Oasis of Salt

Knut S. Vikør's The Oasis of Salt: The History of Kawar, a Saharan Centre of Salt Production is required reading for anyone interested in the history of Kawar and Kanem-Borno. While suffering from a number of typos, this book actually surpasses the incomplete history of Kawar written by Marguerite Le Coeur. Unlike her work, Vikør reaches more level-headed conclusions and theories while also challenging Lovejoy on the economic and political dimensions of Kawar and the salt trade (slavery was marginal to salt production). Of course, as its focus is on Kawar, Kanem and Borno only appear in references to the Kanuri population of the region or in periods when direct authority of Kanem-Borno in the region was attested by various sources. Thus, Kawar is the center of this history, showing how a periperhal central Saharan oasis (and nearby Fachi and Jado) could be significant in the Sudanic salt trade as well as trans-Saharan contact. Kawar as a center-periphery is a key theme here, shifting in its reception of varying cultural influences based on the power dynamics of the Central Sudan and Sahara.

Vikør begins the study with an overview of Kawar, the geography, the relevant populations and the method of salt production. This precedes the second half of the book's chronological analysis, but is very helpful for contextualizing Kawar, Fachi and Jado. Then, the rest of the history analyzes Kawar from the time of Herodotus and the ancient Garamantes to the French colonial conquest. Le Coeur's earlier published history covers the same era, but does not rely on questionable assumptions (Le Coeur believed the Tomagra and Kaye were "Berbers"). In fact, Oasis of Salt is a very careful reading of Kawar's history based on our limited sources. Thus, moving from Herodotus and references to the Garamantes in the south from the Roman era, Vikør endeavors to cautiously interpret the various medieval Arabic sources from the 9th century to the late 14th. Moreover, for those able to read Arabic, an appendix includes the original texts with Vikør's translations. Needless to say, his interpretation of some of these Arabic sources is nuanced enough to give a more accurate impression of Kawar from the 7th century onwards. 

While we may never the full historicity of Uqba b. Nafi's "conquest" of Kawar or what exactly the famous alun of Kawar actually was, it becomes clear that Kawar was probably known or at least heard of by the Garamantes and probably an entrepot for trans-Saharan trade by the 9th century. The references to Kanem and Zaghawa or Zaghawi captives certainly suggests the Ibadi trade network had penetrated Kawar and likely introduced Islam into the region. This early Ibadi influence and links to the Fezzan are the reasons Vikør sees early Kawar as falling more into a Maghrebi or North African sphere of influence (exemplified in the ancient Arabic place names and the gassars, which seem to owe more to Kanuri or Sudanic influences but use an Arabic term), later shifting to predominantly "Sudanic" with the assertion of Kanem's control or interests by the 12th century. With the rise of Kanem (even under mai Arku, hints of Kanem's influence in Kawar and ties to the Tomagra and Dirku suggest early links), Sudanic civilization exerted its influence to a greater extent in Kawar and even the Fezzan. Then, despite the decline of Kanem by the late 1300s, the Bornoan state under the Sayfawas reasserted their claims to Kawar. To what extent Arku, Dunama, Ali Gaji, Idris Alooma, or other mais of Kanem-Borno were ever able to exert strong authority over Kawar is unclear, but surviving Borno mahrams and the Diwan suggest familial, tax exemptions, marital, and military strategies.

However, unlike Lovejoy, Vikør does not seem to see Borno's interest in Kawar as being connected to the trade in salt in the Sudan. Instead, Borno was more interested in securing Kawar for trans-Saharan trade to Tripoli, via the Fezzan. Of course, it is hard to imagine Borno not trying to take advantage of Kawar's salt production, as the Koyam were said to have been involved in it and perhaps the Bornoan state added Kawar's salt exports to local natron production in Manga and near Lake Chad to supplement their trade with Hausaland and beyond. In other words, even if trans-Saharan trade and the Kawar salt caravans usually operated independently, it is difficult to imagine Borno not actively promoting Kawar's salt trade. This does not exclude the possibility of Tuareg caravans carrying salt from Kawar to Hausaland, which the Kano Chronicle may suggest was occurring by the mid-15th century. Indeed, the ensuing conflict between the Tuareg of Ayar and Borno in the late 17th century and 18th century, even if it was often small-scale raids in Kawar, does suggest Borno's interest in Kawar were important for security of trans-Saharan trade but perhaps the profitable salt trade, too. Indeed, Tuareg incursions on the borders of northern Borno plus Tuareg settlements of enslaved farmers in Damergu must have been seen as as combined threat to Kawar and Borno's direct borders. The Koyam must have been threatened too, by the rising importance of Tuareg, specifically Kel Owey salt caravans to Fachi and Kawar. 

Overall, this is mandatory reading for anyone interested in Kawar, Kanem-Borno, or the Central Sudan. While there are some arguments of the author we disagree with or find implausible or lacking adequate backing, Oasis of Salt is so far the best read on Kawar's history. Lovejoy's work is on the larger Central Sudan and should be read in conjunction, and Le Coeur's work, based on field experience and exposure to the Teda of Kawar and Tibetsi, should likewise be added to one's list. Taken together, the three provide a great overview and list of sources on Kawar's historic importance and role as a bridge between Kanem-Borno and the Mediterranean. We disagree with the author about the Kanuri of Kawar being the remnants of an original proto-Kanuri population that once lived further north, but he's likely right about the population always being, mostly, Sudanic. We would like a bit more details on the clan systems of the Teda and Kanuri before accepting his theory, though it does seem that early Kawar's population was closely related to the Kanembu and Kanuri. In addition, he's almost certainly correct about the Zaghawa/Banu Duku to Sayfawa "dynastic" change, too. It is far more likely that the Sayfawa dynasty and "Zaghawa" represented two local lineages rather than Hume being a Berber outsider. But based on our limited sources, Vikør does not agree with Lange that there definitely was a shift in dynasties from pre-Islamic Kanem to the Sayfawa. In light of his generally careful scholarship and useful references and translations, this is an enlightening history of a Saharan region whose entire existence is predicated on trade. 

Borno and Salt in the Central Sudan

Paul Lovejoy's Salt of the Desert Sun: A History of Salt Production and Trade in the Central Sudan is required reading for anyone interested in the production and trade of one of the major commodities used in the "Central Sudan" region of West Africa. Although mostly based on 19th century and colonial-era sources on salt production, markets, social relations, and political economy, Lovejoy's important study elucidates the importance of salts in the regional economy. If one can stomach the somewhat duller early chapters, the second half of the book contains rich details and references for specifics on social relations, labor, proprietorship, political factors, and changes in the development of salt production. While technologically quite "primitive" and limited by climactic variables and transportation, the role of salt in the region's economy was significant. It even contributed to Hausa and Central Sudan trade with the Volta Basin, especially for kola nuts. Indeed, the full scale of it can only be glimpsed because of our limited sources which largely date from the 19th and 20th centuries.

So, how did the Central Sudan's salt trade impact the development of Borno and Borno's hegemony in the region? For much of the precolonial era, particularly before the c.1759, Borno was the closest to creating a quasi-monopoly of salts in the region. Due to Borno's control of the Kawar desert salines as well as Sahelian and Lake Chad sources (salt and natron), it became the dominant player in the salt trade for centuries, probably as early as the 16th century. Salt was used for livestock, medicinal purposes, culinary tastes and industrial uses (tanning), so it was directly linked to agriculture, textiles, leatherwork, and long-distance trade. By controlling most of the sources of salts in the region before the Tuareg affiliated with Agadez seized control of the trade of Bilma by 1759, Borno was in a tremendous position to dominate the larger economy of the area. Borno's salt works in Mangari, or Gourbei, for instance, were relatively close to the capital city and its populous district. This district, according to Lovejoy, was also an agricultural center with a local textile industry. Lake Chad also served as a center for livestock-raising, which profited Borno's economy as it still dominated Kanem on the eastern shores of Lake Chad. 

Although the control of Kawar was central to Borno's interests in trans-Saharan trade, Lovejoy's text convincingly illustrates how the desert salines of Bilma and Fachi contributed to the bustling trade in salt across the Central Sudan. Additional sources of salt in the Sahelian region of Borno also contributed to the strong regional economy, which surely contributed to Borno's preeminence as the predominant power in the region. As Barkindo argued in the UNESCO series, Borno in the 1500s-1700s possessed a strong regional economy and salt surely played a role. Despite the limited sources, Lovejoy speculates that control of salines in the semi-arid Sahel zone of Borno was likely distributed through fiefs, whose holders were mostly based in Birni Gazargamo. Fief-holders and others who jostled for lucrative grants of fiefs may have relied on slave labor in Gourbei and other regions, suggesting that slaves procured via raids and trade with Bagirmi could have found local uses in Borno's local industries. Consequently, one can see how trans-Saharan and regional trade supported each other through various linkages. 

Unfortunately, this strong regional economy began to decay by the 18th century. The main victor of this process was the Sokoto Caliphate and the Hausa traders (though many were actually of Kanuri and Tuareg origins). The Tuareg of Agadez were able to seize control of the distribution of salt from Bilma and Fachi while continuing to supply salt from Teguidda to Hausaland. Increasingly, after 1759, the trade routes reoriented through the Tuareg networks in the desert to Hausa cities like Kano. Hausa traders, who were active in the kola trade, textile manufacturing and exports, and, through Kanuri-descended "Beriberi" traders, had access to salts from Borno and Foli in Kanem, were able to become the dominant market for salts while supplanting Borno's role. As convincingly laid out by Lovejoy, Borno gradually became an economic satellite of the Sokoto Caliphate, despite still occupying some importance from its Sahelian and Lake Chad salines. One would think the rise of Hausa traders moving kola nuts into the Central Sudan, plus the increase in textile production in areas such as Kano further eroded what remained of Borno's textiles and trade network. 

Thus, the Tuareg, by defeating the Koyam and nomadic allies of the Sayfawa rulers in the 18th century, replaced the Kanuri in the movement of desert salts to the savanna lands further south. Hausa traders and networks gradually replaced Borno merchants while incorporating some into their networks. Borno gradually became dependent on the Sokoto Caliphate after losing western territories, the Kawar, and, eventually, Kanem. Despite only being one of the major commodities exchanged in the Central Sudan, the loss of dominance of the salt trade was undeniably linked to Borno's gradual decline in the 18th and 19th centuries. Exactly how and why Borno's nomadic allies were defeated by the Tuareg and the Sayfawa rulers did not make more consistently forceful attempts to reassert their authority in Kawar is not clear. Regardless, their lack of forceful action in the late 18th century probably contributed to the weakness of the Sayfawa rulers in the face of Fulani jihadist attacks in the early 19th century. The Great Drought of 1738-1753, the defeat of Borno by Mandara in 1781, and possibly another drought in the 1790s or early 1800s must have also played a role in the long decline of the Sayfawa rulers.