The Lāmīb̳e of Fombina : a political history of Adamawa, 1809-1901

The Lāmīb̳e of Fombina : a political history of Adamawa, 1809-1901 by Sa'ad Abubakar analyzes the rise and fall of a jihadist state founded by the Fulbe, or Fulani, in the vast region of Fombina. Unlike other emirates within the Sokoto Caliphate, Fombina lacked a prior history of political centralization. Instead, the large province was shared by a plethora of ethnic groups living in small chiefdoms. The Fulani int he area, who already had a presence by the 18th century, were also divided into smaller clan and lineage groups. While Borno and Mandara had some degree of influence in the area through trade, raiding and conquest, and the Jukun state appears to have exerted some degree of influence there previously, Fombina's non-Fulbe lived in "theocratic" chiefdoms and small-scale polities. Long-distance trade was limited and the Fulani in the pre-jihad period lived under the dictates of the non-Muslim, non-Fulani sedentary populations. That said, the Fulani themselves were only weakly Islamized prior to the 19th century, preferring to live by pulaku and customary laws and tradition rather than Islamic ones. 

Nonetheless, events in the 19th century led to a rapid transformation of this area, turning it into one of the largest yet most decentralized emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. The jihad in Fombina, propelled by Modibbo Adama, was strengthened by incoming Fulani migrants who were fleeing Borno after al-Kanemi's victories against Gwoni Mukhtar and other jihadists. In addition, some of the Fulani clan leaders led an expansion into the southern areas to claim new pasture and lands, subjugating pagan sedentary groups. By the 1840s, with a capital established at Yola, the Adamawa emirate was a large, decentralized state with various sub-emirates that largely acted independently of Yola. According to Abubakar, this decentralized nature of Adamawa was due to the incomplete conquest of the Habe populations in the region (many rebelled and sometimes cut off loyal provinces) and the resistance of Fulani Ardo'en and sub-emirs to obey the emir in Yola. While tribute and participation in the military campaigns of the emir were expected and could be gained from loyal provinces, southern sub-emirates often ignored or rebelled against this. In addition, not all Fulani clans were included in the Adamawa leadership, and Islam itself was not widely practiced or observed by the Fulani. Thus, some ignored or disobeyed the emir at Yola. This problem only worsened as some of the sub-emirates experienced dynastic crises or internal wars over succession, a problem the ruler at Yola could not always alleviate. 

Ultimately, by the end of the century, the partition of this vast, loosely joined state was inevitable. British, French and German interests in the Benue and Chad Basin made its longevity numbered. The state, to its credit, was able to consolidate some of its gains and implement a real administrative machinery (with titles borrowed from Hausa and Kanuri, as well as other parts of the Sokoto Caliphate), and the use of slaves for food crop production and the promotion of trade (particularly ivory) did promote some degree of economic development and improvement in conditions for Fulani and allied leaders. Furthermore, the invitation extended to Muslim scholars and pilgrims attracted a larger class of pious Islamic leaders, who in turn promoted a deeper spread and adherence to Islam. Earlier in its existence, it also scored victories against Mandara and was able to protect its northern border with Borno. The state was even able to survive the Mahdist movement and the Sudanese warlord, Rabeh, ultimately falling to the European powers. 

The central theme here appears to be one in which the incomplete centralization of the Adamawa Emirate hindered its ability to establish a stable political system. Of course, This uneven centralization of the state appears to have been a result of the region's lack of such a system before the 19th century, as well as the particular nature of Fulbe society and political traditions. Thus, instead of a jihadist state that had the political traditions of Hausa states with centuries of political traditions, Modibbo Adama and his successors had to create one wholesale, borrowing from the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno, and Hausaland. Indeed, Adama is said to have studied and lived in Borno and adopted some of its titled positions in his administration, testifying to the importance of these older political systems in Adamawa attempt at reforms. Abubakar likewise endeavors to include pagan, non-Fulbe peoples as part of this story, albeit their perspective is more dependent on oral tradition and often lost in the entangled histories of the various sub-emirates. 

Damagaram

Due to the founder of Damagaram's ruling dynasty's links to the 17th century Islamic settlement of Kalumbardo, the history of this state is yet another interesting product of that famous community of mystics. It is also worthy of study since it went from being a peripheral vassal state of Borno to becoming one of the major powers and trading centers of the Central Sudan in the 19th century. Salifou's history, Le Damagaram ou Sultanat de Zinder au XIXe siècle, endeavors to provide a complete history of this vital century. Relying on colonial-era documents like the Tilho Mission, translated Arabic chronicles or local texts, and oral sources from informants in the region today, he largely succeeds in providing a synthetic overview of the area's rise and fall with attention paid to economic, social, political, military, and cultural factors.

According to Salifou, Damagaram's Maalaam, or Malam, the founder of the ruling dynasty, did not establish a kingdom as such in the late 17th century. Instead, after fleeing the destruction of Kalumbardo (and supposedly said to be the son of a Sayfawa princess in one source), he established himself in the region of Damagaram. He and his sons for the next several generations, ruled villages but not as a united kingdom. That development appears to have only occurred by the 19th century, when Damagaram began to become a major player. The apogee was achieved under Tanimun, who continued the kingdom's expansion, improved the administrative and military capacity of the state (using slave officials and manufacturing and importing firearms and cannons) and increasingly acted autonomously of Borno. Indeed, this reversal of relations between the tributary state of Damagaram and Borno under Shehu Umar is clear due to Damagaram's central role as a trans-Saharan trade center through which Borno received northern imports. Damagaram, however, continued to pay a costly tribute to the Shehus of Borno, but were able to act autonomously and absorb their neighbors.

Overall, Salifou's short history of 19th century Damagaram provides an overview of this complex region during an era of great change in the Central Sudan (the impact of the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio, the decline of Borno, and European colonialism). Damagaram's rapid rise at this late date is undoubtedly due to this dynamic. It soon became a regional player whose military power was so feared that even Borno cancelled a campaign against it. Damagaram was also able to stabilize relations with the Tuareg, establish sharia law, produce firearms and cannons (albeit less effective than the imports), and profit from dynamic commercial links with slaves, salt, natron, textiles, and ostrich feathers as major commodities. To Salifou's credit, he acknowledged the central role of slavery and the slave trade in all of this, although the negative impact of this trade on leading to a state of constant war and aggression (plus the negative impact of Arab or North African financiers and traders who wanted slaves for northern markets) is perhaps not fully elucidated. Furthermore, given the limited sources for Damagaram, especially for developments before the 19th century, it might be beneficial to consider writing a general history of Kutus, Damergu, Damagaram, Minaw and nearby areas from the 17th to 19th centuries. Perhaps this greater regional context would provide readers a greater sense of Borno's long-term interests in this area and how, once Borno's decline began, smaller polities like Damagaram could rise to local and regional significance.

Talaka and Talakawa

Talaka or talakawa means commoner in Hausa, but various sources attribute the word's origin to Kanuri or Tuareg (Berber). The term's widespread use among Berber-speaking communities as well a various Sahelian and West African cultures with links to trans-Saharan trade point to a Berber origin. The term's Berber origins can be seen in the following passage from Dictionnaire des racines berberes communes: Suivi d’un index français-berbère des termes relevés by M. A. Haddadou:

L£W luqqet « être pauvre, p. ext. être humble et doux , être humble, doux et pieux » selleqqet « rendre pauvre » taleqqe, pl. tileqqewîn « homme, femme pauvre » (To) taleqqi, pl. tleqqiwin « homme, femme pauvre » (Ghd) taleqqi « misère, pauvreté » (Wrg) taleqqi, pl. tileqqwin « pauvreté, misère » (Mzb)

Indeed, even deep into the Sahara, among the Tedas and Dazas, the word is used. Others point to its existence in Mandingue, Bambara and other West African languages. It is remarkable that a word to designate commoners and the poor is shared across so many cultures with links to the Sahara, Sahel, or trans-Saharan trade. Intriguingly, the word does not appear to be of Arabic origin. Perhaps its widespread occurrence across many languages in and around the Sahara is a testament to the increased role of trans-Saharan trade in social divisions and status? And, undoubtedly, the strong presence of Berber speakers among the Muslim traders and residents in the Sahel. 

Research Guidelines

Reading some of the research guidelines for projects in the 1980s on the history of Quranic education in Borno and the biographies of the ulama of the Central Sudan since the 15th century was an interesting experience. Although the projects seem to have never took off, the short publications tied to the Centre for Trans-Saharan Studies at the University of Maiduguri contain a number of interesting ideas, bibliographies and a rough plan for how to conduct these vast research projects. Alas, with the exception of a tabaqat of Borno ulama in Bobboyi's dissertation, The 'Ulama of Borno: A study of the relations between scholars and state under the Sayfawa, 1470-1808" and the project edited by Hunwick and others on Arabic literature in the Central Sudan, we are still in the dark about these rich topics. 

On the Zagwe Dynasty

Marie-Laure Derat's L’énigme d’une dynastie sainte et usurpatrice dans le royaume chrétien d’Ethiopie, XIe-XIIIe siècle is an intriguing and challenging work. The lack of adequate documentation for most of the rulers of the Zagwe dynasty and the problematic reliance on oral traditions, hagiographies and historiography based on the Solomonic legend of the subsequent dynasty makes it rather difficult to establish with greater clarity what was the Zagwe dynasty. However, using the available Arabic sources (particularly Copts writing the history of the Patriarchate of Alexandria), later hagiographies, archaeological evidence, and inscriptions, land grants and kings lists, Derat proposes some new interpretations while raising more questions. Derat does this while endeavoring to understand the paradox of how the Zagwe rulers were seen as both usurpers yet holy.

For example, the assumption of an Agaw or Cushitic origin of the Zagwe dynasty is far from clear. Further, the oral traditions compiled by Conti Rossini are contradictory and difficult to make sense of. Instead of assuming a Cushitic or Agaw origin, Derat proposes a model in which the Zagwe rulers emerged from a long-lasting second wave of Christianization that occured in the late Aksumite and post-Aksumite period in eastern Tigray. Archaeological evidence indicates there an area of ongoing church construction and thriving Christian communities, perhaps leading to a reunified Ethiopian Christian kingdom that reestablished contact with the Patriarchate in Egypt. Derat even suggests that the famous rock-hewn churches at the site associated with the most illustrious Zagwe ruler, Lalibela, were not built because of Muslims prohibiting Ethiopians from making the pilgrimage there. Indeed, the Zagwe appear to have contributed to the Christianization of an already used space, building marvels that were associated with rulers like Lalibela. Their donations to churches and ecclesiastical groups similarly exemplify their efforts to reinforce their rule as patrons of the Church and monasteries. 

Unfortunately, since it is so difficult to disentangle the problematic sources written during the Solomonic era and shed light on the Zagwe dynasty from sources written during their dynasty. The genealogy of rulers is uncertain, the hagiographies were written after their fall and promote the idea of the holiness of some as saints while also accepting the Solomonic legend of the legitimate dynasty which took over in 1270. Nonetheless, it does seem like the standard narrative on the Zagwe dynasty in Ethiopian historiography is in need of substantial change. Portraying them as "Cushitic" or Agaw usurpers against "legitimate" Semitic Solomonic rulers or implying that the former practiced matrilineal succession based on the contradictory sources available indicate this problem quite well. All one can say is that the Zagwe rulers such as Lalibela and Yemrehanna Krestos achieved sainthood while modeling an idealized kingship, one which was later adopted by Zara Yaq'ob and subsequent Solomonic rulers. This paradox of usurpers and holy rulers may reflect that long process of Christianization in other regions of the kingdom which, influenced by the traditions of the Kebra Negast and apocalyptic literature from Coptic and Syriac sources, later emerged the Solomonic dynasty as heirs to Aksum. 

Nubia Under the Pharaohs

Bruce Trigger's Nubia Under the Pharaohs is a brief study of the relations between Egypt and its southern neighbor from the Early Dynastic Period to the rise of the Napatan Kushite kingdom. As one can expect, a study such as this relies heavily on archaeological surveys, excavations and inscriptions to make sense of Pharaonic Egypt's interests and subjugation of Nubia. However, Trigger's publication is rather outdated by now, and reflects older scholarship's occasionally problematic racial framework. For instance, Egyptian attitudes about the southerners during the period of the New Kingdom empire are compared to the attitudes of Europeans about black Africans during the period of European colonial rule in Africa. Sure, Egyptian inscriptions recorded during the zenith of their empire in Nubia reflected their self-serving narrative but one wonders to what extent it was any different from Egyptian attitudes about their Levantine subjects. In addition, "brown" populations in Lower Nubian are distinguished from the "negroid" populations further south in a way that racializes the population history of Nubia. This does not seem particularly helpful, especially given the wide-ranging ties between Lower Nubia and Upper Nubia since prehistoric times. Indeed, the widely-shared C-Group characteristics as well as the presence of Pan-Grave burials (in addition to Egyptian imports and Egyptian-styled graves) point to a heterogeneous population in which "race" as we see it today should not be imposed. 

Despite these aforementioned "issues" and being somewhat dated, Trigger's study does suggest some ideas about how and why "Egyptianization" in Nubia became so influential and enduring. While influences from predynastic Upper Egypt appear already in the A-Group culture of Lower Nubia, the less favorable agricultural conditions in that section of Nubia may have limited the development of states or stratified societies. Nonetheless, populations in Lower Nubia were able to enjoy imported manufactured products from Egypt in exchange for African products desired by the Egyptian royal court and luxury markets in the Near East. Acting as middlemen between the powerful Egyptian state to the north and southern territories like Yam (Iam, assuming it was indeed in the area that later became known as Kerma), Lower Nubian groups appear to have enjoyed a degree of prosperity in the Old Kingdom period. However, Middle Kingdom Egyptian expansion, which included fortifications at key sites along the Nile to protect trade routes and access to gold, removed the need for Nubian middlemen in this next phase of Egyptian relations with Nubia. Nonetheless, a powerful state centered at Kerma, Kush, was able to prosper and during the Second Intermediate Period, even trade with the Hyksos in Lower Egypt profitably. Kerma expansion to the Egyptian frontier made them a potent state whose rulers were interred in large burials featuring human sacrifice on an impressive scale. Undoubtedly, Kerma was a power with access to Egyptian and Near Eastern products as well as some of the amenities and features of pharaonic civilization (the adoption or use of hieroglyphics is inferred from an Upper Egyptian ruler intercepting a letter from the Hyksos ruler to the Kerma king). 

The New Kingdom era, however, ushered in the most extensive period of Egyptian rule. Extending to at least the 4th Cataract, the New Kingdom pharaohs sponsored more fortifications, Egyptian settlements, gold mining operations, trade expeditions with the south, and Egyptian settlements. Egyptianization took on a new dimension as local elites (which included some descendants of the Kerma rulers as well as local headmen who had probably enjoyed a degree of status and power under Kerman rule) were sometimes sent to Egypt for education and adopted Egyptian burial styles, ritual worship and other traits. To what extent the population of Nubia was reduced to serving as peasant labor for estates of temples or serving the Pharaohs for mining or military service is unclear. According to Trigger, Egyptianization here was so heavily promoted because the Egyptians had little respect for local institutions and cultures in Nubia while also eager to fill the void left by the fall of Kush with more "advanced" Egyptian administrative, economic, and religious features. We find it hard to imagine the kingdom at Kerma was so lacking in establishing an administrative framework but perhaps the Egyptians wanted to efface the old system of Kush, especially since occasional rebellions in Upper Nubia continued to arise that may have preferred the Kushite state system. Regardless of the extent to which Egyptianization was more heavily promoted in Nubia than in the Levant, after 500 years, one can see why the Napatan-Meroitic civilization that emerged after Egyptian colonial occupation may have borrowed heavily from pharaonic civilization as a framework for the administration of an state that encompassed all of Nubia.

Masks, the Mosque and Mali

François-Xavier Fauvelle's highly readable Les masques et la mosquee: L'empire du Mali (XIII-XIVe siecle) is based on a series of lectures given by the author, benefitting from its written form to incorporate new insights and depth. Due to the limitation of the available sources, Fauvelle endeavors to put the pieces of the puzzle together in a manner that is likely or at least to propose hypotheses that match or can correspond with what is known, often without adopting literalist interpretations of external Arabic sources or the large corpus of oral traditions. Thus, a possible area is proposed for the site of Mali's capital during the 1300s, when Mali was at its apogee. In addition, a reinterpretation of Ibn Khaldun's chronology of Mali kings in the 1200s and 1300s is offered that attempts to make sense of the two distinct "houses" of the imperial dynasty, one claiming descent from Sunjata and the other from his brother, Abu Bakr. The legendary Mansa Musa, a descendant of the house of Abu Bakr, may not be remembered by traditionists because of his lack of direct descent from Sunjata. While some of the ideas of Fauvelle are still just hypotheses, we found his analysis of Mansa Musa's pilgrimage and the story of his rise to the throne interesting. Mansa Musa as Moses and his predecessor, who allegedly perished in the Atlantic, as a Pharaoh, is a "fresh take" on the anecdote and how Mansa Musa possibly positioned himself in relation to Quranic or Islamic notions of Moses and proper leadership. The intriguing take on Malian court ritual under Mansa Sulayman is also fascinating, indicating how the rulers of the Mali Empire were mansas and sultans who interfaced between two distinct conceptions of power and legitimacy.