1/19/26

The Apogee of Agadez and the Zenith of Borno: Istambulawa-Sayfawa Conflict in the 17th Century


A passage from Girard's "Histoire chronologique du royaume de Tripoly de Barbarie" describing the pilgrimage of an Agadez prince.

            Although the conflict between the Sultanate of Aïr and Borno during the 17th century is well-known, reexamining its nature during the reign of Ali b. Umar of Borno (r. 1639-1677) and that of his son, Idris b. Ali (1677-1696) is worthwhile. This period happened to overlap the apogee of the Aïr Sultanate during the reigns of Muhammad al-Mubarak (1654-1687) and that of his son, Muhammad Agabba (1687-1721). During this era, the Sayfawa sultans of Borno were probably at their zenith, too, with Umar b. Ali and Ali b. Umar consolidating the gains of Idris b. Ali (r. 1564-1596). Aïr in this time was also in a period in which patrilineal succession occurred (from Muhammad al-Mubarak to Agabba). Additionally, territorial expansion through the incorporation of Adar developed at this period. Moreover, closer scrutiny of Aïr in this region reveals how economic, religious, and military factors made the Istambulawa sultans of Aïr rivals of the Sayfawa in the Central Sudan. In truth, these conflicts even reverberated in Tripoli, where Girard witnessed the quarrels of “blacks” from Agadez and Borno in the North African port. This essay shall examine each of these factors to contextualize how Sayfawa and Istambulawa competition arose through them. It will be demonstrated that the Istambulawa sultans were, at their apogee, regional rivals whose pilgrimages to Mecca, sponsorship of Islamic studies, fostering of trade ties to the Fazzan, and expansionist activities to the South were meant to challenge the hegemony of Borno in the Central Sudan.

Economic Factors

            First, the economic factors. Agadez had long been an important economic center for trans-Saharan trade. But the scale of it appears to have increased during the 17th century. For instance, Aïr began exporting senna to Tripoli by 1657, according to Girard.[1] This was cultivated within the region, suggesting gardens were established to increase production in the fertile areas of Aïr. Evidence also suggests the sultanate of Agadez was exporting horses to some of the Hausa states to the south, too.[2] In addition, Aïr possessed salines which were traded to Hausaland since the 15th century, if not earlier.[3] Naturally, Agadez was a major desert “port” for the export of gold and slaves from the south to North Africa, via the Fazzan and Ghadamis. Thus, economic development of the Hausa kingdoms to the south would have also favored Agadez as the northern “port” for Hausaland’s exports to North Africa and the Mediterranean. While this type of economic power was not the same as that of Borno, which at this time controlled Kawar (also a center for salt production and trade) but also large Sudanic lands where textile production, slave exports, and a larger agricultural surplus was attainable, Agadez’s commercial expansion and geographically favorable position made it an important site for trans-Saharan trade. Furthermore, growing ties between Agadez and the Fazzan during the 17th century may have partly undermined the economic influence of Borno. After all, if the Hausa kingdoms like Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, or Gobir were relying less on Borno’s controlled trans-Saharan route to the Fazzan, then Agadez was likely the one who benefitted as more commerce passed through Aïr to reach North Africa.

In addition, evidence of Agadez’s ties to the Fazzan and northern Africa during the 17th century can be found in Arabic documents from Ghadamis. Published and translated by H.T. Norris in Arabic Historical Literature from Ghādamis and Mali: Documents from the 18th to the 20th century, a major source is Tadhkīr an-Nāsī wa-Talyīn al-Qalb al-Qāsī (The Reminder of the Forgetful and the Softener of the Harsh). A biography of Shaykh ʿAbdallah b. Abī Bakr al-Ghadāmisī, it contains numerous references to his father and sons who studied in Agadez or became prosperous merchants in the city. For instance, the shaykh’s father, Sidi Abu Bakr, died in Agadez in 1641.[4] Another relative, Sidi Abu Bakr, was born in 1648 and traveled to Agadez with his father, Shaykh Abdallah. This was likely during the reign of Muhammad al-Mubarak, when this son of the shaykh became a prosperous merchant in Agadez favored by the sultan (likely al-Mubarak). According to the text, the Agadez sultan cherished him so much: “So his love for him grew in his heart.” He also went on the pilgrimage to Mecca three times. When he died in 1699, allegedly due to magic and sorcery, he was known for his success as a merchant.[5] His grandfather had also been known for his wealth, causing a jealous merchant to complain to the sultan about him possessing wealth that exceeded 40,000 mithqals.[6] Besides merchants from Ghadamis who were established in Agadez, the Fazzani merchants and scholars were established in the city. One family of Islamic scholars, the Barakila, were based in the city at this time.[7] The author of a remarkable diary that covers the second half of the 17th century, Abu Bakr b. al-Tahir Tashi, married a woman of Fazzani origin in 1689.[8] The numerous Fazzani and North African community based in Agadez was likely one of the reasons why Muhammad al-Nasir, of the Awlad Muhammad of the Fazzan, fled to Agadez in 1699. When he returned in 1700, al-Nasir also had Tuareg in his party.[9] This suggests that, despite Borno’s hegemony in Kawar and its long-standing ties with Tripoli, the dynasty in power in the Fazzan still looked to the west and southwest when in trouble. Agadez by the late 17th century was one area where many Fazzani merchants and Islamic scholars were based, and therefore a natural choice for fleeing sultans to find refuge. Overall, this concentration of Fazzani merchants and scholars in Agadez illustrates the emergence of an alternative Islamic-commercial hub that reduced Borno’s monopoly over trans-Saharan exchange.

Furthermore, the Kel Ewey Tuareg appeared to have enjoyed close relations with the sultans of Agadez in the 17th century. Indeed, Muhammad al-Tafrij, Muhammad al-Mubarak, and Muhammad Agabba may all have had Kel Ewey mothers.[10] While the era of Kel Ewey hegemony in Aïr is more easily attestable in the 18th century, the antecedents of their ascent may be traced to the 17th century. For example, Tuareg tradition suggests that al-Mubarak may have interceded on behalf of the Kel Ewey to force the Kel Gress to leave Aïr, leading to their migration to Adar and Gobir.[11] Although the evidence from the diary of Tashi reveals that the sultans were still occasionally threatened by conflict between the Kel Ewey and the Itisen, the Kel Ewey appear frequently in important political or economic contexts. For instance, Abu Bakr, the leader of the Kel Ewey, participated in the pilgrimage of Prince Aknafaya, a son of Muhammad al-Mubarak, in 1681.[12] Similarly, when Zamfara attacked the Kel Ewey in 1685, al-Mubarak immediately responded with a large force that included Abu Bakr and his Kel Ewey followers.[13] In light of the Kel Ewey’s reputation as traders and being more sedentary than other Kel Aïr, it is tempting to see their actions here as part of the economic interests of the Kel Aïr in trade and commerce with the lands to the south. The Kel Ewey factor here suggests that al-Mubarak and Agabba’s actions in Adar and Zamfara may have been at least partly motivated by a desire to support Kel Ewey trade and agricultural expansion.

In summary, economic factors related to commerce, trans-Saharan trade, and the trade routes that connected the Sudan to North Africa and the Mediterranean were part of Istambulawa competition with the Sayfawa. The growth of senna exports was another factor whilst the alliance between sultans al-Mubarak and the Kel Ewey, a group known for their commerce and sedentary agricultural settlements by the 18th century, likely favored the expansion of the sultanate into Adar and raids on lands claimed by Borno. The growth of ties between merchants and Islamic scholars in the Fazzan and Agadez appears to have increased during this era, presenting yet another challenge to Bornoan commercial hegemony as it deviated from the Lake Chad-Kawar-Fazzan-Tripoli route dominated by Borno. By aligning with a commercially oriented and increasingly sedentary Tuareg group, the sultans of Agadez also gained a social base that facilitated territorial expansion at the expense of Borno.

Factors of Faith and Spirituality

            Beyond trade, another dimension of Istambulawa-Sayfawa conflict during the 17th century was of a spiritual and religious nature. Although both were self-professed Muslim dynasties, the rulers of the Sayfawa also claimed caliphal status.[14] Moreover, the lineage of al-Mubarak and his successors may have also seen themselves as competitors for Islamic legitimacy with the powerful Sayfawa dynasty during this time. Take the hajj, for example. Ali b. Umar of Borno was known for performing the pilgrimage to Mecca several times. Indeed, he was said to have even founded homes in Cairo, Mecca and Medina with stores to support Borno pilgrims.[15] He was also known for his piety and support for scholarship. In the words of the Diwan, “C'était un homme courageux et un grand penseur.”[16] Even Girard, writing of Ali b. Umar based on his reputation in Tripoli, described him as someone “qui vivoit en opinion de sainteté parmy les Mahométans.”[17] Undoubtedly, Ali b. Umar and the Sayfawa dynasty’s known penchant for performing the pilgrimage enhanced their saintly reputation. In that light, it is interesting to note that a son of Muhammad al-Mubarak is known to have performed the pilgrimage at least three times.

Like the Sayfawa, the sultans of Agadez were also supposed to be pious, Islamic rulers. Without the status of caliphs, they developed the myth that their line began with Yunus, a prince from Constantinople. Though obviously a myth that lacks any historical accuracy, this origin myth turns the Kel Aïr sultans into children of another caliph, the Ottoman sultans. More likely, however, the institution arose as mediators of the Tuareg clans in Aïr, with Yunus being invited from the Sattafan country in Adrar-n-Ifoghas.[18] This region indicates possible origins in the marabout lineages of the Kel Tadamakkat, a region with deep Islamic roots and great influence in the lands of the Tuareg.[19] However, even the Istambulawa were said to possess a certain baraka and be related to the power of fertility.[20] In their victory against the jihad of Hadahada during the reign of Muhammad al-Tafrij, the Istambulawa were described by al-Hajj Muhammad b. Tighna in the following manner, “It is they who bring the evil to an end.”[21] Moreover, the same poem, written in response to Hadahada to criticize him for revolting against the sultan, also includes the following line: “Gratitude is a duty of a subject if the sultan acts justly, and patience is a duty if he acts unjustly.”[22] These aforementioned verses illustrate how the sultans of Agadez were perceived by at least some Islamic scholars of Aïr, as the source of justice and equality. It is thus very likely that Muhammad al-Mubarak, like his brother before him, saw his power similarly as a source of justice and one who must be obeyed. Like the Sayfawa, the Istambulawa claimed power through Islamic legitimacy. Lastly, both dynasties claimed origins from distant Islamic lands and a certain baraka.

            By looking at the practice of Islamic pilgrimage during the 17th century, one sees another element of the conflict over spiritual or religious status in the Central Sudan. The Sayfawa, a long-lasting dynasty with many mais who performed the pilgrimage, were already seen as Islamic and well-known in the Islamic world. The lineage of Muhammad al-Tafrij and Muhammad al-Mubarak, on the other hand, descended from a branch of the royal family which may have performed the hajj in the 16th and 15th centuries. According to Djibo Hamani, Yusuf, the father of Muhammad al-Tafrij and Muhammad al-Mubarak, was the son and grandson of men called al-Hajj. While these men may not have been from the royal family, the accession of Yusuf to the throne in 1594/5 may have benefited politically from this past of Islamic pilgrimages.[23] This tradition of hajj was maintained by the descendants of Yusuf, too. The most well-known case, that of Aknafaya, was a son of Muhammad al-Mubarak who performed the pilgrimage at least three times. On one of those occasions, in 1675, his second pilgrimage, he was briefly described by Girard as traveling in a group of 400 pilgrims and being “entièrement nègre.”[24]

While Ali b. Umar of Borno was described as traveling in a caravan of more than 2000 people in one of his later pilgrimages, this is nonetheless an important indication that the royal family of Agadez was known for undertaking the lengthy journey to Mecca.[25] By doing so, the rulers of Agadez were establishing or strengthening ties in the East and in North Africa whilst also enhancing their reputation as Islamic rulers. Unfortunately, internal politics within Aïr may not have been stable enough for a reigning sultan to make the pilgrimage himself, but members of the royal family doing so could still present an image of Aïr as an Islamic state.  These numerous pilgrimages of Aknafaya at a time when Borno’s ruler was known for his several “flights” to Mecca and Egypt could hardly have been coincidental. It is possible that al-Mubarak wanted to challenge the primacy of Borno by sending his son on the hajj several times. Even into the early 18th century, an unnamed Tuareg “prince” returning from hajj in 1710 was met by Fr. Carlo in Traghen.[26] It is thus conceivable that members of the royal family in Agadez continued this tradition with at least one of the sons of Muhammad Agabba making the pilgrimage. We strongly suspect part of this was politically motivated to elevate the reputation of the Istambulawa and demonstrate their status as peers with the Sayfawa.

            Furthermore, the status of Aïr in terms of Sufism within the Sudan and beyond is well-attested in this period. In fact, Ahmad al-Yamani of Arbaji, in modern-day Sudan, traveled to Aïr and Borno in the 1660s. Whilst his time at the second Kalumbardo settlement in Borno is well-known, the fact that he also studied in Aïr with Shaykh Ahmad al-Sadiq b. al-Shaykh Uways is significant. According to the Nashr al-Mathani, this man’s zawiya was widely celebrated. He died in 1679/80, and promoted the Suhrawardiya.[27] It is also said that the leader of the second Kalumbardo center, Abdallah al-Barnawi, studied under Shaykh Ahmad al-Sadiq.[28] This close association between Islamic mysticism in Aïr and the mystic school of Kalumbardo suggests that Sufi networks connected both Aïr and Borno. If the sources are credible, Abdallah al-Barnawi was perhaps influenced by Aïr Sufi traditions and perhaps Sidi Mahmud al-Baghdadi. In fact, this may also elucidate why the only time al-Yamani saw al-Barnawi upset was when a disciple wished that God destroy the Tuareg. In the words of Nashr al-Mathani, al-Barnawi replied, “Ne reste pas devant moi.”[29] This was allegedly said even though the Immakitan Tuareg raided Kalumbardo and were ultimately responsible for the destruction of the second community when they killed al-Barnawi in 1677/8.[30] The words of the shaykh only make sense if one seriously considers the possible influence of Aïr Sufi networks on his community, with evidence of similar practices of the followers of al-Baghdadi in Aïr and the Kalumbardo community as described by oral tradition.[31]

Naturally, that Aïr was known for its Sufi leaders such Ahmad b. al-Sadiq as far away as the Sinnar Sultanate and Morocco suggests the region was very much on the map of broader currents of Islamic mysticism in the 17th century. Since Kalumbardo was influenced by that tradition, Islamic mysticism may have been yet another expression of Istambulawa patronage for religion and an assertion of the sultanate’s status in the Muslim world. Aïr not only attracted students from as far as riverine Sudan, but also Fazzani scholars such as the Barakila.

            Finally, the military conflicts and raiding between the Kel Aïr and Borno during the second half of the 1600s were another arena for competition over religious legitimacy and leadership. According to a 1658 document translated by H.R. Palmer, Ali b. Umar launched an expedition against the Tuareg in response to the complaints of a woman who lost a grass cover of her calabash in Aïr. This conflict could be the one that took place between Borno and Aïr after the return of Ali b. Umar from the hajj in 1656, when Girard wrote that Borno had intense wars with Agadez and “Ethiopie” at this time (probably Kwararafa).[32] Nonetheless, the account translated in Bornu Sahara and Sudan, entitled “An Account of N’Gazargamu” by Palmer, mentions Ali b. Umar leading 1000 cavalry in an attack against the Kindin of Ahir, who were led by Ada Hamma.[33] This episode is difficult to interpret, but it appears to be an expedition launched in response to raids by the Kel Aïr. If the Bornoan source is reliable, the ruler of the Aïr was named Ada Hamma, which is contradicted by all other sources. However, the name Hamma is frequently found among the Tuareg.[34] Similarly, the diary of Tashi refers to a military leader named Amma Fatim in the attack against Borno in 1679, although his full name was Muhammad b. al-Hajj Ibrahim. In the second expedition against Zamfara in 1685, the leader was named Yusuf, nicknamed Addabab.[35]

Consequently, the Ada Hamma named in the 1658 Borno source could have been a Tuareg military leader but perhaps not Muhammad al-Mubarak himself. But most intriguing in Ali b. Umar’s victory against this Tuareg leader is the imposition of Islamic faith on the vanquished. After agreeing to convert to Islam, Ali b. Umar spared the Kindin leader. He also left 4 mua’llims with him.[36] Despite the implausibility of a Tuareg leader in the 1650s not knowing what Islam was, the narrative does suggest that Ali b. Umar saw the expedition as one that was legitimate based on Islamic concepts of holy war. The leaving behind of Islamic scholars with the Tuareg leader is an indication of this, as they would presumably have ensured proper Islamic practice of Ada Hamma. Furthermore, the leaving behind of a slave of the mai, Shakiralla, may have been done to ensure the loyalty of Ada Hamma after his capture. Overall, the military victory of this campaign, which included captives (some 1000 were given to the woman who complained to the mai), was partly defined as religious with Ali b. Umar promoting Islam among defeated or conquered peoples.

In the context of our known sources, it is likely this was merely a victory against one of the Kel Aïr factions, although further investigation is required to better establish a chronology of military engagements between the Kel Aïr and Borno during the period from 1639-1677. Nevertheless, it indicates a moment in which the Sayfawa used Islam to legitimize their victory against the Kel Aïr, who at the time also proclaimed their own Islamic legitimacy. Naturally, subjects of the rulers of Agadez contested the legitimacy of the Sayfawa. In fact, according to Girard, they mockingly referred to Ali b. Umar as “Sultan el Gatous,” due to the widespread belief that the mai could transform into a cat. Instead of seeing it as an example of his virtue (the cat was allegedly Muhammad’s favorite animal), it became a way to mock Borno’s ruler by subjects of Aïr in Tripoli.[37] Yet through framing frontier warfare as religious correction, the Sayfawa positioned themselves as Islamic arbiters over Tuareg groups whose sultan claimed similar legitimacy.

            Overall, religion and spirituality were a major factor in Istambulawa-Sayfawa conflict. By engaging in multiple pilgrimages, al-Hajj Aknafaya, a son of Muhammad al-Mubarak, was likely “competing” with the Sayfawa who were well-known for undertaking the pilgrimage. By going multiple times, this Agadez prince was probably trying to match the reputation of Ali b. Umar and his dynasty. In addition to strengthening the Istambulawa’s Islamic credentials and status, the pilgrimages increased contacts with other parts of the Muslim world. Besides the hajj, Sufi centers and Islamic scholarship in Agadez and other parts of Aïr attracted students from abroad. Their reputation further enhanced the reputation of the Istambulawa as patrons of Islam just as the Sayfawa were known for doing so through their own patronage of Islamic scholarship and piety. The links between Kalumbardo and the Aïr region are another element of this connection, with the Sufi Ahmad b. al-Sadiq functioning as a teacher of Abdallah al-Barnawi. In terms of Islamic mysticism and Sufism, which existed in Borno long before this period, Aïr may have been one of the influences upon the famous Kalumbardo center’s ideology and practices. As dynasties who also claimed exotic origins (though the exact chronology for the development of the Istambul myth for Agadez is ambiguous) and religious legitimacy, the commercial and military expansion of Aïr at this time undoubtedly butted heads with the Islamic credentials of Borno.

Military Factors

            Unsurprisingly, military factors related to raiding, war, and the acquisition of territory were also part of the competition between the Sayfawa and Istambulawa. Thanks to Girard, the 1658 source on Gazargamo, a praise song to a yerima said to have been a grandson of Ali b. Umar, and the journal of Tashi, a tentative chronology for some of the raids and wars is possible. Revisiting each of these sources on the wars and raids sheds another light on the political conflict between the two dynasties in the Central Sudan.

The aforementioned conflict between Ali b. Umar and the Tuareg led by Ada Hamma, for instance, should have taken place before or by 1658. That timing overlaps with the return of Ali b. Umar from the hajj in 1656 and wars with the Tuareg and Kwararafa. According to the 1658 text, Ali b. Umar also left a garrison at an unnamed place to defend the frontier, including many horses. To the people he left behind, he said, “May God bless you. Remain here.”[38] Though very fragmentary, the evidence suggests Ali b. Umar left behind forces to defend Borno’s northwestern frontier. This 1658 source is one of the few written ones to directly attest to Ali b. Umar’s frontier policy. It may also have been the conflict recalled in traditions of the Kel Férouan disobeying the sultan of Agadez when they refused to participate in the defense of Aïr against an invasion from Borno. Known previously as the “Bâton du Sultan” for always supporting the Istambulawa, they chose to not resist Borno at a time after the Kel Gress were already defeated (and presumably pushed to migrate south).[39] If this took place during the reign of al-Mubarak, it may have the 1658 conflict in which the Kel Férouan decided not to resist.

Understandably, the concern for defending Borno’s frontier from Tuareg raids and attacks was a significant consideration for the Sayfawa, who supported the creation of several buffer states at Muniyo, Kutus, Damagaram, and the use of Koyam communities to defend Borno’s heartland. Oral tradition from the Jetku or Jetko, for instance, recall migration to a Tal on the road to Dirku, north of N’guigmi. They apparently paid tribute to Mai Arri, who told them to stay at Tal to watch the Kindin.[40] The Mai Arri very well could have been Ali b. Umar, whose government planned to use the Jetku to guard the northern borders of Borno. Subsequently, the Jetko were under the administrative care of the tshiroma of Borno, indicating that the heir-apparent to the mai was given responsibility for the important Tell District north of the Komadugu.[41] This area, one of the many in which concern was shown for protecting the border from Tuareg raids, was also essential for protecting access to Kawar and northern trade routes to the Fazzan. Clearly, the yerima and to a lesser extent, the tshiroma, were expected to oversee Borno’s frontier defenses against dynamic Tuareg pressure which challenged Sayfawa authority.

Perhaps something similar occurred in Muniyo, where Kazelma Saemi, a Mandara prince, was sent to aid a chief named Gamagama against the Tuareg.[42] Zakari Maikorema believes this took place sometime in the late 1600s, possibly around the same time that the chiefly lineage of Kelle began with Atari Goumsoumi in Kutus.[43] The Sayfawa patronage of these smaller states as buffers between Borno’s central provinces and external foes like the Kel Aïr or Tuareg bandits further strengthened the image of the Sayfawa as protectors of these far-flung territories whose rulers sent tribute. With the aid of the yerima based in Gazargamo, oversight of these northwestern provinces bordering Aïr would have likely been closely watched.

But returning to documented conflicts, the best-known war between Agadez and Borno took place after the return of Ali b. Umar from his hajj in 1667. In this war, rebels of Borno sought aid from the ruler of Agadez in their attempt to seize the throne. Unfortunately for the rebels, the Sayfawa mai returned from the pilgrimage and was able to drive the forces of Agadez outside the kingdom.[44] The question of whether Kwararafa also attacked Gazargamo at the same time as the Tuareg besieged the capital is still unresolved. Barth, presumably relying on oral tradition, believed the attack from both groups took place at the same time.[45] The Gazetteer of Muri Province edited by Fremantle also supports this narrative, with the Kwararafa ruler, Katakpa, named as the one who launched the attack from Puje. Yet Ali b. Umar’s forces were able to convince the Tuareg army on the north side of the city’s walls to join them in an attack against Kwararafa.[46] Whether or not the Kwararafa attack on the capital really took place at the same time as the assault by the Tuareg and local rebels requires far more scrutiny to verify. But it indicates the most dramatic moment of Aïr-Borno conflict in the century. For the first time, Aïr soldiers were stationed directly outside Gazargamo and threatened to overrun the city.

The next documented military expedition, of 1679, was probably launched from Dabak. Led by Amma Fatim and including the Kel Ewey, “They seized children, herds and possessions, then the Sultan returned homewards.”[47] The reference to herds here and the date of the attack place it during the reign of Idris b. Ali. It is rather tempting to link this raid with the Kanuri praise song to a yerima. Translated by J.R. Patterson and entitled “Song to the Yerima,” it praises the yerima named Mohammadu. During his lifetime, a raid from “Sultan Ali whose country is Aïr” came to take away cattle from the land of Digima, a region under the care of the yerima.[48] It is very likely that Patterson mistranslated the song or perhaps the original verses are corrupted, since it names sultan Ali even though there was no sultan in Agadez called by such a name. It is possible the text mistranslated or garbled the name of the Aïr ruler, confusing him with Ali b. Umar of Borno, the grandfather of the yerima. Anyway, the song’s reference to the Fulani whose cattle were the target of the Tuareg is consistent with the 1679 expedition’s return from Borno with large herds. Moreover, the yerima, according to Nachtigal, was responsible for watching the southeastern Tuareg to protect the country.[49] The office of digima, mentioned in the song, was responsible for looking after the correspondence of the king of Borno. Nachtigal believed that his administrative territory in the days of the Sayfawa covered the royal residence, but in the 1870s, was Demagarim and neighboring areas.[50] This raises the question of a possible anachronism in the text of the praise song to Mohammadu, but chronology is consistent with the 1679 expedition led by Amma Fatim. In the praise song, Aïr only sent 70 horsemen to attack, strongly suggesting a small raid that struck somewhere on the northwestern borders of Borno.

Conclusion

In summation, the conflicts between the Istambulawa and Sayfawa during the second half of the 17th century were complex, multifaceted issues of regional importance. Economically, the growth of Agadez and Hausaland’s commercial centers, as well as the burgeoning power of the Kel Ewey, presented a threat to Borno’s hegemony in the Central Sudan. Close ties between Agadez and the Awlad Muhammad of the Fazzan, plus Fazzani traders and scholars based in Agadez illustrate this increased scale of commerce and cultural exchange. In addition to their economic considerations, the religious or spiritual factors also contributed to rivalry between the two dynasties. The Sayfawa, ancient and reputed for saintliness, were also confronted by the Istambulawa whose members engaged in the pilgrimage (sometimes more than once). Aïr sultans also presented themselves as legitimate Muslim rulers who promoted Islamic study, welcomed scholars, and were known to rule a domain that included illustrious shaykhs. To some extent, Aïr Sufi practices and ideology even reached as far as Sinnar and certainly shaped the second Kalumbardo settlement led by Abdallah al-Barnawi. While Ali b. Umar still asserted Bornoan Islamic legitimacy and even presented the Aïr Tuareg as pagans in need of his tutelage, the subjects of the Agadez sultan rejected this. Last, but certainly not least, the economic expansion of Aïr and its own internal dynamics led to more Tuareg clans migrating south and invading or raiding parts of the Central Sudan. The conquest of Adar, for instance, was only one aspect of Asben’s interference in the affairs of Hausaland. With the addition of new lands for herds and sedentary farming communities to exploit through tribute obligations, some Tuareg groups were able to transition gradually into sedentary or merchant groups with increasing ties to the Hausa trading centers. Perhaps the roots of the Kel Ewey hegemony in Aïr during the 18th and 19th centuries owes much to this early 17th century moment of Kel Ewey alliances with the sultans of Agadez. With territorial acquisitions in the south, the stage was set for further commercial development and power that, ultimately, did not require the Istambulawa anymore. But, for about 50 years, the Istambulawa truly were rivals to the Sayfawa.



[1] Girard, Histoire chronologique du royaume de Tripoly de Barbarie in R. Dewière, L'esclave, le savant et le sultan: représentations du monde et diplomatie au sultanat du Borno (XVIe-XVIIe siècles). Histoire. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, 2015.

[2] Moise Landeroin, “Notice Historique” in Documents scientifiques de la Mision Tilho, 483. According to one tradition, a young Muhammad Agabba went to Kebbi to sell horses to the Kanta.

[3] H.R. Palmer, “Kano Chronicle,” 76.

[4] H.T. Norris, Arabic Historical Literature from Ghadamis and Mali, 23-24.

[5] Ibid., 61.

[6] Ibid., 56.

[7] Ibid., 78, 170.

[8] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs: Their Islamic Legacy and Its Diffusion in the Sahel, 84.

[9] H.W. el-Hesnawi, Fazzan under the Rule of the Awlad Muhammad. A Study in Political, Economic, Social and Intellectual History, 137, 101.

[10] K.S. Vikør, The Oasis of Salt: The History of Kawar, a Saharan Centre of Salt Production, 202.

[11] C. Jean, Les Touareg du Sud-Est: l'Air: leur rôle dans la politique saharienne, 92.

[12] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 80.

[13] Ibid., 81.

[14] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 31

[15] Rerum aethiopicarum scriptores occidentales, Vol. 14, 384.

[16] Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem-)Bornū: Chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 81.

[17] Girard, in Dewière, 600.

[18] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 52-53.

[19] Djibo Hamani, Au carrefour du Soudan et de la Berbérie: Le sultanat touareg de l'Ayar, 138-139.

[20] Nicolaisen, Ecology of the Pastoral Tuareg, 416.

[21] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 129.

[22] Ibid., 133.

[23] Djibo Hamani, Au carrefour, 225.

[24] Girard, in Dewière, 607.

[25] Ibid., 602.

[26] Richard Gray, “Christian Traces and a Franciscan Mission in the Central Sudan, 1700-1711.” The Journal of African History 8, no. 3 (1967), 386.

[27] Mouhammad Al-Qâdirî, Michaux-Bellaire, Édouard (trad.), Nachr al-Mathânî, II, De l’an 1051 (1641J.-C.) à l’an 1100 (1688 J.-C.), 308-309.

[28] John Lavers, "Diversions on a Journey of the Travels of Shaykh Ahmad al-Yamani," in The Central Bilād Al-Sūdān: Tradition and Adaptation : Essays on the Geography and Economic and Political History of the Sudanic Belt: Proceedings of the Third International Conference of the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, Held from 8 to 13 November 1977, 225.

[29] Mouhammad Al-Qâdirî, Nachr al-Mathânî, II, De l’an 1051 (1641J.-C.) à l’an 1100 (1688 J.-C.), 253.

[30] Ibid., 258.

[31] Behique Dunama, “Shaykhs of the Koyam and the Legacy of Kalumbardo,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2024/05/shaykhs-of-koyam-and-legacy-of.html and “Revisiting Sufi Mystics of the Niger Desert,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2024/01/revisiting-sufi-mystics-of-niger-desert.html

[32] Girard, in Dewière, 604.

[33] H.R. Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 35.

[34] Dierk Lange, Diwan, 98.

[35] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 80-81.

[36] Palmer, Bornu Sahara and Sudan, 35.

[37] Girard, in Dewière, 620.

[38] Ibid.

[39] C. Jean, Les Touareg du Sud-Est, 96.

[40] H.R. Palmer, Sudanese Memoirs Vol. 3, 34-35.

[41] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan Volume 2, 252.

[42] Landeroin, “Notice historique,” 404.

[43] Maikoremi Zakari, Contribution à l'histoire des populations du Sud-Est nigérien: le cas du Mangari (XVI-XIXe s.), 114. Although Maikoremi argued that the chiefly dynasty of Kutus was founded before the second half of the 17th century, Landeroin argued that the founders of both the ruling lineage of Muniyo and Kutus overlapped (“Notice historique,” 419.

[44] Girard, in Dewière, 604.

[45] Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa: Being a Journal of an Expedition Undertaken Under the Auspices of H.B.M.'s Government in the Years 1849-1855, Vol. 2 (1857), 598.

[46] J.M. Fremantle (editor), Gazetteer of Muri Province, 35.

[47] H.T. Norris, The Tuaregs, 80.

[48] J.R. Patterson, Kanuri Songs, 13.

[49] Gustav Nachtigal, Sahara and Sudan, Vol 2, 250.

[50] Ibid., 250, 252.