Muhammad Kisoki and Borno

            The altercation between Borno and Kano during the reign of the latter’s Muhammad Kisoki is an intriguing example of conflict between the two states. Although there are some chronological ambiguities that require attention, Yusufu Bala Usman has connected Kisoki’s raid on Nguru with the Kano campaign of Borno during the time of Idris Alooma. According to Ahmad b. Furtu, a highly biased but contemporary source, Kano had “betrayed” Borno through fortifying towns or sites on their border with Borno and launching attacks. In response, Borno raised an army which destroyed the fortifications or walls and then failed to take Kano itself.[1] Importantly, the opposing side’s perspective can be glimpsed through the Kano Chronicle. Thus, one does not have to rely solely or mainly on Ahmad b. Furtu’s panegyrical text for his patron, unlike the case of most of the other peoples Borno went to war against during the lengthy reign of Idris Alooma. Therefore, this brief article shall examine Borno-Kano relations during the reign of Muhammad Kisoki, focusing on the raids launched from Kano against Borno and the response. This post argues that Muhammad Kisoki’s eastern raids likely correspond to the campaigns described by Ahmad b. Furtu and were autonomous Kano initiatives rather than part of a Kebbi-led regional conflict.

By examining this episode more closely, however, one sees yet again the influence of Maidaki Hauwa (and her brother, Guli) in a confrontation with Borno. Maidaki Hauwa had previously been involved with suppressing a revolt by the Dagachi in Kano, someone descended from the Sayfawa line and very influential. After preventing his rebellion, her son, Abdullahi, returned from a campaign and then faced an invasion from Borno. Undoubtedly linked to the Dagachi’s actions, Kano’s king, accompanied by mallams, had to submit to the mai. Then, once the mai returned to Borno, Abdullahi tricked or deceived the Dagachi and gave his office to a slave.[2] Although taking place several years before the Borno-Kano conflict during Idris Alooma’s reign (1564-1596, according to Lange’s chronology), it is very likely that Kisoki’s influential grandmother and her brother, whose influence at court was extremely powerful, shaped Kano state policy with regard to the frontier with Borno. By taking another look at this critical juncture, one can see just how realpolitik shaped relations between a regional power like Borno and the smaller Hausa states which, depending on one’s view, paid tribute or sent regular “gifts” to the mai.

But can we confidently date Muhammad Kisoki’s attacks on Borno with the reign of Idris Alooma? The two only overlapped, using Lange’s chronology and the dates in the Kano Chronicle, c. 1564-1565. Dierk Lange has suggested that the conflict with Kano occurred early in Idris b. Ali’s reign, perhaps in c. 1564, but other sources suggest the mai went on a pilgrimage to Mecca at this time.[3] Since our dates for Kisoki and Idris Alooma are approximations and other king lists of Kano give Kisoki’s predecessor a slightly longer list, one could possibly make the case for a longer period of overlapping reigns.[4] The other problem with Kisoki’s Borno conflict occurring during the reign of Idris Alooma is the praise song mentioning his grandmother, Hauwa. She could have been alive in the 1560s as a very aged woman, but some may prefer to date this period of conflict to an earlier decade in Kisoki’s lengthy reign.

The other issue with establishing a clearer chronology is the, quite frankly, mess made by previous generations of scholars interested in this part of the world. For instance, M.G. Smith, without a single source to back his speculative reasoning, suggested that Kisoki’s raiding of Borno territory may have been done in conjunction with the Kanta of Kebbi. Without any firm evidence and relying upon later sources and traditions of the power and stature of the Kanta in this part of West Africa, Smith has argued that Kisoki may have been the Kanta’s representative in central Hausaland. Consequently, Kisoki’s raid may be associated with Kebbi’s larger conflict with Borno. Building this possible theory on flimsy foundations, Smith then tentatively dates Kisoki’s attack on Nguru to 1544.[5]

Although Smith is merely suggesting possible regional scenarios to contextualize the wars and raiding between the major states in the Central Sudan, this is hardly supported by the source materials. While Muhammad Bello in the 1800s wrote of Kebbi conquering other Hausa states like Kano in the 1500s, it is very difficult to detect any of this in the Kano Chronicle or the Bornoan records. The Chronicle actually portrays Kisoki as the ruler of all of Hausaland. Indeed, according to this same source, “He waged war on Birnin Unguru because of Agaidam.”[6] This last word brings to mind Geidam in modern Nigeria, to the east of Nguru. This area may have been a source of contention as Borno was facing an extended famine during Abd Allah b. Dunama’s reign (c. 1557-1564).[7] This could have been influenced by the wars between Borno and Kebbi, as well as the distractions Borno faced from the Bulala to the east in Kanem and local revolts by the Sao in Borno and other groups. Seeing an advantageous position to strike, Kisoki (or perhaps his grandmother’s brother, who was extremely influential in the royal court) may have envisioned Kano extending further east. Certainly, booty in horses and textiles were desirable since Kisoki ordered no captives taken from Nguru.

Furthermore, utilizing all the various sources on the Kanta of Kebbi and his negative relations with Borno suggests a large-scale confrontation in which Borno attempted to besiege Surame took place in c. 1561. Traditions referring to this do not reference Kano at all. In fact, it was on Katsina territory the Bornoan forces engaged in combat with the Kanta.[8] This is highly suggestive of Kano’s actions against Borno likely being autonomous responses of the state to Borno and perceived weaknesses on its western borderlands with Kano.

For these aforementioned reasons, one is inclined to agree with Yusufu Bala Usman. Usman, in a largely insightful article on the history of relations between Borno and the Hausa states, correctly identified Kisoki’s raids with the ones described by Ahmad b. Furtu. Moreover, as Furtu writes, these raids were a “betrayal” by the people of Kano. As for the Kano Chronicle, Kano attacked Nguru because “it is the will of God.”[9] Usman’s reasoning here is not entirely clear, but the raids from Kano and the reference to the building of walls or fortifications around various towns in the Kano kingdom  are consistent with the actions of Kisoki. After all, by improving defenses on his eastern frontier, forces from Kano could more safely engage in raids or attacks on western Borno or its vassal provinces, then retreat to secure sites if pursued or followed. Over time, this could have led to a gradual increase in Kano’s influence and possible territorial gains to the east. One suspects the “will of God” as a justification of war was designed to show Kisoki as waging just war against various subject peoples of Borno who were not necessarily Muslims.

Agreeing with Usman also allows one to gain some insight into how both sides viewed their actions. One already knows the Borno perspective, even if Ahmad b. Furtu was not an eyewitness to the Kano campaign. He nonetheless wrote an explanation for the campaign based on Kano and its fortified towns like Kirza, Kalmasan, Majiya, Ukluya, Dulu, Awazaki, Ajiyajiya, Sa’iyya, Galaki and Kay. To Furtu, they not only fortified many settlements, but “resorted to abominable cunning and vile deeds.”[10] The conflict ended with the “many” expeditions launched against Kano, including Majagani. These expeditions led to the destruction of fortifications while the residents fled. Unfortunately, most of these expeditions are not described in detail and after the destruction of Majiya’s fortifications, the Bornoan forces were allegedly able to dismantle the walls and fortresses placed around other towns with little or no resistance. It is very unlikely that the ruler of Kano would have sat idly by, even if the musketry of Borno proved very effective against Majiya’s defenders. Overall, Furtu’s account seems to suggest Kano began this process of fortifying towns and launching raids before the reign of Idris Alooma, especially since the labor and resources necessary to build walls around several towns or cities could hardly have been accomplished in a short amount of time.

The Kano Chronicle, likely written in the late 1800s, lacks this level of detail but understandably highlights the moment of Kisoki’s victory as Borno failed to take Kano city. As previously mentioned, Muhammad Kisoki ordered the raiding of Nguru, a town which was the capital of the powerful galadimas of Borno by the 1600s. Murray Last has read the account of this as symbolic warfare, playing with the idea of the Kanuri word for the Hausa, afuno, and arse-clothes or nudity. After all, Kisoki did not take captives but focused on horses and clothes.[11] However, this symbolic meaning may not be relevant if Kisoki was endeavoring to present himself as a legitimate Muslim ruler not willing to take Muslim captives. Indeed, even Ahmad b. Furtu portrayed his patron similarly. Next, the Chronicle explains how the ruler of Borno then sought to attack Birnin Kano the following year, but failed to take the town. This led to an extended praise song which even included Maidaki Hauwa as the “old lady with swaggering gait, old lady of royal blood, guarded by men-at-arms.”[12] By praising Kisoki as the “physic of Bornu and the Chiratawa,” one can also surmise that Kano’s war with Borno involved Shira. Despite this victory of sorts, or at least the failure of the attempted assault on Kano, Kisoki invited prominent shaykhs from Borno anyway.[13] One may surmise here that Borno was still perceived as a source of reputable Islamic scholars and religious figures, Kano’s rulers were entrenching their own state legitimacy through war and Islam.

Ultimately, both sides could claim some degree of victory. Kano was able to withstand a military attack on its capital from its powerful neighbor. Borno, on the other hand, secured its western frontier by destroying fortifications and weakening Kano’s ability to launch deeper raids into Borno. Doing so inevitably aided the economy through the increased security for traders and travelers. It likewise made it easier for Borno to focus on internal rebellious groups and the Bulala to the east for a number of Kanem expeditions. Kano, meanwhile, was able to protect its capital and, unlike Abdullahi, Kisoki did not have humble himself before the mai. This expresses a growth in the political stature of the sarki who could meet the Sayfawa as a peer. Lastly, an attempt at revisiting the various sources on this encounter does support Kisoki’s raiding activities to the east as likely to be the same as those mentioned by Ahmad b. Furtu. Furtu’s account is too brief and not backed by eyewitness testimony. But based on the scale of operations and the necessary shovels, hoes, and implements to destroy town walls at various sites and then to attack Kano’s capital, the Kano expeditions must have been large and time-consuming.

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[1] See Dierk Lange, A Sudanic chronicle: the Borno Expeditions of Idrīs Alauma (1564–1576 according to the account of Ahmad b. Furtū. Arabic text, English translation, commentary and geographical gazetteer for a detailed translation of Ahmad b. Furtu’s text.

[2] For an attempt at making sense of the Dagachi and his descendants in Kano and their impact on Kano-Borno relations, see Behique Dunama, “The Dagachi of Kano: Elite Exiles, Political Centralization, and Kano-Borno Relations,” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2026/03/the-dagachi-of-kano-elite-exiles.html.

[3] See Dierk Lange, A Sudanic Chronicle, 69.

[4] See Paul E. Lovejoy and John Hunwick, “Not Yet the Kano Chronicle,” Sudanic Africa 4 (1993) for different regnal years for Kano’s rulers. One manuscript assigns Abdullahi, Kisoki’s father, a reign of 12 years instead of the 10 in the Kano Chronicle.

[5] M.G. Smith, Government in Kano, 1350-1950, 140-141.

[6] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 38 (1908), 79.

[7] See Dierk Lange, Le dīwān des sultans du (Kānem- )Bornū: chronologie et histoire d'un royaume africain (de la fin du Xe siècle jusqu'à 1808), 80.

[8] For a discussion of the various sources on Kebbi and Borno in the 1500s, see Behique Dunama, “The Kanta of Kebbi and Borno.” https://thedreamvariation.blogspot.com/2025/12/the-kanta-of-kebbi-and-borno.html.

[9] Yusuf Bala Usman, “A Reconsideration of the History of Relations Between Borno and Hausaland Before 1804” in Yusufu Bala Usman & Muhammad Nur Alkali (editors), Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno, 183-184.

[10] Dierk Lange, A Sudanic Chronicle, 66-67.

[11] Murray Last, “From Sultanate to Caliphate: Kano, 1450–1800 A.D.”  in Bawuro M. Barkindo (ed.), Studies in Kano History, 72.

[12] H.R. Palmer, “The Kano Chronicle,” 79.

[13] This may have predated the Kano campaign of Borno.

A Sudanic Chronicle

Lange's A Sudanic Chronicle: The Borno Expeditions of Idrīs Alauma (1564–1576) is an indispensable work. A scholarly, modern translation of one of the chronicles of imam Ahmad b. Furtu, it is one of the earliest extant West African chronicles, written in 1576. It is also one of the most detailed primary sources from Borno on the Sayfawa dynasty and the reign of Idris b. Ali. Indeed, when paired with the 1578 chronicle on the Kanem campaigns of Idris b. Ali against the Bulala on the opposite shore of Lake Chad, Ahmad b. Furtu is probably our most important written source on Kanem-Borno from the precolonial era. Unfortunately, the chronicler only covers the first twelve years of his ruler's reign, but he provides an intimate look at some of the social, political, demographic, military, diplomatic, religious and economic dynamics in 16th century Borno. Moreover, Lange's scholarly translation is more accurate and usable than the 19th century Redhouse translations or the Palmer ones with their egregious errors. For that reason alone, plus the detailed footnotes by an academic who specializes in the region, Lange's translation is required reading. 

What stands out more clearly in this translation than that of Redhouse is the literary allusions, Quranic references, and the role of military tactics. For instance, the expertise in which Idris, the brother of Vizier Kursu organizes the musketeers, shieldsmen, and cavalry to effectively defeat Ngizim towns was far more explicit here. The greater precision and contextual knowledge of the translator vividly brings to life some of the combat, military strategies, and long-term goals of Idris Alooma to wear down, defeat, displace, destroy, and starve rebels, external enemies, and nomadic foes (like the Tuareg of Air). Snippets of the population movements and displacements, such as the construction of ribats to end "pagan" incursions, are additional evidence of large-scale movements across Borno which reveal the long-term strategy of the Sayfawa to consolidate their power. Furthermore, Ahmad b. Furtu's individuality and background as the chief imam of Birni Gazargamo are more readily discernible here, perhaps due to useful footnotes of Lange.

Unfortunately, Lange never followed this with a similar scholarly translation of the second chronicle of Ahmad b. Furtu. It's a shame since the two chronicles, both panegyric in tone and clearly meant to flatter the sultan, nonetheless constitute hugely significant sources on events in Kanem and Borno during the late 16th century. The Kanem campaigns described by Ahmad b. Furtu are essential for highlighting the larger regional ambitions, influence, and extent of Sayfawa power across the Central Sudan. It also would have been interesting to read a similar gazetteer of towns and settlements in Kanem as well as Lange's commentary to shed light on the Quranic, literary, or linguistic peculiarities of the text. 

The Kanem Campaigns of Idris Alooma

The other chronicle by Ahmad Ibn Furtu covers the Kanem campaigns launched by Sultan Idris Alooma against the Bulala leaders of the region. The conflict was, according to this chronicle that covers 7 expeditions launched against Kanem, sparked by the Bulala refusal to cede 3 districts to Borno and a disrespectful letter sent from them to Idris Alooma. What proceeds from here is a hard to follow account in Redhouse's dated translation of various expeditions launched by Idris against the Bulala, who usually choose to flee and avoid pitched battles. So, Idris and his forces subdue the Tubu, ensure the loyalty of other Tubu and Arabs, raid and pillage, and forcibly relocate various peoples of Kanem into Borno. Finally, a claimant to the throne of Kanem who is aligned with Idris manages to secure the throne with the aid of Idris, who only keeps a few provines of Kanem for Borno while returning most of the area to the new ruler, Muhammad. 

Through occasional asides, Ahmad Ibn Furtu alludes to the genealogy of the Borno rulers and their ancient history in Kanem, as well as the various conflicts both internal and with the Bulala that precipitated their shift to Borno. Intriguingly, Ahmad Ibn Furtu seems to draw from both oral traditions for the early history of Borno (as well as a chronicle one a recent forebear of Idris) as well as written sources, hinting at the possibility of a number of lost chronicles of the Saifawa dynasty. Perhaps the Girgam really was just an abbreviated form of a much longer chornicle(s) that covers their lineage from their alleged Himyarite origins to the 19th century. Indeed, when covering the early history of the Saifawa kings from their ancient Kanem period, there is clearly something akin to legend and lost grandeur in Ahmad Ibn Furtu's claim that Kanem once extended as far east as Dongola and the Nile. Of course, his patron, Idris, has surpassed his ancestors as a military genius guided by devout Islamic principles, according to Ibn Furtu.

Unfortunately, we found this chronicle to be less informative and more tedious of a read than Ibn Furtu's coverage of the Borno wars. Too many encounters with the Bulala here end with the flight of the Bulala king to the deserts, and it is not entirely clear what happened in certain passages. Some of this must be due to the translation and the bewildering number of towns and place names which are not explained by the translator. Nonetheless, there is a wealth of information on military organization, tactics, and Borno's possibly "quasi-feudal" relationship with its tributary subjects and allied nomadic groups (Tubu and Arabs, for instance). A number of titled dignitaries also appear, suggesting something of the political and military administrative apparatus of Borno in the late 16th century. Allusions to merchants and the purchase of horses point to relations with North Africa and the wider world, which presumably received some of the captives from the various expeditions to Kanem. On slavery, supposedly one of the other reasons Borno was superior to the Bulala of Kanem was due to their respecting Islamic laws prohibiting the enslavement of Muslims. The Bulala, on the other hand, kept Muslim and non-Muslim captives as slaves, violating Islamic law. Perhaps Borno's Saifawa dynasty remembered events from the late 14th century when even members of the royal family became slaves sold to Egypt or Syria. Or, again, it was just another example of Ibn Furtu exaggerating the Islamic credentials of Borno and its dynasty against the pagan or insufficiently Muslim polities surrounding them. 

But once we have perused the more recent translation of Lange and reviewed more of the literature on Ibn Furtu, we shall return to his work and the nature of historical writing in "Sudanic" Africa. It has always struck us as rather odd that so many are familiar with the Timbuktu Chronicles and the importance of those primary sources for the study of Songhay or even the earlier Ghana and Mali "empires" yet few seem to acknowledge or reference Ibn Furtu's 2 chronicles which predate the Timbuktu tarikhs. Why is that? Perhaps the more limited nature of Ibn Furtu's writing, which focus on military campaigns? Or simply Timbuktu being better known as an exotic and mysterious location than Borno?

The Borno Campaigns of Idris Alooma

Perhaps out of boredom, we here at the blog have recently finished reading the first of two chronicles by the chief imam of Borno, Ahmad Ibn Furtu, translated by Redhouse in the 1860s. Covering various campaigns during the first 12 years of the reign of Sultan Idris Alooma in the second half of the 16th century, it is the earliest surviving historical writing in West Africa. As to be expected of a work by a learned Muslim, Ahmad Ibn Furtu endeavored to portray Idris as a model sovereign and Muslim, whose piety, completion of the Hajj, and willingness to listen to the advice of the learned made him an even better ruler than his grandfather. Unfortunately, the chronicle on the grandfather of Idris has not survived for posterity, but one can assume it was one of the primary models for Ahmad Ibn Furtu's historical writing, and thereby probably written in a panegyric tone that praised the military prowess, justness and religious devotion of Borno's ruler, stressing the Islamic models of the Prophet. Unfortunately for modern readers, much of the details of Idris's various campaigns against the "Sao" and Tuareg, the Ghizm and other peoples were lost, as the author seems to have mostly relied on oral accounts and perhaps only witnessed a few of the expeditions personally.

Thus, the reader only finds outlines of various expeditions with occasional anecdotes on the piety and Islamic virtue of Borno's ruler. For instance, Ahmad Ibn Furtu will insert examples of the Islamic devotion of Idris in the middle of or right after describing a campaign, such as the building of mosques in clay (instead of reeds) as one of the innovations of his ruler. Or, alternatively, Idris's intervention in public morality by prohibiting fornication and urging his subjects to submit to judgments of holy law instead of their chieftains. Fortunately, something of the military tactics and battle formation can be gleamed through Ahmad Ibn Furtu's history, however. We know the Borno ruler used brutal tactics against his enemies, destroying their crops and their trees or groves to reduce places of refuge for them. He also established stations or outposts which were fortified and used as bases to continually attack the crops and fortified settlements of his opponents. If Ahmad Ibn Furtu is to be trusted, Idris was one of the first Borno rulers to use more camels for carrying military provisions during campaigns in arid areas. In addition, Sultan Idris apparently was the first to think of enlarging the ships used by Borno's forces on Lake Chad and the rivers in their domain, developing larger ships to carry more people and supplies instead of the older ones constructed from hollowed out trees.

Oddly, Borno never seems to have adopted the use of the cannon, which presumably would have made their siege warfare tactics more effective against some of their "pagan" foes. Ahmad Ibn Furtu also mentioned the famous musketry of Borno's military, trained by Turkish advisors. Indeed, one of the few casualties in a Borno campaign on Denkir was a Turk, Ali Ghar, attesting to the presence of Turks in the military. On the ground, they appear to have played a significant role in the military formation of Borno, shooting from the rear while men bearing shields protected them from the front against arrows and darts. The cavalry appear to have remained in the rear unless the enemy directly engaged them, or they were used to cover the enemy forces from behind, preventing them from fleeing back to their strongholds. Despite their use of firearms, they seem to have relied heavily on archers and horsemen bearing armor. Moreover, much of the military spoils was meant for redistribution to chiefs and subordinates of the Sultan, and one can assume many of the children and women captives were destined for the trans-Saharan slave trade. Even Muslims appear to have been taken as captives, such being the case in the campaign against the Tuareg Berbers, who were loyal to Air ("Ehir" in Redhouse's dated translation) until subdued by Idris. To cap it all, according to Ahmad Ibn Furtu, Borno's military often exterminated the adult male population of their enemies and resettled some of the survivors in various parts of the empire, uprooting them from their homes and putting them to use in other areas. 

But as one of our few surviving written sources from the early modern era in Borno, the document is also a treasure for its descriptions of Borno's relations with its "pagan" neighbors, ethnographic descriptions, and the extent to which Borno was integrated into the wider world. For example, Ahmad Ibn Furtu alluded to Sultan Idris's pilgrimage to Mecca multiple times in the text, even including references to the pilgrimages of Idris's forebears. This, besides establishing the Islamic devotion of Borno's rulers, also points to the extent to which these elites viewed Borno as a part of the Muslim world, and its ruler as a Protector of Muslims. One would think the pilgrimages to Mecca also helped establish Borno as a Muslim power to the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic states, possibly faciliating the introduction of Turks and other foreign mercenaries. In fact, a mysterious man, perhaps named Francisco, randomly appeared in the history, perhaps another example of foreign mercenaries or advisors who made it to Borno in the second half of the 1500s. 

Borno's relations with Sahelian and West African rivals was also an interesting dynamic. Much of the reasoning for some of the various expeditions was meant to ensure security on the roads of Borno, to protect merchants. Moreover, Borno's ruler was able to shift the loyalty of various Air-aligned Tuareg to his camp, ensuring some degree of influence in the Sahel and Sahara against a rival power. Even with "polytheist" neighbors, Idris was able to overlook religious differences and act on their behalf while increasing his own prestige and influence. This can be best be seen in the case of a "Mendera" prince overthrown by his uncle, who is later restored to the throne by Idris. Borno was effective at intervening in the affairs of neighboring states, including non-Muslims, and expanding its sphere of influence when not directly administering others. Unfortunately, our chronicler was, perhaps not surprisingly, not interested in the religious practices of the Sao "polytheists," but the mention of groves of the Sao Ghafata leads one to think those woods may have possessed a religious or sacred meaning. This could add another dimension to Borno's insistent deforestation of their lands, something the Muslim historian would have applauded as a champion of Islam.

One supposes the larger question of this all is to what extent is Ahmad Ibn Furtu's chronicle a historically reliable work and what does it suggest about the nature of history, religion, and political power in 16th century Borno? As the author admitted himself, the lack of details on some of the expeditions and the fact that much, if not most, of Idris's reign is omitted, we have inherited only a limited portrait of the Idris. However, the author was clearly cognizant of precedents for his work in earlier historical works, and saw his ruler in the light of both Islamic ideals and the history of the Sayfawa dynasty. As panegyric, this work places Idris at the pinnacle of great mais in the dynasty, and probably took a few liberties to express that opinion by attributing innovations or conquests that may have not been due to Idris. It causes one to wonder if other mais or prominent people in Borno similarly commissioned likewise works on their deeds, ancestry, and accomplishments, and the extent to which writing of local history was practiced at earlier dates in the history of the Sayfawa dynasty. Regardless of the hard to believe instances in the work, clearly political power in Borno was tied to realpolitik concerns and a balancing act of supporting Islam (through pious acts, charitable works, construction of mosques, reinforcing Islamic law, respecting Muslim intellectuals) while dominating or reducing to tributary status non-Muslim neighbors. Prominent persons attracted subordinates and dependents, and were in turn called upon to support the mai in various campaigns while the majority of the population presumably toiled as farmers, shepherds, servants, and artisans in villages and towns. One can assume that the construction of the Kanuri as an ethnic group developed over the centuries of Sayfawa control in Borno. Lamentably for those interested in this history, these developments were marginal to the author of the chronicle, who sought to praise and justify the reign of the mai.