Looking for Borno in Aïr Traditions

Whilst perusing  Documents Nigériens: Tome I, l'Aïr edited in French by Boubou Hama in the late 1960s, we came across references to Borno multiple times. Unfortunately, the corpus of oral traditions collected here are often of a very vague nature. Indeed, when recounting the history of the sultans of Agadez, informants appeared to be making composite figures of various sultans without any clear chronological precision. With these limitations, it is sadly difficult to use these traditions to better contextualize the relations between the Tuareg of Asben and Borno.

Nonetheless, some of the traditions do affirm a period of Bornoan hegemony of Aïr. For instance, one elder reputed to be over 100 years old, reported that that the people of the region had to pay tribute to the people of Borno annually. Part of this tribute consisted of animals (cattle?), slaves, and sometimes nobles. Since the tribute was too onerous, the Abzinawa decided not to pay it any longer. When Borno's representative came to collect it, the people of Aïr refused. The sultan of Borno, not named, prepared to go to war and came to Aïr with his army. But, the Tuareg had fled to the mountainous caves of Bagzam and withstood the besieging forces of Borno. Through a ruse conceived by a man named Hamed Yahya, the eldest, the Tuareg sent out an old camel stuffed with grains, dates, and water. When the Bornoan forces killed and opened the entrails of the camel, they found it full of provisions. This led the Bornoans to assume the Tuareg had sufficient food and water in their mountainous caves to continue to avoid engaging the king of Borno. Deciding to leave Asben, the Bornoan troops lifted their siege and returned to Koukaoua (Kukawa). Obviously, the reference to Kukawa is an anachronism here since this event is said to have taken place when Agadez was a small village or recently founded. This campaign is probably the ill-fated Bornoan expedition to Asben mentioned in the Kano Chronicle, taking place in the 1400s. 

Another informant cited in the study also referred to the same conflict with Borno. According to an elder named Ousmane ben Elhadj Kemel, the Bornoans collected an annual tribute from the Tuareg of Aïr consisting of a beautiful young girl. The Bornoan envoy was called Aganga (a Kanuri or Bornoan form of this word is not known to us) and was refused the tribute one year. According to tradition, the girl who was supposed to be given in tribute had a brother who refused to accept it. What is distinct about this version of events is that the girl's brother actually killed the Aganga, triggering an invasion from Borno. In addition, this tradition of the conflict mentions 3 camels whose stomachs were filled with ample food, giving the impression to the Bornoan troops waiting out the Tuareg hiding in the caves of Bagzan that their enemies had ample resources. Meanwhile, the Bornoan troops were running out of water and supplies, forced to abandon Aïr soon after. Another distinguishing trait of this tradition is that the Istanbul legend starts here, with the Tuareg sending their dignitaries to find a sultan in Istanbul during the time Borno's sultan was in the region. 

Other references to Borno or areas once affiliated with Borno are more arduous to connect with other sources. For example, one tradition based on information from Mohamed ben Agueb refers to Younoussou and Mohamed Ben Younoussou. The latter is mentioned for having attacking Gobir and forcing its ruler to flee their capital. In 578, a year equivalent to our 1182-3. But the context of this attack on Gobir and the conflict in Bilma are more suggestive of the 1700s. The reference to Fachi and Mohamed Younoussou appointing Ibrahim ben Ahmed as chief of Bilma seem to refer to the period of conflict over Kawar in the mid-1700s. 

Later on, Mohamed ben Younoussou defeated Gobir and went to war with Borno, occupying a Bornoan fortress built on a high hill. This campaign was advised by the Agadez sultan's vizir, Abdallahi ben Youssouf, who actually wantedt o weaken the Tuareg. Thus, the troops sent by Agadez to attack Borno found themselves completedly encercled by Bornoan warriors, who trapped the Tuareg on the hill. Eventually, Mohamed ben Younoussou was able to escape and reached Haedja, where he fought with a Bornoan leader named Ibrahim. It is possible this Ibrahim was a galadima of Borno sometime in the mid-1700s. By the end of the conflict, the Tuareg were defeated in 608 and force dto flee to Agadez where the Bornoans followed the Tuareg to Talmari, where they were defeated by the Acharifane. Upon his return to Agadez, Mohamed Elbaki was appointed as heir. 

The best we could do for trying to situate the above tale with the known history of Agadez-Borno wars is to suggest the campaign in which the Agadez sultan penetrated deep into Borno and was forced to flee happened during an attack on Gaskerou or Kawar in the middle decades of the 1700s. According to Landeroin, Bornoan forces did attack and pursue the Tuareg in that raid, before ultimaetly fleeing back to Borno.  In Koyam tradition, the place where the pursuing Bornoan army was defeated was not Talmari, although it is possible the Tuareg and Koyam traditions remember the place differently. 

The same source also included Borno or the Beriberi as enemies of Agadez during the reign of Sultan Mohamed "El Fadel," who reigned after the aforementioned Mohamed ben Younoussou. Apparently, the Beriberi and "Baghoussow" had crossed the Niger to provoke the Tuareg of Aïr on their own territory and committed massacres at Tiguida and Ingall before being vanquished by Mohamed El-Fadel. We could not be sure to what extent any Bornoan sources recall this, or if there is confusion on the part of the traditionists.

The Reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun (1729-1744)

        Mai Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, who likely reigned in 1729-1744, was one of the last successful Sayfawa monarchs of the 18^th century. During the Late Sayfawa Period, the dynasty that ruled Borno gradually withered with the loss of Bilma. Even more, Wadai’s expansion into eastern Kanem, the autonomy of the Bedde, and Bagirmi’s attacks against the Kotoko states and southern Borno during the reign of mbang Muhammad al-Amin also occurred in this late 18^th century decline. Naturally, tensions between Borno and Mandara continued as well, with disastrous consequences for Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. Nonetheless, until the fall of Gazargamo in 1808, the Sayfawa remained powerful and likely possessed a spiritual stature or authority unequalled in the Central Sudan. Yet before that decline of the second half of the 18^th century, some of the last maiwa endeavored to reassert Borno’s political and economic dominance. Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents such a ruler, and although his reign is poorly documented, glimpses of his attempts to restore Borno’s hegemony can be found. After a brief overview of the extant sources, this article shall review Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun’s policy with regard to Hausaland, the question of relations with Mandara and Bagirmi, and an overview of domestic affairs within Borno. Undoubtedly, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun represents one of the last assertive Sayfawa rulers, whose reign complicates narratives of 18th-century Bornoan decline and political disengagement.

Discussing the Sources

            In terms of source material, the lack of a surviving chronicle severely limits one’s efforts to reevaluate the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Nonetheless, an assortment of oral sources and written sources provide enough clues for a tentative overview. First, the Diwan. Essentially a list of the various rulers of the Sayfawa maiwa with brief details on their reign, the Diwan aids in establishing an approximate timeline for the Sayfawa rulers.[1] In addition, the Kano Chronicle briefly alludes to an attack on the Kano kingdom by Borno during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Besides identifying the Sarkin Bornu as Ali, the chronicle’s erroneous description of the campaign is contradicted by Bornoan oral sources which establish that it was not Ali who attacked Kano in the 1730s.[2]

A third written source, a rihla copied in the mid-19^th century, presents a number of problems. The manuscript was found in the library of Shaikh Abu Bakr al-Miskin, and supposedly written by his grandfather, Muhammad b. Ali b. Dunama b. Ali b. Umar b. Idris.[3] It is supposedly a description of the hajj of Ali b. Umar. But the year given for this undertaking, 1727-8, and the description of the reign of about 15 years that followed, are more applicable for Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun. Is it possible that this source is about the hajj of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun but changed to be about Ali b. Umar due to the latter’s renown?[4]

Besides the aforementioned written sources, a number of oral sources exist. One of the most important, a Kanuri praise song translated by J.R. Patterson in Kanuri Songs, is particularly conspicuous. Given the genre and its conventions, one cannot expect a song that is necessarily historically accurate. Yet it speaks to a type of court praise singing and ethos that very much emphasized military valor and power. In addition, studies of the history of the Central Sudan based on oral sources supplement the meager textual ones. For instance, H.R. Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs contains a short chapter on Muhammad Hajimi and the Masbarma that alludes to the Kano campaign.[5] Likewise, a girgam translated in Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan refers to Muhammad as the “lord of Lergam the Black Prince with the white mouth-veil.”[6] This supports the identification of the builder of the elite brick building at Lergam with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, a tradition cited by Seidensticker.[7]

Unsurprisingly, a number of 19^th century, colonial-era reports and works by 20^th century scholars drawing on oral sources for the history of Hausaland, Bagirmi and Kanem refer to relations with Borno in the first half of the 18^th century. Furthermore, M.G. Smith, Hogben and Kirk-Greene provide useful clues on Kano and Hausaland during this period while Lavers, Nachtigal, and H. Lanier’s syntheses of Bagirmi history assist in reconstructing Bagirmi’s relationship with Borno. Great caution must be used with such material, particularly as later scholars sometimes regurgitated information from colonial-era scholars who hardly cited their sources. For instance, Lavers has uncritically repeated H.R. Palmer for the theory of a Mandara campaign of Ali b. Umar during the 1650s. When one checks Palmer, however, there is no sourcing to determine where he found this information![8]

Overall, the sources for the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun are hardly adequate, but sufficient for a tentative overview. Doing so allows one insights into the nature of Sayfawa statecraft and relations in a dynamic 18^th century world. The Sayfawa maiwa were hardly the indolent sovereigns only engaged in Islamic study or ritual seclusion in this time.

Borno, Kano, and Hausaland, c. 1729-1744

            Perhaps the best documented action of the mai was his attack on Kano, which may have taken place in 1734 (it coincided with a solar eclipse). Kano had previously been the subject of a campaign during the reign of Idris b. Ali in the 16^th century. At the time, Kano’s actions of fortifying settlements near Borno’s frontier were seen as a threat. For perhaps equivalent reasons, Borno’s Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also attacked the powerful Hausa kingdom. In this campaign, probably in the 1730s, the Kano Chronicle reports that “May Ali” came to make war on Kano during the reign of Sarkin Kano Kumbari (1731-1743). The Bornoan forces allegedly camped at Faggi for 3 nights without fighting due to the intervention of Shehu Tahiru and Shehu Bunduu.[9] Apparently, one of the mallams, Shehu Attahiru, who persuaded the mai to leave was an ancestor of the emir of Kano.[10] Unfortunately, this chronicle does not elucidate why the conflict arose in the first place, but it emphasizes the role of highly respected Islamic leaders in bringing peace.

Despite the chronicle suggesting a rather brief Bornoan siege, other sources suggest a far longer campaign. For example, tradition reported in Palmer’s Sudanese Memoirs suggests that the mai was in the Kano state for 7 months.[11] Indeed, the mai attacked but did not prevail “until the appointed time came.” If the campaign lasted at least 7 months and the mai eventually prevailed, then Borno may have been able to successfully restore its position of dominance over Kano, albeit likely only with some form of tribute or vassal status for Kano’s sarki. In terms of why the conflict arose in the first place, Lavers has proposed that Kano was attacked to prevent it from importing guns and upsetting the regional balance of power.[12] While plausible, there is no evidence for this in our surviving sources. Other scholars emphasize internal dynamics within Kano. Thus, the Gaya, whose influence in Kano affairs was great during the reign of Sarkin Kano Sharifa and Kumbari, played a role. Moreover, new towns and walls around several in the eastern domain of Kano, such as Takai, Tsokuwa, and Rano implied the closing of the frontier with ribats. The newer towns constructed in this era often followed a uniform plan, suggestive of state or official planning. They were often built in the open plain while others, at major crossroads for trade, became administrative centers for taxation and cheap labor for Sharifa and Kumbari.[13] Thus, it is possible that Borno’s intervention in Kano was due to the latter’s operations along its eastern frontier and the creation of fortified settlements. This theory is more persuasive than that of the firearms in Kano, although the two are not mutually exclusive. Consequently, Borno’s response was likely motivated by increased attempts at centralization by Kano’s rulers as well as ensuring Kano’s access to firearms did not upset the regional balance of power.

But what was accomplished by Borno’s intervention in Kano in c. 1734? According to some sources, the conflict with Kano likely reverberated across Hausaland with Bornoan intervention beyond. Although the Kano Chronicle does not report the outcome, other sources highly affirm the notion of Borno’s ruler reestablishing Kano as a vassal state (even if only symbolic).[14] The Gazetteer of Kano Province reports that the mai  had issued an ultimatum to Kano: he would burn the city unless tribute was paid.[15] Others suggest that Borno overran other parts of Hausaland at this time, too. Although corroborating evidence is lacking, Hogben and Kirk-Greene wrote of the many Kanuri links in Zaria. For instance, the office of Limamin Kona was reserved to a family of Borno origin. Other Bornoan emissaries or officials in Zaria could potentially be linked to this episode, such as the Madalla.[16] Another source, the Abuja Chronicle, dates the Beriberi (Kanuri) of Borno attacking Hausaland to 1734, with Zaria paying tribute to Borno.[17] Other evidence for this is lacking, but it is certainly possible that Borno’s actions in Kano in c. 1734 also impacted Zaria and other Hausa states, particularly in the reassertion of a claim by Borno to regional hegemony. To what extent Borno may have also used Gobir to influence events in Hausaland is unclear, but Gobir during the reign of Babari (c. 1741-69?) attacked Bornoan territory at Shirra.[18] Ultimately, a resurgence of Bornoan claims to regional supremacy and tribute may have been won from Kano and Zaria during the c. 1734 campaign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

Mandara, Bagirmi and the East

In addition to the Kano campaign, which appears to have been a success, Borno’s relations with Bagirmi during this time appear favorable for the former. Bagirmi was forced to submit to the authority of Borno during the reign of mbang Lahoual (or Alahouine). In the words of H. Lanier, “En 1741, attaqué par le sultan de Bornou, il fut vaincu et dut se soumettre à la souveraineté de ce pays.” [19] Although Bagirmi was able to throw off the yoke of Borno during the reign of Hadji (dated c. 1741-1784 by Lanier) and end Borno’s claims to sovereignty of the kingdom, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was apparently successful in Bagirmi. Likewise, the rihla mentions Bagirmi as one area where the Sayfawa mai traveled on the pilgrimage. If the problematic source is incorrectly attributing the hajj along the Sudan Road to Ali b. Umar but actually describing a pilgrimage of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, then Bagirmi was allegedly one of the areas where the Sayfawa ruler settled 5000 captives in 1727/8.[20] This act of establishing settlements in Bagirmi could be partly motivated by a desire to facilitate travel for pilgrims using the Sudan Road in the 18^th century. Furthermore, it also served to emphasize the power of the Sayfawa ruler whose act of establishing towns or villages in other kingdoms was an assertion of Borno’s influence and power in the Central Sudan.

Naturally, the highly problematic account of the 1727/8 pilgrimage must be interpreted very carefully. But it is consistent with the actions of the Sayfawa in the first half of the 18^th century who may have successfully imposed tributary relations on Bagirmi. In fact, it may also have been during the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun that the “Kurata” or Tunjur Arabs in Kanem sent their leader to Borno for confirmation of his position. This may explain why the praise song to this mai names the Kurata among the captives of the mai.[21] The actions of the Sayfawa mai in Bagirmi are perhaps to be expected with similar developments in Kanem which may have included greater control of the Tunjur in Kanem who usually resisted the alifa at Mao.[22] In short, Borno may have succeeded in establishing firmer control of Kanem (which was to become a major battleground in the 19^th century) as well as imposed tribute on Bagirmi whilst protecting its influence over various polities south of Lake Chad.

Besides Bagirmi and the eastern shores of Lake Chad, Mandara was also another arena of conflict for Borno. The previously mentioned Rihla even claims “Ali b. Umar” (although the dates used in the document align with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun) died in Krowrowa, which appears to be Kerawa, once a capital of Mandara. This problematic source asserts, “He raided Krowrowa and died there in Krowrowa where his grave is visited.”[23] This is contradicted by the Diwan, which indicates that Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in Gazargamo.[24] In spite of these contradictions and inaccuracies, the text does seem to be accurate in referring to conflict with Mandara during the first half of the 18^th century, before Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama’s disastrous campaign in the 1780s. According to Barkindo, the Islamization of Mandara in the early 1700s was supported by Borno. In fact, Dunama b. Ali (c. 1696-1715) was said to have sent Islamic scholars to Mandara. Tradition in Mora of Mandara’s conversion to Islam during the reign of Bukar Aji (who reigned c. 1715-1737) even suggests he grew up in Borno and was sent to Mandara after Borno had the previous ruler killed. Interestingly, Bukar Aji is also said to have taken the title of mai and remodelled his court on that of Borno. Tradition also asserts that Bukar Aji and his successor sent regular gifts of tribute to Borno. Even Hamdun b. Dunama reciprocated, sending a personal Quran to Bukar Aji.[25]

Yet despite Borno’s role in the ascent of Mandara’s first Muslim king, occasional conflict occurred. To Lavers, serious trouble with Mandara occurred during the reigns of al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama and Muhammad b. Hamdun, who both fought Mandara.[26] It would seem that Mandara’s allegiance to Borno depended on the proximity of Borno’s army. So even the spiritual authority or stature of the Sayfawa and the renown some maiwa achieved as pious figures was not sufficient to ensure the loyalty of Mandara. In this case, Mandara’s now Muslim kings were likely eager to benefit from expansion and raiding, when possible, the vulnerable tributary polities of Borno. Though it does not seem likely that Hamdun b. Dunama or Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun died in a war with Mandara, the existence of conflict between the two states points to a problem which only grew during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama. But for now, Borno was able to meet the challenge, at least based on available evidence. Moreover, the period of Aji Bukar and Madi Makiya’s reigns, c. 1715-1751, also coincided with the immigration of Bornoan settlers in Mandara. Their presence also necessitated the assertion of Sayfawa rule or authority that may have caused conflict with Mandara’s kings who saw these settlers as their subjects.[27] But, Mandara’s kings accepted Borno’s right to tax many towns in the northern part of its domains until c. 1751 and Borno continued to raid parts of Mandara despite receiving gifts and tribute from Aji Bukar and Madi Makiyya, the latter possibly the son of a Kanuri woman.[28] This level of Bornoan influence in the affairs of Mandara may have also been motivated by the interests of the Bornoan elite to expand and protect their influence in the south while the north was challenged by population movements due to prolonged drought and climate change.

Internal Dynamics in Borno

In terms of internal affairs and domestic concerns, the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun was challenged by ecological shifts, migration, and famine. Indeed, a famine that persisted for 2 years occurred during his reign.[29] The last several years of his reign coincided with a drought that lasted from 1738-1753. Due to this period of long-lasting drought, various groups such as the Jetko, Tubu, Tuareg, Koyam, and Fulani migrated to more fertile lands, thereby increasing the chances for conflict over scarce resources in difficult times.[30] Despite these challenges, Borno was still in control of Bilma. The Bedde, however, were beginning to act autonomously in the 18^th century and disrupt caravan routes.

In the face of these challenges, the Bornoan state was still able to continue past Sayfawa practices such as the sponsoring of elite brick structures. At the site of Lergam, for instance, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun is remembered for sponsoring the construction of a brick building for what was likely a palace enclosure. According to Wilhelm Seidensticker, “The name of the founder of the palace was given as Mohammed Ajimi, who can be considered identical with Muhammad b. al-Haji Hamdun (ca. 1731-1747).”[31] Located 31 kilometers west of Geidam and on the northern banks of the Komadugu Yobe, today the site lacks any visible evidence of bricks except for a few from what was presumably the wall of the palace enclosure. Magnavita also described the site of Lergam, reporting that Lergam was also known as Kirishadam, referring to the largest refuse mound. Although the area was only an estimated 250 by 250 meters, Lergam appears to have been built by the mai as a temporary residence.[32] Like Gambaru built in the 16^th century, Lergam indicates that a Sayfawa ruler was still able to support elite architecture using brick well into the 1700s.

 Likewise, Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun also supported the creation of new towns or settlements, including Kurnawa or Dalaturi. Kurnawa, according to J.R. Patterson’s Borsari District Assessment Report, was founded by a Mandara slave named Haji Amadu. This Mandara captive of the Borno mai, Momadu Haji, was given his freedom upon his return from Mecca. Subsequently, he left Birni Gazargamo and founded Kurnawa with his followers. His descendants later ruled the town.[33] This act demonstrates the role of the Sayfawa and their captives or dependents in the administration and the creation of new settlements. The praise song to this mai also emphasizes his power to redistribute and relocate people:

You son of Aji, can collect or disperse people at your will

And turn again, and make a town (with those you have dispersed)

You are the scourge of Jillam, Dalla Darge and Dakkinam Dalla Damaram

Some towns are founded during the cold season of the year

But some of yours have been founded as the result of your victories, Aji Gana the Intriguer[34]

 

Many of these places are difficult to identify, but the implication is rather clear: the mai possessed great authority through the control of people, including the relocation of dependents or subjects to create new towns. Additionally, he was able to found towns through his military victories. Since the conventions of the praise song may lead to exaggeration, one must use this type of material very cautiously. Even though the general image of the authority of the maiwa in this period is supported by conflict with Mandara (possibly related to Bornoan settlers in parts of Mandara), the possible settlement of slaves in parts of Bagirmi and Wadai, and the creation of Kurnawa as a prosperous town.

            Finally, the domestic religious policies and political choices made by Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun were also significant. He was the first mai to invite Shaykh Tahir b. Ibrahim to Gazargamo. This shaykh later played a prominent role in Borno during the reign of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). His father, Hamdun, was also remembered as a scholar in Borno tradition who had studied at al-Azhar in Cairo.[35] Hamdun was also said to have written 12 copies of the Quran and placed himself in ritual seclusion.[36] His son, whose pilgrimage to Mecca is still up for debate, may have been similarly pious but was also more likely to have engaged in military campaigns. Yet he also included respected Muslim leaders such as a Masbarma in his retinue during the c. 1734 campaign against Kano. He also listened to Kano mallams to end that conflict, again suggestive of how essential Islam was to state ideology and administrative practices of the Sayfawa court. He likely benefitted from the caliphal status of the Sayfawa whose pious sanctity was acknowledged widely, while also simultaneously endeavoring to recover or restore Borno’s economic and political hegemony.

Conclusion

Despite the paucity of written sources that directly speak to the reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, enough material exists to reconsider this reign. Whilst the Late Sayfawa Period unquestionably included decline, it is very misleading or inaccurate to portray the last century of effective Sayfawa rule as merely one of indolent or secluded maiwa who passively responded to the changing political, economic, intellectual and ecological landscapes. Through the Kano campaign in the 1730s, interventions in Mandara and Bagirmi, the possible support for the Sudan Road for pilgrims, Borno remained a significant contender in the region. Similarly, the sponsoring of new towns and brick architecture as an expression of elite authority reveal the strength of Borno’s ruling dynasty. In other words, all was not immediately lost for the Sayfawa maiwa until the second half of the 18^th century. Undeniably, the prolonged drought and population movements from 1738-1753 and the burgeoning power of the Kel Ewey in Kawar, as well as favorable shifts in power relations that benefitted Mandara, Bagirmi, and Wadai eventually did weaken Borno’s claims to regional hegemony. Yet assertive and dynamic leaders did exist in the 18^th century. The reign of Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun, poorly documented as it is, illustrates this dynamic leadership of the Late Sayfawa Period.

---

[1] Dierk Lange, whose masterful study of this source remains unsurpassed, has illustrated how it can be corroborated by a number of external and internal sources on the history of Kanem and Borno. Whether or not the form that survives is an abbreviated version of a much longer chronicle is unknown, but it at least helps in constructing a mostly accurate timeline for the political history of the Sayfawa maiwa.

[2] The Kano Chronicle is hardly free of anachronisms, inaccuracies, omissions, or additional textual problems. There is a great danger in relying too heavily on it to reconstruct the history of Kano and Hausaland, but it can also be corroborated by various external sources that are suggestive of an at least generally accurate chronology.

[3] See Behique Dunama, “A Sayfawa Hajj in c. 1728” for an early attempt at reconciling this source with the mainstream of historical sources on the Sayfawa, https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/09/a-sayfawa-hajj-in-c1728.html.

[4] This source requires much deeper textual analysis and a new translation. It may also refer to an attack on Kerawa, a capital of Mandara, that could have taken place during the reign of Ali b. Umar, Dunama b. Ali, or al-Hajj Hamdun b. Dunama. It problematically refers to the Sudan in a seemingly modern way, too.

[5] It is not always clear from where and by whom H.R. Palmer derived his information. Nonetheless, the tradition strongly supports the identification of the Sayfawa mai who attacked Kano in the 1730s or so with Muhammad b. al-Hajj Hamdun.

[6] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 253.

[7] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks” in Nilo-Saharan. Proceedings of the First Nilo-Saharan Linguistics Colloquium, Leiden September 8–10, 242.

[8] This specific example refers to a problematic passage in H.R. Palmer’s Bornu Sahara and Sudan. In describing Ali b. Umar’s campaign against the Tuareg of Air, Palmer adds narrative elaboration in which a Kel Etti woman sought Ali b. Umar’s aid at the same time he was in the midst of a Mandara campaign. See Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 247.

[9] H.R. Palmer, “Kano Chronicle,” 90.

[10] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 10. Without elucidating his evidence, Louis Brenner has argued that Shehu Tahir was Muhammad b. al-Tahir b. Ibrahim al-Fallati, a known Fulbe scholar in Borno. See “Three Fulbe Scholars in Borno,” 107.

[11] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 111.

[12] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, 203.

[13] Murray Last, “From Sultanate to Caliphate: Kano c. 1450-1800” in Studies in the History of Kano, 83-84.

[14] See M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350-1950.

[15] W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, 9.

[16] Kirk-Greene & Hogben, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions, 219.

[17] Alhaji Hassan and Shuaibu Na’ibi, Abuja Chronicle, 14.

[18] Shaykh Dan Tafa, Rawdat’l-Afkaar.

[19] H. Lanier, “L’ancien royaume du Baguirmi,” Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française No. 10 (1925), 460-461.

[20] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage, 397.

[21] “The Kurata Arabs in the Kanem towns are your slaves.” H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[22] For an admittedly speculative look at this period, see Behique Dunama, “Siècles Obscurs: The Alifas of Kanem and the Tunjur in the 17th and 18th Centuries” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/11/siecles-obscurs-alifas-of-kanem-and.html.

[23] Omer El-Nagar, West Africa and the Muslim Pilgrimage: An historical study with special reference to the nineteenth century, 399.

[24] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan des sultans du Kanem-Bornu : chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 82.

[25] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom, 132-134, 145.

[26] John Lavers, “Kanem and Borno to 1808,” 203.

[27] Bawuro Barkindo, The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902, 145.

[28] On the possible Kanuri parentage of Madi Makiya, see H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs II, 98.

[29] Dierk Lange, Le Diwan, 82.

[30] For an overview of this period and the impact of the prolonged drought, see Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty.

[31] Wilhelm Seidensticker, “Borno and the East: Notes and Hypotheses on the Technology of Burnt Bricks,” 242.

[32] Carlos Magnavita, “Short report of a visit to the archaeological sites of Lergam and Garu Kime, Geidam L.G.A., Yobe State of Nigeria,” Borno Museum Society Newsletter 76.

[33] J.R. Patterson, “Assessment Report on Borsari District, Bornu Emirate, Bornu Province” (1918).

[34] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 254.

[35] Hamidu Bobboyi, The 'Ulama of Borno: A Study of the Relations between Scholars and State under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808, 22, 29.

[36] Muhammad Nur Alkali, Kanem-Borno Under the Sayfawa: A study of Origin, Growth and Collapse of a Dynasty, 299. 

Muhammad Agabba, Adar and Kebbi: Rise and Decline of States in the Central Sudan

            Whilst revisiting multiple sources on 17^th century Agadez and its relations with Borno, we realized how the conquest of Adar was an episode in the expansion of the sultanate to the South that is worthy of a second look. Although known from various sources compiled as the Chroniques d'Agadès and translated by Urvoy, the episode is vividly recalled in oral tradition. Subsequent chroniclers and writers, such as Muhammad Bello and his nephew, Shaykh Dan Tafa, also referred to this affair in their 19^th century writings. More recently, scholars such as Djibo Hamani have examined the history of Adar in detail, supplementing the written sources with oral traditions. Nonetheless, closer scrutiny of the various sources available on the 1673 campaign of the Kel Aïr against Kebbi reveals often unexplored dynamics. When one considers these factors, such as the role of Gobir and Zamfara in the weakening of Kebbi or the possibility of dynastic intrigue within Kebbi’s royal house, it becomes clear how a teenage Muhammad Agabba, prince of Agadez and son of Muhammad al-Mubarak (r. 1654-1687), was able to defeat the Kanta of Kebbi. Indeed, inter-state alliances, dynastic intrigue, and the realignment of powers in the Central Sudan during the second half of the 17^th century reveal a historically dynamic region.

            Fortunately, a contemporary source written by a man who lived at the time of the 1674 campaign survives. A part of a diary of a Tuareg man of Agadez, who certainly came from the upper echelons of society, has been published as part of the Agadez Chronicles. In addition to Urvoy’s French translation of this important text, H.T. Norris translated into English a slightly different copy of the manuscript in his The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel. The author of this brief diary (it appears to be incomplete, as it abruptly terminates with the end of the 17^th century), Abu Bakr b. al-Tahir Tashi, knew Salih, a brother of Muhammad Agabba, and was likely acquainted with other members of the royal family.[1] That means his references to the 1673 campaign and subsequent military ventures in Adar or the lands to the south are likely based on direct testimony from those who participated in them. The authenticity of the journal is unquestionable because it contains details corroborated by other 17^th century sources. For example, Girard’s Histoire chronologique du royaume de Tripoly de Barbarie refers to the pilgrimage of another brother of Muhammad Agabba, al-Hajj Aknafaya, in 1675.[2] In the 19^th century, Muhammad Bello of the Sokoto Caliphate, who may have possessed access to earlier written sources from Aïr and Hausaland, also referred to Agabba’s victory against Kebbi. Bello’s account, which was closely followed by that of his nephew, Dan Tafa, mentions Gobir and Zamfara as allies of Asben in the conflict with Kebbi.[3] Another text, the Y Tarichi, also alluded to Agabba’s role in the war with Kebbi that preceded the 1673 campaign.[4]

Additional corroboration of events mentioned by Abu Bakr b. al-Tahir Tashi can be found in oral traditions in Adar, other parts of Hausaland and likely Borno. For instance, Kanuri praise songs translated by J.R. Patterson include a “Song to Yerima Mohammadu” which was said to date to the reign of Ali b. Umar (or possibly in the reign of his son, Idris b. Ali, who reigned 1677-1696).[5] In this praise song, a reference to a raid on Borno from the Kel Aïr Tuareg could possibly be the raid of 1679 mentioned by Tashi.[6] In Zamfara, historical traditions also recall a ruler, Babba, whose son, Yakubu, participated in the defeat of Kebbi with Agabba of Asben and Muhammad b. Chiroma of Gobir.[7] Likewise, traditions in the region reported by Landeroin include a detailed account of the conflict between Aïr and Kebbi that precipitated the war in 1674 and Adar. The tradition, which offers details not seen in the diary of Tashi, nonetheless identifies Agabba as central in the conflict.[8] Finally, Djibo Hamani’s research in Adar found rather detailed accounts of the 1673 conflict which emphasized the role of Agabba in defeating the Kanta of Kebbi. In this version of events, Muhammad al-Mubarak consulted a mallam, Dan Barewa, to counter the powerful magicians of the Kanta of Kebbi. Nonetheless, it was Agabba’s forces who successfully evaded detection by the Kanta’s magicians and defeated him.[9]

Considering the rich oral traditions and textual sources referring to the role of Agabba in the conflict, and the contemporary source of Tashi’s diary, a tentative attempt to marry the two types of evidence is in order. After all, according to Tashi, Muhammad Agabba would have only been a teenager in 1673 (as he was born in 1657).[10] That he was young when he achieved victory against the ruler of Kebbi can be confirmed in the traditional praise of Agabba: Kuykuyun Tanshamat, koya babba kurma.[11] When one incorporates the oral traditions, despite their contradictions, a far more complex tale emerges than the brief annals of Tashi’s diary. That a young prince from Asben could defeat the ruler of what was once a major power in Hausaland is more plausible in light of the (somewhat) contradictory oral traditions from the region. These traditions point to both the importance of a (brief) alliance between Asben and the Hausa states of Gobir and Zamfara. Moreover, internal dissension and turmoil within the ruling dynasty of Kebbi likely preceded and facilitated the conflict. Although Tashi’s journal omits much of this from his narrative, his inclusion of an enemy named Kufkana is highly suggestive. This man may very well have been a dissident Kel Aïr leader who supported the Kanta against the Agadez.

Let us begin with Landeroin. According to oral traditions in Adar, Kebbi’s conflict with Asben began during the reign of Kanta Slimane. When Muhammad al-Mubarak of Agadez sent his son, Agabba, with a caravan of horses to Kebbi, Slimane mocked Agabba. In this narrative, the insult directed at Agabba was due to the shabby dress of his party of 20 men. Supposedly, all were dressed the same, so Slimane could not tell which of them was a prince. Although he did not understand what Slimane had said to him and the interpreter initially refused to translate the insult, Agabba only became upset later. This was the insult that prompted Agabba’s return to Asben and later expedition to Kebbi, where he defeated the Kanta at the pond of Baratta. What is most interesting about the tradition as reported by Landeroin, however, is the allusion to a son of Slimane, Hoummoudou, who had killed his brother and fled to Gobir and Asben. The murder of his brother took place after their father appointed him as Dan Galadima, making Hoummoudou jealous and eager to seize power. According to this tradition, Hoummoudou was the grandson of the Gobir king and later went to Asben, from where he sent Agabba to Kebbi to gather information for dethroning his father. This narrative suggests that the active involvement of a Kebbi prince was a main reason for Agabba going to Kebbi in the first place. Moreover, the tradition claims that northern Adar already had Tuareg communities.[12] It is possible that seeing a region in which the Tuareg of Aïr could expand as well as an alliance with a rebellious Kebbi prince were major reasons for Agabba’s return to Kebbi with a large expedition. This prince, Hoummoudou is likely the 9^th Kanta, Muhammadu Kaye, who reigned from 1674-1676 in the genealogy of Kebbi kings reproduced by Kirk-Greene and Hogben.[13] However, the defeated Kanta killed by Agabba would have been Umaru Giwa, according to this same genealogy. Slimane, the 5^th Kanta, reigned in c. 1621-1636, long before this period. Thus, if the tradition repeated by Landeroin is accurate in the essentials, he was given the wrong name for the Kebbi king defeated by Agabba.

Besides Landeroin’s account, the Y Tarichi also includes the alleged insult of the Kanta. Unlike Landeroin’s version of events, the insult was directed at Muhammad al-Mubarak, Agabba’s father, to instigate a war. This chronicle presents al-Mubarak as fearful of the Kanta, prompting him to send the old tribute of water and sand from Asben. Yet Agabba, his son, demanded troops from his father to avenge him for the insult.[14] Likely drawing on oral traditions and perhaps portraying Agabba as braver and more independent than his father due to Agabba’s role as the first sultan of Adar, this version of events at least includes the insult by the Kanta. Of course, part of the reason for Muhammad al-Mubarak’s reluctance to go to war with Kebbi may have been due to Kebbi’s role in supporting his father on the throne of Agadez in a civil war in 1602-3.[15] Was al-Mubarak recalling how his father, Yusuf, had relied upon Kebbi’s aid in the recent past?

Hamani’s own research in Adar centered on the magical or supernatural resources used by both sides in their war. Whether or not Muhammad al-Mubarak consulted a mallam named Dan Barewa is unclear, but the fear of the Kebbi’s powerful magicians is plausible. The reference to sand and supplies from Asben to evade the magic of their foes and to surprise the Kanta interestingly echoes allusions to sand and water from Asben as tribute to Kebbi.[16] Indeed, on the first Kanta who was said to have also conquered Asben, Dan Tafa wrote, “It is said that Kanta forced the Asbenawa to carry to Surami the water of a certain lake in the territory called Tinshamau; and to bring sand from this same lake for his horse to stand upon. They were obliged to do this by force, and executed his commands right swiftly.”[17] Thus, what was once imposed as tribute from Kebbi on Asben, particularly the sand for the horses of the Kanta and water from Tinshaman became part of the process of resisting the magicians of Kebbi in the 1670s. Alternatively, it could be a metaphor for Asben ceasing to pay tribute to Kebbi since sand, water and other supplies from Asben were used by Agabba’s expedition to defeat the Kanta.

As for the role of Zamfara and Gobir in the conflict with Kebbi, the oral traditions provide many clues for how this brief alliance came about. According to Dan Tafa, Muhammad Chiroma (or, Muhammad b. Chiroma) of Gobir and Yakubu b. Babba of Zamfara waged war on Kebbi with Asben. Indeed, their forces laid waste the land of Kebbi and made the Emir of Zanfara ruler over the greater portion of it…”[18] That Zamfara benefited the most from the decline of Kebbi may explain why Tashi’s diary contains an entry on an expedition in 1685 against Zamfara. Apparently, Amma Fatim was sent with a group of Tuareg against Zamfara whilst the second expedition was led by a Yusuf, nicknamed Addabab. Significantly, this expedition was triggered by the massacre of 700 Kel Away by Zamfara forces, leading to the Itisen, Kel Away, and forces led by Amma Fatim attacking Zamfara. According to Tashi, the second expedition was extremely successful: Zamfara’s heroes, chief men, and fuqaha had been killed.[19] That conflict between Zamfara and Asben occurred in c. 1685 was possibly related to the division of lands once ruled by Kebbi. In fact, conflict between Gobir and Asben later occurred, probably for similar reasons. Dan Tafa’s account of Gobir’s history in this period includes references to Gobir’s ruler, Muhammad b. Chiroma, going to war with Kebbi again and driving out its ruler, Humadu. This suggests that this ruler, who had conspired with Agabba against his father only a few years previously, was only able to hold the throne for a short period before Gobir attacked him. In fact, Humadu and his principal men were clothed in rags when captured by Gobir’s forces, an ironic end considering Humadu’s predecessor insult directed at Agabba for his shabby clothes.[20] Later, during the reign of Muhammad b. Chiroma’s son, Soba, Gobir attacked Asben. This event, based on Tashi’s diary, took place in 1689, culminating with Agabba’s victory against Soba. But this was only achieved after Soba had driven Salih, Agabba’s brother, back to Adar.[21]

Thus, the alliance or coalition of forces which severely reduced the territory controlled by Kebbi, was itself very unstable. From the victory of Agabba in 1674, war against Zamfara followed in 1685. Then, a few years later, conflict with Gobir arose by 1689. Gobir’s own rise continued as it assaulted Zamfara in the 18^th century. But without this earlier coalition in the 1670s, it is not clear if Agabba would have been so fortunate. Agabba went from supporting a contender to the throne of Kebbi, whose incumbent king may have supported Kufkana against Agadez. But Humadu was quickly defeated by Gobir. In turn, conflict arose between Zamfara and Asben and Asben and Gobir over the division of the spoils from Kebbi. While Adar certainly fell within the orbit of Asben, until Agabba was dethroned in the 1720s, Adar appears to have been overseen by another prince, Salih. After Salih died in Adar in the 1690s, presumably another member of the royal family of Agadez oversaw the territory.

In summation, the tale of Aïr’s expansion into Adar is a complex, multifaceted tale of intrigue, war, and realpolitik. That a contender for the throne of Kebbi was likely involved in instigating the war is plausible, perhaps fleeing to Gobir and then Asben before the war. Even though he was later defeated by Kebbi within a few years after ascending to the throne, al-Mubarak and Agabba had to contend with Zamfara and Gobir in the next decade. Consequently, the history of Kebbi’s decline was a long affair in which Aïr, Gobir and Zamfara fought over the spoils long after 1674. Zamfara, which had seemed like it gained the most out of defeat of Kebbi, was later defeated by Gobir in the 18^th century. Aïr, whose sultans were frequently deposed and often possessed little authority over the Kel Aïr were soon kings of a declining city. Contextualizing the rise of Asben rule in Adar clearly demonstrates the dynamic political landscape of the Central Sudan in the 17^th and 18^th centuries. Moreover, the victory of a teenaged Agabba against Kebbi must be understood as part of this complicated process of Kebbi’s imperial decline and the nature of inter-state alliances within Hausaland. With the diary of Tashi, the works of Bello and Dan Tafa and the corpus of oral traditions, historians have a rich example of this process from the second half of the 17^th century.

---

[1] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 77.

[2] See relevant extracts from this work in Rémi Dewière, L'esclave, le savant et le sultan: représentations du monde et diplomatie au sultanat du Borno (XVIe-XVIIe siècles), 607.

[3] Muhammad Bello, The history of islam, scholarship and revivalism in Western Sudan being an annotated translation with introduction of Infaqul-Maisur fi Tarikh Bilad al-Tukur of Sultan Muhammad Bello bin Fodio, 82.

[4] Djibo Hamani, Au carrefour du Soudan et de la Berberie: le sultanat touareg de l'Ayar, 423.

[5] J.R. Patterson, Kanuri Praise Songs, 13.

[6] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 80.

[7] Kirk-Greene & Hobgen, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions, 371.

[8] Landeroin, “Notice historique” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 482-483.

[9] “Le petit chien de Tanshamat qui apprend à nager au grand.” Djibo Hamani, L'Adar précolonial (République du Niger): contribution à l'étude de l'histoire des états Hausa, 92-94.

[10] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 78.

[11] Djibo Hamani, L'Adar précolonial, 94.

[12] Landeroin, “Notice historique” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 483.

[13] Kirk-Greene & Hobgen, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of Their Historical Traditions, 253.

[14] Djibo Hamani, Au carrefour du Soudan et de la Berberie: le sultanat touareg de l'Ayar, 423.

[15] Ibid., 225.

[16] Djibo Hamani, L'Adar précolonial (République du Niger): contribution à l'étude de l'histoire des états Hausa, 94.

[17] H.R. Palmer, “Western Sudan History: The Raudthât’ Ul Afkâri.” Journal of the Royal African Society 15, no. 59 (1916), 263.

[18] Ibid., 267.

[19] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 81.

[20] H.R. Palmer, “Western Sudan History: The Raudthât’ Ul Afkâri.” Journal of the Royal African Society 15, no. 59 (1916), 267.

[21] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 83.