, southeastern Africa or the Red Sea coasts of Africa. This pattern, so different from sites in West Africa in the 10th-15th centuries, implies that Kanem was ultimately part of the Indian Ocean network that brought high alumina soda glass beads to eastern African sites. Since these types of beads were not common west of Kanem, despite trade routes through the Fazzan connecting western Africa to the Mediterranean, one must wonder if Kanem accessed the beads through a separate route to Egypt or Nubia. While further confirmation of the analysis of glass bead chemical composition in Makuria and Alwa is necessary, it is possible this eastward route from Kanem connected to the Red Sea/Indian Ocean networks through Nubia (or Egypt). Possible indications of a route to Nubia may be found in the analysis of beads at Soba, the capital of Alwa. In Soba, 20 high alumina beads of Indian origin were part of a study of 23 glass beads.

Besides the data from chemical analysis of glass beads, studies of cattle remains suggest Makuria imported cattle from the west. According to "The cattle factor. Faunal evidence for the study of social and economic processes in the medieval Middle Nile Valley. Sudan" by Marta Osypińska and Mariusz Drzewiecki, Makuria imported long-horned cattle from the west, probably the Central Sahel or Kordofan. Their analysis of faunal remains suggests that Alwa practiced a more conservative livestock farming based on ancient Kush while Makuria may have imported as much as 1/4 of its cattle from the west. While there is no evidence for Kanem playing any role in supplying cattle from the Central Sahel to Nubia (Makuria), it is possible that both Kanem and Makuria had an interest in secure trade routes through Kordofan and Darfur. This facilitated access to Egypt (and Nubia) for Kanem while the Christian Nubian kingdoms could be guaranteed of some security for trade routes through Darfur to Kawar and North Africa. Evidence from Nubian graffito writings or inscriptions found in Kordofan, such as one attesting to King Siti and likely from the 1330s, likewise demonstrate Makuria's interests in Kordofan and perhaps Darfur to the west. 

In summation, Kanem's eastward expansion in the 13th century was likely related to economic interests that likely included access to Indian Ocean networks via Nubia (and/or Egypt). While the northern, trans-Saharan route through Kawar and the Fazzan to the Maghreb and Egypt was still very important, the unique chemical composition of beads found at medieval Njimi suggest the use of an alternative route for at least beads. Since the Daju polity of the 13th century was possibly decentralized and divided, Kanem may have been able to expand its influence and promote an Islamic community of traders at the town of Tajuwa, likely somewhere near the Daju polity's base in Jebel Marra. Direct control or tribute-raising on much of the region would have been difficult due to the Zaghawa and Daju "pagans" who used the deserts and mountains to resist Kanem. Nonetheless, for the region to retain its significance to Kanem's rulers, Kanem may have engaged with the Daju polity for more security of the trade routes that led to Nubia (or Egypt). The possible evidence of a Nubian use of this trade route, or at least use by Muslim traders from Makuria and Alwa who also traded with the lands west of the Nile, can be seen in the cattle imports from the Sahel in Makuria. Furthermore, Makuria's rulers raiding a Daju town in the 12th century may be due to their raiders disrupting trade passing through the region. Lastly, the chemical composition of several beads at Soba, the capital of Alwa, resemble those of Njimi in Kanem. This may be due to interest in Makuria and Alwa in maintaining the trade routes to the west. Although any evidence for direct engagement between Kanem and the Christian Nubian states is lacking, Muslim traders active in all three kingdoms may have been the link.

Bibliography

Courtecuisse, L (editor). Les Arabes du Tchad. Paris: Centre de hautes études administratives sur l’Afrique et l’Asie modernes, 1971.

Hopkins, J. F. P., and Nehemia Levtzion (editors). Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2000.

Lange, Dierk, and Silvio Berthoud.  "L'intérieur de l'Afrique occidentale d'après Giovanni Lorenzo Anania (XVIe siècle)". Cahiers d'histoire mondiale, 14, no. 2 (1972): 299-351.

Magnavita, S., MacDonald, B. L., Magnavita, C., & Oga, A. (2024). LA-ICP-MS analysis of glass beads from Tié (12th–14th centuries), Kanem, Chad: Evidence of trans-Sudanic exchanges. Archaeometry, 66(1), 100–118. https://doi.org/10.1111/arcm.12898

McGregor, Andrew James. The Stone Monuments and Antiquities of the Jebel Marra Region, Darfur, Sudan (dissertation). University of Toronto, 2000.

Nachtigal, Gustav, Allan G. B. Fisher, and Humphrey J (trans.). Fisher. Sahara and Sudan, Vol. 4. Berkeley and; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971.

O’Fahey, R. S. 2008. The Darfur Sultanate : A History. New York: Columbia University Press.

Osypińska, Marta, and Mariusz Drzewiecki. 2024. “The Cattle Factor. Faunal Evidence for the Study of Social and Economic Processes in the Medieval Middle Nile Valley. Sudan.” Journal of Archaeological Science Reports 55 (April): 104513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jasrep.2024.104513.

Then-Obłuska, J., & Dussubieux, L. (2023). Overseas imports on the Blue Nile: Chemical compositional analysis of glass beads from Soba, Nubia. Archaeometry, 65(5), 1018–1031. https://doi.org/10.1111/arcm.12863

Voyage to Wadai

Traveler al-Tunisi's Voyage au Ouadây is the sequel of sorts to his earlier narrative on his travels through the Darfur Sultanate. Even more extended and featuring additional tangents and chapters on his traversing of the Sahara, al-Tunisi's account provides detailed informaton about a pivotal era in the history of the Sudanic region (and Tripoli). Traveling to Wadai during the reign of Sabun, who opened another route for trans-Saharan trade to Benghazi, al-Tunisi personally witnessed (or heard via his father and others) the exploits of Wadai's victory against Baghirmi. In addition, al-Tunisi witnessed the last days of the Awlad Muhammad sultanate in the Fezzan, some of the career of Yusuf Qaramanli in Tripoli, and stories of the decline of Borno via jihad of Zaky (Uthman dan Fodio). Thus, al-Tunisi's travels and anecdotes captured a significant moment in the history of the Sudanic region as major figures like Sabun, Yusuf Qaramanli, al-Kanemi, and Uthman dan Fodio reshaped the economic, social, and political landscape of much of Africa. Indeed, through his experience in Egypt and witnessing the reforms of Muhammad Ali, one can even include Egypt and the Sudan as part of this era of momentous change which significantly impacted the Sudanic areas.

A native of Borno who studied at al-Azhar in Cairo.

Undoubtedly, the major importance of this work is the overview of the kingdom of Wadai. Probably founded sometime in the early 1600s, al-Tunisi reported some of the traditions of its origins. Claiming Abbasid origins and other traditions, Wadai's first ruler united the region and established a tradition in which successors could only be born to mothers from 5 privileged tribes. Moreover, the sultans of Kordofan, Darfur, and Waday purportedly shared a common origin, which could be a reflection of the previous political history before the 17th century. While, sadly, the people of Wadai and Darfur, to al-Tunisi's knowledge, did not write or keep chronicles of their history, he was able to write a brief summary of the history of Wadai's sultans before Sabun. Indeed, it was clearly one in which conflicts with the Keira sultans of Darfur were frequent. Darfur's rulers intervened in the affairs of Waday while those of Wadai attempted to do the same in the other country. In fact, before al-Tunisi's arrival in Wadai, conflicts with Dar Tamah, the mountainous region subject to Darfur that stood between the kingdoms, were supposedly fueled by the Fur sultan's interest in weakening Darfur. However, neither kingdom could truly subjugate the other. Perhaps the vast distances and relatively equal military forces (despite Waday's troops being braver) lowered the chances of success. However, after Sabun's death under mysterious circumstances (was he killed by cow thieves or did he die from illness), one of his brothers later seized the throne with the aid of Darfur, pledging to pay tribute. That brother, however, was able to relatively easily take power due to internal divisions and a recent plague that struck the kingdom. Needless to say, he was able to easily enough throw off the yoke of tribute to Darfur. 

The major area of focus for al-Tunisi, of course, was the piety and brilliance of Sabun. Intriguingly, he personally was not well-treated by Sabun. Blaming it on a Moroccan sharif who abused his position and influence in Wadai's court, al-Tunisi was not the recipient of the totality of Sabun's largesse. Instead, it was the privileged position of al-Tunisi's father, who served as an advisor to the sultan, which seems to have accounted for the high praise of our author. His father, who received land grants, gifts, and helped in some of Sabun's campaigns (including the violent one which denuded Tamah of crops), must have told his son of some of the brilliance and piety of Sabun. According to our author, Sabun vanquished injustice, centralized administration (by shortening terms of service for administrators and using others to spy on them), welcomed ulama and Islamic holymen, and engaged in just campaigns against the incestuous, violent mbang Ahmad of Bagirmi. Furthermore, Sabun revealed himself as a reformer and visionary, planning to create coinage (a plan he was persuaded not to pursue by his court), open new trade routes to the Magreb to decrease his dependence on the Fazzan, and employ firearms with slaves especially trained in their use. While some of Sabun's reforms and visions did not materialize, he was able to, despite the significant loss of lives, open a new trans-Saharan trade route, expand Wadai's influence in Bagirmi and make Wadai one of the strongest kingdoms of the Bilad al-Sudan. The story of his rise was also an admirable one, relying on cunning and careful planning to outmaneuver his brothers. Sadly, after his death, Wadai witnessed a series of ineffective or corrupt rulers who disputed the throne until a brother of Sabun returned decades later. 

One of the most interesting chapters of al-Tunisi's voyage tells the tale of the conquest of Bagirmi, a major kingdom once tributary to Borno. Unlike other sources, claiming Sabun of Wadai only invaded Bagirmi upon the request of a (weakened?) Borno, al-Tunisi places all the blame on mbang Ahmad. Ahmad was so perverse he married his half-sister, ignoring the wishes of the ulama and Islamic law. Then he went so far as to lust after his daughter! Meanwhile, his fetcha was busy raiding Wadai territory despite several peaceful letters from Sabun. To provide even further justification, ulama in Bagirmi allegedly wrote to Wadai asking for intervention from the tyranny, corruption, and perversity of the mbang. Unsurprisingly, after the raids on Wadai territory continued unabated, and the alleged corruption of Bagirmi's ruler descended into further degeneracy, Sabun launched a campaign. Sabun's troops continued their advance onto Massenya while the mbang pretended his troops could handle the invasion and there was no immediate threat. By the end of the campaign, Bagirmi's mbang was killed in battle, Massenya was sacked (the treasury of the mbang supposedly had the equivalent of more than 200,000 francs) and pillaged (including the enslavement and rape of several inhabitants) and Sabun placed another member of the royal family on the throne. Unfortunately, a son of the previous mbang and his fetcha continued to resist Wadai, fleeing to Kotoko and then plotting against the king placed on the throne by Wadai. After more campaigns, Sabun agreed to allow this prince to become the new mbang of Bagirmi, with an agreement to pay a lowered annual tribute to Wadai. The effects of this campaign were such that the price of slaves decreased and a number of Bagirmi subjects ended up in Wadai. 

Photo from Lebuef's Ouara, Ville Perdue.

For significantly increasing the size of the kingdom, welcoming Islamic scholars, and opening new trade routes, and combating corruption and tyrannical officials in his kingdom, Sabun was compared to Muhammad Ali of Egypt. While the comparison was probably just in some regards, Sabun's reign was perhaps too brief to consolidate all of his achievements for subsequent rulers. Nonetheless, al-Tunis's description of the customs and cultures of Wadai and the the rest of the Sudan (Black Africa) are occasionally fascinating and problematic. As in his book on Darfur, one can occasionally detect ethnocentric biases. Indeed, the depiction of the sexual and marital practices of Wadaians may reflect a belief in the lasciviousness of black Africans. The pagan populations to the south of the Muslim Sudanic states, naturally, are beyond the pale in terms of civilization and culture. Pagans who do not possess any law, they were also decentralized and did not unite when it would have been feasible to do so against the Muslim raiders to their north. But al-Tunisi was not so biased as to not recognize great talent in the artisanry of some weapons and tools produced by the southerners, the Fertity, Kirdaouy, and others. In addition, his account of the operation of Darfur slaving expeditions, very distinct from those of Wadai in that they were operated by private individuals with a firman from the sultan, illustrates how easily tributary pagan populations to the south could be victims of raids as well as benefit from the slaving expeditions. Some of these Darfur expeditions penetrated deep into the heart of Africa, with one 18th century group allegedly reaching a vast river with people who looked like Indians (this is not explained in the text). This deeper penetration of the African interior from the North is interesting in light of the deeper penetrating of slave trading from the Indian Ocean to the east as well as the ongoing slave trade to the Atlantic World.

Besides his general commentary on the military, administrative, religious, and marital customs of Darfur and Wadai, al-Tunisi also applied a theory of Ibn Khaldun to explain the decline of Borno under the Sayfawa. According to him, the forces of Zaky (dan Fodio) were initially so successful against the Bornoans due to the latter's customs of luxury and comfort. Becoming too comfortable and attached to their luxuries, the Bornoans were no longer able to field the type of brave resistance necessary against their opponents. Consequently, they required the aid of the al-Kanemi, mistakenly represented as the alifa of Kanem, to defeat the Fulani and liberate Birni Gazargamo. Unfortunately, al-Tunisi never personally traveled to Borno. But his father and other informants did, one source even reporting that the soldiers of Borno were such cowards that they mistook a flock of ostriches from afar for the vast army of their foes. The frightened Borno soldiers then were ready to turn around and flee. While the reality of Borno in this phase was more complex and al-Tunisi did not have enough information, it is possible his testimony reflects a shift in the Sayfawa dynasty's basis of power. Instead of pure military force, which likely retained importance, the Sayfawa mais may have relied more on their perceived spiritual and religious authority. One wishes al-Tunisi had been able to gather more information on Borno in the early 19th century instead of reporting a few anecdotes and commenting on the treatment of his father who was robbed there due to the ongoing conflict with Bagirmi. 

Overall, al-Tunisi's two-part travelogue is a fascinating account of much of the Sudanic belt of Africa in the early 19th century. His numerous tangents are occasionally delightful treats to information about various topics. For instance, the pretensions of Tubu Rechad "sultans" who take advantage of their desert setting to repeatedly demand gifts from travelers. Or, for instance, finally returning to Tunis only to have his father steal his money while taking a bath! Then the ordeal with his uncle when he endeavored to collect the goods and inheritance of his father, who passed away during his final trip to Waday. Our traveler experienced a number of setbacks and wonders, including people stealing his water while crossing the Sahara and being saved by a devout, faithful slave. He even experienced the perils of internal discord and war in the Regency of Tripoli when the Awlad Sulayman rebelled against Yusuf Qaramanli. The poor traveler even had to bear the risk of traveling with goods of Yusuf Qaramanli overland. One only wishes al-Tunisi and Perron had collaborated on an account of his experiences after his travels to Black Africa, such as the wars over Greek independence and events in Egypt after his final return to Cairo. 

al-Tunisi's Darfur

Muhammad al-Tunisi's account of his voyage to Darfur, translated from the Arabic into English as In Darfur, is one of the major sources for reconstructing the history of the Darfur Sultanate. Based on his experiences there and covering the late 18th century and early 19th century period of the Keira rulers, al-Tunisi describes his travels there, gender relations, the political offices, diet, domestic architecture, magic and local superstitions, local politics, and social and ethnic divisions. The multiethnic Darfur sultanate included a mix of various ethnic groups, including Zaghawa, Fur, Arab, Fulani, and others. 

Due to al-Tunisi's own background as someone coming from an educated family and claiming descent from the Prophet, he and his father found favor and support in Darfur, even receiving a fief with rights to the taxation of villages. Because of his privileged position in Darfur and shared religion with the elites of Darfur, al-Tunisi's description of Darfur (and Wadai) occasionally provides more insights into the nature of the kingdom than that of later European travelers who were outsiders. Of course, al-Tunisi was still a biased outsider in another sense, bringing an Arab, North African perspective on Fur sexual mores, gender relations, and improper practices such as the possible human sacrifice.

Despite his own biases and sexism, al-Tunisi is an important source for documenting how extensive Darfur's links to the outside world were. The Sudanic belt, from Timbuktu and Mali in the west to Sinnar and Abyssinia in the East, and from the Maghreb and Egypt to Dar Runga and Dar Fartit in the south, the world of Darfur in this era was closely tied to regional, African, and global networks. The rulers of Darfur, for instance, used a royal seal made in Egypt. The sultan used the title of khaqan like the Ottoman sultan, too. An Egyptian fellah and musketeer named Zabadi served in the Darfur army. Darfur's ruler Tayrab invaded Kordofan. 

In addition, after the French invasion of Egypt, Zawanah Kashif fled to Darfur, was well-received and then plotted to murder the sultan. Darfur was, through its trade links to Sinnar, Egypt, North Africa and the rest of Sudanic Africa, was clearly a participant in global trade. Political ramifications of the French invasion of Egypt also reached Darfur, just as epidemic diseases from the Islamic Holyland struck Wadai. While some may think of the Darfur sultanate as an insignificant, minor African kingdom, al-Tunisi's account indicates the opposite. Indeed, during this era, Darfur was particularly important on a regional level, even as succession crises fueled civil wars. 

Darfur Sultanate

Although Darfur is not Kanem-Borno, it is a part of a broader array of societies and polities that developed in the Sudanic Belt. Moreover, the Keira sultans of Darfur seem to owe something to the ancient civilization of Kanem-Borno. Indeed, if O'Fahey's excellent The Darfur Sultanate: A History, is any reliable indicator, Darfur seems to have been an easternmost extension of the "Central Sudan" region. The ancient use of Maghrebi-styled Arabic script in some of the early extant documents plus the presence of Kanuri words (goni, mayram) and people (oral traditions of a branch of the Sayfawa dynasty in the region, plus Borno faqihs and traders active in Darfur) do suggest some degree of influence from Borno. 

While O'Fahey seems to reject the theory of a Sayfawa colony in Darfur in the 1400s or 1500s as an unproven theory of Arkell, Darfur appears to have been, like Bagirmi and Wadai, at least partly influenced by Kanem-Borno and likely received some of its earliest Islamic influences from the west. Early medieval references to what is likely today's Darfur, particularly the Tajuwiyyin (probably the Daju, who may have established the first known kingdom or polity) and the subsequent Tunjur state, Uri, and the Darfur Sultanate as it existed under the Keira from the 17th century to 1916 definitely enjoyed cultural and economic ties to Kanem-Borno. Later, particularly after the conquest of Kordofan (making the kingdom as large as Nigeria for decades), Darfur's relations with the Nilotic Sudan and Egypt were unsurprisingly strengthened, and placing Darfur as a bridge of sorts between the Eastern and Central Sudan. In fact, one of the sultans, Muhammad al-Husayn, was of Ethiopian origin through his mother and merchants from Egypt and the Nilotic Sudan appear to have played a major role in the development of Kobbei as a city and economic link between the Nile Valley and Darfur. Fulani Islamic scholars, Borno faqihs, Bagirmi slaves and mercenaries, and even a Mauritian Shinqiti could become influential in the court or towns and settlements like Manawashi. 

As for the history of the Keira and their kingdom, O'Fahey mainly draws on al-Tunisi, Nachtigal, a number of charters and court records, letters, oral traditions, and external European and Middle Eastern documents that shed light on the history of the region or its relations with the outside world. Some pleasant surprises include Arabic local sources from the Tunjur state that preceded the sultanate, which was already partly Islamic, as well as a rich body of land charters that O'Fahey exploits to reconstruct land tenure (mostly usufructuary and entirely dependent on the will of the sultan), rural social structure, and the role of centralizing mechanisms in state administration. The richest source, besides oral traditions, appear to be the writings of al-Tunisi and Nachtigal for their detailed portraits of the sultanate in the 19th century. By this time, the sultanate was no longer making new conquests, but did appear to have gradually pushed south through slave raiding (although always requiring passage through lands controlled by Baqqara nomads) and incorporated a plethora of ethnic groups: Fur, Masalit, Meidob, Birged, Zaghawa, Fartit, and others. 

According to O'Fahey, Islam became one of the tools of the centralizing process as the Darfur sultanate transformed from warbands of the 17th century to one in need of more effective centralization in the 18th century after new conquests essentially ceased. The recipients of land grants and new administrative posts, often including Islamic holymen from the east or west, brought skilled and loyal bureaucrats, generals, and merchants into serving the state apparatus while simultaneously weakening the traditional titleholders. Naturally, this process was uneven and pre-Islamic religious and political influences continued to shape the kingdom. Islam did gradually become more influential on the Keira royal court, and several kings sponsored the construction of mosques, established land grants to religious scholars (like the mahrams and mallamtis of Borno), and engaged in the larger Muslim world to establish Darfur as a legitimate member of the Dar al-Islam. 

Yet, like the sultans of Agadez, the Darfur sultans faced severe limits to how much authority they could effectively yield. The low population density of Darfur probably placed limits on how much taxation and exploitation fief holders could get away with on the peasantry. Nomadic populations to the north and south controlled the access points of Darfur's major trans-Saharan trade commodities (slaves, ivory, gum arabic). In order to reach the slave raiding areas to the south and southwest, the kingdom's bands had to pass through lands controlled by nomads only loosely under the control of the sultans. Then, trans-Saharan caravans going to Egypt from Kobbei had to pass through desert or Sahelian landscapes under the control of the Zaghawa or other nomadic populations. It seems, perhaps like the Sayfawa dynasty, the Keira sultans engaged in some marital alliances with subject populations to facilitate trade and political incorporation of non-Fur peoples, but the demographic and ecological barriers imposed limits on how much authority the Keira could yield. If one adds the factor of conflicts over succession to the throne and the failure to adapt in time to new military technology, it is no surprise that the Keira were defeated by al-Zubayr so easily. Needless to say, Rabih, who served under al-Zubayr, would later go on to conquer Borno with the military tactics and armaments al-Zubayr used so effectively against the cavalry of Darfur.

Perhaps for our purposes, the best way to think about Darfur is in terms of its "Sudanic" dimensions as a crossroads of the Sudanic belt. In many respects, it brings to mind Borno and the Funj with regards to the land grants, mounted warrior elite soldiers, reliance on the slave trade (though O'Fahey thinks most slaves taken in raids by the Darfur state were used locally), tension between Islam and pre-Islamic practice, and centralizing administrative tendencies restricted by various factors. Unlike the sultans in Agadez, the Keira sultans were not elected by nomads determined to prevent the sultan from becoming too powerful, but obstacles to their centralization could be found in other ways. Like the Sayfawa dynasty in Borno, the Keira had to find a way to balance the sometimes conflictual subsistence economies of their subject populations while also supporting markets, long-distance trade, security, and, to the extent possible, cementing their relations with the larger (Islamic) world, even France. Darfur appears to have done this through supporting African pilgrims en route to the Holy Land, as well as engaging in diplomatic relations with the Ottomans, Egypt, and other states. One sultan, Muhammad Tayrab, even went so far as to order an expensive Arabic dictionary produced by an Indian scholar. Other sultans received honorific titles from Constantinople. These Sudanic states resemble, to a certain extent, "feudal" societies of Europe and Asia with a "Sudanic" state structure of private and communal land tenure, partly literate bureaucracies, monarchs with elective councils, and a constant struggle for harmonizing countervailing forces.