9/20/25

The Manga Revolt of 1824 and the Peasantry in Borno

"The squirrel said he eats all sorts of roots except the talaka root—that one is too bitter." 
-Manga Proverb

One of the intriguing episodes in Borno history witnessed by Denham in 1824 was an uprising of the Manga people. While the revolt has been analyzed by historians such as Lovejoy, Maikorema Zakari, Louis Brenner, and other scholars of Borno history, we believe it is important for many reasons. First, as a peasant rebellion in the name of the Sayfawa dynasty, the revolt forces one to reconsider the relationship between the ruling class of the Sayfawa dynasty and the peasantry. Second, even if mainly opportunistic in terms of the Sayfawa ruler, the revolt was led by a charismatic Muslim cleric. This suggests Islamic leaders were, at least sometimes, a voice for the oppressed and exploited peasantry. Thirdly, the revolt may have been connected to the struggle over the salt-producing areas. Despite the lack of clarity on the nature of pre-19th century history of salt production in the region, the Manga migration into the area may have marked the beginning of commoner control over a major economic resource. Thus, the revolt poses interesting questions on the nature of slave and peasant production in precolonial Borno and how subaltern classes negotiated the control over resources with the ruling class in a state of transition. 

According to Denham, the revolt was led by Fanaamy, a charismatic Muslim cleric renowned for his ability to make charms. The same source described him as a man with one side of his face hairless and another side covered by a thick beard (Denham 239). The Manga revolt arose, with Fanaamy as the mover, after they slaughtered 120 Shuwa Arab allies of al-Kanemi. Since the Manga had not fully accepted the authority of al-Kanemi as the effective head of government and the collection of tribute from the province always provoked bloodshed, the Manga decided to declare themselves as the subjects of the Sayfawa mai and attacked settlements loyal to al-Kanemi. Although Denham suggests the Manga rebels were capable of raising 12,000 archers, it is unclear exactly how many soldiers they had (204). They ultimately submitted to the Shehu after the latter sent 8000-9000 Kanembu spearmen and 5000 Shuwa and Bornoan (Kanuri?) forces against the rebels. 

Before putting down the revolt, however, the rebels were able to partly burn and pillage towns like Kabshary (223). Rhamadan, placed at Kabshary after its residents fled the Manga attack, used a ruse to defeat a much larger force of about 800 Manga rebels. Through this ruse, his smaller force, with only 12 Shuwa Arabs armed with guns, was able to slaughter 400 of the rebels (228). By the third of June, Rhamadan and Dawud were able to capture 800 Manga captives, women and children, to present to the Shehu. But, al-Kanemi being politically shrewd, freed the women and children on the grounds that they were Muslims and innocent of causing the revolt. The booty taken from the Manga captives also included horses and livestock (229). Later, by the fifth of June, the Manga began to submit to the Shehu, except for Fanaamy, who sent a peace offering that included thousands of slaves, cattle and 300 horses on the following day (230). The malam, however, eventually came to submit to al-Kanemi due to the intervention of the Shehu's personal reputation as a maker of charms and his use of the British travelers in Borno to fire two rockets. The rockets, which were seen by Fanaamy's son, awed the Manga who had never seen such a thing (231). 

By the next day, Fanaamy came to submit to al-Kanemi with 1000 followers. To his great surprise, the leader of the rebellion was given fine clothes and Egyptian turbans (232). According to Denham, al-Kanemi had no intention of leading a brutal slaughter of the Manga. Due to their location on the borderland, the Manga were known as warriors using poison arrows and accustomed to combat with the Tuareg and Fulani (237). As such, it was in the interests of the state to conciliate the Manga and restore peace to protect the border. Thus, al-Kanemi relied on his own reputation as a renowned malam to write charms to dull and damage the spears and arrows of the rebels. The renown of al-Kanemi for his charms was surely known in Borno since he used them when defeating the Fulani jihadists who had seized Birni Gazargamo, allegedly using a calabash filled with charm water (Koelle 230). Additionally, Denham personally believed his rockets also had a major effect by terrifying the Manga. Indeed, Fanaamy was said to have declared, "That to withstand a sheikh of the Koran who performed such miracles was useless, and at the same time, haram (sin)." Fanaamy's inability to resist the superior power of al-Kanemi convinced the Manga to submit (Denham 239). 

If Denham's account for the conflict, which he personally did not witness most of, can be considered reliable, it suggests that al-Kanemi led a large force of Kanembu, Arab, and Kanuri soldiers against the Manga to intimidate and frighten them. Then, after scoring a few victories and using his reputation as a holy man with the ability to write powerful charms, he was able to force most of the Manga leaders to submit to his authority. The account of Denham, however, ignores the Manga chiefs who led their villages in rebellion except to report on their submission. Moreover, since Denham believed the mai of Borno, Ibrahim, to be a powerless puppet of al-Kanemi with only the illusion of power through a subsidy from the Shehu, perhaps the lingering loyalty of parts of the Borno population to the Sayfawa dynasty was more meaningful than he realized. Last but certainly not least, the conflict over control of salines, or sites for natron production in Mangari may have fueled the conflict, too. Exploring each of these factors is necessary to understand the Manga Revolt from as many angles as possible. 

First, the lingering appeal to the authority of the Sayfawa. Although largely powerless since 1808, the Sayfawa loyalists still included 260-300 courtiers in the 1820s. So, even if Ibrahim reigned by the sufferance of al-Kanemi, there were still many in Borno who chose to remain loyal to the Sayfawa house (Denham, Vol. II, 107. Indeed, despite his young age of around 22, Ibrahim may have been closely watching the Manga rebellion from a supportive or at least neutral perspective. After all, Ibrahim was present on the campaign (Denham, Vol. I, 222). Furthermore, Ibrahim was eager to assert his authority after the death of al-Kanemi in the next decade, when he tried to force Shehu Umar to come to his court and pledge allegiance (Brenner 64). Therefore, it is hard to imagine the sultan of Borno being completely unaware of rebels in Mangari pledging their allegiance to him. Of course, al-Kanemi likely kept a close watch on Ibrahim at this critical time since a previous king, Dunama, had planned to defeat al-Kanemi with the aid of Bagirmi in 1820 (53). 

Further evidence of remaining Sayfawa loyalism may also be seen in the history of Mangari, Muniyo and western Borno before the fall of the Birni Gazargamo. According to Muhammad Nur Alkali, the galadima of Nguru was closely tied to the Manga (Nur Alkali 263). A Kanuri praise song for galadima Dunama Aisatu, who lived in the 18th century, refers to familial ties to the ruler of Muniyo. Since the position of galadima was held by descendants of the Sayfawa ruler, Umar b. Idris, and its dynasty had close ties with the Manga and the vassal state of Muniyo, it is possible that the Manga rebels of 1824 were proclaiming their Sayfawa loyalties due to much deeper ties than one may think. While the region of the Manga rebels in 1824 was once occupied by the Koyam for about 250 years, the Sayfawa court official, the zigibada, of slave origin, had the administrative district encompassing Manga, Borsari, Wulegi and supervision of the Koyam (Nachtigal 253). This titled official survived the transition to the al-Kanemi dynasty, and was possibly someone who would have paid close attention to events in Mangari at the time of the revolt. If this official had survived in the Sayfawa court, he may have been sympathetic to the Manga rather than al-Kanemi. While speculative, it is known that al-Kanemi endeavored to place as many areas of Borno under the control of his own following, the Kanembu and Shuwa allies (Brenner 104). Is it conceivable that forces opposed to al-Kanemi but also with strong ties to the Sayfawa going back centuries, may have clandestinely supported the Manga? Surely, the galadima and zigibada may have wanted to protect their own interests in the region and preserve, to whatever extent possible, zones of influence and fiefs (chima). 

Map of Muniyo and the nearby region, in 1854 (from Zakari's Contribution à l 'histoire des populations du Sud-Est Nigérien : Cas du Mangari (XVIè-XIXè siècle).

Lovejoy, whose Salt of the Desert Sun adopts a more economic perspective on the Manga Revolt, characterizes it as a peasant uprising. According to Lovejoy, the Manga revolted in an assertion of their rights to the salt districts of Goubei by championing Sayfawa restoration (Lovejoy 258). Lovejoy's fascinating thesis raises the question of peasants (the Manga) using control or access to a major resource (natron, and areas for natron production) to defend their own economic rights. Since Manga as an appellation is often equated with talaka status, the Manga uprising as a peasant revolt over who would control the salines in Mangari is an attractive hypothesis (270). Since the Manga peasants worked in the salines during the dry season and used that natron to trade and access goods acquired via the Hausa states, ensuring they could access the salines without too many obstacles was imperative (284). Unfortunately, oral traditions and written sources are unclear about the fief distribution which encompassed the salt-producing areas. If, as seems the case, al-Kanemi assigned them to his allies in Kukawa rather than the traditional elites (and perhaps those aligned with the Sayfawa court and the zigibada), the Manga uprising makes additional sense. While the nature of the tribute or taxation the Manga refused to pay is left unclear in Denham's account of the revolt, that the Shuwa were sent to collect it may serve as evidence that al-Kanemi had reassigned fiefs in the region to Shuwa allies. When the Manga began migrating in larger numbers to the region near the salines after the fall of Birni Gazargamo, they may have come to enjoy greater autonomy until al-Kanemi reassigned fiefs and demanded tribute payments. 

Yet, a problem with Lovejoy's perspective on the revolt is the lack of clear evidence for this in oral traditions. Although the natron produced by Manga laborers must have been part of the tribute or taxes demanded Shuwa allies of al-Kanemi, oral traditions do not emphasize this factor. Maikorema Zakari, whose study of Mangari is based on oral traditions, gives a fuller perspective than Denham. According to Zakari, the Manga began to migrate to the east in the early 1800s, fleeing the harsh rule of Kosso of Muniyo. Their first locality in the east was Wogum, founded in 1801 (11). Maine-Soroa, one of the Manga centers of the 1824 revolt, was founded sometime later by Digagi Kaumi (142). Landeroin was told that the Manga at the time obeyed lawans appointed by the rulers of Borno and Muniyo (Landeroin 412). The ruler of Muniyo, Kosso, however, often interceded directly with the Manga settlements, bypassing the lawans and bulamas (423). Returning to Maine-Soroa, Landeroin was told the ancestor of its chief was Adem Lafiami, whose son, Kagoumi, became dougaji in the early 1800s when invested by mai Dunama of Borno. Landeroin's informants told him Kagoumi was succeeded by his son, Nasser, who founded Maine-Soroa. Nasser was said to have been appointed by al-Kanemi to the post of bulama for the community (424). Zakari, on the other hand, was informed that Nasser and his allies of Maine-Soroa played a key role in the 1824 revolt led by Malam Fanaamy. Shehu al-Kanemi was even said to have ordered the killing of Nasser with other leaders in Kukawa after the revolt (Zakari 145). Thus, despite making peace with the malam who led the revolt and was incorporated into the regime, local chiefs were later removed from their positions of authority and killed. But, oral traditions recorded by Landeroin suggest the succession to the position of bulama and lawan remained in the family (Landeroin 424).

While the oral traditions give a somewhat fuller picture to the revolt, much remains uncertain. Apparently, the origins of Maine-Soroa can be traced to a local chief appointed by one of the last Sayfawa rulers. Since the Manga migrated eastward were already fleeing the oppressive taxation of Kosso of Muniyo, they may have also come to resent changes in the administration of the region ushered in by the al-Kanemi regime. While respecting the local lineage in Maine-Soroa through confirmation of their positions, al-Kanemi's Shuwa allies probably tried to collect taxes from fiefs in the region, which probably included salines. The leaders of Maine-Soroa and other settlements, however, may have administered the region with an eye to preserve their independence and protect their communities from the encroaching state and Tuareg bandits. According to Michael Horowitz, whose Manga informants were questioned on various aspects of Manga inter-group relations with other ethnic groups, the village chief bulama had limited authority. While able to order the villagers to work on his land, he could not act independently of the lawan. The latter, lamentably, could abuse their authority more easily, especially when they could pay off the representative from the central government (Horowitz Vol. III, 721). If the chief was truly tyrannical, the residents of the area would unite to gather money and send a representative to complain to the ruler at the capital (722). Other Manga interviewed by Horowitz reported that if Manga leaders were too oppressive, people could leave the village or request a new chief (740). Due to their recently established villages in the region, the local leaders may have been more careful to preserve their following and grow their communities. Consequently, this may have made the lawan less eager to collect taxes on grain or salt for the Shehu and his representatives, after being appointed by al-Kanemi to divide and rule the region (Zakari 144). This would have led to conflict with new chima distributions in the area when al-Kanemi took power, particularly if the newcomers were Shuwa without any deep roots in the area and eager to maximize tax collection. 

The Manga, in response, revolted with the aid of a charismatic faqih renowned for his ability to write charms. Said to have spent time in the south, Fanaamy may have been an outsider in the community whose renown for writing charms and stature as a malam made him a figure around which the communities could rally. If so, then this represents both a peasant revolt legitimized by Islam and the legacy of the Sayfawa. This is rather different from past revolts in Borno by communities refusing to pay taxes or tribute. For instance, the rebellions during the reign of Idris b. Ali in the 16th century lacked any clear Islamic inspiration and were sometimes led by decentralized groups. A clearer demonstration of the acceptance of Islam or at least Islamic legitimacy for building peasant communities free of oppressive taxation cannot be found than in the case of the Manga uprising. The growth of villages affiliated with the shaykhs of the Koyam may be another example of this growing stature of Islamic holy men as figures for social reform or at least more just government. According to tradition, their wise, just rule attracted residents who would not wish to remain under the heel of poorly administered chima (Landeroin 398). 

Although al-Kanemi succeeded in crushing the Manga revolt with little bloodshed, the Manga rose again in 1846. By this time, mai Ibrahim requested the aid of Waday to defeat Shehu Umar, the son of al-Kanemi (Brenner 65). The forces of Waday were defeated and Ibrahim killed, but the Manga insurrection of the same year threatened Shehu Umar (72). Once again, the Manga of Maine-Soroa led the attack on Shehu Umar in the hopes of profiting from the Waday invasion (Zakari 146). Although the sources do not suggest Ibrahim of the Sayfawa was in communication with the Manga rebels, it is possible they were partly motivated by the wish to support the Sayfawa. This second rebellion also supports the idea that local leaders within the eastern Manga communities continued to resist the divide and conquer strategy implemented by al-Kanemi after the 1824 revolt. The major difference with this uprising, though, is the conspicuous lack of a malam or Islamic leader. 

This review of the 1824 Manga rebellion raises questions on the nature of class, production, Islamic legitimacy and ideology for social reform, and relations between the Sayfawa dynasty and the peasantry. Undoubtedly, other push factors like oppressive rule in Muniyo and pull factors like the abandonment of Birni Gazargamo leading to an area with weak central authority afterwards were also factors in leading to revolt. But the past Manga connections with the galadima holders in Nguru, who were resistant to al-Kanemi but linked to the Sayfawa, may have been part of a pro-Sayfawa stance of Manga communities. Further, the titled officer with ties to the Sayfawa court who once oversaw the region occupied by the Manga may have also sympathized with the Manga as al-Kanemi's supporters seized control of fiefs or taxation privileges. Moreover, the prominent role played by a malam suggests Islam shaped the articulation of class and social conflict, whilst still affirming the elite political order of the Sayfawa period. If more traditions and written sources existed on the nature of other rebellions in precolonial Borno under the Sayfawa, particularly among areas where Islam was more widespread, comparisons with this revolt could be enlightening. Was the spiritual power and sanctity of the mai a source of appeal to peasants eager to sever ties with abusive fief-holders? To what extent did peasants have access to the royal court in Birni Gazargamo when dealing with abusive and exploitative chima?

Bibliography

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