Hausa Influences in Oyo

Whilst perusing Samuel Johnson's History of the Yorubas, one notices multiple examples of Hausa influence in the Oyo state. Even when referring to the mythical or semi-legendary rulers like Sango, examples of this Hausa or northern presence can be detected in Yoruba historical tradition. For example, one of the Yoruba legends of origin traces the people's descent from Lamurudu of Mecca. This figure was said to have been the father of Oduduwa as well as two kings of Gogobiri and Kukawa in the Hausa region (3). Kukawa may mean Borno. Even the (legendary) Sango was said to have had a Hausa slave, too (149).

Some titles used in the Oyo government were also words of Hausa origin. Take the Magaji, for instance. This title was said by Johnson to go to the heir of a great estate, usually the eldest son of that family. The alafin of Oyo's court also included an official called the Magaji Iyajin. He functioned as an official "elder brother" who defended the interests of the king (69). Well, magaji in Hausa means heir or successor, according to An English-Hausa Dictionary. Another word of Hausa origin used by Oyo's government was the seriki, derived from the Hausa word for king. According to Johnson, the seriki was an military leader who was comparable to the Balogun but more for the young warriors. A successful seriki could even succeed the Balogun (133).

Some of the specific trumpets and instruments associated with kingship also came from the Hausa or via Nupe peoples. The kakaki and ivory trumpets were only used for the king (121). Johnson also referred to a cymbol (aro) or the Bembe drum as instruments introduced by the Hausa. The use of these instruments may have been through the Nupe as an intermediary, but it demonstrates how the northern peoples exerted a significant influence on Oyo.

As noted by various scholars, such as Adamu in The Hausa Factor in West African History, Hausa captives and artisans were also a significant presence. Hausa captives were the main labor force for taking care of the cattle owned by the chiefs. In addition, Hausa and Fulani peoples were often the barbers and ropemakers in Oyo (123). Hausa traders were also a familiar presence long before the 19th century. One of them, named Alaja-eta by Johnson, had his goods seized in Oyo until Aole, the alafin, ordered them returned. The failure to return the Hausa merchant's Koran contributed to the political tensions of Aole's reign after the zenith of Abiodun (190). Later, the Hausa slaves in Oyo joined Afonja as soldiers for Ilorin, but that development is better known or documented.

Overall, the Hausa influences in Oyo seem to be of a much deeper antiquity than we initially thought. While much of it was likely indirect through Nupe and Bariba peoples, the actual Hausa presence in Oyo was clear. And it was not restricted to slaves and Hausa or Fulani-oriented crafts and trades. It even included titles and political offices that used words of Hausa origin. Some were said to marry with the elite of the Oyo kingdom. Thus, Abiodun, remembered in tradition as one of the greatest kings of the Oyo Empire, married his daughter to a Muslim who had secretly harbored a son of Gaha for several years (186)! According to Johnson, Abiodun was previously a trader in potash before ascending the throne and defeating Gaha (187). Is it possible the potash trade increased Abiodun's dealings with Muslim traders from Hausa land and the north? 

The Little Ice Age and the Oyo Empire

We found the above talk on Oyo b Akin Ogundiran rather fascinating. Gathering data or sources from archaeological, climatological and historical information, an interesting look at the rise of the Oyo Empire is possible.

Robin Law's Oyo Empire

Robin Law's The Ọyọ Empire, c.1600-c.1836: a West African imperialism in the era of the Atlantic slave trade was one of those important studies of a major West African polity that we found difficult to read a year ago. We believed it was relying too heavily on fragmentary traditions and hearsay that entered into the contemporary European sources to be sufficiently accurate. However, since it was published in the 1970s and of course relied heavily on local oral traditions in addition to classic studies by Yoruba authors like Johnson, we decided to revisit Law's book. As he himself admitted, his study relied on limited sources and some of its conclusions will hopefully be advanced or rebutted by subsequent scholarship. Nonetheless, as one would expect from a meticulous like Law who has written extensively on the Slave Coast, his study of the Oyo Empire during the same era endeavors to contextualize Oyo's expansion in the era of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. 

Oyo, as major supplier of captives to the ports of the Slave Coast, was, however, a hinterland kingdom based on a cavalry force. This cavalry, supplied from the north, meant Oyo was deeply connected to Nupe, Bariba, and even Hausaland and Borno for horses, equipment, and goods acquired through trans-Saharan trade. Thus, Oyo provides an interesting example of an Atlantic trading state (which for a time commanded tribute from Porto Novo, Badagry, Allada and Dahomey) which also had close ties to the savanna states to the north. Indeed, the mention of "Yoruba" slaves by Timbuktu scholar Ahmad Baba and the trade in horses and slaves between Kano and the Nupe must have brought the Oyo Yoruba into contact with Muslim Sudanic West African traders by the 16th century. After a period of Bariba and Nupe rule, a resurgent Oyo was able, by the 1600s, able to expand and use its own cavalry to assert itself effectively in savanna territories around Oyo (and the southwest). Even some hilly areas or regions with politically fragmented Yoruba fell under Oyo rule, through a combination of Oyo colonists and military force. Gradually, Oyo was able to profit from both the Atlantic trade via the coast as well as the northern trade routes that linked it to the Sudanic regions. 

Instead of providing captives to the north in exchange for horses, like in its earlier period of growth, Oyo was able to trade cowries and European goods for horses from northern suppliers. Indeed, by the late 18th century, with access to the coast through ports like Porto Novo, Oyo was likely a major supplier of Hausa and northern slaves to the Atlantic trade. Oyo's own textile industry and far-ranging traders also continued to prosper, seeming to avoid any negative internal impact of the slave trade (such as insecurity) until its later years of decline. Indeed, Oyo may have benefitted from a more monetized economy stimulated by trade, cowries, textiles, foodstuffs produced for traders (and captives) and redistributed imported European goods or silks, natron and leather goods from the north. Oyo, like Dahomey and Asante, appears to have been able to combine imperial expansion and Atlantic slave trade to become wealthier states. Unfortunately for Oyo, however, political centralization did not reach the level of Benin, Dahomey or Asante. The alafins of Oyo were never able to completely subdue the powerful Oyo Mesi and the Basorun, who controlled the capital's army. Instead, the alafins of Oyo had to rely on palace slaves and officials they appointed to oversee provinces, collect tribute, and command the provincial army to expand the state and increase their own power. 

However, after Basorun Gaha seized power in the middle of the 18th century, Abiodun was only able to restore the alafin to effective authority through an alliance with the head of the provincial army. This, however, led to further problems with the coup d'etat against Awole in c.1796, when the head of the provincial army decided to rebel against Awole. This, followed by Afonja inciting a Muslim rebellion and further conflict between provincial leaders against an Alafin who could accumulate too much power, paved the way for Oyo's eventual collapse. Oyo, according to Law, was thus unable to attain a comparable degree of centralization to that of Benin, Dahomey and Asante. Whether or not it was really due to the reliance on cavalry for the military (the costs of maintenance for imported horses being too costly for kings alone to finance), Law appears to be correct in noting the lack of adequate centralization to ensure imperial stability. Consequently, after reaching perhaps its imperial and slave trading peak in the 1780s, Oyo declined afterwards as Afonja and the repercussions of Uthman dan Fodio's jihad destroyed Oyo. 

What we find interesting about Oyo is in its role as an imperial middleman between the Sudanic states and the Atlantic. Horses from the north, captives and luxuries acquired through the trans-Saharan trade were sold in Oyo just as European products and cowries circulated north. Oyo, through its reliance on cavalry, may have lacked the degree of centralization of Borno (despite a similar "fief" system of allocating tribute rights) since it had to incur the costs of importing horses and maintenance. Oyo, nonetheless, appears to have faced limitations on its expansion as the forested southern Yorubaland territories were able to resist cavalry. Northern expansion was thwarted by the Nupe and Bariba states who possessed easier access to horses, even if Oyo did succeed in imposing tribute on southern Nupe and Bariba states. Even Oyo expansion to the southwest, for access to the coast through Dahomey and Porto Novo, was likewise limited by the rainy season that made it difficult to permanently retain control over the area. In conclusion, Oyo may have been more restricted than some of its northern, cavalry-based trading partners due to the geographic and climate factors in Lower Guinea. Perhaps these checks imposed on Oyo expansion contributed to the weakening of centralization? If, perhaps, an interior kingdom with access to horses had been able to permanently conquer and administer Dahomey and Porto Novo, unhindered access to Atlantic trade and ongoing northern economic exchange may have stimulated a more centralized Oyo with effective use of firearms?