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A map of Mandara in the early 18th century by Barkindo (The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902).
One particularly interesting textual source on the history of Borno in the 18th century was written in 19th century Mandara. A kirgam written in Arabic decades after a war in which Borno forces were defeated by Mandara, the text is both fascinating and problematic. It nonetheless offers one of the few descriptions of the physical appearance of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). It's also one of the few written sources on Borno's disastrous defeat outside Doulo that is dated to the period before the colonial era. Indeed, the defeat in many ways encapsulates Borno's declining fortunes in what we like to call the Late Sayfawa Period (1715-1808, or 1715-1846). This period saw Borno's loss of the lucrative salt trade from Bilma, growing independence of Bedde communities, Gobir's refusal to render tribute, a long drought, Wadai's incursions into Kanem from the east, and the truly calamitous fall of Birni Gazargamo to forces aligned with the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio. Consequently, Borno's defeat by the hands of Mandara, despite mustering what the sources suggest was an enormous army (including cavalry and firearms), is worthy of historical inquiry for understanding the Sayfawa's gradual loss of paramount status in the Central Sudan. In order to address this conflict, the Ungwa-a-Mufaka is an essential source.
Written during the reign of May Iliayassa (1845-1858) of Mandara, the Ungwa-a-Mufaka was translated into French in Eldridge Mohammadou's Le royaume de Wandala ou Mandara au XIXè siècle. Though written many years after the conflict, dated to 1196 AH, the kirgam cites a number of eye-witness testimonies. For instance, the future prince, Boukar Adjama, was one witness (60). Another, Oumata Nadji, was cited for a description of the physical appearance of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama on page 62:
C'était un homme d'une taille impressionante. Son teint était clair et lui donnait l'apparence d'un Arabe Chouwa. Il avait une grosse tête, des yeux aux globes très blancs mais qui devinrent toutes rouges lorsqu'il monta en selle. S'élancent dans les rangs de son armée, il se mit à exhorter ses hommes d'une voix si puissante que les veines de son cou enflèrent et qu'on put les distinguer nettement à distance.
Besides the eyewitness reports, the kirgam also quotes letters exchanged between Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama and the king of Mandara, May Bladi. Since it is far more likely that the conflict between the two states happened during the reign of Bladi's successor, Bukar-a-Jama, the kirgam must be interpreted carefully. Nonetheless, the access of the chronicle's author to Mandara elites who were present during the war and possibly correspondence between the Sayfawa mai and Mandara's king, the source presents a plausible account for Mandara's victory.
A map of Mandara at its territorial zenith (Barkindo).
So, what does the chronicle actually tell us of the conflict? According to this source, the war began after a Shuwa Arab went to Gazargamo and reported to the Sayfawa mai the resources of Mandara. This Arab had lived in Mandara before moving to Borno, thereby making him an informed observer of Mandara's political, economic and geographical conditions. The ruler of Borno, hearing abou this, developed an interest in seizing Mandara, eliminating Mandara's king and dignitaries, and reducing its people to slavery (44). Subsequently, Borno sent its emissary, Katouri b. Boukar, to Mandara with a letter from the mai. This first correspondence compared the mai to a lion or cat while belittling Mandara's king as a chicken or hare. The implied threat clearly stated his hostile intentions: "Ceci je te le dis pour que tu sois informé et que tu puisse méditer sur la conduite, et les conseils les plus opportuns à prodiguer à ton peuple" (45). Thus, the conflict was presented as one of Borno initiating conflict and declaring hostile intent through letters. The use of the written word to exchange messages between kings in the Central Sudan was also evident in the letters sent by the Bulala and Sayfawa during the conflict in Idris b. Ali's reign (1564-1596). To what extent the conflict was fully instigated by Borno is unclear, but it is difficult to imagine Borno launching a major expedition against a kingdom merely out of a desire for booty and conquest, particularly due to the problems on many other fronts that must have occupied the court's attention. In that light, it is better to understand the conflict as caused by Mandara's assertion of dominance over some of Borno's southern tributaries during the 1770s and early 1780s, as suggested by Barkindo.
In order to prevent the war, Mandara's king allegedly sent many letters, gifts, money and slaves. The first response included 3000 thalers, 1000 slaves, 100 horses and a promise of tribute (48). Borno's Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, however, refused to accept this. Indeed, he went as far as imprisoning and later ordering the punishment of a member of his court who urged peace (49). Unsurprisingly, Borno's second letter pledged to invade Mandara. A numerous army consisting of cavalry, archers, spearmen, shield carriers, and men armed with firearms began the march toward Mandara (50). Despite this invasion, Mandara's king continued to attempt a peaceful resolution by sending gifts and money with his letters. Indeed, the kirgam gives an exceedingly high number of 32 letters sent by Mandara to stop the Borno invasion (41). Nonetheless, these repeated peaceful overtures fail despite the Mandara king's message, "Nous mettons entièrement à ta disposition et attendons tes ordres pour les exécuter. Tous tes désirs seront les nôtres" (52). The dream of a Mandara marabout is even mentioned, probably to symbolize the imminent attack from Borno against the capital.
Since the chronicle emphasizes the numerous attempts by Mandara to avoid military conflict, it also highlights the immoral or unjust nature of Borno. For example, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama's imprisonment of a member of his court for speaking against the war serves to highlight his injustice. Another episode, even more alarming, emphasizes the immoral actions of a Sayfawa prince. Named Yarnam, the prince stayed at Karangou with a man named Ali Ayssami. In addition to being fed by his host, Yarnam demanded payment and later raped his host's wife and daughter. When Ayssami sought redress from the mai, he did nothing (57). This episode is yet another instance in which the cause of the Sayfawa was unjust and immoral. That Borno would go to war against another Muslim kingdom who sought peace was also an argument in favor of Borno's immoral war.
Returning to the chronicle suggests Borno's forces took about 18 days to reach Doulo, the Mandara capital. Along the way, thousands of soldiers joined the campaign and various villages of Mandara were sacked or pillaged (56). Once outside Doulo, a kaigama, named Ali Madjounoun, leading Borno's forces, was instructed by Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama to attack, seize the palace and prevent the enemy from fleeing into the mountains (55-56). This suggests that the Bornoan army was very familiar with the mountainous terrain favoring Mandara. While this was happening, Mandara, which apparently had scouts or spies informing their court of the Borno army's movements, had carefully prepared for their defense. The king planned specific areas for his troops to strike (60). Their careful planning paid off despite being outnumbered by the invading forces. Indeed, they were successful enough since the kaigama was taken captive. When he refused to serve Mandara, he was executed (61). As the battle continued, ultimately lasting from noon until sunset, the mai led the Bornoan forces, exhorting them to fight while mounted on his horse. But, the Bornoan forces began to retreat, losing all semblance of order as Mandara soldiers pursued them (63-64). During this chaotic retreat, many Borno troops were seized and their weapons, valuables, horses, and persons were taken.
Meanwhile, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama continued to retreat on horseback as Mandara soldiers chased after him. They apparently let him escape as the night progressed, but they managed to seize the person carrying his scepter (64). The chronicle suggests that the Mandara troops, being simple soldiers, were hesitant to directly attack the king of Borno due to the "sacred person" of a king, even an enemy (64). That characterization, however, is contradicted by Borno traditions, which mention Ali b. al-Hajj receiving a wound in this war (Landeroin 399). Perhaps this attempt by the Mandara chronicle was meant to minimize the idea of soldiers attacking kings to maintain status distinctions and power relations? Regardless, the Mandara campaign was an utter disaster for Borno. Many troops were lost, horses, weapons, and soldiers were seized, and Mandara likely continued to intrude upon Borno's southern tributaries. While the kirgam states only 180 Mandara elites were killed and 35 disappeared, the casualties of the rank and file are not known (but probably very large) to the chronicler (65).
Ultimately, the Ungwa-a-Mufaka is a precious source for contextualizing one of the military defeats in the Late Sayfawa Period. Although obviously biased and perhaps too eager to portray the ruler of Mandara as entirely blameless, the kirgam provides some much-needed context on the affair. It provides a physical description of the mai and some insights into the nature of Late Sayfawa Period military and political thinking of this era. Without the Bornoan perspective as can be reconstructed in the works of al-Tahir al-Fellati, one must use the Mandara kirgam and oral traditions. The benefit of the chronicle is in quoting the testimony of those actually present when the war took place in 1781. Hopefully the other textual sources on this episode will be published or studied for further insights into its causes. Lastly, one should consider the 19th century date for the kirgam and the possible impact of the jihad on delegitimizing the Sayfawa in some quarters. This could be a relevant factor for understanding the kirgam's portrayal of the mai as an oppressive king.
Bibliography
Barkindo, Bawura M. The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development, and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom. Stuttgart : F. Steiner, 1989.
Mohammadou, Eldrige. Le Royaume du Wandala ou Mandara au XIXe siècle. Tokyo: Institute for the study of languages and cultures of Asia and Africa, 1982.
Tilho, Jean (editor). Documents scientifiques de la Mission Tilho. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1910.