Des jésuites au royaume du prêtre Jean

Des jésuites au royaume du prêtre Jean (Ethiopie): stratégies, rencontres et tentatives d'implantation, 1495-1633 by Hervé Pennec is another study of the Jesuits and the mission in Ethiopia. Since the scholarly literature and written sources on the topic is vast, Pennec proposes new interpretations and questions about the subject. While revisiting the sources and challenging readers to reconsider the strategies and tactics employed by both the Jesuits and ruler Susenyos, one can see that the topic of the Jesuits in Ethiopia and this transformation of Prester John of myth into the "real" Ethiopia which the Latin West engaged in the Early Modern Period still raises many questions.

The first third of the book begins with Portugal's early relations with the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia, and how Ignatius of Loyola (and others) mistakenly assumed the Abyssinian ruler was ready to submit to Christ. Relying on outdated information from Alvares, plus the issue of Bermudes and his claim to be Roman Catholic patriarch, confusion abounded. Despite being well-informed on some aspects of Ethiopia, the founder of the Jesuit order wrongly believed that Ethiopia was ready for submission to the papacy. Of course, Galadewos had no interest in doing such a thing, and the early wave of Jesuits in Ethiopia found themselves largely on the periphery. Still, despite their small numbers in the second half of the 16th century, Ethiopian religious literature engaged in a Christological written (and oral) debate with the Jesuit missionaries, particularly once Susenyos converted to Catholicism in 1622. Despite their complete lack of success in converting Ethiopian rulers, the early Jesuits did proselytize and preach to Luso-Ethiopians, maintaining Roman Catholicism among descendants of Portuguese in Abyssinia. Moreover, Goa, as the capital of Portuguese India and center of the Jesuit missions in the Orient, was also an early example of a periphery being arguably more important or essential for the survival of the Jesuit mission in Ethiopia than Rome, Portugal and Spain. Goa, much closer to the Jesuit missions and capable of receiving and sending information more quickly, shaped the decisions on personnel who were ultimately sent to Ethiopia. This was no simple matter, since Ottoman control of the Red Sea made the matter more difficult.

Pennec likewise focuses on how the Jesuits, once able to establish a foothold again in 1603, particularly with the arrival of Pero Paes. Whilst it would take several more years before an Ethiopian ruler converted to Catholicism, one can begin to see here the Jesuits establishing stone churches and residences (with Ethiopian workers and at least one Indian). By erecting churches in stone, some beautifully designed, the Jesuits were implanting themselves in the kingdom on a more permanent basis. By doing so, they were also increasingly drawn into what Pennec sees as royally-sponsored churches. Gifts of land (gult), money, supplies, and the involvement of Susenyos in the ceremony culminating the completion of churches was partly a way for Susenyos to assert his power. This meat that Susenyos, and his brother who converted to Catholicism before him, were incorporating the Jesuits into a familiar patter of royal sponsorship and assertions of power, particularly in Gojjam and around Lake Tana. While the Jesuits undoubtedly benefitted from receiving lands, supplies, funds, and elite backers, they were also part of a strategy of Ethiopian rulers to express their power, which even included enlisting the Jesuits (or the masons among them) to construct stone palaces and monumental architecture for him. This complex process was followed by the Jesuit experience in Ethiopia after the conversion of Susenyos. Part of this complex relationship was also due to Susenyos's desire for Spanish troops to be sent to Ethiopia to help him as a prerequisite for converting, while the Jesuits told him he would have to submit to the papacy before any European troops would come to his aid.

With the 1620s, Pero Paes died but Susenyos's conversion gave the Jesuits their legitimacy and renewed the mission by the arrival of more missionaries. Although a failure within ten years, as Susenyos abdicated and his son, Fasiladas, later exiled the Jesuits, one can see this experience as the zenith of the mission. More missionaries on the ground, conversions of more Ethiopians (although the numbers given by the Jesuits are problematic, it seems that Gojjam had more converts), and Susenyos sidelining his Catholic brother as a supporter of the Catholics. Nonetheless, the mission's short-lived success came to an end with Susenyos's abdication. Pennec's study is less focused on this period, highlighting how Paes and d'Almeida's histories of Ethiopia must be analyzed carefully for the ways in which the authors engaged with Ethiopian written sources, especially the royal chronicle on the reign of Susenyos. Paes especially, despite his nearly 20 years spent in Ethiopia and his familiarity with ge'ez and Amharic, must be interpreted for the ways they cite, paraphrase, and refute Ethiopian sources. For instance, the question of the metropolitan accused of fathering children, drinking, and abusing his ecclesiastical authority in Paes's redaction of the chronicle of Susenyos, and being involved in a revolt in 1617 against the king, may not necessarily be an insertion by Paes. It is possible that later versions of the chronicle after Susenyos's reign censored that segment of the chronicle, but Paes, who was of course biased against the metropolitan sent from Egypt, may have been closer to the truth.

Mozambiques and East Africans in Colonial Haiti

Trying to find details on the "Mozambiques" and East Africans in colonial Haiti is, rather difficult. They were largely imported into the colony during the last 2 decades of colonial rule, often being imported at Le Cap, Saint-Marc, and Port-au-Prince. While Jesuit historian Charlevoix mentioned an early presence of Monomotapa and Madagascar slaves in the colony, they were not considered desirable slaves by the French. However, the development of the Mascarenes and the insatiable need for labor in Saint-Domingue made East Africa and Mozambique a supplier of over 20,000 captives to the colony from 1773 until the 1790s. As the above maroon case indicates, some of these "Mozambiques" had even been enslaved in the Mascarenes for a while, learning French (and presumably, Mauritian Creole?) before being brought to Saint-Domingue. 

Michel, a Macoua (Makua) 

Trying to determine the "nations" of the Mozambiques in Saint-Domingue is difficult. The only two "nations" we have seen explicitly mentioned in the colony are Makua (Macoua, Maquoua) or Maconde (of Tanzania and parts of Mozambique). Despite the appellation, many of the "Mozambiques" came from diverse areas in Southeastern Africa. The Makua may have been a larger proportion of the total, but if the composition of the "Mozambiques" in the Mascarenes is a reliable indication, Saint-Domingue may have included Mondjavoas, Senas, Moussenas, Yambanes, Mouquindos, Maravis, and Niamoeses in addition to Makua and Maconde. This ethnic heterogeneity seems to have been completely lost in the eyes of Saint-Domingue's slaveholders, who should have known the "Mozambiques" were quite different from other Africans yet not a singular group in themselves.

A Mozambique who spoke Portuguese and Spanish

It also appears that some of the "Mozambiques" had spent substantial time in the Portuguese colony or among Lusophones. For instance, the above case of a runaway demonstrates how some "Mozambiques" could speak Portuguese and Spanish. This may explain why some of the "Mozambiques" encountered by Descourtilz were also devout Catholics (in his eyes). They, like some of the "Congo" in Saint-Domingue, were influenced by Roman Catholicism and may have added to the already Christian (or partly Christianized) segment of the enslaved population. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say to what extent these Catholic "Mozambiques" formed a significant part of the "Mozambique" population in Saint-Domingue, but they were conspicuous enough to be noticed by Descourtilz.

4 runaway Makuas. Perhaps the large concentration of "Mozambiques" in some areas favored marronage as they found people from the same or similar ethnolinguistic backgrounds to escape with.

A runaway slave of the Maconde "nation" appears here.

As for East Africans, purchased from Kilwa, Mombasa, Monfiat and Zanzibar, Saint-Domingue received a little over 2000. Vidargent, of the Malingue nation, may be an example of this East African (Tanzanian) presence. The French slave trader, Morice, used the word Malingue to refer to captives purchased from Kilwa. The name may be a corruption of Maningo or Machinga, peoples from the hinterland of Kilwa or the Tanzanian interior. Malingue could also refer to a completely different African "nation" in West or Central Africa, but we thought it interesting that Morice used the same word in the 1770s and an African of that "nation" appeared in the colony around the same time. This presence of captives purchased via the Swahili Coast was on a much smaller scale and, alas, the "nations" of these groups in the colony of Saint-Domingue are not clearly specified or listed in the archive. We know from Moreau de Saint-Mery that captives purchased from Montfiat, Kilwa, and variosu spots on the eastern coast of Africa could be found, including from some closer to the Cape of Good Hope (Natal Africans?). 

Sadly, our only somewhat detailed account of "Mozambiques" in colonial Haiti remains the work of Descourtilz. For example, he conversed with a Mirault who owned many Mozambiques, including one who allegedly consumed human blood. Again, it is via Descourtilz that we learn that some of the Mozambiques were Catholics through Portuguese influence. Even more useful is Descourtilz's brief and problematic description of the "Vaudoux" of the Mozambiques. According to him, their "Vaudoux" practice consisted of imploring their "serpent" or "vaudoux" for the favor of their masters, the acquisition of money, to find love or for other wishes. He even described a Mozambique "Vaudou" reunion which allegedly occurred at the Pelerin habitation in Saint-Louis. According to him, the Mozambiques met in a secret spot and as part of their ritual, a child was beaten or severely injured. Since Descourtilz did not witness some of the things he described, he must be used cautiously here. Nonetheless, we may be reading a very biased, incomplete account of diviners and spiritual practices of southeastern African peoples. 

After Haitian independence, the presence of "Mozambiques" was noted for some time. For example, a colonel named Louis Mosambique was killed by Petion in Saltrou for what may have been an attempted conspiracy or revolt in 1816. In terms of cultural legacy, it's possible their presence in Haiti was comparable to that of Brazil. They came in large numbers, but far smaller than other groups and therefore their cultural impact may be minimal. Instead, they were more likely to become part of the established culture among the enslaved. Nonetheless, it is both fascinating and horrifying to see the links between the Indian Ocean and Atlantic Ocean for the slave trade to the Mascarenes and the Caribbean. 

On the Zagwe Dynasty

Marie-Laure Derat's L’énigme d’une dynastie sainte et usurpatrice dans le royaume chrétien d’Ethiopie, XIe-XIIIe siècle is an intriguing and challenging work. The lack of adequate documentation for most of the rulers of the Zagwe dynasty and the problematic reliance on oral traditions, hagiographies and historiography based on the Solomonic legend of the subsequent dynasty makes it rather difficult to establish with greater clarity what was the Zagwe dynasty. However, using the available Arabic sources (particularly Copts writing the history of the Patriarchate of Alexandria), later hagiographies, archaeological evidence, and inscriptions, land grants and kings lists, Derat proposes some new interpretations while raising more questions. Derat does this while endeavoring to understand the paradox of how the Zagwe rulers were seen as both usurpers yet holy.

For example, the assumption of an Agaw or Cushitic origin of the Zagwe dynasty is far from clear. Further, the oral traditions compiled by Conti Rossini are contradictory and difficult to make sense of. Instead of assuming a Cushitic or Agaw origin, Derat proposes a model in which the Zagwe rulers emerged from a long-lasting second wave of Christianization that occured in the late Aksumite and post-Aksumite period in eastern Tigray. Archaeological evidence indicates there an area of ongoing church construction and thriving Christian communities, perhaps leading to a reunified Ethiopian Christian kingdom that reestablished contact with the Patriarchate in Egypt. Derat even suggests that the famous rock-hewn churches at the site associated with the most illustrious Zagwe ruler, Lalibela, were not built because of Muslims prohibiting Ethiopians from making the pilgrimage there. Indeed, the Zagwe appear to have contributed to the Christianization of an already used space, building marvels that were associated with rulers like Lalibela. Their donations to churches and ecclesiastical groups similarly exemplify their efforts to reinforce their rule as patrons of the Church and monasteries. 

Unfortunately, since it is so difficult to disentangle the problematic sources written during the Solomonic era and shed light on the Zagwe dynasty from sources written during their dynasty. The genealogy of rulers is uncertain, the hagiographies were written after their fall and promote the idea of the holiness of some as saints while also accepting the Solomonic legend of the legitimate dynasty which took over in 1270. Nonetheless, it does seem like the standard narrative on the Zagwe dynasty in Ethiopian historiography is in need of substantial change. Portraying them as "Cushitic" or Agaw usurpers against "legitimate" Semitic Solomonic rulers or implying that the former practiced matrilineal succession based on the contradictory sources available indicate this problem quite well. All one can say is that the Zagwe rulers such as Lalibela and Yemrehanna Krestos achieved sainthood while modeling an idealized kingship, one which was later adopted by Zara Yaq'ob and subsequent Solomonic rulers. This paradox of usurpers and holy rulers may reflect that long process of Christianization in other regions of the kingdom which, influenced by the traditions of the Kebra Negast and apocalyptic literature from Coptic and Syriac sources, later emerged the Solomonic dynasty as heirs to Aksum. 

Southern Ethiopia and the Christian Kingdom, 1508–1708

Southern Ethiopia and the Christian Kingdom, 1508–1708: With Special Reference to the Galla Migrations and Their Consequences  is Merid Wolde Aregay's seminal thesis on the Solomonic kingdom. Seeking to elucidate the fall of the centralized state and the decline of imperial control of a regimented military which had made the Solomonic state's expansion to the south possible, Aregay's state contextualizes this development with the history of Ahmad Gran's invasion, Oromo expansion, the Jesuits, and religious controversies between unctionists and tewahedo groups of the Ethiopian Church. Drawing on the voluminous royal chronicles, Jesuit sources, land charters, and travelogues, Aregay presents a convincing case for the various crises being so devastating to the Solomonic state due to the rise of the provincial nobility in power against the emperor. 

Over time, imperial control was effectively lost in some provinces while the chewa regiments and professional soldiers either formed mutinous bands or became part of the provincial elite's retainers. Emperors like Lebna Dengel exacerbated these above problems through tyrannical rule and slave raiding that aroused opposition and even support for Ahmad Gran's conquest. The past ability of the Solomonic state to check the expansion of pastoralist lowland groups into the highlands was lost through the united Muslim front of Adal and the weakening of the military defenses and centralized imperial government. This only facilitated Oromo expansion as, in their early migration waves, Oromo clans were often more effective as there was enough land and booty for various clans to collaborate in their raids. The military, through its ineffectiveness or imperial abandonment of provinces, led to some peasants and tributaries bearing arms to defend themselves or becoming dependents or clients of Oromo groups. 

Subsequent emperors, particularly after Galadewos, continued the trend of weakening central authority and the military by relying on slave raiding, not resisting the growing autonomy of regional governors and nobility, and failing to check rapid Oromo expansion. Minas, who was a pawn of his mother and her influence, and Sarsa Dengel who succeeded him, were often ineffective or unable to check provincial officials like the bahr negash Yeshaq. Later neguses, such as Susenyos, a former bandit, tried to administer the empire by allowing the provinces to be mostly ruled by his brothers and sons-in-law. Susenyos, according to Aregay, weakened the position of emperor by rejecting the pomp and ritual associated with his office. His reliance on slave raids targeted non-rebellious pagan Agaw and other groups to raise revenue instead of reforming the administrative structure of the empire to increase revenue derived from the provinces. The attempt to impose Catholicism on the population drove the Church into revolt, further weakening the central government as it illustrated for posterity that the Church could act independently of the emperor. 

This contributed to the later conflicts within Ethiopian Christianity between the unctionists and orthodox positions on Christological controversies. Unfortunately, these religious controversies became even more problematic in the 17th and 18th centuries as emperors from Fasiladas to Iyasu I struggled to contain the conflicts between clerical and monastic groups that involved nobles, warlords, and Oromo groups in their struggles with each other and the imperial court. Thus, even a "traditionalist" emperor like Fasiladas appeared to rule a state with flimsy foundations as the Solomonic state faced internal Christian religious division, Oromo raiding, nobility vs. imperial court intrigues or civil wars, and pretenders to the throne. In other words, the system which had been established by the early Solomonic rulers that had led to the formation of an empire was not maintained.

For the interests of this blog, it is interesting how the Solomonic Dynasty appears to have followed a similar trajectory to the Sayfawa during this same period. The Sayfawa appear to have reasserted themselves in the Central Sudan as a major power from c.1500 until the early 18th century. While Sayfawa rule seems to have declined after Ali b. Umar in the 17th century, Sayfawa rule may have suffered from overtaxation of the peasantry, slave raiding on certain tributary or predatory areas that could have been more effectively integrated into the core, and the increase of mallamtis and Sufi centers that might have challenged the imperial court's authority or religiously-based legitimacy. Some of the seeds of their decline may have already been evident in the uprisings, political discord and factions over succession, and inability to protect the western frontier from Tuareg bandits, lacustrine settlements from Yedina attacks and Kanem and Kawar from Tubu and Tuareg incursions. However, like their Solomonic counterparts, the Sayfawa occasionally produced great or competent mai who attempted to challenge the decay or complacency of the court. But circumstances eventually reached the point where the mais were unable to stamp resistance from former tributaries like Mandara.

Bahrey and the Oromo

Although the writings of Bahrey are sadly too brief for a deeper history of the Oromo peoples of the 16th century, his History of the Galla is a fascinating document. As an early ethnographic document of sorts, the Ethiopian monk sought to elucidate the social structure of the Oromo and its role in their often victorious raids and battles with Solomonic Ethiopia. Furthermore, in spite of his own Christian biases and panegyrical allusions to Sarsa Dengel's military prowess and zeal for Christian expansion, Bahrey strikes the modern reader as a relatively balanced source on the Oromo. He blames the small size of the Ethiopian warrior class and the egalitarian (or relatively so) Oromo social system in which all men are reared for war. 

If true, this meant the Oromo age-grade system and their lubas were able to expand and raid several parts of the Solomonic kingdom due to their large source of warriors. Their social system also, according to the end of Bahrey's brief account, included a division of labor on the behalf of the village or community. Their system, though lacking the kind of permanent centralized authority of the Abyssinians or the later Oromo kingdoms, was flexible and able to adapt to different conditions. For instance, the adoption of horses and mules under Mesle in the years 1554-1662 represented an innovation in Oromo military tactics. Thus, it is less surprising to understand how and why the Oromo migrations of the 16th century were so successful, despite occasional internal disputes or divisions. 

The success of the Oromo and the Solomonic dynasty's struggles to contain them during the 16th century remind us of other African states facing similar problems during the same era. The infamous "Jagas" of Kongo, for instance, appear to have formed effective warbands that allowed them to threaten Kongo and other kingdoms in West Central Africa. The Songhai, in West Africa, had Fulani marauders and other issues. Borno, under the Sayfawa dynasty, was also dealing with ongoing rebellions or insecurity near Lake Chad. According to Ahmad b. Furtu, whose chronicles of Idris b. Ali's military campaigns in Kanem and Borno have survived for posterity, the Sayfawa mais had to deal with the rebellious Bulala in Kanem, Tuareg incursions, Kano raids, and attacks from Sao populations near the imperial capital. Like Sarsa Dengel, Idris b. Ali appears to have been quite effective as a military leader. The displaced populations, war captives, and nearly exterminated peoples who felt the wrath of Borno were, for the most part, pacified or reduced to tributary status. 

Unlike the Solomonic rulers, Borno appears to have been far more effective at securing its internal borders by the late 16th century. Part of this must have been due to the different socioeconomic structures of their respective enemies, as well as internal factors like military tactics, adoption of firearms, and administrative practices. One wonders what the Sayfawa would have done if faced with an enemy comparable to the Oromo peoples of the 16th century. The closest enemy might have been the Tuareg along the northwestern border and some of the Tubu and Arab populations in Kanem who were initially aligned with the Bulala sultans. We know Idris b. Ali, at least, won over some of the latter two groups and was able to force some of the Tuareg raiders into vassal status.

A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991

Although our major interest is in the Solomonic Dynasty's medieval and early modern history, one cannot avoid the fascinating history of modern Ethiopia in the 19th and 20th centuries. Like Liberia and Haiti, Ethiopia was rather unique for being one of the few independent black countries in the imperial world order after the Scramble for Africa. Like Haiti, it also offers an example of a country of heterogeneous origins with a recognized yet compromised sovereignty. In the case of Ethiopia, it was the tripartite alliance of Britain, France, and Italy which ensured post-Adwa Ethiopia could not have developed too independently. In Haiti, the Western powers were also present and helped to ensure Haitian economic development would be limited. Thus, Haiti and Ethiopia share a common history of heroic political sovereignty won through the sword but failed economic development through internal dynamics and foreign imperialism. The Ethiopian case also adds another dimension of imperialism since modern Ethiopia's borders were based on the expansion of the Shawan ruler Menelik II and he had to defeat the legacy of the Zamana Masafent's regionalism.

Bahru Zewde's A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991 seems to be one of the better general introductions to understand this dynamic in Ethiopian history: political independence accompanied by economic dependency. Beginning with the late Zamana Masafent and the striking rise and fall of Tewodros II, Zewde suggests Tewodros possessed a modern vision without practical steps or a process for achieving it. Later emperors, like Yohannes IV, were able to muster enough power to defeat expansionist Egypt but did not fully centralize the empire. That great task was left to Menelik II, an astute leader who managed to secure the throne and expand the more to a greater extent than any of the medieval great Solomonic dynasts. Zewde's study demystifies the Battle of Adwa and shows the failure of Menelik II to follow through after Adwa. Thus, Italy retained significant influence in Italian Somaliland and Eritrea while the French exerted influence through the Djibouti railway extension to Ethiopia. The British, the major imperial power in northeast Africa, sought to protect their interests in Sudan and were willing to, with the French, allow Italy the ability to exert itself in the Horn. 

Unfortunately, Menelik's modernizing attempts were restricted and succession posed another threat to the fragile state. Lej Iyyasu, who eventually became emperor, was removed from power for his alleged immoral conduct and interest in integrating minority populations such as the large Muslim population. Eventually, the future Haile Selassie, an ambitious man and an absolutist, secured the throne over the course of several years. According to Zewde, Haile Selassie's ascent to absolute power was based on favoring men of humble or lower rank as appointees to political office instead of the hereditary nobility. This tactic, however, did not mean the Emperor was interested in any meaningful social, economic or democratic reforms. Land, especially in the southern provinces, was increasingly privatized and the lot of the Ethiopian peasantry declined. Industrialization remained weak and foreign economic penetration of the economy was strong. Much like Haiti, actually, Ethiopia was dependent on exports of coffee. This generally dismal condition continued after the restoration of imperial power with the Liberation of Ethiopia from the fascist Italian occupation. Despite a few attempted coups and assassinations, and a bourgeoning student movement, Haile Selassie clung to power until 1974, when the Solomonic lineage came to an ignominious end. 

The depressing and horrifying annals of the Derg years and the role of the TPLF and Eritrean independence forces in toppling it conclude Zewde's history. The Derg administration, which arose out of the military, was not initially Marxist, but adopted its rhetoric. Land reform was implemented, albeit not in a way that actually gave inalienable land rights to the peasant or included them in the political process. The depressing condition of the economy, widespread practice of executions and political persecution and the catastrophic famine of the 1980s shed additional light on the failures of the Derg regime. This tragic recent history highlights how the struggle for political centralization had to, in some fashion, restructure itself along federal lines, come to accept the loss of Eritrea and confront the question of ethnic and religious diversity. However, throughout the 1900s, some of the reforms which had interested some Ethiopian intellectuals since the beginning of the century finally saw the light of day, albeit after several decades of collaborating with various members of the traditional elite or through influence on the military and students. Unfortunately, throughout the period Ethiopia remained economically weak and internally divided. Replacing Britain with the US and, later on, the USSR, as major sources of financial and technical support, did little to improve the lot of the impoverished masses. Limited import substitute industrialization under Selassie remained embryonic. Thus, without real economic development, political autonomy meant little. 

Walatta Petros

This is a nice video on a remarkable Ethiopian woman. Due to our ongoing interests in Ethiopia and the Jesuits, the hagiographical literature on Walatta Petros is a fascinating text to tackle.

Ethiopia and the Red Sea

Mordechai Abir's Ethiopia and the Red Sea probably should have been given an alternative title. Besides one chapter on the role of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean in Ethiopia's trade networks and Ottoman versus Portuguese conflicts for dominance of the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean, this book is mostly a narrative history of the Solomonic dynasty of Ethiopia from it's expansion in the 1300s to the era right before the Gondarine period. So, Abir's study builds on earlier research by the author and the scholarship of Tamrat and other Ethiopianists to analyze why the Solomonic dynasty failed to establish a more integrated, centralized state in the Horn of Africa. Lacking familiarity with most of the sources utilized by Abir, we cannot determine how accurate or misleading some of his interpretations are, but he did not really utilize Ethiopian sources in Ge'ez so one cannot help but think that skews his interpretation of certain figures, like Susenyos or the conflicts within the church between the two monastic orders over theological debates.

Besides disastrous events like the jihad of Ahmad Gran and the Oromo migrations which continued with very little Ethiopian resistance from the royal court, Abir outlines a plethora of additional factors behind the failure of the Solomonic state to develop an effective, centralized polity capable of integrating or resisting Oromo migration, modernizing, or expanding its influence in the Horn. These include an elite Church dependent on appointed abuns from Egypt, little sustained efforts at evangelizing and integrating conquered peoples, tensions between the Amhara and the northern population of Tigre, regional lords and nobility using succession and factions in the royal court to challenge or revolt the emperor, attempted military and administrative reforms that, in some cases, aided and abetted Oromo expansion into provinces of the empire. The particularly long reign of Sarsa Dengel seems to be a great example of wasted opportunities for reform and centralization, processes that could have helped Ethiopia resist or integrate the Oromo and build a "modern" state beyond the "feudal" military-administrative structure Abir describes. It's hard for this blog to not read Abir's chapter on Sarsa Dengel and not think of the opposite trends in Borno under Idris b. Ali, or Idris Alooma, who appeared to have been far more effective at defending and expanding the borders of Borno while also promoting a monotheistic religion that must have served an integrative function in its vast domains.

Of course, the most interesting and perhaps too brief chapters analyze Susenyos and the Jesuits. Susenyos is depicted as someone who believed in the superiority of Catholic or European civilization and wanted to use it as a way of modernizing the state. Earlier rulers, who had expressed an interest in European military technology and artisans, were supposedly not modernizers, despite some of them attempting various administrative and military reforms with Mamluk or European aid. Susenyos, however, was pressured by the Jesuits into thinking Portuguese-Spanish military aid would flow to Ethiopia if he agreed to impose Catholicism as the official religion. With their aid, presumably Susenyos could have created a state based on different lines, reclaimed territories lost to the Oromo, and "modernized" Ethiopia. Abir presents this as an early attempt by a non-European state to modernize long before the more famous examples of the Middle East and Egypt, but one which Ethiopia was not prepared for due to the very unlikely chances of a Portuguese military presence or expedition and the fierce resistance to the Jesuits from members of the emperor's inner circle, the native religious hierarchy, Jesuit dogmatism attacking local culture and the "feudal" lords opposed to political centralization. Since more recent scholarship has focused on the period of the Jesuit mission, we shall return to this period in Ethiopian history and some of the conclusions reached by Abir of the Gondarine period as one of decline or, perhaps, failure.

Church and State in Medieval Ethiopia

Due to its central importance as a key study of medieval Ethiopian history, we finally read Taddesse Tamrat's important study. While definitely reflecting some of the older biases in the scholarship on ancient Ethiopia, particularly the role of speakers of Semitic languages from South Arabia as civilizing agents, it remains a definitive study of the early centuries of the Solomonic dynasty. Indeed, Tamrat's work demonstrates how effective hagiographical literature from the region can be for reconstructing the distant past. These sources of course have their limitations and raise additional problems, but Tamrat seems judicious and capable of parsing the likely and factual information from them to form a coherent historical narrative of Church-State relations. In addition to hagiographies, Ethiopian land grants, royal chronicles, and external Arabic and European sources, Tamrat occasionally uses local traditions to shed further light on the contours of the Solomonic state's development.

Tamrat's study basically outlines the development of the Solomonic dynasty from 1270 until the period before Ahmad Gragn nearly defeated the Solomonic rulers of the Christian state. Beginning with the somewhat dated overview of Aksumite origins and Christianity in the region through the Zagwe dynasty, Tamrat proceeds to cover the next few centuries. Territorial expansion under the Solomonic rulers, particularly Amda-Seyon, favored the resurgence and growth of monastic communities, evangelization of some conquered peoples, an efflorescence of Ethiopian literature, and the Christian kingdom becoming the dominant power in the region. Already one can see Ethiopian Christianity diverging from the Coptic Church, especially over the issue of observance of the Sabbath (seen as a Jewish custom by the Patriarchs in Alexandria). 

Religious differences within the Ethiopian Christian community, conflicts with pagan and Muslim neighbors and subjects, and complications with Muslim rulers of Egypt and Alexandria all illustrate how Ethiopian Christianity was never isolated or removed from the fate of the state. Thus, under strong rulers like Zara Yaqob, the Church was unified and the force of the government assisted monastic communities, the spread of churches, and even Ethiopian communication with Christian Europe. Unfortunately, the problems of succession, the dependence on the Egyptian bishop to ordain local priests, Muslim expansion under Adal, and the failure to integrate subjugated "pagan" and Muslims paved the path to the near disintegration of the Empire in the 1500s.

In some respects, the Solomonic dynasty reminds this blog of our favorite African imperial line, the Sayfawa. Although obviously distinct as one was Muslim and the other Christian, both lasted for several centuries. Both experienced periods of decline, civil war, succession crises, conflicts with "pagan" neighbors (and, according to some sources, "Christian Kwararafa" or Christian "Gaoga" opposed the Sayfawa), and a strong association with their official religions. Indeed, studies of the ulama and Islam in Kanem-Borno illustrate a similar close association between the ruling house and their monotheistic religion. Of course, the surviving written sources from Ethiopia significantly outnumber what we have for Kanem-Borno, but one wonders to what extent a comparative perspective on the two dynasties might reveal for African precolonial political longevity, religion, intellectual development, or even statecraft. Naturally, the Horn of Africa was better known to the outside world at an earlier date than the Lake Chad Basin, but we still think there is something to be said for contextualizing the development of these long-lasting dynasties in a "Sudanic" context.

Poncet's Voyage to Ethiopia

Charles Jacques Poncet's relation of his voyage to Ethiopia in the late 17th century is a fascinating portrait of the Funj Sultanate in today's Sudan and Solomonic Ethiopia under Emperor Iyasu I. Ostensibly voyaging to Ethiopia to provide medical services to the Ethiopian ruler, Poncet was involved with a plan to reintroduce the Jesuits into Ethiopia while also promoting the idea of an Ethiopian embassy to Louis XVI. As a reputable physician in Cairo, Poncet seemed perfect for the mission, and left behind a very flattering portrait of Ethiopia for his French and European readers. While the Jesuits never did become a significant force in Gondarine Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian embassy to France failed to reach the court of Louix XIV, Poncet is one of our richest sources on Ethiopia and the Funj Sultanate. 

Ethiopians may have distrusted Jesuits and Catholics, as well as practicing forms of discrimination against local Muslims, but Ethiopia from Fasiladas to Iyasu I cannot be said to have practiced isolationist policies. In addition to attempted overtures to the Mughals in India and the Dutch East India Company in Batavia during the second half of the 17th century, Poncet portrays close relations and economic ties between the Funj Sultanate and the Solomonic rulers of Ethiopia. Indeed, a brother of reigning king of Sennar was living at the court of Iyasu I, and trade ties were close between the two regions. One almost sees Ethiopia, and the capital Gondar, as being part of the larger "Sudanic" and Nile Valley trade systems that intersected with Mediterranean and trans-Saharan networks. In addition, Ethiopia benefited from the Funj's trade across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean while also having relations with the Ottoman Pasha in Massawa. Thus, Gondarine Ethiopia appears to have been a node in Sudanic, trans-Saharan, Northeast African caravan trade, and Indian Ocean networks that stretched to India and Europe. 

Unfortunately, Poncet did not provide more details on the movement of people and goods between the Funj Sultanate and Gondarine Ethiopia. Both rulers split the duties on cotton exported to Ethiopia from Sennar at the market town of Chelga, and "Gebertis" Muslims from Ethiopia seem to have played a key role in commerce between the states. Poncet also mentioned an Ethiopian in Sennar who had converted to Islam, a Joseph, who was executed. Nevertheless, it makes one ponder the links Gondarine Ethiopia may have already had with lands further west, such as Kordofan, Darfur, and the Lake Chad Region. If caravans were active between Borno and the Funj, and Muslim pilgrims from "Takrur" were possibly already traveling the "Sudan" road, perhaps Gondarine Ethiopia also looked to western lands for additional economic and political relations. This is pure speculation on our part, but we hope to learn more about Gondarine Ethiopia's relations with the Funj and other lands to the west in order to examine this larger African context. 

The Glorious Victories of Amda Seyon, King of Ethiopia

Although obviously from a different time and era than the chronicles of Ahmad b. Furtu, Huntingford's translation of the royal chronicle of Amda Seyon's 1332 campaigns brought us back to Borno and the campaigns of Idris Alooma. Of course, the chroniclers of their respective kings relied on their own religious traditions and unique political and dynastic claims to legitimacy, but both created relatively detailed and panegyrical chronicles of specific military campaigns during the lengthy reigns of pivotal rulers in the Solomonic and Sayfawa dynasties. 

For instance, both Ahmad b. Furtu and the anonymous chronicler of Amda Seyon undeniably sought to justify the military campaigns of their patrons on religious grounds, with their respective kings reestablishing or restoring the true faith while engaging in large-scale military campaigns that transformed the larger region with population displacement and realignments through imperial expansion. Similarly, both chroniclers compare their patrons to their alleged illustrious forebears, Sayf and the House of Solomon with the expected references to the holy texts of their respective faiths. The major difference here, of course, would be the primary antagonism between Islam and Christianity in the case of Ethiopia while Christianity was a non-factor in Borno's campaigns during the the reign of Idris Alooma.

Despite these probably superficial parallels, we are fascinated by the idea of a comparative study of the Sayfawa and Solomonic dynasties as examples of long-lasting African political systems. Both drew on "world religions" of Christianity and Islam but of course owed much of their origins to an ancient, deeper past in their regions of the Lake Chad Basin and the Ethiopian highlands. Both also provide interesting examples of the vicissitudes of these dynasties during the 19th century and European imperialism as they transformed, declined, or, in the case of the Solomonic rulers, maintained their independence.