The Reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun (1729-1744)

        Mai Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, who likely reigned in 1729-1744, was one of the last successful Sayfawa monarchs of the 18^th century. During the Late Sayfawa Period, the dynasty that ruled Borno gradually withered with the loss of Bilma. Even more, Wadai’s expansion into eastern Kanem, the autonomy of the Bedde, and Bagirmi’s attacks against the Kotoko states and southern Borno during the reign of mbang Muhammad al-Amin also occurred in this late 18^th century decline. Naturally, tensions between Borno and Mandara continued as well, with disastrous consequences for Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. Nonetheless, until the fall of Gazargamo in 1808, the Sayfawa remained powerful and likely possessed a spiritual stature or authority unequalled in the Central Sudan. Yet before that decline of the second half of the 18^th century, some of the last maiwa endeavored to reassert Borno’s political and economic dominance. Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents such a ruler, and although his reign is poorly documented, glimpses of his attempts to restore Borno’s hegemony can be found. After a brief overview of the extant sources, this article shall review Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun’s policy with regard to Hausaland, the question of relations with Mandara and Bagirmi, and an overview of domestic affairs within Borno. Undoubtedly, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents one of the last assertive Sayfawa rulers, whose reign complicates narratives of 18th-century Bornoan decline and political disengagement.

Discussing the Sources

            In terms of source material, the lack of a surviving chronicle severely limits one’s efforts to reevaluate the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Nonetheless, an assortment of oral sources and written sources provide enough clues for a tentative overview. First, the Diwan. Essentially a list of the various rulers of the Sayfawa maiwa with brief details on their reign, the Diwan aids in establishing an approximate timeline for the Sayfawa rulers.[1] In addition, the Kano Chronicle briefly alludes to an attack on the Kano kingdom by Borno during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Besides identifying the Sarkin Bornu as Ali, the chronicle’s erroneous description of the campaign is contradicted by Bornoan oral sources which establish that it was not Ali who attacked Kano in the 1730s.[2]

A third written source, a rihla copied in the mid-19^th century, presents a number of problems. The manuscript was found in the library of Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Miskin, and supposedly written by his grandfather, Muhammad b. Ali b. Dunama b. Ali b. Umar b. Idris.[3] It is supposedly a description of the hajj of Ali b. Umar. But the year given for this undertaking, 1727-8, and the description of the reign of about 15 years that followed, are more applicable for Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Is it possible that this source is about the hajj of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun but changed to be about Ali b. Umar due to the latter’s renown?[4]

Besides the aforementioned written sources, a number of oral sources exist. One of the most important, a Kanuri praise song translated by J.R. Patterson in Kanuri Songs, is particularly conspicuous. Given the genre and its conventions, one cannot expect a song that is necessarily historically accurate. Yet it speaks to a type of court praise singing and ethos that very much emphasized military valor and power. In addition, studies of the history of the Central Sudan based on oral sources supplement the meager textual ones. For instance, H.R. Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs contains a short chapter on Muhammad Hajimi and the Masbarma that alludes to the Kano campaign.[5] Likewise, a girgam translated in Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan refers to Muhammad as the “lord of Lergam the Black Prince with the white mouth-veil.”[6] This supports the identification of the builder of the elite brick building at Lergam with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, a tradition cited by Seidensticker.[7]

Unsurprisingly, a number of 19^th century, colonial-era reports and works by 20^th century scholars drawing on oral sources for the history of Hausaland, Bagirmi and Kanem refer to relations with Borno in the first half of the 18^th century. Furthermore, M.G. Smith, Hogben and Kirk-Greene provide useful clues on Kano and Hausaland during this period while Lavers, Nachtigal, and H. Lanier’s syntheses of Bagirmi history assist in reconstructing Bagirmi’s relationship with Borno. Great caution must be used with such material, particularly as later scholars sometimes regurgitated information from colonial-era scholars who hardly cited their sources. For instance, Lavers has uncritically repeated H.R. Palmer for the theory of a Mandara campaign of Ali b. Umar during the 1650s. When one checks Palmer, however, there is no sourcing to determine where he found this information![8]

Overall, the sources for the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun are hardly adequate, but sufficient for a tentative overview. Doing so allows one insights into the nature of Sayfawa statecraft and relations in a dynamic 18^th century world. The Sayfawa maiwa were hardly the indolent sovereigns only engaged in Islamic study or ritual seclusion in this time.

Borno, Kano, and Hausaland, c. 1729-1744

            Perhaps the best documented action of the mai was his attack on Kano, which may have taken place in 1734 (it coincided with a solar eclipse). Kano had previously been the subject of a campaign during the reign of Idris b. Ali in the 16^th century. At the time, Kano’s actions of fortifying settlements near Borno’s frontier were seen as a threat. For perhaps equivalent reasons, Borno’s Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also attacked the powerful Hausa kingdom. In this campaign, probably in the 1730s, the Kano Chronicle reports that “May Ali” came to make war on Kano during the reign of Sarkin Kano Kumbari (1731-1743). The Bornoan forces allegedly camped at Faggi for 3 nights without fighting due to the intervention of Shehu Tahiru and Shehu Bunduu.[9] Apparently, one of the mallams, Shehu Attahiru, who persuaded the mai to leave was an ancestor of the emir of Kano.[10] Unfortunately, this chronicle does not elucidate why the conflict arose in the first place, but it emphasizes the role of highly respected Islamic leaders in bringing peace.

Despite the chronicle suggesting a rather brief Bornoan siege, other sources suggest a far longer campaign. For example, tradition reported in Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs suggests that the mai was in the Kano state for 7 months.[11] Indeed, the mai attacked but did not prevail “until the appointed time came.” If the campaign lasted at least 7 months and the mai eventually prevailed, then Borno may have been able to successfully restore its position of dominance over Kano, albeit likely only with some form of tribute or vassal status for Kano’s sarki. In terms of why the conflict arose in the first place, Lavers has proposed that Kano was attacked to prevent it from importing guns and upsetting the regional balance of power.[12] While plausible, there is no evidence for this in our surviving sources. Other scholars emphasize internal dynamics within Kano. Thus, the Gaya, whose influence in Kano affairs was great during the reign of Sarkin Kano Sharifa and Kumbari, played a role. Moreover, new towns and walls around several in the eastern domain of Kano, such as Takai, Tsokuwa, and Rano implied the closing of the frontier with ribats. The newer towns constructed in this era often followed a uniform plan, suggestive of state or official planning. They were often built in the open plain while others, at major crossroads for trade, became administrative centers for taxation and cheap labor for Sharifa and Kumbari.[13] Thus, it is possible that Borno’s intervention in Kano was due to the latter’s operations along its eastern frontier and the creation of fortified settlements. This theory is more persuasive than that of the firearms in Kano, although the two are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, Borno’s response was likely motivated by increased attempts at centralization by Kano’s rulers as well as ensuring Kano’s access to firearms did not upset the regional balance of power.

But what was accomplished by Borno’s intervention in Kano in c. 1734? According to some sources, the conflict with Kano likely reverberated across Hausaland with Bornoan intervention beyond. Although the Kano Chronicle does not report the outcome, other sources highly affirm the notion of Borno’s ruler reestablishing Kano as a vassal state (even if only symbolic).[14] The Gazetteer of Kano Province reports that the mai  had issued an ultimatum to Kano: he would burn the city unless tribute was paid.[15] Others suggest that Borno overran other parts of Hausaland at this time, too. Although corroborating evidence is lacking, Hogben and Kirk-Greene wrote of the many Kanuri links in Zaria. For instance, the office of Limamin Kona was reserved to a family of Borno origin. Other Bornoan emissaries or officials in Zaria could potentially be linked to this episode, such as the Madalla.[16] Another source, the Abuja Chronicle, dates the Beriberi (Kanuri) of Borno attacking Hausaland to 1734, with Zaria paying tribute to Borno.[17] Other evidence for this is lacking, but it is certainly possible that Borno’s actions in Kano in c. 1734 also impacted Zaria and other Hausa states, particularly in the reassertion of a claim by Borno to regional hegemony. To what extent Borno may have also used Gobir to influence events in Hausaland is unclear, but Gobir during the reign of Babari (c. 1741-69?) attacked Bornoan territory at Shirra.[18] Ultimately, a resurgence of Bornoan claims to regional supremacy and tribute may have been won from Kano and Zaria during the c. 1734 campaign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

Mandara, Bagirmi and the East

In addition to the Kano campaign, which appears to have been a success, Borno’s relations with Bagirmi during this time appear favorable for the former. Bagirmi was forced to submit to the authority of Borno during the reign of mbang Lahoual (or Alahouine). In the words of H. Lanier, “En 1741, attaqué par le sultan de Bornou, il fut vaincu et dut se soumettre à la souveraineté de ce pays.” [19] Although Bagirmi was able to throw off the yoke of Borno during the reign of Hadji (dated c. 1741-1784 by Lanier) and end Borno’s claims to sovereignty of the kingdom, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was apparently successful in Bagirmi. Likewise, the rihla mentions Bagirmi as one area where the Sayfawa mai traveled on the pilgrimage. If the problematic source is incorrectly attributing the hajj along the Sudan Road to Ali b. Umar but actually describing a pilgrimage of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, then Bagirmi was allegedly one of the areas where the Sayfawa ruler settled 5000 captives in 1727/8.[20] This act of establishing settlements in Bagirmi could be partly motivated by a desire to facilitate travel for pilgrims using the Sudan Road in the 18^th century. Furthermore, it also served to emphasize the power of the Sayfawa ruler whose act of establishing towns or villages in other kingdoms was an assertion of Borno’s influence and power in the Central Sudan.

Naturally, the highly problematic account of the 1727/8 pilgrimage must be interpreted very carefully. But it is consistent with the actions of the Sayfawa in the first half of the 18^th century who may have successfully imposed tributary relations on Bagirmi. In fact, it may also have been during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun that the “Kurata” or Tunjur Arabs in Kanem sent their leader to Borno for confirmation of his position. This may explain why the praise song to this mai names the Kurata among the captives of the mai.[21] The actions of the Sayfawa mai in Bagirmi are perhaps to be expected with similar developments in Kanem which may have included greater control of the Tunjur in Kanem who usually resisted the alifa at Mao.[22] In short, Borno may have succeeded in establishing firmer control of Kanem (which was to become a major battleground in the 19^th century) as well as imposed tribute on Bagirmi whilst protecting its influence over various polities south of Lake Chad.

Besides Bagirmi and the eastern shores of Lake Chad, Mandara was also another arena of conflict for Borno. The previously mentioned Rihla even claims “Ali b. Umar” (although the dates used in the document align with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun) died in Krowrowa, which appears to be Kerawa, once a capital of Mandara. This problematic source asserts, “He raided Krowrowa and died there in Krowrowa where his grave is visited.”[23] This is contradicted by the Diwan, which indicates that Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in Gazargamo.[24] In spite of these contradictions and inaccuracies, the text does seem to be accurate in referring to conflict with Mandara during the first half of the 18^th century, before Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama’s disastrous campaign in the 1780s. According to Barkindo, the Islamization of Mandara in the early 1700s was supported by Borno. In fact, Dunama b. Ali (c. 1696-1715) was said to have sent Islamic scholars to Mandara. Tradition in Mora of Mandara’s conversion to Islam during the reign of Bukar Aji (who reigned c. 1715-1737) even suggests he grew up in Borno and was sent to Mandara after Borno had the previous ruler killed. Interestingly, Bukar Aji is also said to have taken the title of mai and remodelled his court on that of Borno. Tradition also asserts that Bukar Aji and his successor sent regular gifts of tribute to Borno. Even Hamdun b. Dunama reciprocated, sending a personal Quran to Bukar Aji.[25]

Yet despite Borno’s role in the ascent of Mandara’s first Muslim king, occasional conflict occurred. To Lavers, serious trouble with Mandara occurred during the reigns of al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama and Muhammad b. Hamdun, who both fought Mandara.[26] It would seem that Mandara’s allegiance to Borno depended on the proximity of Borno’s army. So even the spiritual authority or stature of the Sayfawa and the renown some maiwa achieved as pious figures was not sufficient to ensure the loyalty of Mandara. In this case, Mandara’s now Muslim kings were likely eager to benefit from expansion and raiding, when possible, the vulnerable tributary polities of Borno. Though it does not seem likely that Hamdun b. Dunama or Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in a war with Mandara, the existence of conflict between the two states points to a problem which only grew during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. But for now, Borno was able to meet the challenge, at least based on available evidence. Moreover, the period of Aji Bukar and Madi Makiya’s reigns, c. 1715-1751, also coincided with the immigration of Bornoan settlers in Mandara. Their presence also necessitated the assertion of Sayfawa rule or authority that may have caused conflict with Mandara’s kings who saw these settlers as their subjects.[27] But, Mandara’s kings accepted Borno’s right to tax many towns in the northern part of its domains until c. 1751 and Borno continued to raid parts of Mandara despite receiving gifts and tribute from Aji Bukar and Madi Makiyya, the latter possibly the son of a Kanuri woman.[28] This level of Bornoan influence in the affairs of Mandara may have also been motivated by the interests of the Bornoan elite to expand and protect their influence in the south while the north was challenged by population movements due to prolonged drought and climate change.

Internal Dynamics in Borno

In terms of internal affairs and domestic concerns, the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was challenged by ecological shifts, migration, and famine. Indeed, a famine that persisted for 2 years occurred during his reign.[29] The last several years of his reign coincided with a drought that lasted from 1738-1753. Due to this period of long-lasting drought, various groups such as the Jetko, Tubu, Tuareg, Koyam, and Fulani migrated to more fertile lands, thereby increasing the chances for conflict over scarce resources in difficult times.[30] Despite these challenges, Borno was still in control of Bilma. The Bedde, however, were beginning to act autonomously in the 18^th century and disrupt caravan routes.

In the face of these challenges, the Bornoan state was still able to continue past Sayfawa practices such as the sponsoring of elite brick structures. At the site of Lergam, for instance, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun is remembered for sponsoring the construction of a brick building for what was likely a palace enclosure. According to Wilhelm Seidensticker, “The name of the founder of the palace was given as Mohammed Ajimi, who can be considered identical with Muhammad b. al-Haji Hamdun (ca. 1731-1747).”[31] Located 31 kilometers west of Geidam and on the northern banks of the Komadugu Yobe, today the site lacks any visible evidence of bricks except for a few from what was presumably the wall of the palace enclosure. Magnavita also described the site of Lergam, reporting that Lergam was also known as Kirishadam, referring to the largest refuse mound. Although the area was only an estimated 250 by 250 meters, Lergam appears to have been built by the mai as a temporary residence.[32] Like Gambaru built in the 16^th century, Lergam indicates that a Sayfawa ruler was still able to support elite architecture using brick well into the 1700s.

 Likewise, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also supported the creation of new towns or settlements, including Kurnawa or Dalaturi. Kurnawa, according to J.R. Patterson’s Borsari District Assessment Report, was founded by a Mandara slave named Haji Amadu. This Mandara captive of the Borno mai, Momadu Haji, was given his freedom upon his return from Mecca. Subsequently, he left Birni Gazargamo and founded Kurnawa with his followers. His descendants later ruled the town.[33] This act demonstrates the role of the Sayfawa and their captives or dependents in the administration and the creation of new settlements. The praise song to this mai also emphasizes his power to redistribute and relocate people:

You son of Aji, can collect or disperse people at your will

And turn again, and make a town (with those you have dispersed)

You are the scourge of Jillam, Dalla Darge and Dakkinam Dalla Damaram

Some towns are founded during the cold season of the year

But some of yours have been founded as the result of your victories, Aji Gana the Intriguer[34]

 

Many of these places are difficult to identify, but the implication is rather clear: the mai possessed great authority through the control of people, including the relocation of dependents or subjects to create new towns. Additionally, he was able to found towns through his military victories. Since the conventions of the praise song may lead to exaggeration, one must use this type of material very cautiously. Even though the general image of the authority of the maiwa in this period is supported by conflict with Mandara (possibly related to Bornoan settlers in parts of Mandara), the possible settlement of slaves in parts of Bagirmi and Wadai, and the creation of Kurnawa as a prosperous town.

            Finally, the domestic religious policies and political choices made by Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun were also significant. He was the first mai to invite Shaykh Tahir b. Ibrahim to Gazargamo. This shaykh later played a prominent role in Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). His father, Hamdun, was also remembered as a scholar in Borno tradition who had studied at al-Azhar in Cairo.[35] Hamdun was also said to have written 12 copies of the Quran and placed himself in ritual seclusion.[36] His son, whose pilgrimage to Mecca is still up for debate, may have been similarly pious but was also more likely to have engaged in military campaigns. Yet he also included respected Muslim leaders such as a Masbarma in his retinue during the c. 1734 campaign against Kano. He also listened to Kano mallams to end that conflict, again suggestive of how essential Islam was to state ideology and administrative practices of the Sayfawa court. He likely benefitted from the caliphal status of the Sayfawa whose pious sanctity was acknowledged widely, while also simultaneously endeavoring to recover or restore Borno’s economic and political hegemony.

Conclusion

Despite the paucity of written sources that directly speak to the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, enough material exists to reconsider this reign. Whilst the Late Sayfawa Period unquestionably included decline, it is very misleading or inaccurate to portray the last century of effective Sayfawa rule as merely one of indolent or secluded maiwa who passively responded to the changing political, economic, intellectual and ecological landscapes. Through the Kano campaign in the 1730s, interventions in Mandara and Bagirmi, the possible support for the Sudan Road for pilgrims, Borno remained a significant contender in the region. Similarly, the sponsoring of new towns and brick architecture as an expression of elite authority reveal the strength of Borno’s ruling dynasty. In other words, all was not immediately lost for the Sayfawa maiwa until the second half of the 18^th century. Undeniably, the prolonged drought and population movements from 1738-1753 and the burgeoning power of the Kel Ewey in Kawar, as well as favorable shifts in power relations that benefitted Mandara, Bagirmi, and Wadai eventually did weaken Borno’s claims to regional hegemony. Yet assertive and dynamic leaders did exist in the 18^th century. The reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, poorly documented as it is, illustrates this dynamic leadership of the Late Sayfawa Period.

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[1] Dierk Lange, whose masterful study of this source remains unsurpassed, has illustrated how it can be corroborated by a number of external and internal sources on the history of Kanem and Borno. Whether or not the form that survives is an abbreviated version of a much longer chronicle is unknown, but it at least helps in constructing a mostly accurate timeline for the political history of the Sayfawa maiwa.

[2] The Kano Chronicle is hardly free of anachronisms, inaccuracies, omissions, or additional textual problems. There is a great danger in relying too heavily on it to reconstruct the history of Kano and Hausaland, but it can also be corroborated by various external sources that are suggestive of an at least generally accurate chronology.

[3] See Behique Dunama, “A Sayfawa Hajj in c. 1728” for an early attempt at reconciling this source with the mainstream of historical sources on the Sayfawa, https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/a-sayfawa-hajj-in-c1728.html.

[4] This source requires much deeper textual analysis and a new translation. It may also refer to an attack on Kerawa, a capital of Mandara, that could have taken place during the reign of Ali b. Umar, Dunama b. Ali, or al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama. It problematically refers to the Sudan in a seemingly modern way, too.

[5] It is not always clear from where and by whom H.R. Palmer derived his information. Nonetheless, the tradition strongly supports the identification of the Sayfawa mai who attacked Kano in the 1730s or so with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

[6] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 253.

[7] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks” in Nilo-Saharan. Proceedings of the First Nilo-Saharan Linguistics Colloquium, Leiden September 8–10, 242.

[8] This specific example refers to a problematic passage in H.R. Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan. In describing Ali b. Umar’s campaign against the Tuareg of Air, Palmer adds narrative elaboration in which a Kel Etti woman sought Ali b. Umar’s aid at the same time he was in the midst of a Mandara campaign. See Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 247.

[9] H.R. Palmer, “Kano Chronicle,” 90.

[10] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 10. Without elucidating his evidence, Louis Brenner has argued that Shehu Tahir was Muhammad b. al-Tahir b. Ibrahim al-Fallati, a known Fulbe scholar in Borno. See “Three Fulbe Scholars in Borno,” 107.

[11] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 111.

[12] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, 203.

[13] Murray Last, “From Sultanate to Caliphate: Kano c. 1450-1800” in Studies in the History of Kano, 83-84.

[14] See M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350-1950.

[15] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 9.

[16] Kirk-Greene & Hogben, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions, 219.

[17] Alhaji Hassan and Shuaibu Na’ibi, Abuja Chronicle, 14.

[18] Shaykh Dan Tafa, Rawdat’l-Afkaar.

[19] H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française No. 10 (1925), 460-461.

[20] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage, 397.

[21] “The Kurata Arabs in the Kanem towns are your slaves.” H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[22] For an admittedly speculative look at this period, see Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html.

[23] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage: An historical study with special reference to the nineteenth century, 399.

[24] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan des sultans du Kanem-Bornu : chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 82.

[25] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 132-134, 145.

[26] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808,” 203.

[27] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902, 145.

[28] On the possible Kanuri parentage of Madi Makiya, see H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 98.

[29] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan, 82.

[30] For an overview of this period and the impact of the prolonged drought, see Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty.

[31] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks,” 242.

[32] Carlos Magnavita, “Short report of a visit to the archaeological sites of Lergam and Garu Kime, Geidam L.G.A., Yobe State of Nigeria,” Borno Museum Society Newsletter 76.

[33] J.R. Patterson, “Assessment Report on Borsari District, Bornu Emirate, Bornu Province” (1918).

[34] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[35] Hamidu Bobboyi, The 'Ulama of Borno: A Study of the Relations between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808, 22, 29.

[36] Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty, 299. 

The Lāmīb̳e of Fombina : a political history of Adamawa, 1809-1901

The Lāmīb̳e of Fombina : a political history of Adamawa, 1809-1901 by Sa'ad Abubakar analyzes the rise and fall of a jihadist state founded by the Fulbe, or Fulani, in the vast region of Fombina. Unlike other emirates within the Sokoto Caliphate, Fombina lacked a prior history of political centralization. Instead, the large province was shared by a plethora of ethnic groups living in small chiefdoms. The Fulani int he area, who already had a presence by the 18th century, were also divided into smaller clan and lineage groups. While Borno and Mandara had some degree of influence in the area through trade, raiding and conquest, and the Jukun state appears to have exerted some degree of influence there previously, Fombina's non-Fulbe lived in "theocratic" chiefdoms and small-scale polities. Long-distance trade was limited and the Fulani in the pre-jihad period lived under the dictates of the non-Muslim, non-Fulani sedentary populations. That said, the Fulani themselves were only weakly Islamized prior to the 19th century, preferring to live by pulaku and customary laws and tradition rather than Islamic ones. 

Nonetheless, events in the 19th century led to a rapid transformation of this area, turning it into one of the largest yet most decentralized emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. The jihad in Fombina, propelled by Modibbo Adama, was strengthened by incoming Fulani migrants who were fleeing Borno after al-Kanemi's victories against Gwoni Mukhtar and other jihadists. In addition, some of the Fulani clan leaders led an expansion into the southern areas to claim new pasture and lands, subjugating pagan sedentary groups. By the 1840s, with a capital established at Yola, the Adamawa emirate was a large, decentralized state with various sub-emirates that largely acted independently of Yola. According to Abubakar, this decentralized nature of Adamawa was due to the incomplete conquest of the Habe populations in the region (many rebelled and sometimes cut off loyal provinces) and the resistance of Fulani Ardo'en and sub-emirs to obey the emir in Yola. While tribute and participation in the military campaigns of the emir were expected and could be gained from loyal provinces, southern sub-emirates often ignored or rebelled against this. In addition, not all Fulani clans were included in the Adamawa leadership, and Islam itself was not widely practiced or observed by the Fulani. Thus, some ignored or disobeyed the emir at Yola. This problem only worsened as some of the sub-emirates experienced dynastic crises or internal wars over succession, a problem the ruler at Yola could not always alleviate. 

Ultimately, by the end of the century, the partition of this vast, loosely joined state was inevitable. British, French and German interests in the Benue and Chad Basin made its longevity numbered. The state, to its credit, was able to consolidate some of its gains and implement a real administrative machinery (with titles borrowed from Hausa and Kanuri, as well as other parts of the Sokoto Caliphate), and the use of slaves for food crop production and the promotion of trade (particularly ivory) did promote some degree of economic development and improvement in conditions for Fulani and allied leaders. Furthermore, the invitation extended to Muslim scholars and pilgrims attracted a larger class of pious Islamic leaders, who in turn promoted a deeper spread and adherence to Islam. Earlier in its existence, it also scored victories against Mandara and was able to protect its northern border with Borno. The state was even able to survive the Mahdist movement and the Sudanese warlord, Rabeh, ultimately falling to the European powers. 

The central theme here appears to be one in which the incomplete centralization of the Adamawa Emirate hindered its ability to establish a stable political system. Of course, This uneven centralization of the state appears to have been a result of the region's lack of such a system before the 19th century, as well as the particular nature of Fulbe society and political traditions. Thus, instead of a jihadist state that had the political traditions of Hausa states with centuries of political traditions, Modibbo Adama and his successors had to create one wholesale, borrowing from the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno, and Hausaland. Indeed, Adama is said to have studied and lived in Borno and adopted some of its titled positions in his administration, testifying to the importance of these older political systems in Adamawa attempt at reforms. Abubakar likewise endeavors to include pagan, non-Fulbe peoples as part of this story, albeit their perspective is more dependent on oral tradition and often lost in the entangled histories of the various sub-emirates. 

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850 is another one of Zeltner's shorter books, this one consisting of some introductory chapters and essays on 4 major figures who shaped the Chad Basin in the first half of the 19th century. Beginning with 2 chapters on the regional context and Arab migrations before delving into Abd al-Jalil, Yusuf Caramanli, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi and Sabun of Wadai, Zeltner treads familiar ground. Those who have read his work on Tripoli and Kanem will perhaps not find much new material here. Nonetheless, he corrects some of his past assertions or mistakes and offers some more detailed analysis and commentary on Arab genealogies and the rise of Wadai as the major power in the eastern Chad Basin. Zeltner is probaby correct to identify the ancestors of the Bani Hassan as among the Arabs in Kanem who allied themselves with Idris b. Ali against the Bulala in the 16th century. The suggestive analysis of Kotoko and Mandara state and religious ideologies and the ancestor-snake cult of Wadai are thought-provoking, too. 

Although one may take issue with a great man approach to the history of the area around Lake Chad, Zeltner's detailed study of the 4 aforementioned leaders actually does a great job highlighting how closely connected their respective states and peoples were. For al-Kanemi, the shehu who founded today's dynasty of Borno, his maternal family's Fezzani origins and his upbringing in today's Libya (plus his several years spent in the East) illustrates how the elites of Borno were not isolated from broader trends and currents in the Islamic world. Moreover, due to what Zeltner sees as the military weakness of Borno, al-Kanemi had to rely on diplomacy to avert a Tripolitanian invasion and use their support against Bagirmi. While he perhaps ultimately failed to fully restore Kanem to Bornoan suzerainty, and the Fezzani invasions were disasters that even included his sister among their victims, al-Kanemi succeeded in impressing the British Borno mission, ending the Bagirmi threat, defended the western frontier, and secured an alliance with the Awlad Sulayman. 

One cannot help but admire al-Kanemi, despite his flaws and perhaps his questionable reasons for agreeing to send his child as a hostage to Libya. His charisma, ability to attract Kanembu and Arab followers (as well as other adventurers and outsiders), military and spiritual leadership and interest in technological and economic advantages of relations with the British certainly made him an exceptional ruler in a turbulent era. It just seems fantastic that he was so afraid of a Tripolitanian invasion despite surely knowing something of the financial straits of the Pasha. Either way, British refusal to loan the necessary funds and direct relations with Britain made the invasion impossible. That must be part of the reason for al-Kanemi's cordial reception of Denham, Clapperton and Oudney. He further secured Borno from northern attacks through sealing an alliance with Abd al-Jalil and the Awlad Sulayman, who became the effective rulers of the Fezzan after al-Mukni's fall from grace. 

The other figures examined by Zeltner include some of the most influential and notorious figures in the history of Chad and Libya. Yusuf Caramanli, the murderous man who slaughtered his own brother in front of their mother, saw to the end of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty in the Fezzan. His corsair activity and heavy involvement in the slave trade were interrupted by European pressure and the Greek war of independence, forcing him to overtax the population. Unlike, say, Muhammad Ali in Egypt, he was never able to successfully conquer or launch a permanent occupation of Sudanic Africa. His bey of the Fezzan, who harbored his own hopes of an empire in the southern lands, was recalled. As mentioned previously, Yusuf additionally failed to secure the necessary British loans to fund a full invasion of Borno. Nevertheless, the fact that his troops were able to invade Bagirmi and loot Massenya was an impressive feat, showing Tripolitanian imperial ambition perhaps akin to that of Egypt in the Sudan. It also attests to the powerful role of firearms in a region which had once been a pioneer in the use of muskets in 16th century Borno.  

Wadai under Sabun and Abd al-Jalil of the Awlad Sulayman represent more admirable figures. The latter, after his tribe's defeats and oppression from Yusuf Caramanli and Tripolitanian authorities, almost became the force of unification for Libya's Arabs. By mastering the Fezzan and establishing cordial relations with Borno, he only needed to secure a Mediterranean port. The divisions within the Arab population and conflict with the Pasha who succeeded Yusuf made this impossible before his death. Tragically, a famine and treason among the Arab allies brought about the death of Abd al-Jalil. The Awlad Sulayman later migrated to Kanem, where they became the major arbiter between Borno and Wadai. British and French involvement in Tripolitanian affairs, plus British interest in securing a sea port open to Fezzani caravans (and a dream of ending the slave trade) further demonstrate how significant European involvement in Central Sudanic, Central Saharan affairs were before the colonial conquest. 

Wadai under Sabun, who restored centralized monarchical power and opened a trade route through Benghazi, represented another visionary leader whose successors arguably failed to live up to the opportunities he created. Although we recall other sources mentioning Wadai's invasion of Bagirmi under Sabun as an action mandated by the Sayfawa mai in Borno, Zeltner focuses on the invasion and subsequent tributary status of Bagirmi as a momentous event and display of the regional ambitions of Sabun. Wadai benefited from Barma and other migrants and slaves who brought with them their weaving and dyeing skills. Moreover, intervention in the affairs of Kanem by investing their own alifa at Mao represented a direct threat to Borno. Despite Sabun's opening of a direct trans-Saharan route to the Mediterranean (instead of going through the Fezzan or the arduous route through Darfur, a state previously at war with Wadai) and his success in reducing Bagirmi to a vassal, his successors closed the kingdom due to fears of a Tripolitanian invasion. It would take decades before Wadai's rulers took full advantage of the commercial opportunities Sabun created. Fortunately for Wadai, their rulers did succeed and in so doing created a state which approximated the borders of modern Chad. 

Unquestionably, the first half of the 19th century brought major changes to the Central Sudan and Libya. Demographic changes with the further migration of Arab nomads south of Lake Chad accompanied political and economic transformations. The slave trade, still of the utmost importance for trans-Saharan commerce, continued unabated. But the growing influence of the British and the French in Tripoli and direct contact with Borno promised significant alterations in the balance of power. Borno emerged from the jihad to the west as reduced power, no longer a hegemonic force. Wadai to the east became a major force to reckon with. Libya, through the fall of the Caramanlis and Awlad Sulayman, was more effectively administered by Ottoman-appointed officials. While British dreams of ending the slave trade and ensuring commerce with the African interior via the Sahara did not materialize, the looming threat of Europe dangled like a sword of Damocles over this region of Africa. 

1000 Years of Splendor

Although Philip Koslow's Kanem-Borno: 1,000 Years of Splendor is part of a series of books directed to young readers, we found it useful during our initial "serious" interest in the history of Kanem-Borno. As part of a series for children and with a title that uses the word splendor, one can already guess that the book general narrative will be one of uncovering a "glorious" African past that is unexpected or surprising to the average Westerner. That is undoubtedly what the book delivers, but we were pleasantly surprised to see the level of research Koslow invested in this work. Drawing on Lange, the UNESCO General History of Africa series, Palmer, Nachtigal, Barth, and the publications of Lebeuf and others on the Sao, Koslow does not dumb down the subject matter.

Unfortunately, the text problematically repeats some of the unfounded or weaker claims of Lange. For instance, the assertion on page 21 that the Sefuwa dynasty was of Berber stock but "de-Berberised" through intermarriage with local leading lineages is not clear from the available sources. Kanuri and other scholars also offer a different interpretation of the mune incident during the reign of Dunama. Furthermore, at least one of the images is paired with an incorrect caption. An engraving from the 1820s depicting a raid on Mandara is described as a village in Borno on page 33. Likewise on page 34, a caption for a photograph of the minaret of the mosque in Agadez falsely claims the use of clay for building began in the 16th century in Borno. That is almost certainly false as the use of fired brick and probably clay predates the 1500s. One could also point out the error in the caption for the image on page 48, incorrectly describing it as a depiction of a sheikh instead of a mai who, by the 1820s, was living on, in part, a subsidy from Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi. 

But a few quibbles aside on inaccurate or misleading captions and repetition of unproven assertions by a major figure in "Bornuology" or Kanem-Borno Studies, this is a good overview of a complex African civilization. There is a summary of the chronicles of Idris Alooma (Idris b. Ali), basic review of some key political points revealed from the Diwan and a short chapter on Borno's turbulent period in the 19th century (shock of the jihad, then Rabeh and European colonialism). There are some interesting photographs of Sao artifacts and an attempt to integrate this mysterious people(s) with the history of Kanem-Borno. In such a brief book, there is only so much that could be done to link the Sao and Kanem-Borno, and there remains so much to learn about the various other populations living near Lake Chad. This book at least highlights some of the neighboring societies and cultures which were either conquered or absorbed by Kanem and Borno through Sao arts and archaeology. If only the author added a little more detail on the period between Idris Alooma and the rise of al-Kanemi then this would be one of the better introductory texts. Certainly better than the one Nigerian publication for children we have encountered before that was a brief biography of al-Kanemi. 

The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom

We strongly believe that studying the history of the lesser known polities in the Lake Chad Region is very useful for understanding Kanem-Borno, our main area of interest. By studying smaller polities and societies who, in some cases, were vassals of the state or "empire" of the Sayfawa, one begins to see how Kanembu and Kanuri influences spread throughout various regions in the Lake Chad Basin and beyond. Barkindo's short but powerful study of the Mandara Sultanate from its shadowy 15th century origins to the colonial conquest is a great example of this. Barkindo, with good reason, dismisses accounts of foreign origins or echoes of the Hamitic Hypothesis to explain the formation of a Mandara kingdom. 

Assembling linguistics, oral traditions, archaeological studies, textual sources, and the similarities in political structure of pre-Islamic Mandara and its neighboring societies, it becomes quite clear that the origins of the state cannot be attributed to Tubu, Arab, Berber, or even Borno roots. However, the relocation of the Sayfawa dynasty to Borno in the late 14th century appears to have pushed the ancestors of the Wandala further south into the hills and plains of what became the Mandara state in the 1400s and 1500s. Over time, a combination of Gamergu and Wandala peoples combining agriculture, hunting, iron production, and trade, established a kingdom that was important enough to appear on the world map of Fra Mauro in the 1400s and appear in the works of Leo Africanus and d'Anania. 

But over time, the Mandara/Wandala people adopted and adapted aspects of Bornoan civilization as well as Islam (in c. 1715) and, provide a possibly useful case study of the complexity of Borno relations with neighboring societies. Instead of solely seeing Borno's relationship with Mandara and others in the larger region as one of conquest or empire, the economic, cultural, and, eventually, religious factors appear to explain more fully how the Lake Chad area became a "Bornoan" Sea of sorts. This perspective can be seen in the way Yusuf Bala Usman sought to redefine or contextualize the nature of Hausaland-Borno relations and the question of tribute and gift exchanges. Instead of assuming military conquest was the dominant or only route to which the Sayfawa dynasty established itself as the regional hegemon, cultural, economic, and social factors appear to have been just as important. 

As the dominant power of the Central Sudan until the 18th century, Borno's dominance of salt production/trade, trans-Saharan exchange, textile industry, livestock, horse breeding, and function as a center for Islamic scholarship and culture placed it at a favorable position and could have played a role in Mandara submission or sending of tribute to Borno. Until the second half of the 18th century, when Bagirmi and Wadai offered alternative routes to luxury goods from North Africa and beyond, Borno would have been the major supplier of North African goods to Mandara. Kanuri or Bornoan settlers, Shuwa Arabs, and Islamic scholars also flocked to Mandara, bringing their expertise in weaving, dyeing, animal husbandry, and religious skills to a state that, unsurprisingly, would be more deeply drawn into this orbit. Mandara's expansion and economic growth was stimulated by this development. 

If Barkindo's analysis is correct, Islam also provided a path to push for greater political centralization of the kingdom by challenging the traditional title-holders and their control of the kingship. It would be interesting to compare this with other groups who adopted Islam via Kanem-Borno influence, as well as pushing back against the notion that the Sayfawa were opposed to the expansion of Islam because it would have hurt the slave trade by decreasing the number of legally enslaveable captives. Understanding how and why some peoples resisted Islamization would be shed light on Islamic proselytism and state support for it but we have much to learn about the Bedde, Kotoko, Musgun, Margi, and other ethnic groups and their own distinct histories of relations with Borno.