Showing posts with label Mandara. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mandara. Show all posts

3/4/26

The Sayfawa Maina, Yarnam


Something we have thought about for some time now is the reference to a tyrannical and extreme Sayfawa maina in a 19th century Mandara chronicle. The kirgam, translated in French in Eldridge Mohammadou's Le Royaume du Wandala, ou Mandara, au XIXe siècle, was the subject of another post on the ill-fated 1781 Mandara campaign of Borno. But the chronicle, despite being written several years after the war and from a highly biased perspective, also tells us of a Sayfawa prince named Yarnam who robbed, raped, and killed en route to Mandara. At a place called Karangou, Yarnam was said to have stayed with a man named Ali Ayssami. The prince not only demanded money, he also raped his host's wife and daughter and executed her son. When the host sought justice from the mai of Borno, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, he received nothing. 

While this episode could be a literary invention to portray the Sayfawa ruler in as poorly a light as possible and make his attack on Mandara unjust, it is interesting to note Descourtilz also reported something similar about an African prince who was extremely cruel and monstruous. In the case of Descourtilz, however, it is left ambiguous as to the origin of this prince. But he included the anecdote of this prince in a chapter on Borno, based on interviews with Africans from there living in Saint Domingue (modern Haiti). In Descourtilz's version, this African prince mercilessly killed a child and then killed the daughter of a ruler in a neighboring state. Since the daughter had the same name as the animal meant for sacrifice in some sort of ritual or rite (labani, a forest beast), the despotic prince killed her and offered her as a sacrifice. Needless to say, this triggerered a larger conflict won by the father of the princess. His victory against the prince and his followers supposedly led to some of them ending up on the Rossignol-Desdunes plantation in colonial Haiti.

As previously mentioned, the story reported by Descourtilz does not specify that the young prince was from Borno. But it is inserted in a short chapter on Borno. Is it possible this young prince was the same Yarnam mentioned in the Mandara chronicle? The timing is consistent with a perhaps 1780s Sayfawa maina whose extremely abusive and violent actions led to his demise. Some of his followers may have ended up in Saint Domingue by the end of the 1780s and then were met by Descourtilz. Of course, Descourtilz never clearly identified the place of origin for the prince he was writiing about. 

12/12/25

Borno's Failed Mandara Campaign (1781): Ungwa-a-Mufaka

A map of Mandara in the early 18th century by Barkindo (The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902).

One particularly interesting textual source on the history of Borno in the 18th century was written in 19th century Mandara. A kirgam written in Arabic decades after a war in which Borno forces were defeated by Mandara, the text is both fascinating and problematic. It nonetheless offers one of the few descriptions of the physical appearance of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama (r. 1747-1792). It's also one of the few written sources on Borno's disastrous defeat outside Doulo that is dated to the period before the colonial era. Indeed, the defeat in many ways encapsulates Borno's declining fortunes in what we like to call the Late Sayfawa Period (1715-1808, or 1715-1846). This period saw Borno's loss of the lucrative salt trade from Bilma, growing independence of Bedde communities, Gobir's refusal to render tribute, a long drought, Wadai's incursions into Kanem from the east, and the truly calamitous fall of Birni Gazargamo to forces aligned with the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio. Consequently, Borno's defeat by the hands of Mandara, despite mustering what the sources suggest was an enormous army (including cavalry and firearms), is worthy of historical inquiry for understanding the Sayfawa's gradual loss of paramount status in the Central Sudan. In order to address this conflict, the Ungwa-a-Mufaka is an essential source.

Written during the reign of May Iliayassa (1845-1858) of Mandara, the  Ungwa-a-Mufaka was translated into French in Eldridge Mohammadou's Le royaume de Wandala ou Mandara au XIXè siècle. Though written many years after the conflict, dated to 1196 AH, the kirgam cites a number of eye-witness testimonies. For instance, the future prince, Boukar Adjama, was one witness  (60). Another, Oumata Nadji, was cited for a description of the physical appearance of Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama on page 62: 

C'était un homme d'une taille impressionante. Son teint était clair et lui donnait l'apparence d'un Arabe Chouwa. Il avait une grosse tête, des yeux aux globes très blancs mais qui devinrent toutes rouges lorsqu'il monta en selle. S'élancent dans les rangs de son armée, il se mit à exhorter ses hommes d'une voix si puissante que les veines de son cou enflèrent et qu'on put les distinguer nettement à distance. 

Besides the eyewitness reports, the kirgam also quotes letters exchanged between Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama and the king of Mandara, May Bladi. Since it is far more likely that the conflict between the two states happened during the reign of Bladi's successor, Bukar-a-Jama, the kirgam must be interpreted carefully. Nonetheless, the access of the chronicle's author to Mandara elites who were present during the war and possibly correspondence between the Sayfawa mai and Mandara's king, the source presents a plausible account for Mandara's victory. 

A map of Mandara at its territorial zenith (Barkindo).

So, what does the chronicle actually tell us of the conflict? According to this source, the war began after a Shuwa Arab went to Gazargamo and reported to the Sayfawa mai the resources of Mandara. This Arab had lived in Mandara before moving to Borno, thereby making him an informed observer of Mandara's political, economic and geographical conditions. The ruler of Borno, hearing abou this, developed an interest in seizing Mandara, eliminating Mandara's king and dignitaries, and reducing its people to slavery (44). Subsequently, Borno sent its emissary, Katouri b. Boukar, to Mandara with a letter from the mai. This first correspondence compared the mai to a lion or cat while belittling Mandara's king as a chicken or hare. The implied threat clearly stated his hostile intentions: "Ceci je te le dis pour que tu sois informé et que tu puisse méditer sur la conduite, et les conseils les plus opportuns à prodiguer à  ton peuple" (45). Thus, the conflict was presented as one of Borno initiating conflict and declaring hostile intent through letters. The use of the written word to exchange messages between kings in the Central Sudan was also evident in the letters sent by the Bulala and Sayfawa during the conflict in Idris b. Ali's reign (1564-1596). To what extent the conflict was fully instigated by Borno is unclear, but it is difficult to imagine Borno launching a major expedition against a kingdom merely out of a desire for booty and conquest, particularly due to the problems on many other fronts that must have occupied the court's attention. In that light, it is better to understand the conflict as caused by Mandara's assertion of dominance over some of Borno's southern tributaries during the 1770s and early 1780s, as suggested by Barkindo. 

In order to prevent the war, Mandara's king allegedly sent many letters, gifts, money and slaves. The first response included 3000 thalers, 1000 slaves, 100 horses and a promise of tribute (48). Borno's Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama, however, refused to accept this. Indeed, he went as far as imprisoning and later ordering the punishment of a member of his court who urged peace (49). Unsurprisingly, Borno's second letter pledged to invade Mandara. A numerous army consisting of cavalry, archers, spearmen, shield carriers, and men armed with firearms began the march toward Mandara (50). Despite this invasion, Mandara's king continued to attempt a peaceful resolution by sending gifts and money with his letters. Indeed, the kirgam gives an exceedingly high number of 32 letters sent by Mandara to stop the Borno invasion (41). Nonetheless, these repeated peaceful overtures fail despite the Mandara king's message, "Nous mettons entièrement à ta disposition et attendons tes ordres pour les exécuter. Tous tes désirs seront les nôtres" (52). The dream of a Mandara marabout is even mentioned, probably to symbolize the imminent attack from Borno against the capital.

Since the chronicle emphasizes the numerous attempts by Mandara to avoid military conflict, it also highlights the immoral or unjust nature of Borno. For example, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama's imprisonment of a member of his court for speaking against the war serves to highlight his injustice. Another episode, even more alarming, emphasizes the immoral actions of a Sayfawa prince. Named Yarnam, the prince stayed at Karangou with a man named Ali Ayssami. In addition to being fed by his host, Yarnam demanded payment and later raped his host's wife and daughter. When Ayssami sought redress from the mai, he did nothing (57). This episode is yet another instance in which the cause of the Sayfawa was unjust and immoral. That Borno would go to war against another Muslim kingdom who sought peace was also an argument in favor of Borno's immoral war.

Returning to the chronicle suggests Borno's forces took about 18 days to reach Doulo, the Mandara capital. Along the way, thousands of soldiers joined the campaign and various villages of Mandara were sacked or pillaged (56). Once outside Doulo, a kaigama, named Ali Madjounoun, leading Borno's forces, was instructed by Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama to attack, seize the palace and prevent the enemy from fleeing into the mountains (55-56). This suggests that the Bornoan army was very familiar with the mountainous terrain favoring Mandara. While this was happening, Mandara, which apparently had scouts or spies informing their court of the Borno army's movements, had carefully prepared for their defense. The king planned specific areas for his troops to strike (60). Their careful planning paid off despite being outnumbered by the invading forces. Indeed, they were successful enough since the kaigama was taken captive. When he refused to serve Mandara, he was executed (61). As the battle continued, ultimately lasting from noon until sunset, the mai led the Bornoan forces, exhorting them to fight while mounted on his horse. But, the Bornoan forces began to retreat, losing all semblance of order as Mandara soldiers pursued them (63-64). During this chaotic retreat, many Borno troops were seized and their weapons, valuables, horses, and persons were taken. 

Meanwhile, Ali b. al-Hajj Dunama continued to retreat on horseback as Mandara soldiers chased after him. They apparently let him escape as the night progressed, but they managed to seize the person carrying his scepter (64). The chronicle suggests that the Mandara troops, being simple soldiers, were hesitant to directly attack the king of Borno due to the "sacred person" of a king, even an enemy (64). That characterization, however, is contradicted by Borno traditions, which mention Ali b. al-Hajj receiving a wound in this war (Landeroin 399). Perhaps this attempt by the Mandara chronicle was meant to minimize the idea of soldiers attacking kings to maintain status distinctions and power relations? Regardless, the Mandara campaign was an utter disaster for Borno. Many troops were lost, horses, weapons, and soldiers were seized, and Mandara likely continued to intrude upon Borno's southern tributaries. While the kirgam states only 180 Mandara elites were killed and 35 disappeared, the casualties of the rank and file are not known (but probably very large) to the chronicler (65).

Ultimately, the Ungwa-a-Mufaka is a precious source for contextualizing one of the military defeats in the Late Sayfawa Period. Although obviously biased and perhaps too eager to portray the ruler of Mandara as entirely blameless, the kirgam provides some much-needed context on the affair. It provides a physical description of the mai and some insights into the nature of Late Sayfawa Period military and political thinking of this era. Without the Bornoan perspective as can be reconstructed in the works of al-Tahir al-Fellati, one must use the Mandara kirgam and oral traditions. The benefit of the chronicle is in quoting the testimony of those actually present when the war took place in 1781. Hopefully the other textual sources on this episode will be published or studied for further insights into its causes. Lastly, one should consider the 19th century date for the kirgam and the possible impact of the jihad on delegitimizing the Sayfawa in some quarters. This could be a relevant factor for understanding the kirgam's portrayal of the mai as an oppressive king.

Bibliography

Barkindo, Bawura M. The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development, and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom. Stuttgart : F. Steiner, 1989.

Mohammadou, Eldrige. Le Royaume du Wandala ou Mandara au XIXe siècle. Tokyo: Institute for the study of languages and cultures of Asia and Africa, 1982.

Tilho, Jean (editor). Documents scientifiques de la Mission Tilho. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1910.

8/9/22

The Sultanate of Mandara to 1902: History of the Evolution, Development and Collapse of a Central Sudanese Kingdom

We strongly believe that studying the history of the lesser known polities in the Lake Chad Region is very useful for understanding Kanem-Borno, our main area of interest. By studying smaller polities and societies who, in some cases, were vassals of the state or "empire" of the Sayfawa, one begins to see how Kanembu and Kanuri influences spread throughout various regions in the Lake Chad Basin and beyond. Barkindo's short but powerful study of the Mandara Sultanate from its shadowy 15th century origins to the colonial conquest is a great example of this. Barkindo, with good reason, dismisses accounts of foreign origins or echoes of the Hamitic Hypothesis to explain the formation of a Mandara kingdom. 

Assembling linguistics, oral traditions, archaeological studies, textual sources, and the similarities in political structure of pre-Islamic Mandara and its neighboring societies, it becomes quite clear that the origins of the state cannot be attributed to Tubu, Arab, Berber, or even Borno roots. However, the relocation of the Sayfawa dynasty to Borno in the late 14th century appears to have pushed the ancestors of the Wandala further south into the hills and plains of what became the Mandara state in the 1400s and 1500s. Over time, a combination of Gamergu and Wandala peoples combining agriculture, hunting, iron production, and trade, established a kingdom that was important enough to appear on the world map of Fra Mauro in the 1400s and appear in the works of Leo Africanus and d'Anania. 

But over time, the Mandara/Wandala people adopted and adapted aspects of Bornoan civilization as well as Islam (in c. 1715) and, provide a possibly useful case study of the complexity of Borno relations with neighboring societies. Instead of solely seeing Borno's relationship with Mandara and others in the larger region as one of conquest or empire, the economic, cultural, and, eventually, religious factors appear to explain more fully how the Lake Chad area became a "Bornoan" Sea of sorts. This perspective can be seen in the way Yusuf Bala Usman sought to redefine or contextualize the nature of Hausaland-Borno relations and the question of tribute and gift exchanges. Instead of assuming military conquest was the dominant or only route to which the Sayfawa dynasty established itself as the regional hegemon, cultural, economic, and social factors appear to have been just as important. 

As the dominant power of the Central Sudan until the 18th century, Borno's dominance of salt production/trade, trans-Saharan exchange, textile industry, livestock, horse breeding, and function as a center for Islamic scholarship and culture placed it at a favorable position and could have played a role in Mandara submission or sending of tribute to Borno. Until the second half of the 18th century, when Bagirmi and Wadai offered alternative routes to luxury goods from North Africa and beyond, Borno would have been the major supplier of North African goods to Mandara. Kanuri or Bornoan settlers, Shuwa Arabs, and Islamic scholars also flocked to Mandara, bringing their expertise in weaving, dyeing, animal husbandry, and religious skills to a state that, unsurprisingly, would be more deeply drawn into this orbit. Mandara's expansion and economic growth was stimulated by this development. 

If Barkindo's analysis is correct, Islam also provided a path to push for greater political centralization of the kingdom by challenging the traditional title-holders and their control of the kingship. It would be interesting to compare this with other groups who adopted Islam via Kanem-Borno influence, as well as pushing back against the notion that the Sayfawa were opposed to the expansion of Islam because it would have hurt the slave trade by decreasing the number of legally enslaveable captives. Understanding how and why some peoples resisted Islamization would be shed light on Islamic proselytism and state support for it but we have much to learn about the Bedde, Kotoko, Musgun, Margi, and other ethnic groups and their own distinct histories of relations with Borno.