Hausa Influences in Oyo

Whilst perusing Samuel Johnson's History of the Yorubas, one notices multiple examples of Hausa influence in the Oyo state. Even when referring to the mythical or semi-legendary rulers like Sango, examples of this Hausa or northern presence can be detected in Yoruba historical tradition. For example, one of the Yoruba legends of origin traces the people's descent from Lamurudu of Mecca. This figure was said to have been the father of Oduduwa as well as two kings of Gogobiri and Kukawa in the Hausa region (3). Kukawa may mean Borno. Even the (legendary) Sango was said to have had a Hausa slave, too (149).

Some titles used in the Oyo government were also words of Hausa origin. Take the Magaji, for instance. This title was said by Johnson to go to the heir of a great estate, usually the eldest son of that family. The alafin of Oyo's court also included an official called the Magaji Iyajin. He functioned as an official "elder brother" who defended the interests of the king (69). Well, magaji in Hausa means heir or successor, according to An English-Hausa Dictionary. Another word of Hausa origin used by Oyo's government was the seriki, derived from the Hausa word for king. According to Johnson, the seriki was an military leader who was comparable to the Balogun but more for the young warriors. A successful seriki could even succeed the Balogun (133).

Some of the specific trumpets and instruments associated with kingship also came from the Hausa or via Nupe peoples. The kakaki and ivory trumpets were only used for the king (121). Johnson also referred to a cymbol (aro) or the Bembe drum as instruments introduced by the Hausa. The use of these instruments may have been through the Nupe as an intermediary, but it demonstrates how the northern peoples exerted a significant influence on Oyo.

As noted by various scholars, such as Adamu in The Hausa Factor in West African History, Hausa captives and artisans were also a significant presence. Hausa captives were the main labor force for taking care of the cattle owned by the chiefs. In addition, Hausa and Fulani peoples were often the barbers and ropemakers in Oyo (123). Hausa traders were also a familiar presence long before the 19th century. One of them, named Alaja-eta by Johnson, had his goods seized in Oyo until Aole, the alafin, ordered them returned. The failure to return the Hausa merchant's Koran contributed to the political tensions of Aole's reign after the zenith of Abiodun (190). Later, the Hausa slaves in Oyo joined Afonja as soldiers for Ilorin, but that development is better known or documented.

Overall, the Hausa influences in Oyo seem to be of a much deeper antiquity than we initially thought. While much of it was likely indirect through Nupe and Bariba peoples, the actual Hausa presence in Oyo was clear. And it was not restricted to slaves and Hausa or Fulani-oriented crafts and trades. It even included titles and political offices that used words of Hausa origin. Some were said to marry with the elite of the Oyo kingdom. Thus, Abiodun, remembered in tradition as one of the greatest kings of the Oyo Empire, married his daughter to a Muslim who had secretly harbored a son of Gaha for several years (186)! According to Johnson, Abiodun was previously a trader in potash before ascending the throne and defeating Gaha (187). Is it possible the potash trade increased Abiodun's dealings with Muslim traders from Hausa land and the north? 

The Little Ice Age and the Oyo Empire

We found the above talk on Oyo b Akin Ogundiran rather fascinating. Gathering data or sources from archaeological, climatological and historical information, an interesting look at the rise of the Oyo Empire is possible.

Hausa in Saint Domingue (Before 1770s)

Another thing we would like to call attention to is the earlier presence of Hausa and Central Sudan populations in Saint-Domingue, before the 1770s and 1780s. While most mentions of Gambary and Hausa runaways in the colonial newspaper date from later, there is one early appearance (1766) of a "Gambery" runaway, named la Liberté. The excellent resource, Le marronnage dans le monde atlantique: sources et trajectoires de vie, includes the above ad plus numerous others featuring Hausa and even "Borno" runaways. But what's important to note here is, assuming the Gambary in Saint Domingue were indeed Hausa, which seems likely (the Yoruba term for the Nupe was also used in runaway slave notices as early as 1766, too), then already by 1766, there may have been a small number of peoples from deep in the Nigerian interior or northern Nigeria in the colony. 

Indeed, it is possible that before 1766 a few were classified as "unknown" or lumped in with the "Nago" due to the French unfamiliarity with them. The fact that the two groups were called by a Yoruba name for them in 1766 is perhaps indicative of this. This pattern may have been somewhat akin to the way the "Lucumi" label was applied to many Africans in 19th century Cuba who were actually of quite diverse origins. And, considering how close Oyo's relations with the Nupe and Hausa were, it is possible that slaves of northern origins who spent time in Oyo before being sold on the coast were categorized as "Nago" in some cases. 

In short, the presence of northerners sold on the Bight of Benin to the French slave traders likely occurred earlier than we realize, probably by the 1720s, when "Malais" Muslim traders visiting the Slave Coast directly appear in European sources. The Nupe, according to sources such as the Kano Chronicle, were said to be supplying firearms to Kano by the 1730s or 1740s. The trade with the coast, which reached Nupe through Oyo, would have linked the Atlantic markets to the savanna and Sahel to the North to at least some degree. Additionally, conflict between Gobir and Zamfara or raids between different Hausa kingdoms may have generated captives that ended up being enslaved and sold to Oyo and beyond. Intriguingly, in 1764, Gobir sacked Zamfara's capital and by 1766, "Gambary" make an appearance in Saint Domingue. Conflict between the Hausa states or with their neighbors inevitably created captives, a small subset of whom appear to have been sold on the Slave Coast by the 1760s. 

Dahomey and Its Neighbors

Akinjogbin's Dahomey and Its Neighbors, 1708-1818 is one of the classic studies of the kingdom of Dahomey during a pivotal century in its development. Although Akinjogbin's Ebi theory of Yoruba and Aja polities appears to be untenable, or at least lacking sufficient evidence to be demonstrated fully, the rise of Dahomey as a major power in the Slave Coast region is certainly a topic worthy of analysis. Akinjogbin, who misleadingly presents early Dahomey and Agaja as opponents of the slave trade, or at least its destructive impact on Aja polities like Allada and Whydah in the 17th century, posits that Dahomey achieved an administrative revolution by replacing the Ebi theory for a more centralized, absolute monarchy in which the monarchy endeavored to control the slave trade. Indeed, Dahomey no longer resembled the Yoruba and Aja states of old and was better able to survive the 19th century than Oyo because of it.

However, in terms of economics, Dahomey became wedded to the slave trade and compromised the state's health. Factors in Europe, for instance, or the shifting interests of Oyo in terms of providing the supply of captives for export at Whydah, posed a number of problems for 18th century Dahomey kings. Oyo, under Abiodun, emphasizing Porto Novo as its primary port on the Atlantic, for example, contributed to the economic woes and depression of Dahomey. Dahomey was also not always effective at promoting Whydah as the major port on the Slave Coast. Competition from Badagry, Porto Novo and other ports, combined with the inability of Dahomey to defend Whydah from the old Whydah forces threatened the security of the port and its ability to attract Europeans. Dahomey was also, at least during the reign of Agaja's son, not effective at slave raiding. In short, Dahomey had to rely on Oyo to supply captives for export through Whydah and it had to rely on the vicissitudes of European and Atlantic World commerce and slaving. Some rulers, however, were progressive and thought of other ideas and practices, or even reviving agriculture to promote Dahomey's economy and end the long-lasting depression that began in the 1760s. By then, it was too late as the dependence on the slave trade remained the only option for Dahomey to retain access to Europe.

Despite the economic failings of 18th century Dahomey, Akinjogbin presents Aganja, Tegbesu, Kpengla, and Agonglo as visionary, progressive, rational and skilled leaders and administrators. Indeed, the survival of the Dahomey state during this century is impressive when one considers the weakness of the state militarily or its internal conflicts. In that sense, Oyo's overlordship may have paradoxically created the conditions for Dahomey to consolidate its administrative and economic basis after Agaja's rapid conquests of Allada and Whydah. Oyo and the Europeans on the coast could cause problems, but having Oyo provide some degree of security for its vassals and supplying slaves for export at Whydah, Dahomey's port, created favorable conditions for Dahomey to reestablish itself on a firm footing after 1740. To what extent Dahomey truly achieved a "revolution" can only be answered with deeper knowedge of Allada, Whydah, and Oyo as states.

Robin Law's Oyo Empire

Robin Law's The Ọyọ Empire, c.1600-c.1836: a West African imperialism in the era of the Atlantic slave trade was one of those important studies of a major West African polity that we found difficult to read a year ago. We believed it was relying too heavily on fragmentary traditions and hearsay that entered into the contemporary European sources to be sufficiently accurate. However, since it was published in the 1970s and of course relied heavily on local oral traditions in addition to classic studies by Yoruba authors like Johnson, we decided to revisit Law's book. As he himself admitted, his study relied on limited sources and some of its conclusions will hopefully be advanced or rebutted by subsequent scholarship. Nonetheless, as one would expect from a meticulous like Law who has written extensively on the Slave Coast, his study of the Oyo Empire during the same era endeavors to contextualize Oyo's expansion in the era of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. 

Oyo, as major supplier of captives to the ports of the Slave Coast, was, however, a hinterland kingdom based on a cavalry force. This cavalry, supplied from the north, meant Oyo was deeply connected to Nupe, Bariba, and even Hausaland and Borno for horses, equipment, and goods acquired through trans-Saharan trade. Thus, Oyo provides an interesting example of an Atlantic trading state (which for a time commanded tribute from Porto Novo, Badagry, Allada and Dahomey) which also had close ties to the savanna states to the north. Indeed, the mention of "Yoruba" slaves by Timbuktu scholar Ahmad Baba and the trade in horses and slaves between Kano and the Nupe must have brought the Oyo Yoruba into contact with Muslim Sudanic West African traders by the 16th century. After a period of Bariba and Nupe rule, a resurgent Oyo was able, by the 1600s, able to expand and use its own cavalry to assert itself effectively in savanna territories around Oyo (and the southwest). Even some hilly areas or regions with politically fragmented Yoruba fell under Oyo rule, through a combination of Oyo colonists and military force. Gradually, Oyo was able to profit from both the Atlantic trade via the coast as well as the northern trade routes that linked it to the Sudanic regions. 

Instead of providing captives to the north in exchange for horses, like in its earlier period of growth, Oyo was able to trade cowries and European goods for horses from northern suppliers. Indeed, by the late 18th century, with access to the coast through ports like Porto Novo, Oyo was likely a major supplier of Hausa and northern slaves to the Atlantic trade. Oyo's own textile industry and far-ranging traders also continued to prosper, seeming to avoid any negative internal impact of the slave trade (such as insecurity) until its later years of decline. Indeed, Oyo may have benefitted from a more monetized economy stimulated by trade, cowries, textiles, foodstuffs produced for traders (and captives) and redistributed imported European goods or silks, natron and leather goods from the north. Oyo, like Dahomey and Asante, appears to have been able to combine imperial expansion and Atlantic slave trade to become wealthier states. Unfortunately for Oyo, however, political centralization did not reach the level of Benin, Dahomey or Asante. The alafins of Oyo were never able to completely subdue the powerful Oyo Mesi and the Basorun, who controlled the capital's army. Instead, the alafins of Oyo had to rely on palace slaves and officials they appointed to oversee provinces, collect tribute, and command the provincial army to expand the state and increase their own power. 

However, after Basorun Gaha seized power in the middle of the 18th century, Abiodun was only able to restore the alafin to effective authority through an alliance with the head of the provincial army. This, however, led to further problems with the coup d'etat against Awole in c.1796, when the head of the provincial army decided to rebel against Awole. This, followed by Afonja inciting a Muslim rebellion and further conflict between provincial leaders against an Alafin who could accumulate too much power, paved the way for Oyo's eventual collapse. Oyo, according to Law, was thus unable to attain a comparable degree of centralization to that of Benin, Dahomey and Asante. Whether or not it was really due to the reliance on cavalry for the military (the costs of maintenance for imported horses being too costly for kings alone to finance), Law appears to be correct in noting the lack of adequate centralization to ensure imperial stability. Consequently, after reaching perhaps its imperial and slave trading peak in the 1780s, Oyo declined afterwards as Afonja and the repercussions of Uthman dan Fodio's jihad destroyed Oyo. 

What we find interesting about Oyo is in its role as an imperial middleman between the Sudanic states and the Atlantic. Horses from the north, captives and luxuries acquired through the trans-Saharan trade were sold in Oyo just as European products and cowries circulated north. Oyo, through its reliance on cavalry, may have lacked the degree of centralization of Borno (despite a similar "fief" system of allocating tribute rights) since it had to incur the costs of importing horses and maintenance. Oyo, nonetheless, appears to have faced limitations on its expansion as the forested southern Yorubaland territories were able to resist cavalry. Northern expansion was thwarted by the Nupe and Bariba states who possessed easier access to horses, even if Oyo did succeed in imposing tribute on southern Nupe and Bariba states. Even Oyo expansion to the southwest, for access to the coast through Dahomey and Porto Novo, was likewise limited by the rainy season that made it difficult to permanently retain control over the area. In conclusion, Oyo may have been more restricted than some of its northern, cavalry-based trading partners due to the geographic and climate factors in Lower Guinea. Perhaps these checks imposed on Oyo expansion contributed to the weakening of centralization? If, perhaps, an interior kingdom with access to horses had been able to permanently conquer and administer Dahomey and Porto Novo, unhindered access to Atlantic trade and ongoing northern economic exchange may have stimulated a more centralized Oyo with effective use of firearms?

The Slave Coast

Robin Law's The Slave Coast of West Africa 1550–1750: The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African Society offers a fascinating analysis of the Slave Coast during the era of a growing slave trade with Europe. Differing from scholars like Polanyi or Akinjogbin, Law focuses on the impact of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade as a stimulus to commercialization of the economy. The growth of European trade in the region appears to have fueled monetization and market forces through currencies (cowries), imported goods that reached local markets (not just elites or kings for redistribution), sources of iron and thread for smiths and weavers, foodstuffs trade (to provision slave ships), exports of textiles and akori beads for the Gold Coast, and the rise of mercenaries and soldiers for hire. While features of this commercial economy likely existed in the pre-Atlantic trade era, particularly the trade in salt from the coast or trade in textiles, beads, provisions, ivory, and slaves, the trade with Europeans fueled this process. 

In a sense, one could argue that the Atlantic trade did not hinder economic development of the Slave Coast. However, the unknown demographic impact and the necessity of violence to procure captives undoubtedly led to instability and conflict over access to European trade. This process, according to Law, favored the eventual emergence of a hinterland kingdom, Dahomey, as the dominant power due to its military ethos and ability to procure captives for the coastal ports. Dahomey, like Allada and Whydah, learned to combine a mixed position as middleman and supplier of captives yet ultimately failed to create a new kind of state or "revolution" in Slave Coast precolonial polities. Dahomey, despite some decline in the number of captives exported after the conquest of Whydah and Allada, eventually stabilized its exports and was certainly heavily influenced by the European trade. 

Indeed, besides being more autocratic and, eventually, integrating conquered peoples, Dahomey appears to have become rather similar to Allada and Whydah, the two earlier dominant states in the region. Allada, whose decline was already visible by the late 17th century, was once the paramount power in the region (despite also once being under the overlordship of Benin and Oyo). Like the future Dahomey, at least the Dahomey of Tegbesu, Allada and Whydah were ruled by kings who practiced some degree of ritual seclusion, patronized specific cults that were public festivals, engaged in trade with Europe, and competed with each other and subordinate coastal ports and regions for a share in the market of slaves. Women, unlike men, were favored for local slavery while occasional trade wars between Allada and Whydah destabilized both. The western Slave Coast was also impacted by Gold Coast refugees, mercenaries, and bandits who became an additional source of instability and conflict over control of the Slave Coast's lucrative trade. In fact, Dahomey inherited this as post-conquest Whydah rulers fled west for refuge and a branch of the Allada ruling family emerged in Porto Novo. The eastern portion of the Slave Coast increased in importance for the trade with Europe via towns like Badagry while Dahomey's rulers struggled to consolidate their hold over Allada and Whydah. Over time, the Dahomey kingdom seems to have created a provincial administration and endeavored to combine royal control and private share in the slave trade with a supplier and middleman role. 

Ultimately, despite acting as a stimulus to commercialization and economic exchange, the the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade's legacy in the Slave Coast appears to have created disastrous demographic impacts and a reliance on violence in one form or another to continue. Dahomey's catastrophic depopulation of Whydah, for instance, plus the raiding of various inland communities, must have, at best, neutralized the economic stimulation from trade with Europe. Nonetheless, history of Allada, Whydah and Dahomey during these pivotal centuries illustrates how the trans-Atlantic economic networks were deeply linked to interior African polities, such as Oyo. Through these links to Oyo and the Malais or Muslim traders active on the Slave Coast by the early 1700s, one can connect trans-Saharan, trans-Atlantic, and intra-West African trade networks that illustrate global connectivity. Through the trade of captives native to the Slave Coast, one can also detect their legacy in the Americas through religion, culture, and even, for a time, Allada textiles exported to Barbados. 

Oyo Empire

Despite some video quality troubles and a few errors, this short lecture by Paul Lovejoy is well worth the listen. Oyo was a northern Yoruba state with a cavalry and links to the Nupe, Bariba and Hausaland. Ali Eisami was also enslaved in Oyo so the state was connected to Borno via trade and the slave trade. I just wish we had more sources on the history of this fascinating Yoruba empire. Robin Law's monograph endeavored to make do with the fragmentary oral traditions, limited external sources and later Yoruba histories of the post-imperial Oyo years. What he accomplished was quite impressive for reconstructing the political, economic, social, and administrative features of Oyo, but it all seems so speculative.