Studies in the History of Kano

Studies in the History of Kano is a noble endeavor. Bringing together a variety of specialists on the history of Kano from the precolonial era to the present, the various essays cover a plethora of important topics. Modern urban laborers and the transition to semi-industrial capitalism in colonial and postcolonial Kano, for instance, receives a chapter. Much of the book, of course, focuses on precolonial Kano with some suggestive theories and interpretations of the Kano Chronicle and the pre-jihad polity. We are not yet sure what to make of some of their theories, but it undoubtedly revealed the problem of relying too heavily on the Chronicle as the main source for reconstituting early Kano or Hausa history. 

Despite the problems of authorship, chronology, and omissions in the Chronicle, it remains indispensable and one of the most important sources for Kano and Hausa history today. Smith and Last offer their own differing analyses of the Chronicle and Last's overview of Kano from ca.1450-1800 is a useful attempt at reconstructing the successive "dynasties" that ruled the city and the political factions which shaped the polity. However, perhaps some of their notions of "Berber" or Arab origins for certain rulers of Kano and Katsina are remnants of outdated thinking. 

Other essays focus on markets, trade, production, and how exactly Kano became the "emporium" of the Sudan in the 19th century. Shea's contribution particularly stands out as it raises more questions about the nature of production, crafts, and innovation. One cannot help but feel that archaeologists and historians have a lot more work to do to in this region. Like the case of Barkindo's essay on Kano's gates or Zahradeen's chapter on mosques, much remains unknown and will require new textual sources and archaeological excavation to gain new insights or data. It might also have been useful to include a chapter on Kano's relationship with Borno, outlining the relationship more clearly with analysis of the role of migration, military ventures, Islamic scholarship, and trade that brought Kanawa Hausa into close contact with the Kanuri to the east. 

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850

Les pays du Tchad et la montée des périls, 1795-1850 is another one of Zeltner's shorter books, this one consisting of some introductory chapters and essays on 4 major figures who shaped the Chad Basin in the first half of the 19th century. Beginning with 2 chapters on the regional context and Arab migrations before delving into Abd al-Jalil, Yusuf Caramanli, Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi and Sabun of Wadai, Zeltner treads familiar ground. Those who have read his work on Tripoli and Kanem will perhaps not find much new material here. Nonetheless, he corrects some of his past assertions or mistakes and offers some more detailed analysis and commentary on Arab genealogies and the rise of Wadai as the major power in the eastern Chad Basin. Zeltner is probaby correct to identify the ancestors of the Bani Hassan as among the Arabs in Kanem who allied themselves with Idris b. Ali against the Bulala in the 16th century. The suggestive analysis of Kotoko and Mandara state and religious ideologies and the ancestor-snake cult of Wadai are thought-provoking, too. 

Although one may take issue with a great man approach to the history of the area around Lake Chad, Zeltner's detailed study of the 4 aforementioned leaders actually does a great job highlighting how closely connected their respective states and peoples were. For al-Kanemi, the shehu who founded today's dynasty of Borno, his maternal family's Fezzani origins and his upbringing in today's Libya (plus his several years spent in the East) illustrates how the elites of Borno were not isolated from broader trends and currents in the Islamic world. Moreover, due to what Zeltner sees as the military weakness of Borno, al-Kanemi had to rely on diplomacy to avert a Tripolitanian invasion and use their support against Bagirmi. While he perhaps ultimately failed to fully restore Kanem to Bornoan suzerainty, and the Fezzani invasions were disasters that even included his sister among their victims, al-Kanemi succeeded in impressing the British Borno mission, ending the Bagirmi threat, defended the western frontier, and secured an alliance with the Awlad Sulayman. 

One cannot help but admire al-Kanemi, despite his flaws and perhaps his questionable reasons for agreeing to send his child as a hostage to Libya. His charisma, ability to attract Kanembu and Arab followers (as well as other adventurers and outsiders), military and spiritual leadership and interest in technological and economic advantages of relations with the British certainly made him an exceptional ruler in a turbulent era. It just seems fantastic that he was so afraid of a Tripolitanian invasion despite surely knowing something of the financial straits of the Pasha. Either way, British refusal to loan the necessary funds and direct relations with Britain made the invasion impossible. That must be part of the reason for al-Kanemi's cordial reception of Denham, Clapperton and Oudney. He further secured Borno from northern attacks through sealing an alliance with Abd al-Jalil and the Awlad Sulayman, who became the effective rulers of the Fezzan after al-Mukni's fall from grace. 

The other figures examined by Zeltner include some of the most influential and notorious figures in the history of Chad and Libya. Yusuf Caramanli, the murderous man who slaughtered his own brother in front of their mother, saw to the end of the Awlad Muhammad dynasty in the Fezzan. His corsair activity and heavy involvement in the slave trade were interrupted by European pressure and the Greek war of independence, forcing him to overtax the population. Unlike, say, Muhammad Ali in Egypt, he was never able to successfully conquer or launch a permanent occupation of Sudanic Africa. His bey of the Fezzan, who harbored his own hopes of an empire in the southern lands, was recalled. As mentioned previously, Yusuf additionally failed to secure the necessary British loans to fund a full invasion of Borno. Nevertheless, the fact that his troops were able to invade Bagirmi and loot Massenya was an impressive feat, showing Tripolitanian imperial ambition perhaps akin to that of Egypt in the Sudan. It also attests to the powerful role of firearms in a region which had once been a pioneer in the use of muskets in 16th century Borno.  

Wadai under Sabun and Abd al-Jalil of the Awlad Sulayman represent more admirable figures. The latter, after his tribe's defeats and oppression from Yusuf Caramanli and Tripolitanian authorities, almost became the force of unification for Libya's Arabs. By mastering the Fezzan and establishing cordial relations with Borno, he only needed to secure a Mediterranean port. The divisions within the Arab population and conflict with the Pasha who succeeded Yusuf made this impossible before his death. Tragically, a famine and treason among the Arab allies brought about the death of Abd al-Jalil. The Awlad Sulayman later migrated to Kanem, where they became the major arbiter between Borno and Wadai. British and French involvement in Tripolitanian affairs, plus British interest in securing a sea port open to Fezzani caravans (and a dream of ending the slave trade) further demonstrate how significant European involvement in Central Sudanic, Central Saharan affairs were before the colonial conquest. 

Wadai under Sabun, who restored centralized monarchical power and opened a trade route through Benghazi, represented another visionary leader whose successors arguably failed to live up to the opportunities he created. Although we recall other sources mentioning Wadai's invasion of Bagirmi under Sabun as an action mandated by the Sayfawa mai in Borno, Zeltner focuses on the invasion and subsequent tributary status of Bagirmi as a momentous event and display of the regional ambitions of Sabun. Wadai benefited from Barma and other migrants and slaves who brought with them their weaving and dyeing skills. Moreover, intervention in the affairs of Kanem by investing their own alifa at Mao represented a direct threat to Borno. Despite Sabun's opening of a direct trans-Saharan route to the Mediterranean (instead of going through the Fezzan or the arduous route through Darfur, a state previously at war with Wadai) and his success in reducing Bagirmi to a vassal, his successors closed the kingdom due to fears of a Tripolitanian invasion. It would take decades before Wadai's rulers took full advantage of the commercial opportunities Sabun created. Fortunately for Wadai, their rulers did succeed and in so doing created a state which approximated the borders of modern Chad. 

Unquestionably, the first half of the 19th century brought major changes to the Central Sudan and Libya. Demographic changes with the further migration of Arab nomads south of Lake Chad accompanied political and economic transformations. The slave trade, still of the utmost importance for trans-Saharan commerce, continued unabated. But the growing influence of the British and the French in Tripoli and direct contact with Borno promised significant alterations in the balance of power. Borno emerged from the jihad to the west as reduced power, no longer a hegemonic force. Wadai to the east became a major force to reckon with. Libya, through the fall of the Caramanlis and Awlad Sulayman, was more effectively administered by Ottoman-appointed officials. While British dreams of ending the slave trade and ensuring commerce with the African interior via the Sahara did not materialize, the looming threat of Europe dangled like a sword of Damocles over this region of Africa. 

Colonial Transition of Borno's Economy

Yakubu Mukhtar's Trade, Merchants and the State in Borno, c. 1893-1939 is an excellent analysis of the economy of Borno during the first few decades of British colonialism. Mukhtar's study endeavors to examine the question of trade and economy in colonial Borno in the context of northern Nigeria's economic reorientation to the coast and the thorny issues of dependency theory and vent for surplus theory. Relying on oral sources, colonial reports, and previous scholarship, Mukhtar found the Borno case to not support either theory strongly. Moreover, he found that the colonial state and its reliance on indirect rule, plus issues of transportation and prices for Borno's exports, made Borno rather late in terms of becoming a major exporter of commodities like gum arabic, cattle, or groundnuts. The thorny issues of compelling peasant producers to shift to gum arabic, impose taxation in cash rather than in kind, and attempting to work with "traditional" rulers led to problems like the persistence of slavery until the 1930s or widespread smuggling across colonial borders. One can see the frustrations of the colonial officialdom who sought to make administration of Borno pay for itself despite the troubled economy inherited from Rabeh. 

Indeed, while British colonialism did not bring Borno into the international capitalist system (that already happened through trans-Saharan trade and Sudanic trade in commodities that linked precolonial Borno to Europe and the Mediterranean), British rule did gradually lead to a more thoroughly monetized economy with closer integration into the world capitalist system. With the extension of the railway to Kano and the 1930 extension to Nguru, Borno's hides, skins, gum arabic, cattle, and natron more easily reached Lagos and other regions. European and Levantine commercial firms began to increase their operations in Borno and northeast Nigeria, particularly important as an important node in trade of cattle, kola nuts, cloth, salt, and textiles with the French colonies of Niger and Chad. Again, much of this was not new. Borno had long been a center of Sudanic commerce and its role in the production and distribution of salt, dried fish, livestock, textiles, natron, kola nuts, and other commodities had made it the most important area of the Central Sudan before the Sokoto Caliphate's rise. What British rule did was improve security and, gradually, with the railroad, modern roads, and lorries, increase the scale of trade. Borno remained a peripheral part of Northern Nigeria in comparison to Kano, but the quantity and amount of goods exported to Lagos and beyond gradually led to more local consumers of imported European goods and an indigenous merchant class.

What is most interesting about Mukhtar's study of Borno's economy in the colonial transition is the issue of continuity and change from precolonial patterns. Slavery, as previously mentioned, continued despite British crackdown on slave traders. The system of indirect rule also led to attempts to work with the Shehu and his administration, albeit changing the titled nobility from absentee to settled ones in the villages and towns outside the capital. Borno Resident officials like H.R. Palmer were active in promoting possible exports for Borno, such as gum arabic, while persuading the Shehu to promote gum arabic to the peasantry and engage in trade with European firms, like the Niger Company. Indigenous merchants of Kanuri and Hausa origin, or the once dominant North African traders, also continued to operate in Borno with some enjoying close relations with the traditional authorities. North Africans gradually lost their position of prominence due to the decline of the trans-Saharan trade. While trans-Saharan trade routes connecting Tripolitania with Kano and Zinder sometimes included a stopover to Borno, the second decade of the 20th century saw an end to that. North Africans began to shift to Lagos and working as agents of European firms. Nonetheless, they continued to enjoy a prominent role that led to the establishment of the Fezzan ward of Maiduguri and religious, cultural, and social relations to Borno's authorities. Levantines and even Yemeni traders also entered Borno during this period, sometimes also becoming agents of European firms. Access to credit gave the Levantines an advantage over local traders, who competing with African merchants buying and selling the same commodities. Nonetheless, a number of Hausa, Kanuri and other West African traders became prosperous through kola nuts, cattle, hides, and cotton cloth trade. Their unfamiliarity with bookkeeping, lack of access to credit, and perhaps Islamic and cultural practices that impeded the chances for their businesses to survive the founder's death made it harder for them to maintain a position comparable to that of the Levantines.

Ultimately, the question of Borno's economy and the colonial transition was a mix of moderate improvements and frustrated hopes. New exports like gum arabic and groundnuts replaced slaves, ivory and ostrich plumes, which definitely represented a major shift in Borno's non-Sudanic trade. However, the improvements in transportation were not as widespread or quick enough to have facilitated the development of these exports earlier in the colonial period. Furthermore the persistent problem of food supply and the delicate ecology of the area meant it was not guaranteed that Kanuri peasants would dedicate themselves to gum arabic instead of subsistence crops or groundnuts. Of course, Borno's distance from Lagos and the Atlantic also contributed to its importance. So, while remaining a periphery of Kano and Lagos, Borno was actually hugely important for the trade in cattle and natron from Chad and Niger. Wadai's cattle, for example, were often shipped through Borno to reach Southern Nigeria. Borno was likewise important in producing grain for trade to Niger and Chad. Borno's economic position was thus something of a paradox. It benefited from its geographic position while also suffering from it. The region appears to have experienced something of a boom after 1939 with some exports, but never to have developed the type of successful indigenous business class of Kano. Certainly the benefits of Borno's gradually improved economic situation were also felt unevenly. Peasants and the lower classes may have benefited from access to cash and more affordable imports from Europe, but ongoing issues of transportation, price fluctuations and the depression years must have limited the positive outcomes of this era.

Oyo Empire

Despite some video quality troubles and a few errors, this short lecture by Paul Lovejoy is well worth the listen. Oyo was a northern Yoruba state with a cavalry and links to the Nupe, Bariba and Hausaland. Ali Eisami was also enslaved in Oyo so the state was connected to Borno via trade and the slave trade. I just wish we had more sources on the history of this fascinating Yoruba empire. Robin Law's monograph endeavored to make do with the fragmentary oral traditions, limited external sources and later Yoruba histories of the post-imperial Oyo years. What he accomplished was quite impressive for reconstructing the political, economic, social, and administrative features of Oyo, but it all seems so speculative. 

The Life of Walatta-Petros

The Life of Walatta-Petros was not what we expected. Unfortunately, we made the mistake of acquiring the concise edition, so we are missing all the extra references, commentary, and analysis of the translators. Furthermore, we are missing several sections or chapters, although the concise edition probably contains the most important parts of the text. Nonetheless, this was a useful primer for grappling with Ethiopia's hagiographical literature. While the translation or some of the analysis of it has aroused controversy (the idea that Walatta-Petros was expressing lesbian or same-sex desire always struck me as far-fetched and absurd, particularly with one anecdote in the text illustrating the abbess's opposition to such a thing among the sisters), this hagiography was written within decades after her death. So it does appear more grounded, despite the appearance of several miracles. One almost gets a sense of what was going on 17th century Solomonic Ethiopia. Certainly among its religious communities, at least, and the extent to which Church and State were closely entwined.

Our main interest in the text was the Jesuits and the opposition they aroused among the local Orthodox Christians. Most of the references to Roman Catholicism in the concise edition only allude to the "filthy" faith of the Europeans, or mention the intransigence of Walatta-Petros to Susenyos's attempt to impose Catholicism. In spite of her literate background and the occasional mention of local theologians, Walatta-Petros did not actively debate the Jesuits. And when did she convert a Catholic noblewoman, it was through her humility rather than theological or intellectual debate. Besides one episode with what may have been the Catholic Patriarch, much of the text emphasizes Walatta-Petros's opposition to Susenyos, his persecution of her (but never going far enough to execute her because of her husband and aristocratic lineage), and her various sites for her religious community. In a lowland region, Zhabey, she is sent as a captive to a "black" man serving Susenyos. This part of the hagiography seems particularly interested in emphasizing a distinction between Habasha as neither black nor white, although one wonders if Ethiopian Christianity borrowed early color symbolism of the patristic literature. 

Since we have not read the full text, we will revisit this one. It's fascinating to read about monastic Ethiopian Christianity of the 17th century because of the development of Sufi Islamic settlements in Air and Borno during the same era. Of course, the Christian monastic tradition of Ethiopia has left behind more written sources, but communities like Kalumbardo in Borno might represent an Islamic equivalent of sorts, of religious and spiritual transformation and development that engendered new dynamics. Then there's a parallel of sorts with Church and State, as Umar b. Idris killed and exiled the first Kalumbardo leaders. One would be hard-pressed to find any woman recognized as a spiritual leader in this era of Borno's past, however. 

Walatta Petros

This is a nice video on a remarkable Ethiopian woman. Due to our ongoing interests in Ethiopia and the Jesuits, the hagiographical literature on Walatta Petros is a fascinating text to tackle.